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The Formation of Critical Realism
This series of interviews, conducted in the form of exchanges between Roy
Bhaskar and Mervyn Hartwig, tells a riveting story of the formation and develop-
ment of critical realism.
Three intersecting and interweaving narratives unfold in the course of this
unfinished story: the personal narrative of Roy Bhaskar, born of an Indian father
and English mother, a child of post-war Britain and Indian partition and
Independence; the intellectual narrative of the emergence and growth of critical
realism; and a world-historical story, itself theorised by critical realism in its dis-
cussion of the development of modernity.
This book gives an invaluable account of the development of critical realism,
and its consolidation as a leading philosophy of our times. It takes us through the
major moments of its formation, the principal objections to and controversies
within critical realism, the establishment of its institutions, and considers its lim-
its and future development. Special features of the book include discussion of the
genesis of critical realism, and the origins and nature of the so-called dialectical
and spiritual turns. 
The informal dialogical style of The Formation of Critical Realism makes it com-
pelling reading and an invaluable source for students of critical realism as well as all
those interested in the intellectual story of our times.
Roy Bhaskar is the originator of the philosophy of critical realism and the author
of many acclaimed and influential works, including A Realist Theory of Science, The
Possibility of Naturalism, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, Reclaiming
Reality, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, Plato Etc.,
Reflections on meta-Reality and From Science to Emancipation. He is an editor of
Critical Realism: Essential Readings and was the founding chair of the Centre for
Critical Realism. Currently he is a World Scholar at the University of London
Institute of Education.
Mervyn Hartwig is a leading commentator on critical realism, and the editor of
and principal contributor to the recently published Dictionary of Critical Realism.
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Preface 
The interviews contained in this book were done over a period between August
2007 and March 2008. By August 2008 they were very largely edited, but this
process was not completed until over a year later owing mainly to illness on Roy’s
part (see p. 200). 
They tell the story of the philosophical formation of critical realism from the
inside by its chief architect. This was a dialectical, and at times dramatic, process
involving both what Roy calls a continuing struggle to be ‘in his dharma’, to do
what he is best at doing, and successive critiques, and auto-critiques, of his pre-
existing thought, in the course of which lacunae were identified and remedied.
This process took critical realism philosophically through several distinct phases
and levels of development, the main ones of which are original or basic critical
realism, dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of meta-Reality. The strug-
gles involved in this process took place in the context, and against the background,
of struggles and upheavals in the wider society in which Roy lived, developments
which form an essential part of the narrative of the book. 
It is important to stress that this story is only of the philosophical formation of crit-
ical realism, and it is even then a personal perspective, because we would argue that
critical realism has been practised in science and social science for centuries, and
it is precisely the rationality of this practice that Roy’s work has attempted to bring
out. But it has not been self-conscious, and we would argue that it is explicit ex
ante, philosophically self-conscious metatheory that is needed now, especially in
the human sciences, precisely insofar as their practitioners are besieged by warring
methodologies and philosophical standpoints, between which they are asked to
choose (or make the choice of abstaining from choice). There is a sense in which
we are all philosophers now. In this context the task that critical realism sets itself
of ‘philosophical underlabouring’ has never been more urgent. 
At the same time, Roy held in his work that philosophy only gets its importance
and interest from engaging with the sciences and other human practices, especially
practices oriented to human emancipation, and although much of his work has
been done in relative isolation, it could not have been accomplished without the
nourishment and support he has received from friends and colleagues in other dis-
ciplines. In the 1970s this involved relatively clandestine meetings with other self-
conscious critical realists, then in the 1980s and early 1990s through annual
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Realism and the Human Sciences conferences and cognate events such as the
Chesterfield conferences through to the formation of the Centre for Critical
Realism in 1995 and subsequently the formation of the International Association
for Critical Realism in 1997. These have indeed sustained him.
These interviews have also been conversations; for if Roy has been the chief
philosophical architect of critical realism, they have been conducted by one who
arguably knows more about his work (and a fortiori philosophical critical realism)
than he does! The questions contribute much to the dialogical process, which we
believe will be genuinely informative about the formation of critical realism both
for critical realists and for those who are just interested in its story or what it has to
say. These conversations were also enjoyable encounters for the participants, and
we hope some of this will pass over to its readers.
Unless Roy is explicitly indicated as the author, the notes to the text are by
Mervyn. Their main purpose is to supply references for material in the questions.
We are very grateful to Jenny Cobner for typing the transcript of the interviews
and to Cheryl Frank for expertly recording them.
Roy Bhaskar with Mervyn Hartwig
September 2009
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Abbreviations
Note: square brackets indicate planned books that evolved into others or remain
unpublished.
CCR Centre for Critical Realism
CN critical naturalism
DCR dialectical critical realism
[DM] [Dialectic and Materialism] (evolved into [DMHE])
[DMHE] [Dialectics, Materialism and Human Emancipation] (evolved 
into DPF)
DPF Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom
[DST] [Dialectical Social Theory]
EC the theory and practice of explanatory critique
[EMS] [Empiricism and the Metatheory of the Social Sciences] (evolved into 
RTS, PN, SRHE)
FSE From Science to Emancipation 
[HKHM] [Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx]
[HWP] [Critical History of Western Philosophy]
IACR International Association for Critical Realism
MR The Philosophy of meta-Reality, Volume I
PE Plato Etc. (originally entitled Philosophy and the Dialectic of
Emancipation)
[PES] [Some Problems about Explanation in the Social Sciences] 
(evolved into [EMS])
[PI] [Philosophical Ideologies]
PIF Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom
[PM] [The Philosophy of Money]
PMR the philosophy of meta-Reality
PN The Possibility of Naturalism
[PU] [Philosophical Underlabouring]
RR Reclaiming Reality
RTS A Realist Theory of Science
SEPM synchronic emergent powers materialism
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SRHE Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation
TDCR transcendental dialectical critical realism
TMSA transformational model of social activity
TR transcendental realism
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1 Childhood and adolescence 
Dialectic of alienation and 
wholeness (1944–1963)
MH: In this interview I would like you to delineate and reflect on the processes of
formation of your identity and dharma in childhood and adolescence: the
story of how, to use the terms of your dialectical philosophy, your core univer-
sal human nature came together with the rhythmics of your world-line and
complex social mediations to constitute the concretely singular person Ram
Roy Bhaskar – the self who is yourself, fundamental to which I take it is your
mission in life as a philosopher of emancipation. The concept of personal
identity will be familiar enough to most readers, pertaining in your scheme of
things to the actual embodied person and their stratified personality as it
develops. In its structural aspect it corresponds to 1M in the ontological–
axiological chain (MELD), as does the concept of dharma. Can you begin by
unpacking the concept of dharma a little, which you formally introduced into
your philosophy in I think From East to West?1
RB: As I understand and use it, the concept of dharma refers to what could be
called the unique genius of every person. If you look for synonyms you might
think of ‘vocation’ or ‘calling’. What is pretty close to it is the Greek term
ergon, which is often translated as ‘function’. It is basically what a person is
good at, what comes easily to them. If you want an analogy, you could say the
sun’s dharma is to shine; it is what comes easily to it, it is its nature. Of course,
people have many other aspects to their identity and personality. In the early
Vedic use of the term a banal sense of dharma might have been an identifica-
tion of the caste system, for instance, the notion that it is your dharma to be a
Brahmin. In a lot of Indian philosophy it would often be translated into
English as ‘duty’ but, in the sense in which I use it, it is only your duty in the
way in which it is natural to do it. And everyone has a dharma, everyone has a
set of things that they are best at doing. Of course, what your dharma is you
might not know, it might take a long quest to actually discover what it is. And
what it is will depend on a whole lot of social conditions and will change. If a
person has a dharma to be, say, a mathematician or a musician, in general the
fulfilment of that dharma will depend on being born into a family and living
in a society that has mathematics and music among its practices and the
instruments and other material means for engaging in them. And since a 
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person’s dharma is socially nurtured and developed, it will also be changing in
the course of their life. 
I think one of the dangers is for people to think that they have to give a
description, or complete description, of their dharma or vocational calling.
Thus to describe me as a philosopher might be pretty obvious, but in the con-
text of a discussion, say, of globalisation with a group of economists, if one of
them describes Roy as a philosopher that can have the connotation that Roy
is only a philosopher and cannot therefore contribute in a meaningful way to
the discussion. In contemporary Indian philosophy there is a reaction against
this tendency always to define dharma. It is like the tendency to define what
you might get at in prayer or meditation. Actually, what you can say more eas-
ily is what prayer or meditation is not; this is what is called the negative way.
And most people perhaps have a greater sense of what they cannot do, or do
not want to do, or what does not come easily to them, than of something pos-
itive that they can readily do. And when they do have something positive that
they feel is their dharma they might not be able to verbalise it. 
Finally, one can make a contrast between dharma and karma. Dharma is
what comes most naturally to you, what is your element in life, and karma is a
set of circumstances that you have to accept, the presence of the past, the
nature of the context under which you operate, the conditions you inherit. For
the moment that is all I want to say about dharma.
MH: Am I right in thinking that it aligns with your meta-Reality concepts of the
transcendentally real self and ground-state?
RB: Absolutely. We will talk about that when we come to meta-Reality. 
MH: Could you now indicate a few basic parameters of your childhood and adoles-
cence – when and where you were born, your father, your mother, the schools
you went to and so on?
RB: I was born in London in Hampton Court in 1944, towards the end of the
Second World War. I was the first child of a family of two boys. My father was
a doctor who met my mother in Brighton. My mother had been acting as a
nurse, but by the time I was born she was performing all the functions that a
GP’s wife at that time characteristically performed, keeping the books, acting
as a part-time secretary, and generally making things tick. I was given the
name Ram Roy Bhaskar. Until I went up to Oxford in 1963 I was basically liv-
ing with my parents and a younger brother, Krishan, first in Teddington in
south-west London then at Weybridge in Surrey. As for my schooling, I was at
what was called a prep school – Gate House, Kingston – until the age of thir-
teen. Then at St Paul’s public school in Hammersmith, west London. 
MH: Not everyone gets to be born in Hampton Court Palace. How did that come
about?
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RB: It had been commandeered as a hospital during the war.
MH: Tell us a little bit about your mode of being as a child in phenomenological
terms. How do you remember those times, what were your leading themes and
experiences?
RB: I think, perhaps, I could best put this in the context of a social conflict cen-
tring on my father’s desire that I should become a doctor and my own recep-
tion, reaction and resistance to it. Calling it my father’s desire is to put it a bit
mildly; it was more or less a presumption that I would be a doctor.
MH: He knew your dharma already, right from the outset?
RB: That was it. I was to be made in his own image. He told my brother and me
early on that we would have to be self-made men like himself, he was not going
to leave us an inheritance. I should explain that my father had come from
India just before the Second World War. His family were local Brahmins in
the town of Gujranwala2 near Lahore. The second son of a family of five, his
own father (my grandfather) was an engineer in the Indian Railways, but
when the eldest son became family head my father was cut off. My father, who
had trained as a doctor, came penniless to England to do his FRCS (Fellowship
of the Royal College of Surgeons) in 1939 – which as it turned out he was
unable to do because of the war. However, ably assisted by my mother, he soon
built up a thriving medical practice, first in Brighton and then in south-west
London. Although he characteristically voted Tory, he had identified with
Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress Party in the struggle
for Indian Independence and became a great supporter of the National Health
Service when it was introduced. My mother was English. She lost her father at
birth during the First World War and was taken by her mother to South
Africa. She returned to England just before World War Two and worked as a
nurse in Brighton, where she met and married my father. There was strong
opposition to the marriage on both sides of the family; one aunt from my
mother’s side attended the wedding and that was about it. After her marriage,
my mother assumed an Indian identity; her maiden name was Marjorie and
she now took the name Kamla. She and my father became adherents of
Theosophy – basically Hinduism for westernised Indians – and remained such
for the rest of their lives. The whole family was essentially an Indian family.
My mother accepted this very willingly and happily I should say. But there
weren’t many Indian families in London at the time, not the number there are
now. We were somewhat isolated. We lived in a house where the next Indian
family was miles away, but even so there were Indian families that we were in
regular contact with; it was almost like a big extended family. Much of my
childhood when I wasn’t at school was spent accompanying my parents on 
visits to these other Indian families or to the various societies and functions
my parents attended, especially the Theosophical Society. My father was
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prominent in all the main societies he joined: at one stage he was president of
the Punjabi Society, the Hindu Society, another Indian Society, and the
Rotary Club. And my mother was equally prominent in these societies, and in,
for instance, the Inner Wheel (the female equivalent of Rotary). My father
was also a Freemason; on Saturdays I would see him packing up a little bag and
taking it off for his various ceremonies. I think he was a member of several
lodges and again he rose to the fore in institutional terms. My parents led quite
busy lives.
And then of course my father was a very busy doctor, and he used to like to
take me with him in the car on his rounds. So I spent a great deal of my child-
hood just accompanying my parents, not really doing what I might have
wanted to do as a child, but just being with them. And this meant that I had to
try to compensate for what I perceived to be the poverty of the activities in
which I was forced to engage. I developed quite an active fantasy world, more
generally a kind of inner reflectedness, and I found myself very much leading
a double life: the life of the imagination and the life I could find in play and in
books (which I read avidly), as contrasted with the overt behaviour I had to
display in the social world. This was compliant of me. Actually, perhaps it was
only that it seemed compliant to me, because my parents told me when I was
about eight or nine that from a very early age I was continually questioning
them. So they had started calling me Tumoori, which is Punjabi for Bumble-
Bee, because I was always busy and running around questioning. Another
nickname they had for me was Why-Because. I would be so insistent on get-
ting an answer to my question, an explanation, that as soon as I said ‘why’ I
would come out with ‘because’, trying to prompt them, to get them to actually
provide an explanation. I think I took up this style of questioning, this outer
questioning, because of the disparity I experienced between, on the one hand,
who I was in my inner life and what I really wanted to do or would do if uncon-
strained, and, on the other, the outer compliance I had to show in my overt
behaviour. So in an inward way I was questioning, and continually question-
ing, as it were, both the world and myself.
From quite an early age I felt that I could not understand the presumption
that I should be a doctor, and that indeed it was unacceptable to me; I knew 
I wouldn’t make a good doctor, but there the presumption was, and it would
not go away. This was in fact the central conflict of my youth, and I was 
very aware of it from an early age. Partly because of the amount of time I had
to spend with my father, I was very aware of what he was doing as a doctor 
and so of the fate that awaited me. In this phase of my youth there was thus a
split between my inner reflectedness, my inner being, and my outer activity.
What I started to do was not just question my parents and other authorities 
but to fight, in Gramscian terms, a war of position. I tried to out-manoeuvre
them gradually, and then to seize an opportunity to have an engagement 
on favourable terrain. For example, I overheard my father telling some 
other Indian in London that he was quite wrong to stop his daughter 
marrying who she wanted to. I put it to him that, just as there are false/forced
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marriages, particularly strongly imposed on girls, so there are false/forced
careers, particularly strongly imposed on boys. I seized the opportunity of 
my father’s principled defence of free marriages to put in a point about 
careers. 
MH: You caught him out in a theory–practice inconsistency.
RB: Really, the hypocrisy of parental positions was very apparent to me, and it led
me at quite an early stage to develop criteria of what it was to be a good person.
I thought at the time there were two criteria. The most important was theory
and practice consistency. A good person is one who walks their talk. But
closely following on from that there was universalisability, and this was some-
thing that struck me quite early. For example, when I was in India (my father
took us there twice in our childhood) I would see beggars who were clearly not
enjoying the privileges or rights that my family and people with whom they
associated enjoyed, and I would want to know why. (There were of course beg-
gars in London, but I did not get to see many of them.) Or again my parents
were very disapproving of a boy who was my best friend because he was the son
of a publican. To them he was a kind of outcaste. The questioning part of me
wanted to know, well, what is the difference? When I saw differences all
around me I wanted a ground for the difference. 
This whole issue was closely connected to two concerns. One was a concern
with freedom, and the root of that was a concern for my own freedom. 
The concept of dharma, I think, goes particularly well with such a conception
of freedom, in which freedom is as much about who you are and what you 
can become as it is about what you do or what you have. The other concern
was for social justice, because where there is a difference that cannot be
grounded this is a form of injustice. As Thomas Hobbes I think put it, it is a
moral absurdity. If the sort of life I was leading, certainly from the age of 
seven or eight, was a split life, what then was the contrast? Well, it was a life 
of wholeness or unity. I understood that being aware of possibilities meant 
that I could play. I could be whole in fantasy. But the notion of being whole 
in physical actuality was also of course very important. I spent a tremendous
amount of time playing games, especially cricket. I felt whole when I played
cricket, and I felt whole when I read or when my parents were talking to 
me (rather than at me) about their experiences, such as my father’s involve-
ment in the struggle of the Congress Party for Indian Independence, or 
my mother’s experience as a school girl in South Africa. But obviously I 
had a notion that one could be whole all the time and not just in play 
and occasional moments of fulfilling activity. So, alongside the criteria 
for what it is to be a good person, there was a criterion of integrity, of 
wholeness. This was what I really wanted. I wanted to be not just a good 
person but to be whole, and that meant that I had to fulfil my dharma, I had 
to be doing what came naturally to me, what I was best at doing, what I had a
bent for.
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MH: So what you had going, really – we can see in retrospect – was a dialectic 
of alienation (split) and wholeness, the interplay of negative and positive 
conditions, as you struggled to come into your dharma.
RB: That’s right. If one goes back to the period before I was about eleven, if I had
been asked what I really wanted to do then, I would probably have said I
wanted to be a sportsman. I would do anything to be involved in a game of
cricket. I always wanted to be a cricketer with a slight difference though. From
about the age of nine I wanted to edit a cricketing annual. I wrote to famous
cricketers of the day, such as Len Hutton and Peter May, asking them to con-
tribute to my annual, and a surprising number said they would. I remember
Peter May saying, well, you have told me you are meant to be a doctor, but you
want to be a cricketer; I can just see you as a captain of England! But by the age
of eleven I started getting very bad hay fever and that more or less put paid to
my cricketing aspirations. I developed other interests and obsessions. Music
was a way of escaping. I could get lost in music, particularly classical music;
later I found that possibility also there in pop music, especially in dance. I
probably most enjoyed getting lost in books, and this was a recurring pleasure,
not a phase-specific one like cricket. It became a symbol or badge of my iden-
tity. When I had to accompany my father, say, on his shopping trips to Harrods
or something like that, I would always try to secrete a book about my person,
even if I knew that there was no possibility of reading it. Whenever my parents
took me to the Theosophical Society I used to really enjoy that, not so much
for the content of the lectures and so on – I didn’t attend many of them – but
for the time I would spend in the library (if I didn’t have to look after the
younger children), where I got lost in a world outside my life and existence.
MH: What did you read? Did you read indiscriminately? 
RB: No, I wouldn’t say indiscriminately; I would have a particular interest.
MH: Not just fiction?
RB: No, these were mainly factual books, books about American history, psycho-
analysis, and so on. I felt I knew quite a lot about Theosophy as there were
many Theosophical books in my parents’ house, and also many books about
religion, and about medicine. So when I went to the Theosophical Society
library, which was a good one, I picked on the things that Theosophy did not
talk about, and I also avoided religion in general and medicine. As for my atti-
tude to Theosophy in those days, when I was in my early teens or younger, I felt
it was OK as far as it went, but there were many questions that it did not
address, or did not seem to address, and I was equally interested in them. And
in so far as I was interested in Theosophy, it was a this-worldly interest, my
concern was with how it could alter situations in the here and now. For, being
subject at school to bullying and being on a life-path that I knew was not for
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me, I was very aware of what you might call permitted or officially sanctioned
(or authorised) injustice – the kind of injustice that people come in for when
they are born into a situation or a context in which they have very limited
opportunities for fulfilment. I was already quite concerned about such issues,
and I knew all the standard arguments, and the pros and cons on questions
such as freewill and determinism and so on. This was one thing I certainly had
to thank my parents for: they had a home full of books where I could read about
such things. 
MH: What specifically was OK about Theosophy, and how did it relate to your
concern about ‘permitted injustice’? Did it command your intellectual assent?
Some of the ideas of the spiritual turn are also central to Theosophy; for 
example, the notion that all religions are attempts to approach the absolute,
so each offers a perspective on the same underlying reality. Indeed, if you sub-
stitute ‘norm’ for ‘religion’, the motto of the Theosophical Society could serve
as a motto informing all your work: ‘There is no religion higher than truth.’
And the ‘three objects’ of the original Theosophical Society founded by
Helena Blavatsky and others in 1875 seem entirely compatible with your
mature outlook: ‘To form a nucleus of the universal brotherhood of humanity,
without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour; to encourage the study
of comparative religion, philosophy and science; and to investigate the unex-
plained laws of nature and the powers latent in man.’3
RB: Well, the ethic of universal brotherhood and sisterhood and the commitment
to systematic enquiry are certainly things I approved of. I wasn’t really indoc-
trinated in these three objects, but it would certainly have been the case that
I had come to some sort of awareness of their necessity or desirability inde-
pendently. Because of my experiences of racial intolerance, and finding myself
to be very much an outsider in most of the contexts in which I was involved, I
came to question anything other than, say, the universal brotherhood and sis-
terhood of humanity or what it was supposed to connote. So I might have been
happy to discover that these were the objects. But I think what attracted me
about Theosophy most, abstracting from my parents’ involvement in it, was
an idea that you also find in some theological critical realists, funnily enough.
(Of course I didn’t know anything about them at the time.) This was the 
idea you mentioned that the different religions are different paths to essen-
tially the same goal, which is knowledge of, or identification with, or bringing
about, the absolute. To put it in theological critical realist terms, the different
main teachings of these world religions are different conceptions of the
absolute. 
Actually this marks out a distinctive tradition of interpretation within all
the great world religions, with the possible exception of Christianity save in
more recent times. In Islam you have the Sufis, in Judaism you have Kabbalah;
both groups consciously learned from other religious traditions. In Hinduism
you have this as a specific doctrine, at least in Vedic or, you could say, esoteric
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Hinduism. What all these positions did is formulate a contrast between the
higher truth, which was known to the esoteric, and the ordinary truth. The
higher truth said of some particular religion that this is one path (or sometimes
this is the best path). Very often, of course, this is one path means merely in
effect this is the path you have been introduced to, or that you should follow
in a certain kind of society; it is one of the paths to the absolute. However the
ordinary, common truth said this is the only path, the only way to the absolute.
This split between refined and tolerant religion, on the one hand, and a reli-
gion that asserts a monopoly of truth, on the other, was very clear to me in my
teens. This idea appeared in a popular form in esoteric Hinduism and
Buddhism: that Rama, Krishna, and so on, were followed by Buddha, by Jesus,
and perhaps Muhammad; so that these were all equally but differently avatars4
or, as it were, messengers of God. This is one of the features of Theosophy that
I particularly liked. The idea that there are different paths to the absolute is a
very important feature, particularly for anyone who is going to profess a reli-
gion. 
I myself was not really religious. I did quite enjoy religious ceremonial in
small doses. I was somewhat indifferent as to what sort of ceremony it was: I
was mainly interested in the experience. I had childhood experiences of tran-
scendence in a Christian service or mass as much as I ever remember having
them in a Hindu puja.
MH: How did you come to go to Christian services? Your parents surely didn’t 
take you?
RB: Well, there is no reason why they should not have taken me. But they did not.
For some of my childhood there was a live-in helper to my mother who was a
Catholic, from Ireland. Her name was Tessie, and her bedroom was full of 
crucifixes, as you often find with Irish Catholics. She was extremely devout. 
MH: Was she your nanny?
RB: No, I would say a generalised helper. 
MH: You were very fond of her? I’ve heard tell that you attended her funeral in
Ireland much later.
RB: Yes. My brother and I helped to bury her, and I visited her on several occasions
after her retirement at the time of my mother’s death.
Returning to the theme of religion, since I went to schools where religion
was taught, there were many occasions on which I had to go into a church. At
St Paul’s you did not have to attend the morning ceremonies, you could do
something else because there were many Jewish boys there, but in general in
England at that time attending public schools involved going to church.
Although I could sometimes enjoy the experience and the religious 
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ceremonial, I wasn’t particularly interested in religion for its own sake. I was
interested rather in the great injustices that afflicted me and most, perhaps all,
of humanity. My cast of mind was always this-worldly. Even when I got into
the spiritual turn there were secular motives. I did not affiliate with any 
particular form of religion or substitute religion.
MH: The fact that you had a really rich childhood in terms of religious and spiri-
tual experience was probably important for the spiritual turn. Most people are
brought up just in the one tradition, you experienced a whole variety.
RB: Yes. Theosophy is in many ways a westernised version of Hinduism, and also
Buddhism (it is a moot point exactly what the differences between Buddhism
and Hinduism are). I think it is interesting, and something I would perhaps
like to follow up, that while I was growing up some self-styled theological crit-
ical realists within the Christian tradition were starting to formulate a similar
view to the Theosophical notion that all religions are different paths to essen-
tially the same goal. I had no knowledge of this school, or its name, until well
into the spiritual turn of the late 1990s.
MH: Did you go to Theosophical rituals or services of any kind?
RB: There was a youth section of the Society that they called the Round Table,
which my parents enrolled me in. Its ceremonies were very much like the 
services of the Liberal Catholic Church that the prominent Theosophist
Charles Webster Leadbeater founded in the early twentieth century within
the Theosophical movement, which offered completely open communion
involving the breaking of bread and the drinking of juice. My parents 
were very interested in what was called the Esoteric Section of the 
Theosophy Society, but I never had access to that, just as I did not have 
access to the secrets of Freemasonry. They did not break the rules in that 
sort of way. 
MH: How did the fact that you had a Theosophical and Indian background pan out
for you at school?
RB: One sees everywhere a kind of absurdity, the oppressive nature of the ordinary
truth as distinct from the higher truth. These terms by the way are the terms
that Shankara, an Indian sage of the eighth century CE, formulated. I remem-
ber my first day at my prep school. My very first lesson was a class on religious
studies and the teacher who was taking it started proceedings by asking every-
one who was Church of England to put up their hand, and then everyone who
was Catholic, and then those who were Methodist or some other denomina-
tion of Christianity. Finally she asked for anyone who had not put up their
hand to do so, and so I put up my hand. Then she asked me what my religion
was, and I said, ‘Well, I am not really sure. I believe there is good in all 
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religions.’ That was the vulgar form of the higher truth, the Theosophy that
my parents had instilled in me. And the teacher said, ‘You mean you’re a hea-
then!’5 I was mortified. What a different place the world would be if the criti-
cal realist form of Christianity in a theological sense was more prevalent, and
of course if the Sufi attitude was more prevalent in Islam. 
Shall we go back to the question of my central conflict?
MH: This is related to it. Your teacher was denying you your freedom in the same
authoritarian way your father did, with a goodly dose of ethnocentrism and
racism thrown in.
RB: Indeed, at my first school I was subjected to a lot of bullying. As I was of nor-
mal or slightly more than normal height, and I didn’t wear specs or stand out
in any very obvious way, I can only think that the only reason for it was the
fact that I was known to have an Indian family and background. I certainly
had an Indian name, and by the time I went to my second school, St Paul’s, I
decided to drop my Indian first name, Ram, and have myself called Roy. 
MH: And kept it up until very recently. Did you dress differently? 
RB: There was no Indian dress or anything like that, at least not for the boys. My
father always wore a suit, my mother wore saris, but only when she went out to
a dinner party or was entertaining. What I was trying to do by the time I went
to St Paul’s was to pass as English, to not allow myself to be identified as non-
English or specifically Indian. There were many incidents in which my
Indianness became an issue. For example, I can remember being subjected to
the most horrific bullying at the time of the Suez invasion, starting with the
headmaster, who was extremely irate about India’s opposition to it, referring
to ‘naked fakirs’. 
MH: The headmaster?
RB: Yes, and it wasn’t a big school. ‘Fakir’ is a kind of pun. This stems from a remark
made by Winston Churchill about Gandhi.6 Stanley Baldwin was Prime
Minister at the time. A fakir is just a holy man, but, rather like the
Churchillian ‘V’ sign, it was interpreted and meant to be understood in a com-
pletely different way. 
MH: So the head took it out on you?
RB: Yes, and of course that was a licence for the other students, some of whom were
otherwise quite friendly to me, to take it out on me. It was mainly physical bul-
lying, kicking at my shins and things like that. It did make my life pretty mis-
erable at that school. I was rather relieved to go to St Paul’s and be able to
assume a relatively low profile and not be picked on for anything. I did get a
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reputation with some of the teachers for being somewhat naughty though. I
couldn’t resist trying to subvert pomposity and pretentiousness. For example,
if the chemistry teacher, instead of teaching us about chemistry, was droning
on about some textbook So-and-So had written, I might ask him insolently if
he had found the book a good read, prompting his fury.
MH: What consequences did the bullying have for your identity? Did you identify
as English or Indian, or both?
RB: I identified as neither. I didn’t feel good about being called an Anglo-Indian
because that referred to a caste of Englishmen – 
MH: Was that by your headmaster, your school?
RB: No, I was thinking about myself. I didn’t really feel good about calling myself
an Indian, and I didn’t really feel good about calling myself English, so the
obvious thing might have been to call myself an Anglo-Indian. 
MH: That’s the Raj. 
RB: That’s right; one use of the term was to refer to English people who stayed on
in India after the end of the Raj. Most of the time in England I was treated as
an Indian, an Indian in England, and I quickly realised that I wasn’t happy sus-
taining this identity, not only because of what it excluded me from in England
but also because, when I went to India, I couldn’t really identify as an Indian
either. Indeed, the first thing that struck me as a young child was that every-
one there was either too fat or too thin, too rich or too poor. I was horrified at
the exclusiveness of the caste system and Indian society generally. It did not
take me long to realise that this exclusiveness was also characteristic of British
society, because it was very, very racist. If you were Indian you were basically
excluded. And then my parents wanted to enforce a kind of class exclusion on
me as well, that I shouldn’t be friends with people who weren’t suitable for me.
I couldn’t go along with this. From the standpoint of the inner questioning I
was constantly engaging in, I just could not see any ground for the difference.
It was obvious to me that lower-class people did not behave worse; but nor was
I an inverted snob, I did not think they behaved better than middle-class peo-
ple. Rather, my tendency was to identify with the underdog, so I would be
inclined to feel very Indian in England. For instance, when the Indian cricket
team came to England in 1952 they did terribly poorly, and I supported them.
Similarly, when I was in India, I would stick up for the good points about
England. 
I eventually cottoned on to the fact that no society was perfect, although it
did take me a while to come round to that view. Thus I became suspicious
about why everyone was demonising the USSR (Stalinist Russia), and so
when neither Indian nor English would fit as a description I made myself an
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honorary Soviet citizen. But I did not really have to wait for Khrushchev’s
speech in 1956 when I was twelve to realise that all was not right there.
Indeed, by 1956 I was so impressed by the American opposition to the Suez
adventure that I formed an attachment to the USA. What I was trying to do
in a way was explore the good qualities, the things we were neglecting to men-
tion or had forgotten when we were demonising the Soviet Union or being
very disapproving of the United States, the things that were left out. This
again was prompted by the nascent principle of universalisability. A little later
on I was very taken by the idea that a society such as Brazil, where there did not
seem to be the same overt racial conflict, might be able to transcend the dif-
ference between black and white. Then when I went to Oxford and joined
many societies, I quickly became president or secretary of the Latin American
Society. However, I soon came to feel very embarrassed about this. I realised
that Brazil and much of Latin America was actually founded on a double
oppression, first the oppression of the Indigenous or native American Indian
people and then the oppression of imported people, that is, black slave labour
and indentured Asian labour. In short, they were still very stratified and racist
societies.
MH: Both classist and racist. 
RB: Yes. Siding with the underdog and going against what seemed to be the con-
ventional wisdom were perhaps my two most characteristic dispositions. And
what in a way underlay them both was the fact that I was, and experienced
myself as, very marginalised.
MH: You yourself were an underdog, subject to many constraints. Returning now
to the number one constraint, your being put on the path of being a doctor:
what strategies did you develop to overcome it?
RB: For a while I had a compromise solution: I would become a psychoanalyst,
which meant that I would qualify as a doctor but then do the sort of thing that
I knew myself to be interested in, studying people. By the time I started doing
science, and more particularly biology, I realised that not only was I not good
at drawing, but I abhorred dissection; I was very bad at the practical side 
of biology. I was also very aware that my father led, despite his interest in reli-
gious philosophy and the many societies he belonged to, what would be for me
a very boring life.
MH: Aspiring to conform, to be conventional –
RB: Yes, and going on his rounds and seeing one person after another with the
common cold. I didn’t think I would have the patience for that. On the other
hand, I was really excited by ideas, I was very good at English and writing
essays and I was interested in history and geography and subjects such as that.
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Science was very boringly taught; I wasn’t completely uninterested in it but I
had a penchant for subjects like English and history. After doing O-levels we
went to India for the summer holidays, and when my brother and I flew back
for the beginning of term I seized the opportunity of my father’s absence to go
to the school authorities at St Paul’s and suggest that they switch me from the
science stream to a geography stream, as I felt my main subjects should be
geography (which included some economics and a bit of politics), history and
English and perhaps a bit of Latin or French. Their response was, ‘Oh yes. That
is a much better idea, because you are so good at English and history.’ So they
went along with it. Then my father arrived home four or five days later, found
out what had happened and rang up and went to see the headmaster and the
other relevant authorities and told them to put me back in the biology stream. 
MH: An Indian doctor prevailed over the English public school headmaster. Did
you have mixed feelings about that?
RB: I was more interested in my own freedom than my father’s victory. My father
was very good at bullying such people. Indeed, there were few people he could
not bully. He lorded it over my mother too. I admired his forcefulness, but not
the bullying. Because of my schools’ compliance, I could never really identify
much with them and really wasn’t much influenced by them.
MH: In any way?
RB: No. 
MH: I’ll come back to that in a moment. Might not a way forward in your conflict
with your father have been to devote yourself to a career in theoretical sci-
ence? After all, there are scientific aspects to medicine and science has very
considerable kudos in Theosophy.
RB: No, my father was insistent upon my being a doctor. Basically what he wanted
was for me to first join and then succeed him. He was not interested in me
being a pure scientist; he wasn’t motivated by a fondness for science but rather
by the desire that I should be doing the work in his practice. This was some-
what ironical because my brother, Krishan, who had been ear-marked as an
accountant, actually wanted to do it I think. So he fulfilled my father’s desire
for him, going on to become an accountant.
MH: Might not pure science have satisfied you, however, even though it did not
satisfy him?
RB: No, given the way science was taught at school, I wasn’t much interested in
science; I was interested in people, societies, politics, economics, history. And
I was very interested in philosophy. I read a great deal of philosophy.
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MH: You end up becoming a philosopher – and in the first instance a philosopher
of science at that – to provide a basis for your interest in society.
RB: Absolutely. 
MH: How did you get on with your brother? 
RB: We were emotionally close and fond of each other, but the concentration of
family power meant that there were also, perhaps inevitably, tensions. We
also had differing interests and gradually drifted apart. Affection, however,
remained.
MH: Do you have any regrets about your time as a public school boy?
RB: If you take it on a personal level, I think it did lead to a neglect of my formal
schooling at St Paul’s. I didn’t actually spend very much time in school. It was
possible just to go in, check in for the first lesson of the day, and then 
move out.
MH: For the whole day?
RB: Yes, I would often go and sit in a coffee bar in Hammersmith to read or talk
with my friends; and of course it was a liberal regime that allowed that to hap-
pen. I would perhaps have felt differently if the school had supported my
desire, my determination, to change streams. So what happened here was a
kind of split between me and institutions. I became used to being an outsider,
and even though I wasn’t bullied as an Indian at St Paul’s, I had become an
outsider within the school. Moreover, I wasn’t particularly interested in the
subjects I was taking. I used to perk up when there was a general studies lesson,
because I loved doing what we normally had to do, which was to write an essay.
So good were my essays that I won the Lord Chancellor’s English essay prize,
which I suppose is some achievement in a school such as St Paul’s. I was inter-
ested in the more theoretical side of science, and I realised that, whatever I
eventually managed to be able to do, I would have done well at A-levels, so I
mugged up on selected theoretical topics in all the science papers I was taking.
I was very interested in the theory of evolution and in organic chemistry,
which had just witnessed the discovery of DNA. I was excited by all that, and
did very well – which was just as well, because my marks for the biology prac-
tical were one out of twenty. I have to say that they were so bad in biology
because of my aversion to dissection. 
MH: Was this perhaps related to your aversion to split, your yearning for 
wholeness?
RB: Yes, but also I was, at least in these kinds of things, manually indexterous,
clumsy. Moreover, the particular dead animal we had to dissect in my A-level
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exam was a dogfish. I remember it vividly. Indeed, I have memories from a very
early age of going past the fishmonger, who had a shop about ten doors from
where we lived. And I used to hate the smell, and actually the sight of fish; it
is something I found repulsive. The upshot of all this was that because dissec-
tion played such a large part in the career of a medical student, it seemed to me
that I would never be able to make it, even if I had wanted to.
MH: Dead fish are rather repulsive, but if one likes eating them I guess one over-
comes that. Were you a vegetarian at this stage? Were your parents vegetarians?
RB: They became vegetarians when war-time rationing was ended. I remember
clearly the day. My father came into the room and announced it. My mother
was making chicken soup, which was a favourite of mine, and I was very dis-
appointed! However, since I no longer had to eat fish, or parts of the bodies of
dead animals, I soon came happily to accept it.
Having decided that no society had got it right and that every huma  being
deserves a chance, I became very interested in questions of exclusion and dif-
ference. It was not just that I tended to side with the underdog, I also looked
for those who did not even rate as underdogs; those for instance who were not
even in the caste system in India. For me everyone had a right to pursue their
dharma. So I came to see my own struggle to be in my dharma as part of a wider
struggle for everyone to be in their dharma. I supported and identified with the
civil rights movement in America, nations such as Egypt which were being
bullied by the West, and so on. And of course I was against all class and caste
differences and all the intolerances that these differences are associated with. 
MH: When did you become aware of the idea of being in your dharma?
RB: I don’t remember. 
MH: You would presumably have absorbed it as you were growing up.
RB: By my bed, in the room I shared with my brother, was a little bookcase with a
sample of the 109 or so books my great-great grandfather was reputed to have
written.
MH: He was a Brahmin priest?
RB: He was a Brahmin. I don’t know whether he actually officiated as a priest or
not; he would certainly have been a sage. These books were the background to
my own father’s interest in these things. As I’ve mentioned, he came from a
Brahmin family, and traditionally the Brahmins were the priestly caste. 
MH: To return to the issue of your not identifying with St Paul’s. On your account,
your coming into your dharma was in spite of the school more than because of
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it. Yet you have what strikes people as a public school persona. You ooze an
establishment sort of confidence and charm. 
RB: The confidence probably came from two or three other external sources as
well – the facts that my father was a Brahmin and that he seemed to get his way
in whatever he did, that he had become a self-made man in England, and that
my mother was extremely able and universally loved. 
MH: And then there are more specific things, such as being familiar with 
classical Greek. This is one of the things that rubs off on you in public 
schools.
RB: I didn’t actually do Greek at St Paul’s. I was always very interested in concepts
and often they did not have a good name in English. I basically learnt most 
of what I know about Greek from my father’s books in the first instance, 
especially medical texts and reference books.
I don’t want to deny the possibility of public school influence, but in fact it
is probably just as true to say that it was I who had a bit of an impact on St
Paul’s, though not in the customary way. Every Monday the expected thing
was that you should do something called CCF (Combined Cadet Force),
which entailed dressing up in military uniform – either army, air force or navy
– and then performing various drills, including shooting and things like that.
Now I was very sympathetic to pacifism and certainly did not like the idea of
war. I was a supporter of CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament). There
was an alternative to CCF which was the Boy Scouts, which I joined. But as a
Boy Scout you had to go to school on a Monday dressed in short trousers, and
I felt a bit stupid doing that in Hammersmith, going on the tube in short
trousers. I was well over six feet by then, and you were also supposed to wear a
beret, and I certainly wasn’t happy doing that. The only alternative was to do
PT (Physical Training), which involved a very tortuous form of retribution for
those who were unwilling to bite the bullet and do CCF. So a few friends and
myself thought up another alternative and tried to get the school to accept it
– which it did. This alternative was social work, going around the houses of
Hammersmith and neighbouring areas and knocking on doors and just check-
ing whether people needed anything or whether they knew their rights,
whether they had the television reception they were entitled to, whether they
were drawing their unemployment benefit if unemployed, and so 
on. This was a great success, not least with the school authorities, and it is now
part of the school curriculum. Here was the answer for me as an outsider. I was
able to take advantage of being on the margin to advance not only my own
interests, thus making life easier for myself, but also something that was much
more useful generally.
Another example of this was my reaction to the prescribed sports: rugby,
boxing and cricket. Now, because of my hay fever, cricket was out for me, I
didn’t like rugby, and on pacifist grounds, as well as having had enough of 
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bullying at my first school, I didn’t like boxing. Again I thought up with a 
few friends ways of getting the school to accept an alternative. This was golf.
My father used to play golf at a local golf club (Fulwell) and one of my fellow
students at St Paul’s at the time was a Portuguese junior international; this
lent some credibility to our suggestion, which once again was accepted. What
this meant in practice was that, after a hole or two of golf, I could have the rest
of Wednesday afternoons off in my own home listening to music, and at the
same time the range of options available to my fellow students had been
expanded.
I think what had a permanent impact on me, and one that I regret some-
what, was the split between myself and the institution, between myself and
formal schooling. There are two sorts of outsiders, and I was lucky enough to
be the first. This is the kind of outsider who is in some way also inside – an
insider outsider. Being on the margins can be very useful for such an outsider
because, if you think of the margins as on a page, being on the margins allows
you to be aware of other pages in the book and other possibilities; you are
forced to see many openings that are not otherwise immediately apparent. But
I was also inside – I could see how it might be possible to turn the pages of the
book – I was actually inside the school, I hadn’t been thrown out, and I was in
an Indian family, and both school and family provided enduring constraints
that gave me something specific and concrete to try to transcend. So I always
had a specific target, there was always something I was fighting against.
Whereas if you are the second kind of outsider – an outsider outsider, just out-
side, without any institutions – then you can get completely lost or so demor-
alised that you cannot engage in successful struggle. I was able to engage in
successful struggles.
MH: Did your desire for oneness manifest itself in relation to nature?
RB: If I was asked to choose between the house and the garden, I would always opt
for the garden. I spent a great deal of time there. Much of it was actually throw-
ing a ball against the wall and catching or hitting it, but some of it was just
enjoying – for instance, the flowers. I remember feeling how nice it would be
to be one with the grass, the lawn. My parents had a little bungalow by the sea
in Brighton which they bought when I was about seven or eight, and the small
garden opened up onto the beach. That was great for me, I could play beach
cricket – there was often a game of cricket going on the beach – or alterna-
tively I could just walk along the beach and experience the sublimity of
nature. I loved looking up at the sky or looking out to the sea, or just listening
to it. I felt there was a depth to nature that you would miss out on if you related
to it as an outsider. If you could identify with it, be with it, be one with it, then
it would reveal its depth and beauty to you and afford consolation and inspira-
tion. I had access to the sublime in books and in my fantasy land but also, par-
ticularly to the sea and the sky, there was the sublime in nature. So I treated it
as a most precious resource. 
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MH: On the face of it you had all the makings of a happy childhood – a holiday cot-
tage, a well-to-do family, a culturally rich environment – and yet I get the feel-
ing that you would actually define your childhood as unhappy, basically
because you weren’t given your head on the crucial issue of finding the 
right way for you. If so, it seems to have been paradoxically a very productive
unhappiness in the end.
RB: Yes, I remember a slogan that was often trotted out: ‘enjoy your schooldays,
because they are the happiest days of your life’. Well, mine weren’t, mainly
because of the subjects I was forced to study. There were of course experiences
that my parents shared with me or gave me that I was very happy about; trav-
elling for instance. But the big question of my identity outweighed everything
else. I imagine that this is the case for girls of sub-continental families who
know that they are going to be forced to marry someone they have not chosen
and even against their will. They might have many of the features of a happy
childhood, but that will outweigh everything else. 
MH: The lack of freedom.
RB: Yes. Because the child thinks of adult life as the period of fulfilment, it 
accepts that there are many things it cannot do now; but it has the hope 
that when it is grown-up it will be free to fulfil itself. Girls often have projected
the state of marriage, boys are typically asked what they want to do. Actually I
also asked myself this question because, while I knew I did not want to be a doc-
tor, it was not clear to me that I knew what I positively wanted to be 
(other than perhaps that it would be something to do with people). Around the
age of fifteen or sixteen, since I was really good at writing and loved 
doing it, I felt I might become a novelist and actually started writing a novel. I
also felt that I was good at arguing and entertaining. What everyone, including
my parents, liked me for was a capacity to make them laugh. My dad would
often find it useful to have me in the room when he was talking and arguing
with associates because I could come in and say something witty or light.
Actually this was the great era of British comedy, with shows like Beyond the
Fringe, and I thought about being a playwright. From what I knew about Jean-
Paul Sartre – I admired him greatly – I thought you could just do this thing,
write novels or plays, and I recorded sketches with friends. But as my D-Day
approached I realised I would have to have another strategy, because you could
not just become a novelist or comedian or philosopher or whatever, you had to
pass A-levels and then you had to have admission to an appropriate institution.
So having got A-levels, I realised that I could sit an entrance exam to Oxford
or Cambridge which did not involve science. And so I took the modern studies
entrance exam to Oxford and I won an exhibition – a form of scholarship – to
Balliol College to read PPE (philosophy, politics and economics).
MH: What did you father think?
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RB: He didn’t know. One has to remember that I was fighting a Gramscian war of
position and I was following the Taoist motto that the way to win a struggle is
by preparation, stealth and speed. That was the stealth: you do not tell the
enemy what you are going to do, otherwise he would have prevented me. He
had even filled in my signature to medical school (unbeknown to me) and
King’s College Medical School had actually (I think) admitted me. So getting
this scholarship enabled me to go to him and say, well look, I am going to
Oxford to read PPE, I am not going to cost you anything, you don’t have a leg
to stand on. So he gave way. 
MH: Did he come to terms with it?
RB: Formally he accepted it, but he had his reservations. The simplest form this
took was getting one of his friends to persuade me to have dinners at one of the
law schools (I think the Inner Temple) so that I could at the same time train
to become a barrister, while I was having my little bit of fun doing PPE at
Oxford.
MH: Sounds as though he was fighting a war of position too.
RB: Indeed. I remember being interviewed at the Inner Temple and the head 
of the school or college asked me whether my parents were in law or had 
any relatives in law. When I said no, he asked, ‘What does your father do
then?’, in a rather exasperated tone. So I told him he was a doctor, and he 
said, ‘Well, why don’t you go into medicine?’ Little did he know! After my first
couple of books came out I took the reviews to my father and said, ‘Do you
think I might have taken the right decision after all?’, and he said, ‘Well, I
don’t know about that. If you had gone into medicine you would have had a
Jag by now.’
Of course, some people kindly say to me, ‘You are in effect a doctor now
because you are a healer, trying to heal people, society, and such like.’ 
MH: It is hardly what your father had in mind though. He seems to have been more
interested in material wealth and status. Did he himself have a Jag?
RB: Well, he had a Rolls Royce for family occasions, a Jag for business, and a sports
car for visiting patients. The garage at the house in Weybridge (which was
called ‘Nirvana’) was huge. My parents helped me to buy a Mini when I was
seventeen, and later a sports car.
MH: Were you at all embarrassed by such conspicuous consumption?
RB: There are always special circumstances. This is how he wanted to spend his
money. Remember, these were pre-ecological times, and we were living on 
an estate in Weybridge where you had to drive. That was his little bit of 
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luxury. He didn’t particularly like going out to posh restaurants or staying in
expensive hotels, in fact my parents used to go camping. 
MH: You later characterised the phase of the philosophical discourse of modernity
you lived through as a child and adolescent as the theory and practice of mod-
ernisation, a leading characteristic of which was judgementalism on the basis
of a conviction that the developed countries of the West are in the vanguard
of a unilinear evolutionary process. Were you aware of this kind of big picture
at all before you went up to Oxford?
RB: Yes, the idea was that western societies are the most advanced and map out the
path for less advanced societies, that there is a direct progression from the 
bullock-cart to the car. This was basically a version of history with which my
parents identified, however inconsistent it was with the multilinearity of their
Theosophy and their own experience of exclusion. For reasons we have gone
into, although I enjoyed cars, TV and pop music, I was sensitised to both the
costs and the limited nature of the progress actually made. As Gandhi said
when asked what he thought of western civilisation, ‘I think it would be a 
good idea’.
MH: What has really struck me listening to you today is the extent of the continu-
ity between your developing identity and your mature one; some of the lead-
ing themes from your mature philosophy are present at an early age. You don’t
pose any philosophical problem of trans-life standards, of commensurability
and identity, there is such strong continuity!
RB: Well, I think it is an unfinished struggle. In a way, you see, coming into your
dharma is an ongoing process. To be fully in your dharma you would need to
live in a society that accepted the principle of everyone being in their dharma
everywhere. If you had such a society it would be a eudaimonistic society, a
society in which the free development of each is a condition of the free devel-
opment of all. And to achieve that the first thing you need is survival, which
for many people is a continuous struggle, including to some extent for me. But
once you have survived then you need to flourish, and that is wholly possible,
I do believe, in a spirit of concrete utopianism. We have to overcome the
material c nstraints that prevent humanity having the fine future that it
could still have. Ecological sustainability is a high priority for that, and of
course having a mode of production, consumption, settlement and care and a
way of organising our economic life that does not involve the exploitation of
human beings in the ways that our current capitalism does is another. 
MH: It is an ongoing quest, but were you confident that you were in your dharma
nonetheless at some stage in your childhood? 
RB: Well no, I identified my dharma with being free to do what came best to me or
easily. So my feeling about my dharma might have been wrong, technically
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one must allow that. But my feeling then would have been a superficial one –
and I think it probably was in relation, for example, to being a cricketer, but
probably not in relation to being a philosopher. As a philosopher, though, I
have never felt totally happy; it might be that I am in the right profession, but
there have always been constraints and struggles. I would say my dharma 
was perhaps more complete when I was able to be a philosophy graduate and
then teach philosophy, than it was when I was an undergraduate, in the sense
that I was more in it. I wonder about that, though, because I am not sure what
my complete dharma or what my dharma conceived as itself evolving really is.
For all intents and purposes you could say, well, he is a philosopher, he has
written so many books and there are people who are discussing his ideas. But
that does not necessarily make me feel whole, it depends what people are
doing with the ideas. I think critical realism is still to some extent margin-
alised notwithstanding the valiant struggles being waged by people such as
yourself to demarginalise it. I think everywhere, unfortunately, we have a long
way to go.
MH: I was thinking of your knowing what your dharma is as distinct from realising
it. You knew basically what trajectory you wanted to have?
RB: I think that is so, but had I been free to study what I wanted when I went to
university I might have opted for psychology or sociology, rather than PPE. Of
course, since Oxford and Cambridge were the best universities it was natural
for me to think of going there, and I had gone for Oxford despite, or perhaps
because of, the fact that my family traditionally supported Cambridge – 
middle-class families always supported one or the other. At Oxford I could
have done psychology, but it involved dissecting rats, and playing around with
them. I didn’t feel like doing that, and you had to do sociology via PPE. I was
really concerned about the problems in the world, I didn’t want to do just pure
philosophy at this stage, I wanted philosophy that was going to be relevant to
something. And in this regard when I went to Oxford I was in for a rude shock.
However, at a personal level I felt pretty whole most of the time I was there.
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2 Oxford days
Carrying through the Copernican
revolution in the philosophy of
science (1963–1973)
MH: Tell us, to start with, something about the trajectory of your formal studies at
Oxford: what you started off reading, what you ended up reading, and why 
and how.
RB: In October 1963 I went up to Oxford on the exhibition I had won to read PPE
at Balliol College. That exhibition was very soon converted to an open schol-
arship. I graduated from Balliol in 1966 with a first class BA Honours. Then I
enrolled for a DPhil in the economics faculty to do a thesis called The
Relevance of Economic Theory for Underdeveloped Countries. I was appointed a
lecturer in economics at Pembroke College. I spent a further year at Balliol,
then won a place in Nuffield College and I was there from October 1967 to the
end of the summer 1969. I kept my lectureship at Pembroke. I became a
research fellow at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics and Economics
in about September 1970 and I held that post for one year. Then I was awarded
a junior research fellowship at Linacre College, a fellowship in philosophy – by
now I had switched to the philosophy faculty – and towards the end of 1971 I
submitted a DPhil thesis in the philosophy faculty under the title Some
Problems about Explanation in the Social Sciences, but it was too long for the
examiners. I submitted a second thesis when I was at the University of
Edinburgh, where I had become a lecturer from October 1973. It also was not
accepted, I think this was in April 1974, but it might have been May. 
MH: I’ll return to the fate of your theses. To go back to the beginning: when you
arrived in Oxford you were finally free of your father’s ambitions for you to
become a doctor. It must have been a very liberating experience?
RB: Yes, it was. I found it socially liberating in many respects, but what I found
most liberating was being able to talk about what I wanted to, being able to
express myself in a field in which I wanted to express myself, where the con-
cept of expression made some sort of sense to me. I remember the very first
night after my dad and my mum had driven me up to Oxford and delivered me
there in the afternoon. We all assembled in the dining hall, and before that I
think we were given a glass of sherry in the common room, since it was our first
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day there. A couple of my fellow debutantes, freshers I suppose, started to con-
verse with me and we began having a really stimulating conversation over the
sherry. At dinner, I found myself sitting next to another couple of people
whose conversation I enjoyed, and I think we also had a glass of port there.
Then we went back to the common room for coffee, and then all five of us
went to one of our rooms and sat there conversing till four or five in the morn-
ing. It was not a trivial thing, we were having very exciting free-ranging con-
versations, and I remember going to bed, feeling, ‘Well, I am now doing what
I ought to be doing. This is the life I ought to be living.’
MH: Some of the skills you were deploying would have been honed in your strug-
gles at home and at school.
RB: Absolutely. When I had my first couple of tutorials in PPE I found them
immensely rewarding. The fact that I was doing something I was intellectually
interested in and was able to express myself intellectually was very important.
I was no longer stuck with diagrams of the digestive system of a rat, or dissect-
ing dogfish, or formally repeating theories in physics that were put forward in
such a way that they had no explanatory content in relation to anything in the
world. This was very exciting. Of the three subjects, I think I was most inter-
ested in philosophy. I used to thoroughly enjoy the weekly essay. It was often
a struggle, but the kind of struggle I loved. It might be something on probabil-
ity. I would read the recommended books, then I would have to ask a question
and work my way through to a sufficiently clear understanding of that field to
read a coherent essay. I found it a very stimulating experience.
MH: There was presumably one-on-one tutoring?
RB: It was either one-on-one or one-on-two. Despite my passion for philosophy, at
the end of my finals I eventually opted for economics. This was really because
I thought that economics was the most important, or rather the most serious,
of the PPE disciplines. While I was very good at solving the puzzles that were
posed in philosophy and found the experience very rewarding, they were often
in themselves totally trivial, such as is there another mind in the world, does
this table exist, or do you have two hands? And there I sat reading an essay to
my tutor about it! The topics in politics and economics by contrast were
intrinsically about something, the answer wasn’t obvious, with the only chal-
lenge being how you arrive at the answer. I actually thought at the time that I
was best at politics, but whereas I got alpha marks in philosophy and econom-
ics, in politics in my finals I got gamma marks. At the time I thought this was
because I was too creative and free, and probably too radical, whereas in phi-
losophy and economics there were bodies of theory that you had to show com-
petence in and I was at least very competent in those theories. So I rejected
politics as a career option to some extent and that led me into economics. The
biggest problems in the world were I thought economic ones, and that is the
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reason why I went into doing a DPhil in economics. While I jettisoned 
philosophy because of its lack of seriousness and politics because of its lack of
theory, it was intuitively obvious to me that the economic theory I had been
expounding in my essays and exams was woefully inadequate. In fact the
beauty of the tutorial system was that one was encouraged to be critical even
about the latest received theories. By the time I took finals in economics, my
essays and the discussions I would have with my tutors fully exhausted the
tutorial hour and they were having to find spaces in their schedules to carry on
the discussion.
MH: Tumoori coming into his own – and Why-Because.
RB: That’s right. I took my finals at the end of May 1966 and I think in January we
had a mock finals exam and I won a prize, called the Jenkins prize. I felt com-
pletely on top of my form from the point of view of writing an exam, because I
thoroughly knew the theories involved. 
MH: In orthodox economics?
RB: Yes. But this was also true of philosophy, where I was able to be critical in a
very small way, because most of my criticisms were of the kind that had already
occurred to my tutors or that they were prepared to accept. So I was for them
an ideal – a star – undergraduate.
MH: You were very conscientious?
RB: Well, I always went to my tutorials. I had very good tutors. If I could just
develop the contrasts a little. By the time I did my finals I was so critical of the
received problematics that, as one of the examiners told me later, though he
had been informed that there were two outstanding candidates from Balliol, of
whom I was one, he had been unable to find any really outstanding papers (he
learnt our names only later). By now I had become too critical of the system
and I myself did not enjoy the experience of doing finals, because I was already
onto the terrain of my postgraduate research. Looking at Oxford as a whole
you could say that there are two big contrasts, the contrast between the under-
graduate population and the graduate population and then between the stu-
dents and the teachers. Oxford is very much a place for undergraduates,
Oxford and Cambridge are the best places in the world to be as an undergrad-
uate; you lead a wonderful existence if you are lucky enough to be in a college
and have tutors who are good and have a good circle of friends. Most original
or creative postgraduates, on the other hand, have a very difficult time
because when you are postgraduate you come up very clearly against the lim-
its of the discipline. PPE was designed to turn you into a top-class civil servant,
able to turn your hand to any brief or service the empire in a variety of roles.
But when you are a postgraduate, what you are actually having to do is to
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become professionalised into a particular discipline. There are very different
skills required. When you are an undergraduate it doesn’t really matter what
you say, as long as you say it well, and argue it cogently. But when you are being
indoctrinated into a profession such as law or analytical philosophy or ortho-
dox economic theory, your argumentative prowess and whatever skills or orig-
inal insights you have are totally secondary to working within the existing
problem-field. In the field of development economics this was cost-benefit
analysis under the sign of the theory of modernisation, and when I went into
the faculty of economics as a postgraduate my supervisors and the other econ-
omists I knew were very concerned to enrol me in some research project of
their own, which might be cost-benefit analysis in East Africa. A very nice guy
who was the other tutor in economics at Pembroke, Arthur Hazelwood, tried
to get me into this; he wasn’t coercive at all, but that is basically the kind of
thing my superiors wanted me to be doing.
MH: Do work for them?
RB: I very much resisted this. After doing finals, two other finalists of that year and
I launched a PPE reform group that developed a critique of PPE. The precise
nature of the critique is something we needn’t go into in detail here, but from
my retrospective point of view, trying to capture what I felt at the time, the gist
of it was that PPE may have been a great experience but much of it was not
serious in the Hegelian sense.
MH: So in terms of your struggle to come into your dharma, the big picture is that
Oxford provided a wonderfully exhilarating and liberating context for you as
an undergraduate, but then as a postgraduate you encountered the orthodoxy
of the discipline, the tyranny of normal science, the mandarin outlook of aca-
demia.
RB: Absolutely, and I think you can say that I was already running up against 
the limits of the tutorial system while I was an undergraduate. In January 
1966 I was completely in my element, but by June I was thoroughly browned
off with everything. I remember the last day of my finals. Most people were 
sitting around drinking champagne, but I drove straight back to London. I
wanted to see my girlfriend at the time, but also just to get out of Oxford. In
fact I was fed up, what I had been doing did really feel like a constriction. I
remember I had a friend who had a nervous condition who didn’t take her
finals. She might have spent some time in a mental establishment, as 
they were called, in Oxford. I remember thinking, when I went to see her, that
her condition was a result of the pressure, in the form of an essay a week and
then the finals, on a very creative person. If I had not taken my finals when I
did, I would not have been able to do them. I think I had probably reached 
the point of being too critical for my own good, first in politics and then more
generally.
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MH: How did you manage to be too critical? Were you drawing on influences from
outside the orthodoxies?
RB: At this point in time I would say inside. I was arguably writing better answers
than my tutors could have written within the context of the established
framework, but of course the established framework is never as consistent, as
coherent, as seems to be the case. At the moment before revolutionary science
becomes necessary, just taking the system to its limits is important.
MH: Immanent critique?
RB: Yes.
MH: At a talk you gave in India in 2002 you are introduced as having written your
first book when you were twenty.1 Did you indeed write a book at this time,
and if so what was it on?
RB: This would probably refer to the first draft of Some Problems about Explanation
in the Social Sciences, written in the summer of 1967, when I was 23. (Of course
I had, as already discussed, started writing a novel earlier, when I was about 17,
called Regurgitating Psyche, which was pretty soon discarded.) 
MH: Your tutors, you say, were excellent. Who were they?
RB: I do think I was exceptionally lucky in the tutors I had. In philosophy my main
tutors were Alan Montefiore and Anthony Kenny. Montefiore had extremely
wide-ranging interests and was very tolerant. He tutored at Balliol for thirty
years and is still an Emeritus Fellow there. 
MH: You thank him for reading a draft of A Realist Theory of Science.2
RB: Yes. Kenny had an extremely good analytical mind. He became Master of
Balliol in 1978, and is currently President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy.
In different ways they were both ideal tutors. They were very serious in the
sense that they actually believed and to some extent acted on what they were
teaching. So they had a kind of theory and practice consistency going, and for
me their seriousness was above all evident in their asking, and being amenable
to discourse about, big questions in politics. A very nice guy called Bill
Weinstein, currently Emeritus Fellow at Balliol, and a consultant on corporate
strategy, was my tutor in politics. My main tutor in economic theory was
Richard Portes, and in economic organisation Wilfred Beckerman, who is now
a prominent critic of sustainable development. All these four or five tutors had
one thing in common: they were excellent teachers. I had friends in other col-
leges who were not nearly so lucky. When I became a member of the senior
common room at Pembroke, I could see that, with a few exceptions, including
Ch 2.qxp  12/18/2009  2:02 PM  Page 26
Oxford days, 1963–1973 27
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
my friend Arthur Hazelwood, students there were very unlucky. Of course at
Balliol we achieved exceptionally good results. In my year there were three
Firsts, but in the following year I think there were about thirteen out of a group
of fifteen. I remember one guy getting a First who had borrowed my under-
graduate essays on the eve of his finals. My essays were very much in demand,
both as a resource and to revise from. This was in the days before the internet. 
MH: What was it like living in college?
RB: In Balliol at first I had a nice room, sharing a bathroom and a kitchen with two
others. Then I had a suite of rooms. All these rooms came together with a late-
middle-aged bloke who was basically a glorified servant. He used to come in
and wake you up in the morning. He was called your scout. It was not so long
before that time that undergraduates used to bring their own servants with
them! People were sent down, that means thrown out of the college, for being
found with a member of the opposite sex in their room after ten o’clock. Ten
o’clock is ridiculously early. My room in the first year was directly opposite the
chapel, and the Dean, who was also the person who took services, was respon-
sible for ensuring we were not up to any hanky panky. He would stand there
from a quarter to ten on the look out – I could just see him looking at my room
– and I had one or two very close shaves. I quickly realised there was no prob-
lem if you were prepared to tip the porters, as long as your friend left, not
exactly at ten but perhaps eleven-thirty, when the Dean had gone to bed; then
for half a crown the porter would let her out, or let you out if you were visiting.
In my second year there was a coal-hole that I and a friend made usable so that
we could come in after ten o’clock. It went into the cellars and up our stairs;
the entrance was in St Giles Street. It was as if the system was inviting you to
find a way round it, but if you were caught it could be serious. There was one
occasion when the mother of a girlfriend of mine went to visit her daughter,
and I was in her room at seven in the morning and she went and reported this
to the Dean. I was gated for three or four days. The mother was a bit of a pain.
When she saw me, she turned to her daughter and said, ‘Geraldine! How could
you? What about your Queen, your country?’ And she carried on in this way
for two or three hours, and later launched into a tirade with the Dean, who
must have thought, ‘I have to take some action’. The sort of action that might
normally have been taken if you were caught infringing a rule was rustication,
which meant being sent down for the rest of the term, so I was lucky (perhaps
the tirade made him soft on me). There were people who were sent down even
from Nuffield, which is a postgraduate college. 
MH: What a privileged lot you were, though. Tell us some more about your PPE
reform group.
RB: As a postgraduate one was aware of a movement to change the antiquated
rules governing Oxford collegial life. And this did happen very quickly in the
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late 1960s. By the mid-1970s almost all the colleges had become both-sex
ones, and the gating laws were all abolished. This was in part an achievement
of the Oxford revolutionary socialist movement, which made internal
demands on the system. Together with two friends, one of whom, Trevor
Pateman, went on to become a critical realist (I subsequently examined his
PhD in the philosophy of language and education at Sussex), I was very inter-
ested in the reform of PPE. We wrote a critique of it and within a year or two
the structure of PPE had been transformed. You could now do sociology, you
could do Hegel, you could do Marx, continental philosophy, and these were
permanent effects at the Oxford undergraduate level. 
MH: Did you get a reputation as a rebel or troublemaker?
RB: I think at Balliol I was certainly known as being very clever, but I was also
known as enjoying life to the full, which I did. I didn’t work exceptionally hard
except in my last undergraduate year. I probably did work as hard as, or harder
than, most but otherwise what I would do was spend one day writing an essay,
and another day writing another essay, leaving the rest of the time free for a
mix of preparation, intellectual discussion, socialising, going to parties and
that sort of thing. I was politically radical, but I wasn’t notorious or anything
like that. When I got to Nuffield, then I did become somewhat notorious as a
rebel and a radical. 
MH: Before we go into that, can you tell us more about the undergraduate work you
were doing?
RB: I suppose the basis of PPE was very much laid in the work of John Stuart Mill,
who was an adept at all three. The ideal was to become, more or less, a modern
equivalent to Mill. There was very little discussion of Hegel and Marx, who
certainly weren’t recognised as major thinkers. Most people who did well in
philosophy wouldn’t even have done any Kant. It was sufficient to do
Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, that was it. Philosophy was very philis-
tine in that way. For economics you had to do basic neo-classical and
Keynesian economic theory and problems in the British economy since the
war. To go back to philosophy, you had a moral and political philosophy paper,
on which there was a kind of consensus at the time that was represented by a
text by S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters called Social Principles and the Democratic
State; and a paper on modern philosophy, which was basically Descartes and
the British empiricists. You had to do two compulsory papers in philosophy, in
economics, and in politics and then you had two other options. I took philo-
sophical logic. This was a very exciting and interesting subject at the time. You
did a little bit of formal logic, but it was really based on the Oxford philosophy
of John Austin and the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. One was
reading texts by Peter Strawson such as The Bounds of Sense and Introduction to
Logical Theory, which I still think is a very radical and challenging book. 
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The other option I took was economic development, and there I had as one
of my tutors Paul Streeton, who was a Fellow of Balliol. He was quite a bigwig
in the whole field of development studies. He himself was a disciple of Tommy
Balogh who had also been a Fellow of Balliol and now had some sort of visit-
ing or emeritus status there. Tommy Balogh was Harold Wilson’s economic
guru, and very soon after the Labour party came to power in October 1964 I
remember seeing him in a very inebriated but ecstatic frame of mind. He was
a bigger than life character. He was a Hungarian economist, like Nicholas
Kaldor, but he had been a real critic of the civil service and had written many
articles that were very critical of orthodoxy in the field of development eco-
nomics. You were very aware that he was the guru of Harold Wilson because,
while I can’t remember ever seeing them together, you also saw Wilson at
Oxford. What actually happened on that first night in October was that
Balogh and Wilson decided unilaterally, without consultation with anyone
else in the Cabinet, that there would be no devaluation of sterling, that they
would defend the currency to the hilt. In that decision the fate of the first
Wilson Labour government was sealed, because it meant that there could not
be an (‘indicative’) economic plan of the kind that George Brown had been
working on and people such as Beckerman had supervised in France. There
was no growth potential for the British economy any more, because every-
thing was sacrificed to defending the currency. Of course eventually the
pound was devalued. However, to speak about it, to consider its pros and cons
was taboo. Nicholas Kaldor, the Treasury’s chief economist, went along with
the Balogh–Wilson decision, and might even have approved of it. But that of
course merely set the context for the capitulations of the Labour government
in 1976 to the IMF, and the onset of monetarism – what could be called high-
monetarism under Denis Healey and then of course under Thatcherism. And
that was the beginning of the end of the welfare state in Britain, compared to
what you still have in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. That
fate was sealed on the very first night of the Labour government. Wilson was
known to be one of the best and brightest undergraduates that Oxford had
ever produced; he got one of the best Firsts ever, in PPE. He was an extremely
clever person and yet what a sell-out to the principles behind PPE. First, it was
completely the wrong decision, because all the other goals for the Labour gov-
ernment would have to be sacrificed for it. But then to enforce a complete
embargo on discussion so that there was no possibility within government or
Labour circles of raising this question again, that was a betrayal of the very idea
of rational, even more so that of open and democratic, government. Of course,
what they were worried about, because Britain had a balance of payments cri-
sis, was that if you devalued speculators would think that whenever a Labour
government came to power there would be a devaluation and therefore a run
on the pound, which would make the situation worse for any Labour govern-
ment in the future. That was the rationale for it. But exports would have been
cheaper with the devaluation, and imports would have been more costly; this
is how the American economy has been keeping afloat, at least until very
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recently, effectively by continual devaluations determined by the market and
central policy. 
Harking back to the point about privilege, I have to say that my first eco-
nomics tutorial was not actually with the people I mentioned as my main eco-
nomics tutors but with Derek Robinson, who was not quite such a prestigious
Fellow at Balliol. He worked in the Institute of Statistics, where I myself was
subsequently to work. When I went into his room for the first time, as soon as
I entered the phone rang and he picked it up and said, ‘Oh hello Frank’ – and
that was Frank Cousins, the Minister of Technology. And it was like that, you
were very aware that it did not matter which side or aspect of the class divide
you were on, or which particular institution you belonged to, the hierarchies
of power all converged in Oxford. I liked Derek Robinson, who became a
friend of mine. People like Tommy Balogh and Paul Streeton didn’t. In terms
of economics Paul Streeton, who I think had been a student at Balliol, had
attempted to formalise some of the characteristic errors of development eco-
nomics and there was quite bit of that kind of stuff by Tommy Balogh. Then
there was the debate about Milton Friedman and his critics, who included
Paul Samuelson. I remember I gave some papers at a postgraduate seminar that
Tommy Balogh had come back to run at Balliol, and he didn’t really like them,
even though I was arguing his sort of pitch. I think he was disapproving of me
because I was trying to be, in his mind, cleverer than him, or trying to upstage
him. Whatever little critical liberties you were allowed at a postgraduate level, 
this was always subordinate to the authority of your supervisors and institu-
tional superiors. 
MH: That’s very common in academia. Because of their structural position aca-
demics are prone to be ontologically insecure, and their whole identity is
bound up with building a reputation for being at the forefront of their field, so
they often find the notion that anyone might be brighter or more talented
than themselves difficult to come to terms with.
RB: Exactly. Having entered the Faculty of Economics as a postgraduate student, I
was excited because I had been appointed two exceptional supervisors: Paul
Streeton, who had done the closest thing there was in that sort of context to a
philosophically sophisticated critique of economic theory or what there was of
it from the point of view of development economics; and Ian Little, who had
a fantastically high reputation in Oxford and indeed generally because he was
the author of the standard text on welfare economics called A Critique of
Welfare Economics. So I thought, well, this is great, here are two very good
philosophical minds who are going to help me, and they will read my texts and
point me in the right direction. But they were completely unsympathetic and
totally uninterested in what I was doing. Ian Little, who was at Nuffield, did-
n’t read anything, and Paul Streeton sat on a draft of my thesis for over a year.
When I finally had a conversation with him, he said, ‘It’s not really econom-
ics you know’. It was clear that economics for him was cost-benefit analysis,
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particularly in the field of development economics, and all these wonderful
projects you could be involved in; and he was of course totally uncritical about
the tools he was using for the cost-benefit analysis. ‘No, it’s not really eco-
nomics, is it?’, he said. ‘Wouldn’t you be happier if you switched to the philos-
ophy faculty, or another faculty?’ Mercifully I had also given this text to Alan
Montefiore, after waiting for about a year to get some sort of feedback from
Streeton and Little. He read it quite quickly – I must admit it was a huge text
– but within months anyway, and he said, ‘Well this is great, but I’m not really
competent to comment very much’ (although he did make one or two com-
ments). ‘You should switch to philosophy. You should have as your supervisor’
(because I was saying a lot about philosophy of science in this text) ‘Rom
Harré.’ And now we are talking about the academic year 1969–70.
I was glad to switch to philosophy, but I was nervous about switching to
Rom Harré because I had read a few of his books of the 1960s and they seemed
to me very orthodox, and also he seemed to be a very strong individualist. I
have to say that I very rarely went to lectures; you can get by in Oxford as an
undergraduate without going to any lectures, everything is geared to your
tutorials. But I had been told by a friend that Harré was the nearest thing to me
that there was, that he was a very dynamic guy, a good lecturer, and with very
wide-ranging interests. So I knew a little bit about him at a remove. Anyway,
to my great relief, when I went to meet him in 1970 and handed him my text
– I can’t quite remember exactly which version it was, it was probably a devel-
opment of the one Montefiore had had, I know it consisted of six huge folders
– he read it. I was also aware of a book that for Harré was a major breakthrough,
his The Principles of Scientific Thinking, which had just come out;3 there was a
quantum leap between that book and the books he had written before it in the
1960s. It was intellectual love at first sight. It was a tremendous relief for me;
here was freedom from another huge constraint, the constraint of profession-
alisation into normal science or an academic discipline as taught normally. I
was aware that anyone writing that book with those ideas was not going to be
a problem, and of course he gradually read the text and really I can say that he
accepted it. But he did not actually give me any supervision. I was already
working on the next stage of the synthesis, which was basically a bringing
together of his critiques of the sufficiency of the Humean theory of causal laws
with my own critique of the lack of necessity of it, a critique that was already
developed in my text. I first put the two together in the manuscript, Empiricism
and the Metatheory of the Social Sciences, and then later more simply and
straightforwardly in A Realist Theory of Science. I do sometimes find references
implying that Rom Harré gave me instruction or something like that. It was
never the case. It was a meeting of equals. We had a great mutual respect for
each other and became very good friends. 
The basic problem I faced in working on a postgraduate thesis on the rele-
vance of economic theory for underdeveloped countries was that it was a topic
that was actually impossible to state given the economics profession at the
time, because the postgraduate was inculcated with the notion that it was
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wrong to ask questions about the relevance or the realism of any body of 
theory. The interesting thing was to express that theory in as succinct a way as
possible, to represent it in a few equations on the blackboard, and to work out
their logical consequences. That kind of algorithmic was what economic post-
graduates did; that was the creed of the economics profession – ‘don’t ask
about the realism, otherwise you could blow everything apart’ – that was the
naive justification of it. ‘We all know that we are not living in a world of per-
fect competition, we are not living in a world of a single commodity or two
commodities, it is much more complicated than that. So don’t ask about it,
just see what our tools can do. Don’t ask questions about how good the tools
are in any way.’ The aim was either to be a consummate mathematician and
show how you could manipulate these symbolisms, play with these algebraic
and computational representations of the fundamental axioms of free market
economics, neo-classical economic theory; or to be an ardent practitioner,
applying them in practical contexts. Already traditions such as Keynesianism,
which had only recently been dominant, were on the wane, regarded as hav-
ing nothing more to say. That was up to the politicians. It was just a technique,
possibly a rather dubious technique, to use, so you weren’t encouraged to work
any more in Keynesian economics. I was an office-holder of an undergraduate
society in Balliol, to which we invited people like Joan Robinson to come and
speak. Joan Robinson was a Maoist, which was lovely and refreshing, but it
wasn’t regarded as economics. That was a little bit of fun on the side.
Obviously I was very questioning of that kind of approach to economics.
There was the work of sociologists of knowledge such as Thomas Kuhn. I was
already incorporating the critique of the anti-monists in the philosophy of sci-
ence, people like Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, into my thesis, as well as my own
anti-deductive critique, and supplementing and synthesising the critique of
other anti-deductivists such as Harré. 
However the fundamental problem with the methodological discussions of
economies was hat there was no concept of ontology there. I was aware that
this was something that would have to be broached. 
MH: There was a taboo on it.
RB: Yes, a taboo on ontology. Looking back, I can reconstruct this more rationally
now. I went from economics to philosophy of science, but when you look at
the textbooks in the philosophy of science, your Poppers and Hempels, you
cannot see anything about the real world there either – not when they are
talking about explanation and conformation or falsification and the like. So I
went back to philosophy and critiqued the epistemic fallacy, in other words
the denial of ontology, at its roots. When I was trying to write an economics
thesis most of my criticisms turned on a figure that was absent, the implicit
ontology, what these texts were saying or presupposing about the world. It was
a struggle. I very much enjoyed writing, I enjoyed the texts I was reading, and
I was in a very stimulating social and political environment. But precisely
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because I was very much part of the environment I was critiquing at the level
of metatheory, I was very much identified as a revolutionary. So I knew what
I was up against, and I knew that I should not expect any favours from the
orthodox doyens of development economics. 
By the time I gave my six-volume manuscript to Rom Harré I was already
aware that what I was writing was actually the basis of three books. I was writ-
ing philosophy of science, philosophy of social science and ideology-critique.
The whole thing was about empiricism as a metatheory of the social sciences
(and that is what I actually called a development of it a little later). I gave it
the title of Problems about Explanation in the Social Sciences and submitted it as
a DPhil in 1971. Most of the problems I had between that 1971 text and the
publication of A Realist Theory of Science late in 1974 concerned getti g this
first critique into a manageable form. The overall project was an attempt to
cover the entire ground subsequently traversed by A Realist Theory of Science,
The Possibility of Naturalism and the third chapter of Scientific Realism and
Human Emancipation. Of those three parts, the part I was most impressed with
in the early 1970s was actually the critique of ideology: things like the isola-
tion of empiricism as involving the reification of facts and the fetishism of
conjunctions, and showing the resonances between the system of thought 
and the social order and the utility of using Marxian-type ideology-
critique. I would really need to look at the text of Problems about Explanation,
but my memory is that the role of the necessity for ontology and the role of
transcendental argument is downplayed; they are not really there in their
explicit form, and I think I can best explain how these later things arose in the
context of an account of the influences on my intellectual development. 
MH: Yes, how would you characterise the main intellectual influences that went
into the gestation of your DPhil thesis or theses and eventually A Realist
Theory of Science?
RB: To be a little bit formal about this, I would say there were ten main influences: 
1 the anti-monistic tradition in the philosophy of science;
2 the anti-deductivist tradition;
3 what can be called the theorists of the concrete;
4 sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideologies;
5 Marx and particularly his conception of praxis, which formed the basis of
the transformational model of social activity (TMSA);
6 structure and the whole idea of the contrast between structure and
events, as you could begin to find in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss and
the structuralists, but especially of Noam Chomsky (who gave one of the
few lectures I went to as an undergraduate in Oxford), and Louis
Althusser, who was then at the height of his influence;
7 language;
8 the natural philosophers;
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9 the metacritical context – I went back from Marx to Hegel to Kant and
also had a fresh look at Descartes;
10 perspective: Nietzschean perspectivism, Frantz Fanon’s theory of revolu-
tionary violence, the theory of crisis generally, Antonio Gramsci and, as
a kind of corrective or supplement to Fanon, Gandhi perhaps.
Of course any such list will depend to some extent on one’s starting point. This is
how it looks when I take myself back to writing texts in Nuffield as a sort of con-
sciously revolutionary student. There is a certain amount of irony in talking in
these terms, but nevertheless I was a critic of capitalism and a critic of structural
constraints of the sort that I was up against in my academic work.
MH: Right from the outset?
RB: From 1966, 1967 – it was a gradual thing. In 1966, when I wrote my finals
papers, I was thoroughly imbued with Wittgenstein and Austin, I knew a lit-
tle bit about Kant, Hegel and Marx, but I might not have even been familiar
with the name Thomas Kuhn. His Structure of Scientific Revolutions came out
in 1962, and while I was a postgraduate student at Nuffield, Paul Feyerabend
and Imre Lakatos were having their famous debates in the London School of
Economics. I was quite close to those contexts; from the moment I finished
PPE I was reading everything I could about science, as part of looking into the
scientificity of economics. The extraordinary impact of Kuhn and Feyerabend
involved the recognition that it is not just the case, as Popper argues, that fal-
sification plays a momentous role in science, but that meaning change and
inconsistency are of its essence. So I could begin to view scientific knowledge
as I described it in A Realist Theory of Science: as a transitive dimension, as a
social process, and one that is set in the context of wider social processes,
which are of course in the world. That was the great insight that I took from
the anti-monists I read. My reading of Kuhn and Feyerabend came after my
reading of the very interesting work being done in the more analytical philos-
ophy of science, professional work by writers such as Wilfred Sellars, Hilary
Putnam and so on, and including, I might say, some ordinary language critique
– the work of Michael Scriven struck me as being particularly insightful. We
should perhaps discuss that under theories of the concrete. 
Now this anti-monist strand on its own could not have done the trick, as
there was nothing to stop the collapse into extreme relativism, which is what
happened with Kuhn and Feyerabend; and the reason it happened was that
they lacked any notion of an intransitive dimension, of the real world, of
ontology. And so in reflecting on what was wrong with the anti-monists I was
noting correspondences with what was wrong with economics. I did a lot of
close textual analyses of some philosophers of science and social science and
you could actually see an implicit ontology that was completely false; an
ontology that had only to be expressed to be seen to be false. The extraordi-
nary thing about the dominance of these implicit ontologies was that they
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were informed by the Humean theory of causality. If you actually stated its
implications or that of the Popper–Hempel theory of explanation based on it
in the context of, say, economic theory or some other specific body of social
scientific theory that was at all problematic, it soon became evident that
something was very wrong, that something did not fit. But the way these prob-
lematics keep going is by divide and rule – ‘this is one subject, that is another:
that is next week’s topic’ – and so you never really got down to a focus on the
core theories that underpinned them all, and to a focus on the core theories
precisely as underpinning them all. These core theories were the Humean the-
ories of causality and of experience of the objects of what it was that was con-
stantly conjoined. 
Of course, I did not attempt to rubbish the anti-monists, or anythi g like
that. I was very grateful for their contribution and the stimulus I had from
reading them. The contrast between what Kuhn and Feyerabend were talking
about and what was talked about in Oxford philosophy was enormous. You
weren’t just talking about knowledge in the abstract, you were talking about
concrete knowledge, scientific knowledge, some real form of knowledge in a
real social process. The whole thing had flesh, it moved, whereas the discourse
of standard Oxford philosophy did not.
So the first line of influence had to be taken in conjunction with the second
line of influence, and this was the anti-deductivist line. And it was already
clear to me that you could not make sense of a notion of laws or principles in a
domain such as economics unless you construed them tendentially, as some-
thing that only tended to happen in actuality. Then the question was what
was it that tended to happen? It was obvious that the kind of ontology one
needed was a depth-ontology that involved structures, mechanisms and fields,
something other than events. This issued in the distinction between the
domains of the real, the actual and the empirical, and it was in that context
implicitly and to some extent explicitly that I started looking more closely at
the writings of the anti-deductivists and particularly Harré’s The Principles of
Scientific Thinking. As I’ve already said, I quickly conceived that the first thing
I had to do was supplement Harré’s critique with my own. 
MH: What was wrong with Harré’s critique? 
RB: The anti-deductivists were all trying to say that there was something more to a
causal connection or a law than a constant conjunction of events. What was
this something more? They were basically saying that it was a model. This was
a very Kantian theory. They were saying that knowledge according to the pos-
itivists had no structure, but that you could not talk about a scientific law
unless you had structure, that Kantian element. The problem for me about this
line of thinking was that unless you had a notion of the real world there was no
way you could ultimately arbitrate or choose between different models or con-
ceptions of structure. You want one model and I want another, so they are
equally good, and once again you collapse back into a form of relativism. The
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anti-deductivists did not make the obvious move of going from the model to
the referent of the model because it was totally taboo to talk about the real
world. I realised that, to do justice to their critique and to the anti-monistic
one, you had to have ontology there, and of course that is the way I had been
moving already in thinking about laws. To say that a constant conjunction of
events was not necessary for a law meant that a law had to be something else
that in itself had nothing essentially to do with a constant conjunction of
events. That was an ontological distinction. Quickly the epistemic fallacy fell
into place. And the lack of necessity (as well as sufficiency) of Humean crite-
ria for law, and the necessity for ontology, were two of my three main differ-
ences with Harré at the level of philosophy of science. The third concerned the
question of how you actually argue. There did not seem to be a principal
method of arguing, because after all that is what Harré’s account of science
implied: it was all about the imaginative deployment of models, and another
person might emphasise social context or frameworks or paradigms. How did
you know in any case that science operated in this way? Well, there were peo-
ple such as Mario Bunge, who just looked and described what scientists did, and
that is another influence I will come to. But this certainly was not good enough
for an Oxford DPhil, you had to prove it, and for that purpose I had adopted a
transcendental mode of argumentation. For a couple of years after the publica-
tion of A Realist Theory of Science, Harré actually accepted transcendental real-
ism,4 and then, for reasons that we can come to later, in my view fell back to a
pre-transcendental realist model.5 I had further differences with Harré when it
comes to the philosophy of social science, which we may also come to later.
Perhaps I should briefly clarify my three main differences with Harré at the
level of philosophy of science. First, the Humean theory of causal laws as con-
stant conjunctions of atomistic events or empirical regularities is not only not
sufficient, it is not a necessary condition for a causal law (and a fortiori for all
the theories of orthodox philosophy of science based on the Humean
account). That is to say, the causal connection is neither contingent nor
actual. There is an ontological difference between causal laws and patterns of
events, which is brought out when I talk of the difference between the
domains of the real and the actual. 
So the second difference between Harré and myself at the level of philoso-
phy of science concerns his lack of the notion of ontology. He is a transcen-
dental idealist, rather than a transcendental realist; whereas for me, the
presence of structure in the world, as well as in our knowledge of the world,
must be recognised and accommodated. And, as a condition of this distinc-
tion, we need also the critique of the epistemic fallacy or the conflation of
ontology and epistemology. 
The third difference concerns the nature of philosophical argument, how
we get at our conclusions in philosophy. There is no conscious employment of
transcendental argumentation or commitment to the principle of immanent
critique in Harré’s work. On the contrary, he deploys relatively ad hoc and
metatheoretically ungrounded methods of argumentation. 
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The three differences at the level of philosophy of science concern the lack
of necessity as well as sufficiency of orthodox accounts of science; the absence
of ontology and concomitant commitment to transcendental idealism; and
the lack of a principled method of argumentation.
MH: It is sometimes said that Harré is the co-founder of critical realism with you.
What is your response to that?
RB: I suppose the suggestion must concern itself only with first-level or basic crit-
ical realism, which may be regarded as compounded of theses or positions in
the philosophy of science and the philosophy of social science.6
In respect of the philosophy of science, as I have already argued, Harré’s
position is Kantian, rather than transcendental realist. There is no critique of
orthodoxy at the level of ontology, the critique is restricted to epistemology.
And even here the method of argumentation is, as we have seen, suspect.
Moreover, neither Harré nor his fellow thinkers, such as Charles Varela,
appreciate the way in which the lack of necessity of Humean criteria for ortho-
dox accounts of science provides an extraordinarily strong and powerful case
for a species of realism that can altogether break from the problem-field of
Humean empiricism, in which Harré, like Kant, continues to be mired.
Our positions have always diverged in the philosophy of social science.
When I first met him, he was committed to a methodological individualism.
His approach to structure has usually been voluntaristic. And his ontology of
language has characteristically been idealist. In typical neo-Kantian style, a
dualistic schism and Manichean contrast between the socially constructed
world of society and the empirically given world of nature has pervaded his
thought. In short, whereas in the case of philosophy of science there are con-
tinuities as well as breaks, there is a huge gulf in our accounts at the level of the
philosophy of social science, as he would himself confirm.
Moreover, to imply that he was a co-founder of critical realism would sug-
gest a level of collaboration that we have never enjoyed.7 Finally, the absurd-
ity of this idea may be seen from the fact that he has never claimed to be a
critical realist and has always asserted, when not opposed to it, at least a degree
of difference from it (for example at the International Association for Critical
Realism [IACR] conference in 2008, to the extent of calling himself ‘a neo-
critical realist’).8
The doyens of most of the anti-deductivists were Austin and Wittgenstein,
who were also the chief mentors of what I call the theorists of the concrete.
These included people who had been Oxford philosophers or interested in
Oxford philosophy, such as Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, and I
would mention in particular, as a theorist of the ideographic, or the unique
and particular, Michael Scriven. But the work of Michael Polanyi, The Tacit
Dimension, and other books by him also falls into this category. 
The fourth big influence was the sociology of knowledge and critiques 
of ideology. By now I had a conception of the transitive and intransitive
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dimensions and was beginning to see that, not only did scientific knowledge
and knowledge generally have to be situated in the social world – and the
influences here would include Kuhn and the Edinburgh school of sociology of
knowledge, especially Barry Barnes and David Bloor – but they had to be situ-
ated in the world itself, that is ontologically, as being, and materially, as (an
emergent) part of nature. Moreover, the social world presupposed critique –
and remember I was always at the same time working on or thinking about the
philosophy of social science. Indeed, initially the most important thing for
me, and the first of all the strands of influence to be developed by me, was the
critique of ideology, as I have already said. Eventually I realised that I would
have to give up trying to put that in a very simple form because I did not have
the time and energy. I had to press on with the positive aspects of my personal
dialectic, so its residue is to be found in a chapter in Reclaiming Reality and the
third chapter in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. 
Then the fifth influence was Marx. 
MH: When did you start reading him?
RB: I was very intellectually interested in Marx in my undergraduate days. Indeed,
I had already taken an interest in Marx in socio-political terms as a teenager.
But for me as a postgraduate student Marx had become of practical relevance,
because when I entered Nuffield the social world was very polarised. And
Nuffield – Oxford generally, but Nuffield more than any other college – had
very direct links between the academic community and the key decision mak-
ers outside. George Brown and Jim Callaghan were visiting Fellows, and they
used to come, and we were supposed to socialise with them. The first people I
became friends with in Nuffield – I was already of the left – were students from
the Third World: Trevor Munroe, who a few years later founded the Workers’
Liberation Party in Jamaica, later called the Workers’ Party of Jamaica (a pro-
Moscow communist party); Athar Hussain, who was one of the collaborators
of Ben Brewster and other Althusserians; and another Indian called Prabhat
Patnaik, who went on to a career in India as an academic economist strongly
critical of neo-liberalism and became prominent in the Communist Party of
India (Marxist). Of course before arriving in Oxford these people were already
to some extent organic intellectuals in their own context. What was most
important to them were things such as the black power salute that Tommie
Smith and John Carlos gave at the 1968 Olympics. We studied the news of the
Vietnam war every day, and what was happening with the Cuban and other
revolutions and insurgencies all around the world. This was what immediately
concerned us. We were part of a broader Oxford revolutionary student move-
ment, and I was recognised to be the intellectual, as it were, who was writing
the critiques and the texts; and I used to help them with their pamphlets. The
Nuffield left had a special position here. From the point of view of thinking
about science one obviously needed to look at Marxism; it was obviously going
to be a tremendously relevant resource. When I started reading Marx 
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seriously, I found the youthful writings and texts such as the Introduction to
the Grundrisse, which had only just been published, immensely stimulating. It
was obviously in Marx that you had a conception of praxis. I began to see my
own life, like that of the group, as politicised; so I could no longer be friends in
the same way with colleagues on the other side of the political divide. 
The sixth sort of influence was structuralism. It was tremendously exciting
to read the works of people such as Lévi-Strauss, Althusser and Chomsky. It
was clear that the objects of scientific knowledge they were concerned with
were something other than atomistic events. All three of these structuralisms
were more or less consciously critical of empiricism. It quickly became obvious
to me that the ‘other thing’ that was the bearer of tendencies and powers
would have to be structures. Then you wanted to know in science about the
way structures worked, so you were concerned with the modus operandi, the
generative mechanism, at work as a property of the structure and how it pro-
duced events. I was never an Althusserian, though like everyone else at the
time I was enormously impressed by his work. 
The seventh sort of influence was language. You could not help but be influ-
enced by language if you thought there was any truth in what the later
Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophy was saying, because for them the solu-
tion to all problems lay in the analysis of language. But this interest in lan-
guage, which took me into hermeneutics and semiotics and overlapped with
my interest in structuralism, also raised the question of the limits of language.
It seemed to me patently obvious that society is constituted by more than just
language; that society is about real oppression, real acute poverty, real deaths,
real wars, real battles, and that there is a huge distinction between the word
‘battle’ or any number of sentences about a battle and a real battle. It is impor-
tant to remember in this context that in the formal part of my studies I was
working on three fronts: philosophy of science, philosophy of social science
and the critique of ideology. In the philosophy of social science the limits of
language was obviously going to be a very important topic. 
And then the eighth influence was natural philosophers. These were
philosophers such as Samuel Alexander and R. G. Collingwood. There was a
traditional, pre-Oxford-linguistic discourse about what science did, which,
when it fused historical narrative and metaphysical speculations, as exempli-
fied, for example, in Collingwood’s The Idea of Nature, could be very invigor-
ating and wonderful up to a point. You were actually talking about nature. But
you could also find this kind of thing as well within more orthodox philoso-
phies of science; for example, the work of Bunge, who was saying very sensible
things about what scientists did. The great problem was that it was just their
account, they had no way of demonstrating that it was more than that. When,
for example, analytical philosophers wanted to say, ‘Well, we are not inter-
ested in that, we are pursuing the implications of the analysis of knowledge or
what counts as knowledge, or we are doing something properly philosophical’,
then you had to have a way of immanently critiquing them, of engaging with
them, of making them serious. (I don’t know if I would have used the term
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‘serious’ at this stage.) This was also true of the reflections of writers such 
as Michael Polanyi, who was one of the very few who talked about emergence.
I remember that, even as late as 1985, when I was negotiating with Verso 
for the publication of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, Peter Dews
was deputed by New left Review (whose publishing house Verso was), and pre-
sumably by Perry Anderson, to say to me, ‘Well, emergence is not a scientifi-
cally acceptable concept.’ Yet that was a major part of the realist critique of
science. Polanyi was one of the few people who talked about emergence, 
and yet it was divorced from any philosophically rigorous way of proving or
establishing it. 
And so I became interested – all these influences are going on simultane-
ously – in the ninth line of influence, which was the metacritical one. This
involved going back from Marx and reading Hegel and then Kant, and dis-
covering that transcendental arguments were the key with which I could
unlock empiricism while immanently engaging it. 
MH: So you went to both Hegel and Kant via Marx?
RB: No, I would have read them to some extent before getting into Marx.
MH: Including Hegel? You came to him independently?
RB: It is difficult to say, but undoubtedly by the time I was really interested and
seriously reading Marx, including Capital and trying to make sense of what
Marx was trying to do, I was also interested, as you could not help but be if you
were really interested in Marx, to go into the Marx–Hegel relationship. I
became really interested in Kant as well, and of course the first step in the
melt-down of Oxford linguistic philosophy was Strawson’s The Bounds of
Sense (1966) which defended a non-empiricist method against the methods of
John Austin and other analytical philosophers, which were empiricist: they
said in effect, ‘Just look at the way we use language, take a few examples and
you have your resolution there’. The Bounds of Sense was a systematic attempt
to understand Kant in Kantian terms. Strawson was regarded as the doyen of
the Oxford philosophers at the time. He had established the respectability of
using something like a transcendental argument. Very few philosophers were
consciously doing that, but I seized on it at a relatively early stage. 
Then, of course, before Kant there was Descartes, who everyone agreed was
the founder of modern philosophy. Something like the cogito, ‘I think there-
fore I am’, did indeed seem to me to express what much modern philosophy
was about. Now Wittgenstein had succeeded in critiquing the dominance of
egocentricity in so far as his private language argument basically showed that
society is ontologically prior to the individual. What I wanted to argue was
that, while society is indeed prior to the individual, the natural world is also
ontologically prior to society and thus to any human being, at least any human
being as we know it. And I wanted to ask what are the presuppositions of this
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thought of Descartes, ‘I think therefore I am’, and that led and fed into my cri-
tique of the dominant philosophies of science as ideologies. 
Then the tenth influence can best be introduced in the following sort of
way. Even if you had transcendental argumentation, interesting questions
remained as to why Kant discovered it or why and how you were using it. It was
very obvious to me that in a politically, socially and economically polarised
world perspective is a very important determinant of what one actually
believes. So Nietzschean perspectivism was among my influences. A question
obviously arose: what was the correct or best perspective? My friends from the
Third World at Nuffield and I decided it would be important to read texts rel-
evant to revolutionary struggle in the Third World, of the sort that was going
on in Vietnam. Fanon was the great theorist of revolutionary violence, of the
cathartic effect that violence could have on the individual. And to some
extent this was also very popular among the non-Third-World peer group that
quickly formed around us, including people such as Ben Cousin and Caroline
New.
MH: It is interesting that you identified as Third World when in important
respects you weren’t really Third World, you were First World middle class.
RB: In any event we had Third World allegiances, and we were at the core of the
movement. One of our group was an Indian and another a Pakistani, and I
found it congenial to identify with my Indian background. When we had
black power leaders coming, they tended not to say, well, you don’t look very
brown or black to me. I was always assumed to be on the right side, so this was
a little bit of elitism. I was very critical of elitism, but psychologically, if the
door is open to you and you want to go into that room, then you go through it.
But don’t forget I had suffered racial oppression myself as a child. 
Now undoubtedly revolutionary violence can play a vital role, but some of
my friends thought that was basically it. So they were always up for a con-
frontation whenever they could get it. Remember this is the era of Mao’s
Cultural Revolution. Those who took a contrary view were cold-shouldered.
This happened to me once or twice to my disgust. These were fraternal argu-
ments, but I could see the effect it was having; there had to be a broader strat-
egy. Intellectual struggle was part of it, so I began to think in terms of all
struggles being basically struggles in wars of position and manoeuvre (I was
reading Gramsci) in which you were trying to outflank your opponent, prefer-
ably without violence. You could do this. I believe that all the great revolu-
tionary moments that we know, when they actually happen, do not involve
very much violence at all. It might come subsequently, because the revolu-
tionary cause is incomplete or because it is not carried through, or for some
other reason. Later I became interested in how you could adopt an altogether
different approach. But even then I was aware of, if you like, the transcenden-
tal features of consciousness, that when you are engaging in violence you can
always reflect on it, and when you are reflecting on it you are not (in that
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moment of reflection) being violent and, in the state of non-violence so
achieved, are less likely to be violent at all. That is a clue into a Gandhian
non-violent strategy.
MH: You were into this already in about 1970?
RB: Yes. Properly conceived this is a strategy that is a way of waging war, but a 
non-violent or non-warlike, peaceful way of waging war – or, we might say, of
waging peace, peace in the interests of social justice. Then the question 
could be, at the minimum, which way is the more effective? Gandhi called his
theory satyagraha, which means the way of the truth, holding onto truth,
truth-force. So we have the idea that the self-conscious monitoring of what
was happening at the surface level could, as it were, embody a more profound
truth and give you a greater purchase in your war of position and manoeuvre.
This could be conceived, as I think Gandhi did, and I was later to do (in my
theory of co-presence), as a matter of principle; or it could be viewed, as I 
was inclined to view it at the time, as a contingently tactically superior 
position. Then you could, if need be, choose a violent response, but it was not
a matter of dogma, it was a matter of tactics and strategy. However you can
only articulate that position, which does not eschew violence, from a stand-
point of something that is itself non-violent. Here, of course, you already have
the idea of stratification again; here we are talking about a stratification in
consciousness and a stratification in levels of political strategy. Looking back
on it, as I have noted elsewhere,9 I think the great mistake of the revolution-
ary movements I was associated with in the 1960s and 1970s was to think you
could overthrow capitalism merely by mobilising social hatred. That might
produce a revolution, but would it produce the good society? If you are going
to build a society based on love and co-operation, the end must be prefigured
in the means. Or, as Gandhi put it, ‘You must be the change you want in the
world’.
MH: I’d like you to come back now to the issues surrounding the rejection of your
DPhil theses. What precisely happened, and how would you explain it? 
RB: In autumn term of 1971 I submitted a thesis called Some Problems about
Explanation in the Social Sciences. The name I subsequently gave it after it had
been rejected as a DPhil thesis, Empiricism and the Metatheory of Social Science,
is a better description of it. It was about 130,000 words long. My supervisor,
Rom Harré, was in America and I think he might have forgotten to apply for
an extension of the word-limit, which was 100,000 words. The thesis was basi-
cally a draft of what Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (SRHE) would
later be. It had three chapters, each longer than the one before. The first was
to become ‘Scientific Realism’ (SRHE, Chapter 1) and A Realist Theory of
Science; the second became ‘Critical Naturalism’ (SRHE, Chapter 2 and The
Possibility of Naturalism), and the third on the critique of ideology became ‘The
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Positivist Illusion’ (SRHE, Chapter 3). But the first chapter did not start with
a transcendental argument from experimental activity in science, it started
with a transcendental argument from language. So it is quite interesting I
think even now. Anyway, I was a little apprehensive, I suppose, but basically I
was feeling confident that I had made a significant contribution to knowledge.
The day that my oral examination was due to be held, in early March 1972, I
think, Rom Harré rang me at about eight in the morning. I thought he might
be ringing me up to wish me good luck or something, but what he said was a
bombshell: the examiners had refused to examine it because it was too long.
Since they had had it for several months, I was pretty disgusted at this. If they
had only just looked at it the night before, that would have been even worse,
but what I suspected was that they had had a look at it and were fixing on an
excuse not to examine it, possibly because they did not find it easy to assess the
arguments within it or at any rate did not want to debate them with me. The
first line of defence, if you are faced with something very radical, is not to 
argue with it, to ignore it and hope it will go away. And I think that is what
they tried to do. 
MH: Who were they?
RB: They were David Pears, quite a respected philosopher who was an expert on
Wittgenstein, and Peter Hacker who became very famous for producing one of
the orthodox interpretations of the later Wittgenstein. I was very upset to say
the least when Rom Harré told me this. I talked to a few friends, and I think
almost that day, or perhaps the next, I drove down to London with Gareth
Stedman-Jones, a friend at Nuffield who was a couple of years older than me
but had always been very close to the revolutionary kernel in Nuffield. I went
with him because he had a literary agent. So I met this literary agent who 
took a look at it and sent it to Routledge. The editor of the Routledge 
series was Ted Honderich, who became relatively well known as a philoso-
pher. He wrote to me after about a year saying this is a really formidable work,
we would very much like to publish it, is there any way you could make it a bit
simpler in places? So I wrote back saying I was actually producing a text that I
hoped would be much simpler – by then I was writing A Realist Theory of
Science. I had decided that it was too much to cover the whole territory I was
working on in one book, and that I should concentrate on the positive
account of science. 
MH: How did the examiners get appointed?
RB: The faculty are supposed to appoint them but your supervisor should really
play a role. From what they had written, neither of the examiners were com-
petent to judge my work. Indeed, most Oxford philosophers did not know any-
thing about Kuhn and Feyerabend or about science, and they weren’t really
that much interested in social science.
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MH: Two Wittgensteinians are hardly the sort of philosophers one would choose
as examiners of your work if one wanted to ensure it was given a constructive
reading. Did Harré fight back?
RB: He was personally (though not institutionally) very supportive after the
event. He might have recommended someone else, but he probably did not. 
MH: What did he think of your work? Did he read it?
RB: Yes, Rom read every bit of it and he would sometimes make a little marginal
comment on it, but basically he was extremely supportive to my face in 
everything he said. He was now writing with Paul Secord The Explanation 
of Social Behaviour and giving lectures on it. He more or less twisted my arm to
go along, so I did go to many of them. Sometimes when I was there he 
would take up some point from my work and advertise it to the class. He would
say, ‘As Roy Bhaskar says, we have to distinguish the real and the actual’. He
would say this in a rather offhand way, though I think he did also actually
understand and believe it. He also probably thought he was doing me a 
very good turn, but of course the result was laughter. People thought, what
could be more absurd than distinguishing between the real and the actual! I
was mortified and had a word with him, saying please wait until it comes out.
I had realised from discussing my ideas with people that, as Feyerabend later
put it, it takes time to develop a good theory – if you let it out too soon, then
you lose it. I could have spent a lifetime in the economics faculty arguing
about laws and tendencies and have got absolutely nowhere. When you are
engaging in a strategy of immanent critique, you have to be very careful about
what your target is, and then you have to carry it through, it has to be a total
critique. You isolate what you are trying to attack, you concentrate your 
forces on it and then you carry it out. It has to be total, everything has to be
worked out. 
MH: You have a wonderful gift for this.
RB: Anyway, I told Rom Harré to shut up, but I don’t think he really did; I was not
going to his lectures any more. By now I was living in Herefordshire, close to
the Welsh border, and I was working on my own. After I went up to Edinburgh
in October 1973 I quickly completed A Realist Theory of Science, and took it
down to Oxford.
MH: So you had basically decided to work up the manuscript that became A Realist
Theory of Science as another DPhil thesis. Is that what Harré advised?
RB: No. I was very excited about ontology, I was very excited about transcenden-
tal arguments and I knew what I was doing now. The moves that I was 
making seemed so obvious I could not believe no one else had made them –
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resuscitating the ancient science of ontology or a new form of it, using a 
transcendental method; it was waiting to happen. And people were talking of
a Copernican revolution being in the air; Rom Harré used these terms. This
was obviously a real Copernican revolution, because I was turning Kant
around using his own method. I knew nobody else had done this, and so was
very excited about what I was doing. I wrote the text in quite a short time; I
think I wrote chapters one and two in a couple of weeks in the autumn, the last
term of 1973, and then in a couple of weeks in the first term of 1974 I wrote
chapters three and four. Then I took it down to Rom Harré and gave it to him,
and he kept it overnight. There were tears in his eyes when he handed it back,
saying, ‘Well, if they don’t give you a DPhil for that, then no one can ever get
a DPhil in Oxford’, something like that. I had the thesis bound, and then sub-
mitted it to the faculty. Then the examiners were appointed, and you have to
say there was no other philosopher of science in Oxford other than Rom Harré
at that time. Supervisors weren’t allowed to examine.
MH: It had to be an internal examiner?
RB: No, it did not, but it was the Oxford tradition only to have internal examin-
ers. The examiners were appointed, I went back to Edinburgh and then in
April went down to Oxford for my viva. I went and met the examiners, I knew
who they were of course – 
MH: Who were they?
RB: Geoffrey Warnock, who later became the vice-chancellor of the university
and was Austin’s favourite pupil, and Bede Rundle, who was a logician at
Trinity College. I was completely armed for every possible line of criticism.
But actually there was no criticism. Instead, it was: ‘Do come in, Mr. Bhaskar.
We would like to congratulate you on this piece of work. We cannot find any-
thing wrong with it, in fact we agree with it all.’ I was really taken aback.
‘There is only one problem about awarding you the title of DPhil. We are not
quite sure how you satisfy this statute’, and they took out this big book of
statutes. ‘The work has to be an original contribution to knowledge, but we
already know all this stuff. We cannot find anything new in it.’ I was com-
pletely thrown. On almost every page I say exactly, very precisely, what the
advance is that I am making. I was dumbstruck. They said, ‘If you could take it
back, and just make clear exactly how you are adding to our knowledge, what
we do not already know, then I am sure there will be no problem.’ They prob-
ably knew that I would not do that, and they hoped it would just go away and
be forgotten. But actually this was the other line of defence against a novel sys-
tem of thought: one line is to ignore it, the other is to say you accept it and that
it is in fact already there.
MH: What did you say? 
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RB: I was completely dumbfounded. I had gone in with my mind all cluttered up
with ideas about how to respond to every conceivable criticism. I did not see
the full importance of being empty-minded until much later.
MH: Was Harré there?
RB: No, but I told him. I had given, or very shortly afterwards I gave, this text to a
few people to read, including Perry Anderson, who was the editor of New left
Review, at Verso. One of the other people I gave it to was trying to set up a book
company in Leeds, the boyfriend of Theresa Hayter, Bob Gregory. Bob
Gregory didn’t read it, but he said he would publish it. So it was quickly
snapped up. 
MH: What happened to the interest from Ted Honderich and Routledge?
RB: He wrote to me, after it was already under contract, roughly to the effect that
if anything he preferred the earlier work, regarding A Realist Theory of Science
as tending to idealism in places. I think this was probably because of its refer-
ence to natural necessity, which he perhaps did not sufficiently differentiate
from logical necessity. Generally, however, the response to A Realist Theory of
Science ranged from cautious approval to outright enthusiasm. Perry Anderson
wrote to me, saying this is a work of the moment, your prose has extraordinary
eloquence. Rom Harré was very upset that it had been rejected. The book
came out in November 1974, but we decided to put 1975 as the date of 
publication, because that allowed a whole year for it to be a new book. It was
immediately given a very good review in the Times Literary Supplement by
Stefan Körner. My colleagues at Edinburgh were very supportive; many of
them did not even ask me what had transpired, they knew from my expression
that something terrible had happened. Generally, the reception was very
favourable. It included the two foremost Kant scholars in England: William
Henry (‘Richard’) Walsh, the head of my department at Edinburgh, and
Stefan Körner, who wrote the TLS review. They both liked it. 
MH: You once told me that Perry Anderson felt that it was so radical that you got
what you should have expected – rejection of the thesis I mean.
RB: Many people said it was too good, and I was aware of that myself. But I was per-
sonally crushed, extremely upset. There were various strategies open to me,
though. One strategy was to confront the examiners. But I was already out of
Oxford and it seemed there was no way I could win there, so I tried to outflank
them by getting it published immediately, which is what happened, and then
it was published to excellent reviews. What I thought at the time was, well,
the examiners will be mortified to realise that they have done this, but of
course I did not encounter them again in the flesh and I think they probably
quite soon forgot about it. Of course, I realised that not having a DPhil wasn’t
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the end of the world. As I said to Walsh, the most celebrated of philosophers,
Strawson, did not even have a First. That was common knowledge in 
Oxford. Very few Oxford dons had a DPhil at all. I didn’t think it would be an
insuperable obstacle at the time, but I was very upset.
MH: How do you account for its rejection?
RB: One reason is that, as most of my friends thought, what I was writing was 
too radical to be accepted within the conventional framework, and the 
immanent critique touched points that it just wasn’t acceptable to question
within that system. I think that is part of the truth; but another part is that I
did not belong to the old boys’ network in Oxford. When I went to the senior
common room in Pembroke and to high table at Nuffield I did not feel part of
the club. Many of the Fellows were getting extraordinarily drunk in the mid-
dle of the day and they weren’t doing any work. Oxford philosophy was
tremendously complacent. I could perhaps have joined the club by just con-
centrating on linguistic philosophy, as I was good at that sort of argumenta-
tion, but that wasn’t something I could really justify doing with my life and
whatever talents I might have. So I did not go to high table much, I did not 
sit in the seminars that might have been politic to sit in, and I did not offer to
do papers in front of Strawson, just as I had not wanted to do cost-benefit
analysis. 
MH: You didn’t play the game.
RB: I didn’t get professionalised into normal science. 
MH: It reminds me of a saying of Albert Einstein to the effect that really creative
work always meets with violent opposition from mediocrities.10
RB: Also of course, and this is something I have not thought about until recently,
another reason could have been racism. And then there was politics – because
I was well known to be a Marxist and to identify with the revolutionary left.
At the height of the student revolutionary movement the proctors – the organ
of discipline in Oxford – were always summoning me on one excuse or
another. It was a war. Another thing I think should be mentioned is that I
probably did not sufficiently prepare the ground for the new approach. Of
course, a number of people who knew me and broadly what I was working on,
for example John Mepham, were eagerly awaiting my work, feeling that I
would say something significant. But the actual themes had not been floated,
and you could argue that had I floated some of them in an article or two it
might have made a difference. A few straight articles in orthodox philosophy
of science might have helped. 
A further factor has to be that I did not get the support that I really needed
from Rom Harré. He should have increased the word limit initially and made
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sure that the examiners were going to read it seriously. He could have said to
them, you have to read this thesis and you have to understand what he is say-
ing. I think he could have done more for a better result. The system in Oxford
was that there was a faculty committee that nominated the examiners, but
probably subject to the right of the supervisor to veto them. So the question
might arise as to why Harré was so confident, if indeed he was, that they would
give me a fair crack of the whip. This raises an interesting question about his
thought at a personal level. What I myself would have done as a supervisor is
try to ensure that the examiners are the right people, or at least competent to
examine the thesis; and, if there was any doubt, go and ask them, test their
knowledge of the area, find out. But he did neither. I think this goes to the
basis of an objective weakness in Harré’s thought, his voluntarism about ideas.
This was shackled on to an elitism about Oxford, but it also reflects an unfor-
tunate personality trait, which was that, coming from New Zealand and being
put in the hot-house atmosphere of Oxford philosophy, he and his wife Hettie
went out of their way to conform. They would vote Tory, and Harré was always
the absolute model of an Oxford don. He would dine in college wherever pos-
sible, always go into college for lunch, and take responsibility for choosing the
wines and organising senior common room or high table dinners. He adopted
the whole lifestyle of an Oxford don to an extraordinary degree, almost to the
point of caricature. He craved the social recognition of his peers and the com-
munity in Oxford, which he never really got. He felt he was always looked
down upon as something of an oddball and, as a result, was permanently 
insecure.
MH: Perhaps he was to some extent a victim of what is known in New Zealand 
and Australia as ‘the cultural cringe’. The cringer is commonly thought to be
a person who thinks most things antipodean are second-rate, but underlying
that posture is an inability to accept in a mature way that there are always
going to be some things in a new-world country that are indeed less than
world-class.11 So when abroad your cringer feels very insecure and tries to
compensate, to be more Oxbridge than the Oxbridgeans. But, paradoxically,
the more he does that, the more attention he draws to his problem.
RB: Yes, your cringer is a country bumpkin from one of the colonies. Harré sub-
scribed to what he called the open souls doctrine – he did at this time anyway
– which is the idea that you can find out by talking to people what they think
and believe and you can always argue with it; this can get you a long way, he
thought, because there is nothing more to society and social forms, including
linguistic and ideational forms, than people and their accounts. But actually
there is: once you start looking at the content of their accounts, there is a lot
more to society that heavily constrains who and what are included in the con-
versation, who and what are recognised persons and topics, what subjects and
lines of argument are acceptable. Harré was oblivious to all these questions,
and this was a defect in his thought. In the debates I have had with him, he
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would start off by saying I was his star pupil – after I had just given what I
thought was a devastating critique of his position. We always had very good
debates and I enjoyed his company intellectually because he was lively and
willing to argue. But I think he had a deep insecurity. People are prone to ask
me, ‘Why didn’t you go to Oxford and get your chair?’. One reason is that deep
down – subconsciously – Harré did not want me there. He would have viewed
me as a rival, rather than as someone who was going to support him, which I
always did. He had to be the centre of the show and he did not want anyone
around who might upstage him. It is a great pity at many different levels. I did
not at that time, and also subsequently, have good backers within the analyt-
ical establishment.
MH: What was the relationship between the text of the DPhil thesis and that of
the book we all know? Did you make many changes?
RB: The thesis was published virtually unchanged, and it hasn’t been changed
since.
MH: What a sorry episode in the history of Oxford University. A wider question
that comes up about the rejection of your thesis in so far as it was ahead of its
time is why it had taken so long for the Copernican revolution to manifest in
the philosophy of science. That is some lag!
RB: There are two aspects to this Copernican lag. There is the lag after
Copernicus. This may be explained partly by the fact that self-consciousness
in a practice is only necessary when practice is problematic, as in late 
twentieth-century or contemporary social science. Then there is the lag after
the publication of A Realist Theory of Science. This is explained partly by the 
practice of, in Kuhnian terms, normal philosophy of science, in which a 
piecemeal approach is adopted to essentially fragmented questions, with
causality disconnected from explanation, and explanation from confirmation,
etc. However, there are signs in current discussion of dispositional realism and
the evidential basis of laws that the two main ontological distinctions of A
Realist Theory of Science, between the domains of the real and the actual, and
open and closed systems, are being taken seriously; and that ontology – and
with it the cardinal distinction between ontology and epistemology – is 
coming back into vogue (though not always with sufficient transcendental
grounding). 
MH: Can you now say something about your orientation to religion? Were you
religious in a broad sense when you went up to Oxford? How did your views
change?
RB: What I would say is that, although I was always interested in the transcendent
and transcendental, by the time I went up to Oxford I had a very secular cast
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of mind. Earlier, although by the time I was twelve or thirteen I had ceased any
kind of worship, I had an openness to what we couldn’t or didn’t understand,
which we could say was religious. At Oxford I was intellectually satisfied
because there was enough to get my teeth into, whereas in my very early days
religion was the most expansive framework I had within which to think things
about the world, and that was gradually supplemented by political and social
frameworks. And then I noticed that institutionalised religion was often or
mainly on the wrong side in all those other frameworks, so I left it behind. I
was very dedicated politically – as I have indicated.
MH: Yes. One further thing on the political front, what was your response to the
burgeoning feminism of the times? 
RB: I had myself suffered direct racial oppression as a child, and I was very aware of
women’s oppression from the case of my mother, from the time she was a
young child right the way through. So when feminism began to come up as a
political movement, naturally I sided with it one hundred percent intellectu-
ally; but I had a rude shock, having always been on side existentially, to realise
that it was not just self-evident to feminists that I was going to be on their side.
I had to pay my dues. Much of the time it did not matter, because these things
were not too strictly observed. Sometimes I went to feminist meetings and
took part in them, playing a very modest role; but I also had the experience of
being thrown out of one meeting because I was a bloke. And then I realised
that sometimes even when you walk through doors you have to be careful
about who you are leaving behind, to whom the doors are not open. This 
really struck home to me in 1970 when I went to America, where the feminist
movement was much more advanced than in England. I had always been 
able to talk in a completely free way with my feminist women friends in
Oxford, but it was not possible to have the same sort of dialogue with their
American counterparts. Actually, I think what I later critiqued as left elitism
and substitutionism was partly responsible for this state of affairs. Of course, 
all this was in part a necessary defensive reaction to the exclusions of women
in a sexist society.
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3 Beyond empiricism and 
transcendental idealism
Transcendental realism and the 
critique of classical modernism 
(1973–1975)
MH: You dedicated A Realist Theory of Science, your first book, to your mother. You
mentioned last time that she was dying of cancer as you were writing the book,
which must have been traumatic for you. Can you tell us more about this
episode in your life?
RB: My mother had had cancer for about seven years. The last time I actually
talked to her, the last time she was conscious, was when I was driving to
Edinburgh via London to have my interview for the job I subsequently got
there. It was just before Easter Sunday, I think it was a Wednesday in April
1973. I saw her in hospital and I was so happy because she seemed fantastically
alive and vital and was talking in an enthusiastic and excitable way. Then I
realised that was because she was on morphine, which was the last throw and
basically it means there was no hope. I drove back to where I was living in
Herefordshire and then on Easter Sunday she lost consciousness and I drove to
the hospital in Teddington. It was a little cottage hospital. My father was one
of the senior doctors there – in those days the National Health Service (NHS)
practitioners who were involved in the cottage hospitals used to do opera-
tions; they doubled as surgeons. She was unconscious. I stayed until Monday
morning, then I realised I had to get back to the cottage in Herefordshire;
among other things I wanted to see what the outcome of my interview had
been. On Monday night she died. On Tuesday morning I received a letter
telling me that I had been appointed to the job. I had felt that I probably would
be, because at the interview the three professors, Walsh, Acton and Ronnie
Hepburn, who was head of department and was interested in Wittgensteinian
sorts of issues, had seemed suitably impressed, and at the end Ronnie had come
up to me and asked me what my stipend was. In that kind of context I did not
even remember what a stipend was, so I said, ‘About the normal.’ So actually
I was appointed on a very good salary. In my mind my mother’s death and
going to Edinburgh were closely associated. The events were synchronous in
the strict sense, and I interpreted it as a synchronicity. Edinburgh was like a
gift from my mother. It was a great release for me. I was free of the Oxford old
boys’ network and all its snobberies and affectations, free from the necessity of
doing my thesis, and free from economic dependency on grants and things like
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that. Of course, after three or four years I found Edinburgh itself limiting. Also
it was a long way away from where most of my friends were, and I found myself
doing many long weekend drives to London. So that was the way I interpreted
my mother’s death. My mother’s illness was itself strange, because my 
father, though an NHS doctor, would not admit to either of his grown-up chil-
dren that their mother had cancer, and nor did she. It was an extraordinary
thing – 
MH: She didn’t tell you?
RB: She didn’t say. We knew, but it was a sort of taboo topic at the time.
MH: You never talked about it at all with your family?
RB: No, we did not. For instance, there was an Indian cousin of mine who came
over, and she desperately wanted my father to give my mother some other
non-orthodox western form of treatment. My father also knew homeopathy
and she pleaded with him to at least try that, but he was absolutely resistant. 
It was a peculiar turn of events, and of course my mother died very young, 
she was in her fifties, and she had been ill for an awfully long time. I remember
as she became very ill she was desperately wanting me to tell her something;
she kept pointing to her throat and I knew she was saying, ‘Tell me’. What 
she wanted to know of course was that I had got my DPhil, because she knew
I’d submitted the first thesis. Of course, I couldn’t tell her, so I always skirted
round the subject in some way. And then of course when the turn of my 
second thesis came, it too was unsuccessful, so I wouldn’t have been able to tell
her that either. But I interpreted her also to be saying, ‘Speak out generally. 
Do not take oppression lightly or silently. Use your voice. Speak to the 
world.’ 
MH: Did you feel energised by her death?
RB: No. That was the meaning of it – that’s how I interpreted it subsequently – but
actually I became very depressed for about three or four months. I became
more or less anorexic and I was given various pills for this, none of which
worked. But by the time I arrived in Edinburgh I was OK. 
MH: How did your father cope with your mother’s death?
RB: My father had been very devoted to my mother, going every day during her ill-
ness to be with her for as long as he could. But he told me afterwards that he
could not live, as he put it, without a woman. So a very short search ensued
and he lighted upon the ex-girlfriend of a friend of his and married her. She
was called Brenda. My father insisted on my being his best man, and I 
performed all those duties. My brother quickly fell out with Brenda but I tried
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to maintain a sort of peace, understanding why my father had needed to do
this. That in a way also made the whole episode of my mother’s death more
traumatic, because everyone said to my father: how could you do this? They
viewed my father’s second marriage as a kind of betrayal of such a wonderful
woman. 
MH: When did your father die? 
RB: 1991. 
MH: I will come to that in a later interview then. Can you say more about how you
found Edinburgh after Oxford?
RB: It was a wonderful contrast. The air was fresh and my colleagues were very sup-
portive and appreciative. I was now in a position of responsibility and enjoy-
ing it. I enjoyed, for example, giving stuffy characters like W. H. Walsh, a
distinguished Kant scholar, and H. B. (Harry) Acton, a run for their intellec-
tual money. Acton, a noted Hegel and Marx scholar, but also something of a
Cold War warrior, was one of the three professors, and it may be that I was only
accepted in the department because the other two kept my political alle-
giances completely quiet from him, or so I was led to believe. As a junior lec-
turer I was supposed to call Walsh ‘Professor Walsh’. He invited me round to
his house. I was a friend of his daughter but had to keep that quiet. When he
found out that she was going out with my Jamaican friend he was horrified. 
Of course, you can’t be friends with someone you call Professor Walsh. He
actually liked to be called Richard, and after some minor social loosening 
up, everyone was on first-name terms. Before long there was quite a clamour
for me to succeed Walsh, who was nearing retiring age. But his wife nobbled
him. She thought that having a young revolutionary of Indian descent as 
his successor would ruin his chances of a knighthood. She wanted him to 
be like Strawson and Popper and Ayer, all of whom were awarded knight-
hoods. Even if the whole department wanted me, the door was closed. My
dharma was being freely expressed now in my writings, and my first book had
been well received. I was being invited to conferences and elite colloquia
around the world, one in Houston, Texas with Charles Taylor, David
Hamlyn, and Paul Secord, for example, and another in Barcelona with John
Searle. But how long that would last I did not know, and of course now I 
was also a little uneasy about being a member of any elite. But I was free to read
and write in Edinburgh and to have my own life. I was being paid enough to
live well.
MH: You were married by this stage?
RB: Hilary1 was a member of the revolutionary left in Oxford and I started going
out with her at the end of 1968, beginning of 1969, and then from 1969 to
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1970 we lived in a little rented house in a place not far from Oxford called
Chiselhampton, because I had now moved out of Nuffield. It always seemed 
to happen that when my parents phoned up Hilary answered, and when her
parents phoned up I answered. We were both first children, and while subse-
quent children in our generation were by and large allowed to do what they
liked, there was still an assumption in the case of us first children that you
should be married if you wanted to live together. Also my mother was dying of
cancer, and Hilary was the first girlfriend of mine that my parents liked. I was
similarly liked by Hilary’s parents. Mainly to make things easier we decided to
get married. We did so in September 1971, and while I was working at the
Institute of Statistics we lived in a flat in St Anthony’s College, which had far
better food than most, including and especially a nice bistro. And then the
year after that we bought for a thousand pounds a cottage in Herefordshire on
the Welsh border, and this takes us through 1972–73. When I went to
Edinburgh she went to Newcastle, and although there were periods when we
were very close after that, she basically went her way and I went my own way.
At Edinburgh I had girlfriends, in Newcastle she had boyfriends. She used to
come up and see me now and then. We took a decision that both should be free
to have an independent career. On feminist grounds I couldn’t really argue
against it. We remained very good friends and I would help her with her vari-
ous political projects. 
There was a time when I actually wanted to have children, and when I was
in Edinburgh I used to volunteer to go baby-sitting for my friends. I got on
tremendously well with some of the young families about my age who had chil-
dren. One of them became a girlfriend of mine. It was a very weird thing, I did
not like the situation, but the children were lovely. There was a French lec-
turer in Edinburgh who came to seminars I was holding on structuralism – this
was in keeping with the times – and his wife came too. She was extraordinar-
ily beautiful, a Hungarian-French Jewess. Anyway they both started coming to
my talks, they were great enthusiasts. They invited me round to dinner. Then
the husband let it be known that he was going away for a couple of weeks.
Then she invited me round, and I was delighted because I was looking forward
to good conversation with someone I liked. However, it soon became very
obvious what I was supposed to do. And then she insisted that I come and live
with her and her children as a surrogate husband and father. She had three
children aged between about two and six. They were lovely, and remember,
although it wasn’t pressing on my consciousness, I was aware that I probably
had a subconscious desire to have children. The eldest boy became extremely
attached to me and everyone thought I was his father because I was a bit dark
and all the children had a dark complexion. They acted to me as if I was their
father for those three or four weeks. I think they would have liked to go on hol-
iday with me, but I drew the line at that. 
MH: As you explained last time, you turned to philosophy ultimately because
human emancipation presupposes genuine knowledge of the real forces that
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chain us, and the possibility of such knowledge of the world was widely denied.
In A Realist Theory of Science you wrote that 
we are not imprisoned in caves, either of our own or of nature’s making.
We are not doomed to ignorance. But neither are we spontaneously free.
This is the arduous task of science: the production of the knowledge 
of those enduring and continually active mechanisms of nature that 
produce the phenomena of our world.2
Am I right in thinking that this is the fundamental message of the book?
RB: Absolutely right, this is the way to freedom from ignorance. But, of course,
knowledge is not the only condition of freedom, and later on in my work I had
to go into some of the other conditions. Obviously I knew I would have to do
this, but the theme of the critique of ideologies that masquerade as and stand
in the way of knowledge was already very important. I think the transcenden-
tal revindication of ontology and the understanding that the scientific process
involves a transformation of our beliefs, and gives us access to a world that is
not immediately apparent, is vitally important for general emancipation, and
that is the enduring message of the book. One has to bear in mind that A
Realist Theory of Science was only the first third of a more global project, as
we’ve discussed. I knew it would have to be followed up by a book on the phi-
losophy of social science and also, so I thought, by a book that would carry
through the critique to the level of ideology-critique. I saw it as part of this
broader project; it would explain empiricism and idealism, the false theories
we held about knowledge and even more importantly about being. It was a first
step in a process of ideology-critique, a process that was to be carried through
to my meta-Reality books when I went into the philosophical discourse of
modernity globally, the first phase or moment of which – classical modernism
– is critiqued in A Realist Theory of Science. 
MH: What else would you say is original to A Realist Theory of Science? That is,
what would you say are its really radical claims? What distinguishes it from
mainstream scientific realism?
RB: I think the best way I could answer this is by saying that I think it was like a
revolution waiting to happen. And I can perhaps best illustrate this by going
back to the question of my influences that you asked me last time and the con-
tours of that answer. The anti-monistic and anti-deductivist strands provided
powerful insights into what I was to call the transitive dimension of scientific
activity and ontological stratification, respectively. Of course, they followed
the Kantian path of involution, making scientific structure a function of mind
or of the scientific community rather than seeing it as a real feature of the
world. But nevertheless the concepts of scientific process and scientific struc-
ture were already there. At the same time you had philosophers such as
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Strawson coming up with transcendental arguments. So the basic way I could
appropriate Kant’s method was already there waiting for me. Perhaps the main
thing that was not waiting for me was ontology, and that is I think the really
crucial missing ingredient. I will come on to this by talking a little more about
some of the other things that were already there. 
The idea of structure also loomed large in social theory. It was not satisfac-
torily theorised philosophically, but through people such as Chomsky and
Lévi-Strauss, structuralism had become fashionable and the idea that science
needed to deal with structures was in the air again. There was not a clear 
disambiguation between scientific structure, ontological structure and struc-
ture in the mind. The last was very much Lévi-Strauss’s and Chomsky’s way 
of looking at it, Chomsky with some excuse because the structures he was 
talking about were linguistic structures. But nevertheless you had the concept
of structure there. What is distinctive about transcendental realism in this area
is that, within a conception of an intransitive world, it distinguishes three dif-
ferent senses of structure, or three successive forms of it. The first conception
is that in which there is a simple oppositional contrast between a structure and
an event. Structure is that which generates and explains the event. The second
conception is structure in the sense of the multi-tiered stratification of reality.
Here the distinction between structure and event is applied iteratively and so
extended in principle indefinitely. The third conception is the sense in which,
in the context of that multi-tiered stratification, we can talk about a structure
as emergent, as having come into being. Later, in Dialectic, I came to see struc-
tures in the first sense as themselves moving and changing. 
Then you had the idea of complexity, particularly in relation to events.
There was the old debate about the problem of historical knowledge, and this
also can be applied to knowledge in everyday life. It seemed to me impossible to
fit any ordinary or historical event into the sweep of the deductive-nomological
model; events are complex. And then of course there was experience always rat-
tling around. But what was this about experimentation? If you look at the writ-
ings of the classical British empiricists, such as Locke or Hume, or at Kant, you
can quickly see that, at least when they were concerned with questions pertain-
ing to the justification (as distinct say from the explanation) of knowledge, by
experience they meant experimental activity. But the whole idea that experi-
mental activity was the same as ordinary sense experience was nonsense,
because of course the sorts of things that go on in a scientific experiment in a
typical laboratory are very recondite to the ordinary lay person and to untutored
common sense. So, besides ontology, another major ingredient that needed to
be added was a serious analysis of experimental activity. Even this had been par-
tially prepared for in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von
Wright, who had talked about experimentation as an intervention in the world.
Now clearly the only point of intervening in the world is if you are going to pro-
duce something that would not otherwise happen, and once you take that seri-
ously it becomes absolutely disastrous for empiricism, pivoting on the Humean
theory of causal laws as, or as involving, a constant conjunction of events. 
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Another thing that I brought to the scene or that you could not find imme-
diately there – it had to be repackaged – was the idea of emergence. If you took
a human being seriously and if you wanted to defend the possibility of social
science, as I certainly did, it was clear that you would have to argue that
human beings and social science are somehow emergent from nature. So you
needed a conception of emergence. 
Then the way that I understood transcendental arguments was always in the
particular discursive context of theories of science that palpably held sway. At
the same time I had to do a DPhil thesis that was acceptable to the establish-
ment. The only way to achieve these two objectives was through immanent
critique. As we’ve seen, the particular vantage point from which I was
approaching the issues initially was economics, and this also played a big part
because there was already an ongoing debate about the relationship between
economic theory and the world, with the standard answer being that there is
none; that, in other words, economic theory has to be pursued in some sense
for its own sake. This raised the problem of its status, and I came to think of it
as kind of praxiology, as a theory of efficient action. But of course that itself
presupposes something about the world. I tried very seriously to apply the text-
book deductive-nomological models and so on of philosophy of science to
economic phenomena, and came to the conclusion that this was completely
hopeless; there was no way they fitted. So what was very obvious to me – the
constant for me as a DPhil student in economics through to the writing of A
Realist Theory of Science – was that the Humean theory of causal laws could not
be correct. I would like to stress to anyone trying to do original work that it is
really important to ensure that you have the sort of critical focus that this 
gave me. It is important to be clear about what it is that you are actually attack-
ing. To situate the epistemic fallacy as a fallacy, to show how the Humean 
theory of causal laws just could not apply, even to the extent that the anti-
deductivists thought it could or that Kant and that whole tradition allowed,
that was very important. 
Then of course there was the conception of human beings that underlay the
whole project I was critiquing. This was a very minimalist one that saw human
beings as essentially passive spectators of given phenomena. And so the epis-
temic fallacy, the underlying model of (tacitly gendered) man and the closure
presupposed by the Humean theory of causal laws were always at the forefront
of my mind. I was not particularly thinking that transcendental arguments are
a fine thing in a general sort of way. Rather, I was thinking about how I could
use this mode of argumentation for the practical ends that I wanted to achieve:
the critique of empiricism and idealism, including the transcendental idealist
superstructure on empirical realism. (It should of course go without saying
that none of this was designed to impugn the continuing value and relevance
of reading Hume and Kant.) 
MH: You talk about a revolution waiting to happen. Would it be more accurate to say
there was a revolution underway in the philosophy of science and you carried
Ch 3.qxp  12/18/2009  2:01 PM  Page 57
58 Beyond empiricism and transcendental idealism, 1973–1975
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
this through, synthesising all the elements that were around and adding vital
new ingredients such as the revindication of ontology?
RB: Yes, that is what I am saying. It is important to remember that science is not
simple, it is an arduous process. Scientists have to work at it practically and 
of course mentally, theoretically. But what they are trying to do is uncover
something that people never knew about before. So science is surprising, sci-
ence is wonderful, science has the capacity to transform the world as we know
it. Yet it was never an infatuation with science itself that drove me, it was
rather a feeling that it is part of life, and a part that all my peers think is
extremely important: they themselves think it is of paramount importance, so
let us understand what is happening in science.
Of course the whole point of experimental activity, even when it can only
be done in thought, is precisely to give us access to the structures of the world.
But how exactly does it do this? Everything that happens, happens in accor-
dance with Newton’s laws of physics, but these laws are not the only things
that go to explain events. Moreover, you cannot test Newton’s laws – the prin-
ciples of Newtonian mechanism, for example – except under very special
closed conditions that we have to produce experimentally and then control,
and that means that there is an ontological gap between those laws and the
patterns of events. This was the basis for the distinction between the domains
of the real and the actual. 
MH: So you wouldn’t agree that the focus of transcendental reflection in A Realist
Theory of Science on scientific practice as a paradigmatic practice informing us
about reality makes transcendental realism ‘scientistic’? Or that it is satisfac-
tory to read off one’s ontology from science, as for example Mario Bunge3 does
and Alexander Callinicos4 recommends? 
RB: The important thing I think is that, first, transcendental realism does not
underwrite any particular science or any particular practice of science; it is
quite consistent with a critique of scientific practices in a particular domain.
Rather, what it does is ask what must the world be like for the scientific prac-
tice – experimental activity – that our tradition takes as paradigmatic to be
possible, intelligible, successful and ongoing. Now of course there are also
other practices, and scientific knowledge is not our only value; this is some-
thing that I explicitly signalled in The Possibility of Naturalism. But the argu-
ments in A Realist Theory of Science consist in critiques of empiricist and
idealist accounts of science and of scientific knowledge, and if you do not
think science is important you need not be bound by them. But if you claimed
to think that knowledge is not important I would not understand you. I could,
for example, ask you whether you are telling me that knowledge is not impor-
tant. If your answer was yes, I would ask whether what I said was true. You
would then have to make a claim about knowledge at some level. However, I
can understand what is meant by people who critique the value placed on
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knowledge, because of course there are many other things in life besides
knowledge – many other things necessary for happiness, for example. It also
has to be said that you do not necessarily have to have a very high valuation of
science to accept A Realist Theory of Science because what it says is that, so long
as science in general occurs, then the world has to have a certain shape or cat-
egorial form. So you just have to be interested in the nature of reality; the argu-
ment goes from science to ontology. In no sense is transcendental realism
scientistic. First, it does not underwrite any particular scientific practice; it is
not saying, for example, that some piece of experimental physics is correct.
Second, it does not argue for the supremacy of science over other human val-
ues. Furthermore, I think most of the uses of transcendental realism lie in the
critique of scientific, or allegedly scientific, practices and are oriented towards
better scientific practice, that is immanent critique will constitute or be a part
of the various sciences. Now the second part of your question was –
MH: Is it satisfactory to read off one’s ontology from science?
RB: Any speech action, like any discursive philosophical project, is in a certain
context and my context was one in which analytical philosophy and linguis-
tic philosophy with a tacit empiricist ontology and therefore tacit empiricism
or transcendental idealism was dominant. My objective was to critique it. To
do that I had to engage with the people who were practising it, my critique had
to be immanent and that is why I picked on the transcendental argument-
form, because through it I was able to seize on a premise that my opponents
accepted. This allowed me to show them that experimental activity was
inconsistent with the Humean theory of causal laws, for instance; so some-
thing – either experimentation or the Humean theory – had to go. That is the
sort of thing that a Bunge does not do. He looks at science and he might say
that obviously he Humean theory of causality is wrong, or it needs reformu-
lating or it needs to be put in a wider context, but unless you already accept
that the science he is describing is epistemically valid then the argument is
only going to go so far. Someone could always say that what he is describing is
not science. Or that his analysis is insufficiently deep. For it will always be 
possible to reconstruct any piece of genuine science, if you hone it finely
enough and redescribe it in an appropriate way, as consistent with almost 
any philosophical thesis. If you only describe what happens inside the labora-
tory after an experimental situation has been set up, then it looks as if 
science is Humean. And of course, if you foreswear transcendental argument,
as Callinicos recommends, you are then in no position to critique science
itself.
MH: I turn now to the objects of scientific thought, which you construe as causal
powers. A Realist Theory of Science seems to imply that right at the outset you
denied what you later came to call the ‘brute’ or ‘exhaustive’ physicality of
being:5
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The philosophy of science has noted, quite correctly, that the objects of
scientific thought are ‘ideal’ or ‘abstract’ with respect to [ordinary] things
and events. But the transcendental realist sees such objects as real. For
him the world is composed of real things and generated by real mecha-
nisms. It is the world itself, not our thought of it, that is abstract and
ideal.6
The last paragraph of the book says that, although we could not know it if there
were no material things, ‘electrons could exist without material things’.7 And of
course we have the position that a social structure, like a magnetic field, is ‘irre-
ducible to but present only in its effects’.8 Such views are not well received by some
critical realists who think of themselves as materialists. What can you say to allay
their misgivings?
RB: You cannot of course posit the existence of electrons unless they have an 
effect on material things and that is the way we know them. But at the same
time I think one has to be very wary of restricting one’s ontology to the 
domain of middle-sized material things like us. In any case material things like
us have reasons, we have misgivings. What is a reason or a misgiving? It is 
certainly not material itself. You might say that I can only identify your 
reasoning through certain sounds that you articulate or generate, but you 
just cannot identify the reason with those sounds. It is the reason or the 
misgiving, not the sound, that counts in the explanation of what happens in
the social world. The idea that this is dualist is wrong. The dualism is rather on
the other foot. What it does involve is the notion of emergence, that we have
an ontology, an account of being in which some explanatory structures are
emergent from others. If you subscribe to an exclusively materialist ontology,
an ontology of material things, in the physical sense only, then you cannot
make sense of he emergent powers that are most characteristic of human
beings, or of social structures, or very generally of all those social and material
states that depend upon, or are in part the outcome of, patterns of human
interaction involving such things as reasons. What happens is that the mate-
rialist, who says that all that exists in the world exists at basically one onto-
logical level, is forced into a de facto dualism because they actually have to
argue at another level, deploying an emergent language, a language of reasons.
Such materialism cannot sustain its ontology. So it is a self-refuting and 
dualist position. 
MH: It could be that some misunderstanding arises from the notion of ‘material
causes’. Ideas and meanings are material causes in the Aristotelian sense in
which you deploy that concept in the transformational model of social activ-
ity, for example. It seems to me that that kind of ‘materialism’ is sometimes
mixed up by critical realists with metaphysical materialism. When, for 
example, Doug Porpora argues that social relations are ‘material’,9 this is often
interpreted metaphysically but perhaps he means in the Aristotelian sense.
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RB: Well, on Aristotle’s theory of causes, according to which you have material,
efficient, final and formal causes, every event is supposed to display all four.
The material causes are the antecedent social structures, including social rela-
tions at different levels, together with the pre-existing structures of physical
objects, including artefacts. 
MH: Are social structures just ‘material causes’ of action? Or are they also formal
causes, as Ruth Groff has suggested?10
RB: Social structure is among the social material causes of praxis, in Aristotle’s
sense. But these material causes are stratified, and social structures are deep
and enduring social material causes, which are aefficacious on and in any
praxis or round of social activity. So they are not just conditions of, but condi-
tions in, praxis and thus in Aristotle’s sense, formal causes also. In any given
social context they define and limit what is to count as an appropriate action.
They are pre-existing conditions which are aefficacious in and on and during
praxis, and in and on it from within, as well as without, they inhere in us. It is
vital to see that social structures not only pre-exist, but are ongoing, and ongo-
ing precisely in virtue of our activity. They are thus social material causes
which are also formal, and none the less ontologically real for the fact that
they are not material things (but what produces changes in them).
MH: I turn now to the nature of the transitive and intransitive dimensions and the
distinction between them. People find this difficult to grasp. One of the prob-
lems perhaps is that the distinction as originally formulated is in relation to
science, but you are already thinking in terms of its more general application,
with the transitive dimension embracing everything currently being affected
by human praxis. Thus the intransitive objects of science are absolutely
intransitive (‘not produced by men at all’11) whereas those of social science are
only relatively so (there is causal interdependence to varying degree) except
in so far as things are existentially intransitive (fully determined). Because of
this kind of complication – the transitive objects of science themselves have
an existentially intransitive dimension – some are inclined to think that the
distinction is a pragmatic one that is useful in orienting our thinking about the
scientific process rather than a fundamental ontological one. You are on
record as saying that you drew too sharp a distinction in A Realist Theory of
Science.12 What are your thoughts on this whole issue now?
RB: One has to see the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions
as drawn from an epistemological point of view, and that is the way I was look-
ing at it then. That is to say, the important point was that there is a domain of
objects that exist and act quite independently of any knowledge. So the
emphasis was on existential intransitivity and irreducibility against both the
epistemic and the ontic fallacies. When I say that it was drawn from an episte-
mological point of view, I mean that I purposefully abstracted from everything
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that pertained to the sense in which beliefs themselves are real and from the
social world as itself an object of study, including the beliefs within it. Later on
I would obviously have to include beliefs within being. The reason I used the
terms transitive and intransitive was because they were relatively free of the
connotations that existed around beliefs (or at least knowledge) and being,
and in particular the connotations around epistemology and ontology. They
were most favourable to the establishment of ontology, because what I wanted
to say was that science is a process in motion – that is its transitive dimension
– but that what it studied was something that existed and acted quite inde-
pendently of it. I knew that I would have to qualify that when it came to the
social sciences. However, it still remains the case that epistemologically, at
any moment of time, beliefs and knowledges have an other, an object, a refer-
ent that exists independently of them at that moment of time. That is to say,
there is always a distinction between beliefs and what they are about.
MH: That is existential intransitivity?
RB: Yes, and it establishes a permanent wedge between epistemology and ontol-
ogy. But this wedge, which is the transitive/intransitive divide drawn from 
the point of view of epistemology – the transitive side of the divide – does not
mean that that belief itself is not real and cannot be explained once you are
thinking ontologically. Another way to put this is to say that the notion of
epistemology is proleptically, and necessarily, dualistic – it always implies an
ontology, from which, as epistemology, it remains distinct. But the notion of
ontology is not dualistic, it does not itself have any necessary reference to epis-
temology. However, although the transitive/intransitive distinction registers
a permanent wedge between beliefs and what they are about, this is I think
much less far-reaching than the idea of ontology per se which incorporates the
idea of a distinction between ontology and ontogeny and a notion of ontology
that will encompass the social world and beliefs from the start. However, of
course once you have the idea of an object-domain that exists intransitively,
then you can talk about how we access it. Thus it is only when we have drawn
this distinction that we can begin to do justice to the empirical. 
MH: The question of access pertains to the transitive dimension which, unlike
existential intransitivity, is not a permanent feature of existence conferred by
the irreversibility of time. You see it rather as geo-historically relative, as con-
stituted by the emergence of human beings and the first act of referential
detachment? 13
RB: Absolutely. But one might wonder whether we could use this distinction in
studies of other animals, for example animals that learn. Learning could be a
more general feature of the environment. And then you could think about
constructing arguments, even transcendental arguments, from particular
types of learning.
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MH: There could be embryonic transitive dimensions for many forms of life.
RB: Yes, learning could be a very general feature of the universe. That is a 
speculation.
MH: I now want to ask you about transcendental arguments, the main argument-
form you use to elaborate a realist ontology. As David Tyfield has suggested,
Kantian transcendental arguments can be construed, like yours, as embracing
immanent critique, that is, of Humean experience.14 In which case would it be
correct to say that the crucial move you made was to deepen the focus from
experience to social practices as conceptualised in experience, thereby giving
transcendental arguments purchase on a mind-independent world in so far as
people are themselves causal agents in the world?
RB: For me transcendental arguments are a species of retroductive-analogical
argument distinguished by a number of considerations, the first being that they
have a philosophical subject-matter. I can bring this out by indicating how 
they relate to retroductive-analogical arguments. A retroductive-analogical
argument will say there is a domain of phenomena here, this is what makes
that domain of phenomena intelligible. A transcendental argument as I use 
it will say there is a human activity here which is conceptualised in our 
experience, the nature of the world as structured and differentiated makes 
this activity intelligible. So it has that form. This means that it is fallible, epis-
temically relative; it arrives in a particular social context. A retroductive-
analogical argument does not have to refer to anything to do with human
experience, whereas a transcendental argument does. The minor premise of
the transcendental argument is the basic feature of experience as conceptu-
alised in a certain way. One concerns oneself with a minor premise in so far as
one wants to criticise or develop or perhaps defend some account of that expe-
rience. David Tyfield is absolutely right that significant transcendental argu-
ments always have a critical context; more generally, if you want to produce
an original transcendental argument in philosophy, it is always going to be in
an immanently critical context. The minor premise here has to be some form
of human experience that your opponents accept; for example, experimental
activity, understood in a certain way. The approach is immanently critical in
so far as you are critiquing established or dominant accounts of that activity.
What you will then be doing is bringing out the implicit presuppositions 
of a form of life that has already been ongoing. So you can say that even if 
scientists who are engaging in experiments think their activity under 
Humean descriptions, actually what their activity in practice presupposes is
non-Humean; and so you have the beginnings of what I later called a Tina 
formation. 
MH: Does that mean that every argument that is retroductive from any activity
conceptualised in any way is going to be transcendental? 
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RB: No, it is not quite as simple as that. You do have to have the immanent critique
of some notion about human activity as conceptualised in a particular way.
But characteristically we would only call an argument of that form transcen-
dental if it operated at a level that was sufficiently abstract. So we would 
not normally call an argument about housing or furniture a transcendental
argument. But you could very plausibly construe many of the arguments in
Marx’s Capital as transcendental because they deal with more general or per-
vasive features, the sorts of feature that are, or are close to being, categories.
This brings out another characteristic of these arguments: that they operate at
a syncategorematic level, that is to say, they talk about things in general, not
a particular thing. Then of course the class of transcendental argume ts also
includes, as a sub-class, dialectical arguments. So actually transcendental
argument denotes a distinct class of arguments that are fundamental in social
science as well as in philosophy. 
As part of a discursive strategy of immanent critique not everything critical
philosophers say is going to take the form of transcendental argument. Indeed,
in general, besides providing a transcendental argument that shows that the
selected activity presupposes something that is inconsistent with, that is
excludes the given account of, it they will normally also be concerned to make
various reductios or point to internal aporiai and inconsistencies in the posi-
tion they are attacking. Transcendental arguments have not been well studied
in the period after Kant, just as dialectical arguments have not been 
particularly well studied after Hegel; they were studied in classical Greek and
medieval times when dialectic was not operating in a context of transcenden-
tal arguments. 
MH: Do transcendental arguments work in relation to other social practices such
as music or religion, or do they have to take their departure from science?
RB: In relation to religion Émile Durkheim, for example, gave an interesting
answer to that in his book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. A transcen-
dental argument about music would give you knowledge of the world, and it
would be part of science, the science of music or musicology. A transcenden-
tal argument in the context of music will look at it from the point of view of
the intelligibility of music. It won’t help someone trying to compose like
Beethoven, but it will help someone trying to understand Beethoven better.
MH: Do you want to comment further on the issue of the purchase of transcen-
dental arguments on a mind-independent world?
RB: In terms of the mind-independence of the ontology of transcendental realism,
I think I cannot over-emphasise the role of the practical. In experimental
activity it is our role as causal agents that is vital, not our role as thinkers, and
that immediately gets us out of the purely mental sphere. Of course, my con-
ception of the transitive dimension was very much inspired by Marx and his
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notion of work and labour, but interestingly enough also by Wittgenstein and
his private language argument. Basically Wittgenstein said you cannot be an
atomistic individual – an individual monad – and make sense of language and
meaning; you have to do it by being in the context of the social. And what was
very important to him was not just an abstract social but the social and practi-
cal: social practice, social activity. Philosophical Investigations begins with an
account of builders building, or laying blocks and slabs. That is absolutely
vital; this is where the truth of materialism that we are physical beings – causal
agents – fits in. Most philosophy had completely abstracted from this. Of
course, Wittgenstein did not pursue the implications in full, but that is the real
importance of his private language argument. You could say that there are two
aspects to this argument. First, as I mentioned last time, there is a world out
there independent of my mind. This is not explicitly differentiated into what
exists independently of my mind (the pre-existing social) and what exists
independently of any mind (the purely natural). We have the thesis that soci-
ety is ontologically prior to the individual; but this aspect also immediately
connotes existential intransitivity and realism. The second aspect involves
characterising, further specifying, the nature of the world out there. There are
other people in the social world out there and this pre-existing social world
depends in part on their causally aefficacious activities, that is to say, this
world is dependent on the material activity of causal agents. This specifies the
form of the sociality of the first part of the argument. Of course, once you
understand the physicality of the interactions that human beings enjoy, then
you can also go into social interaction as speech-action and other forms of
action between causal agents who can think, and then we get a more complete 
picture. 
MH: Kenneth R. Westphal has recently argued independently (that is, without, it
would seem, reading your work) that Kant’s own precepts, methods and argu-
ments, when consistently carried through, refute transcendental idealism and
point in the direction of a transcendental realism similar to your own.15 Does
this accord with your own view, both then and now?
RB: Yes it does. There are two things that I would like to say here about Kant’s work.
The first involves the endemic aporiai of transcendental idealism: that actually
unless Kant accepts the reality of the categories and the understanding then we
cannot even have knowledge of the phenomenal world. It seems to me that
Westphal is developing the kind of point I made about the categories and the
understanding in relation to the flux of experience, which is great. Unless you
have a distinction between the objective manifold and the subjective sequence
of experiences, you are not going to have anything that is going to look like the
terms of an empirical invariance – you are not going to have the manifold. If we
include stray events, stray experiences, we are not going to have an empirical
invariance. You can argue that the main contribution that Kant made was 
the idea of stratification within mind. However I want to point out that, in the
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second place, his immanent critique of Humean experience still involves the
idea of Humean causal laws. It still involves the idea of an empirical invariance
of events as being necessary for a law, and that has the disastrous consequence
that our freedom as human beings is placed outside the world as studied by sci-
ence. So there is no scientific route to emancipation, the possibility of a science
of human beings is undercut, and we have a split world. In Dialectic I do actu-
ally explicitly argue that Kant’s own precepts, methods and arguments, consis-
tently carried through, entail dialectical critical realism, hence also
transcendental realism.16 What Kant particularly wanted to do, of course, is to
show how freedom and morality are consistent with the science of Newton. He
never questioned the universality of that science, which he interpreted actual-
istically, and that was a truly disastrous mistake. The empirical realism is the
more important thing in Kant, the transcendental idealism is relatively sec-
ondary. Of course, transcendental idealism in general, from Kant on, has had
this wonderful intuition that scientific knowledge and thought are structured,
but the involution of structure means that there is no way we can ever regard
that structure as anything other than arbitrary: this is my story, one possible
story against others. Of course, we now know in some areas of science that the
Newtonian categories are inappropriate; we do not accept them any longer
even in physics at the level of Einstein’s theory of relativity or at the level of
quantum physics, let alone the human sciences.
Categorial realism is so important, not just in the context of Kant but in the
context of philosophers of science such as Popper, who assume that the cate-
gories are within the human mind or, to put this in a more sociological form,
within society: they are things that we impose either individually or as a com-
munity on the world. If you believe that then you go back on transcendental
arguments, and ultimately you won’t have a ground for saying that a particu-
lar process or law operates in the world. Modal realism too is so important. As
the wonderful saying by Paul Eluard you drew my attention to has it: ‘There is
another world, but it is in this one.’17 It is not this one, but it is in it, it is a pos-
sibility. As a possibility it is enfolded within the things and structures that we
have in this world, and so this world could be different. Modal realism is indis-
pensable for concrete utopianism and for human freedom, and even for the
aefficacy of critique, because you have to be able to say I need not believe this,
there are other possibilities. The specific form of modal realism is dispositional
realism, to which transcendental realism is also committed. This asserts the
reality of causal powers, liabilities and tendencies.
MH: In a paper that attempts to situate your early work in relation to current
debates within Anglo-analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of science,
Ruth Groff has recently suggested that A Realist Theory of Science (RTS) comes
close to espousing 
what Alexander Bird has called the mixed view regarding the existence of
dispositional and categorical18 properties. The mixed view, in contrast to
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either dispositional monism . . . or categorical monism, is the view that
there are some properties that are purely dispositional, others that are cat-
egorical. . . . A fourth position . . . is that all properties are both. Bhaskar
explicitly allowed in RTS for the possibility of properties that are purely
dispositional, but I see no textual evidence to suggest that he held that 
all properties are purely, or even fundamentally, dispositional rather than
categorical. Thus I conclude that the dispositional realism of RTS would
fall into the category of ‘mixed’.19
Is this a view with which you concur?
RB: Yes. What is distinctive about transcendental realism is that it involves a
three-tier analysis of causal powers. Not only may causal powers be possessed
independently of their actualisation, we must distinguish their exercise from
their actualisation, so as to allow that they may be exercised without being
actualised (that is, manifest in an empirical invariance), just as they may be
actualised without being experienced or perceived y human beings. This is of
course an index of the distinction between the domains of the real, the actual
and the empirical. The result is a dynamic depth dispositional realism in
which the real acts, even if it is not manifest in a Humean-type sequence, that
is, irrespective of the closure or otherwise of the system in which it acts – what
I call ‘transfactually’. 
MH: In relation to modal realism, Eluard’s saying should perhaps be amended to
say that there are other worlds, not just another world; that is, the possibility
in this one is infinite. 
RB: Absolutely. You see, modal realism as understood in critical realism is con-
crete rather than abstract. It is not just that the world could have been differ-
ent, or that there could be different worlds, as David Lewis, for example, and
the counterfactual theorists have it – which is true but not very interesting –
but that in our world, the world that we have and know, there are alternatives.
But the very idea of an alternative is something inconsistent with actualism,
and this is why the big negatives – the negative point, the negative critique –
of transcendental realism are so important: to clear away, to get rid of, empir-
ical realism, anthropomorphic accounts of science and being, the epistemic
fallacy, and perhaps above all actualism. 
MH: You wrote: ‘On the conception of philosophy at work in this book both the
ultimate premisses and the immediate conclusions of philosophical consider-
ations are contingent facts, the former (but not the latter) being necessarily
social and so historical’.20 This has been taken to mean that you are commit-
ted to epistemic relativism within science but not philosophy. How would you
respond to this? 
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RB: That is not correct. The premise – for example, experimental activity – is nec-
essarily social, but the conclusion is not, it might be about the world as such
and in general. Moreover, you can detach the conclusion from the premise in
the same way as you can detach the conclusion of a retroductive-analogical
argument if it is acceptable. There is no way I can prove transcendental real-
ism; as I say in A Realist Theory of Science, it is not even the only possible
account, but it is the only one consistent with the phenomena that I
analysed.21 We detach those conclusions because we cannot get by in social
life without using detachment, without accepting our conclusions when they
are as well justified as we can possibly make them, such that we feel that they
are good enough to act on.
MH: This is transcendental detachment?
RB: Yes. I don’t talk about it in A Realist Theory of Science. It is very close to refer-
ential detachment, except you are not detaching the referent, you are detach-
ing the conclusion of your argument. You are detaching it, not because it is
necessarily infallibly true, but as the best account that you know of in that
domain. Without some such procedure, argumentation would have no point
at all and we would be stuck in an endless regress because, whenever we
wanted to establish anything in philosophy and we could not detach it, we
would just have to go on, as Hegel did. You would have to say that you cannot
have any knowledge at all except of the totality, and if you accept with criti-
cal realism that the totality is open and unfinished, then you can never have
any knowledge. That is absurd. If someone said I really believe that you can
never have any knowledge, I would say that is absolutely fine, you stay with
that, but I am talking to those people who believe empiricism and act on it.
And in a subsidiary argument I would want to see what you act on. Because
undoubtedly you would be acting on something like empiricism; you would
not be acting honestly. 
MH: It is important, hermeneutically, to try to understand any work both in its
own terms and context and as a moment in the broader development of a
thinker’s thought. You have said and implied in a range of contexts that A
Realist Theory of Science was already implicitly dialectical. Can you indicate
some of the ways in which this is so? Would it be true to say that the dialectics
came from life before they came from books (we discussed earlier how you
were practising an embryonic dialectical method from very early on)? Of
course, some of the key concepts of transcendental realism – the transitive and
intransitive dimensions; the domains of the real and the actual; transfactual-
ity and tendency; the relational conception of social forms; the ‘holy trinity’ –
are implicit in Marx (whom you were reassessing as a scientific realist), a fact
that must be presumed to lend support to the implicit dialecticality thesis.
When you wrote A Realist Theory of Science were you aware of absences in 
transcendental realism that could themselves be absented by immanent 
Ch 3.qxp  12/18/2009  2:01 PM  Page 68
Beyond empiricism and transcendental idealism, 1973–1975 69
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
critique – that is, that transcendental realism itself could be developed dialec-
tically – and to what extent did you already think this important or even 
necessary? 
RB: I think I would want to answer the part of the question about dialectics 
coming from life before books in a double way. Yes, this is what I was doing, in
life as well as in books. When I wanted to outwit my father’s control of me in
relation to choice of vocation, I was picking on grounds that he would con-
cede but finding cases he didn’t include when he was thinking about it, so I
was looking for the absence there. Similarly, in A Realist Theory of Science I was
looking for what was really missing. As a child this was of course at an intuitive
level; I hadn’t really formulated what I was doing, or at least not to any great
extent. In the second case, although it might have been more conscious, it was
still something that was not discursively formulable in the context of received
ideas about dialectic and dialectical method; there was no way I could have
actually said what I was doing and it took a long time before I felt that I could.
It was only when I had finished Dialectic that I felt at all happy about being able
to situate this approach, and to situate it dialectically. 
In relation to whether I was aware of absences that would or should be
absented, here one has to say yes. As I pointed out last time, A Realist Theory
of Science was only one third of my total project, the other parts being philos-
ophy of social science and ideology-critique or sociology of knowledge. I knew
I was going to have to get round to those two. I was very conscious of the fact
that I was abstracting from the way in which in the social sciences beliefs
themselves are affected causally and causally affect in turn the objects of
knowledge. More generally, that we would have to look at beliefs as part of the
intransitive dimension and thus of ontology in its own right. So I was abstract-
ing from crucial aspects of the social. I was also aware that I was abstracting
from change and from questions of internal relationality – what later became
2E and 3L. And of course even in the triptych of the overall project, I was
abstracting very consciously from the whole context of debates about Hegel’s
and Marx’s dialectical method. As early as 1978 I was writing, for New left
Review it so happens, an article on dialectic, materialism and science. It was
going to be a critique of Galvano Della Volpe, Lucio Colletti and Sebastiano
Timpanaro, but I never finished it. Even the articles I published, for example
the dictionary entries I wrote on dialectical themes, abstracted from serious
engagement with absence, contradiction, and dialectical method. But I was
working on it, and it took thirteen years of hard labour for me to lick the 
problem of absence and see that I had to situate it as an ontological category
and then reconstruct the understanding of being informing my whole project.
It had to be deepened to take into account all the phenomena of processual
reality – the first level of structure I identified in A Realist Theory of Science
had to be seen as itself changing, the traditional principles of substance and
causality had to be dynamised – and that meant that critique also had to be
deepened. 
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MH: In terms of dynamisation, the key implicitly dialectical concept in your first
book is tendency?
RB: Yes, it is the key concept in the dispositional realism I put forward. You have
powers, but a power in motion is a tendency. This gives the concept of power
a three-dimensionality that other accounts, even those of Chomsky and
Harré, lack. Dynamisation was also to allow me to concretise my understand-
ing of scientific method a little, to put the logic of scientific discovery I 
articulated in transcendental realism in a more explicitly social and less, so to
speak, idealised context. This does not mean that there was anything wrong
with the account in A Realist Theory of Science, just that it abstracted by and
large from a lot of messy sociological considerations that the later account
took on board. The logic of scientific discovery – the description of a non-
random pattern in nature, the imagining of a plausible model of a generative
mechanism, the elimination of alternative accounts, the identification of the
generative mechanism at work, and then of a new level of structure – that
model is to be understood as occurring within the epistemological dialectic I
articulated in Dialectic. Or another way to look at A Realist Theory of Science is
to see it as being primarily concerned with ontology and the stratification of
being, and the epistemological dialectic as complementing this with an
account of what the scientist understands and experiences subjectively. In A
Realist Theory of Science I explicitly referred to the logic of scientific discovery
as a dialectic, a dialectic which of course incorporates also a dialectic of
explanatory and taxonomic knowledge. 
MH: The earlier account seems to deny a key feature of the later one and also of the
account in the philosophy of meta-Reality: creativity ex nihilo. It places
heavy emphasis on material causes: ‘man never creates, but only changes, his
knowledge, with the cognitive tools at his disposal’.22
RB: The earlier account does indeed seem to exclude ex nihilo creativity. But its
thematisation of emergence – of the reality of the ‘secondary qualities’ and
irreducible novelty – prepares the way ontologically for such a notion; and it
must be borne in mind that, although it gives an account of science as a social
process in motion, it does not seek to give an account of the source of change,
except by invoking a general notion of human creativity. What is not there in
A Realist Theory of Science is a full statement of the transitive dimension. That
depends upon the development of a philosophy of social science, which was
the brief of The Possibility of Naturalism, and a full account of how you would
critique a system of thought as an ideology. A Realist Theory of Science was not
a full critique of empiricism. It satisfied only one third of the criteria that I give
for ideology-critique in The Possibility of Naturalism. Although there was a
great deal of talk about motion, it did not analyse how motion actually
occurred; it was silent on the categories of negativity and process that were to
come in Dialectic. What you can say in general is that, in the logic of scientific
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discovery in Chapter 3 and throughout the book, there is much that antici-
pates The Possibility of Naturalism and much that depends upon but does not
actually anticipate the work in Dialectic. I had an intuition that absence was
going to be important, but that is all. It was a long time before I could formu-
late what is philosophically necessary for any full understanding of change.
MH: Are there any senses in which transcendental realism is implicitly a philoso-
phy of meta-Reality as well as dialectical?
RB: Yes. Take the critique of atomism in Chapter 2. It is very important for every-
thing that happens in critical realism subsequently, but especially in the meta-
Reality books. While A Realist Theory of Science, as I point out in the
Postscript,23 does not explain the abstract model of human being that under-
lies empiricism and idealism, the beginnings of an answer are sketched in its
discussion of the two poles of the basic problematic of classical modernism: an
abstract, actualist, account of universality and an atomistic, punctualist, ego-
centric view of the world, such that we have atomistic human beings or iso-
lated egos set in opposition to a uniform and unchanging world. That is of
course absurd. But it is an absurdity that was prevalent at the beginning of
modernity in the works of Hobbes and Hume and in the models that underlie
the accounts of science and knowledge that modernity generated, and that are
still prevalent in the textbooks as accounts of explanation, prediction, falsifi-
cation, and so on (see A Realist Theory of Science, Appendix to Chapter 2), and
in the aporiai they generate, such as the problem of induction (see ibid.: 
Chapter 3.6). Even Kant assumed that there is a level at which the empirical
is simply given to us, in which we are completely passive, and then, superim-
posed on this level, a mind that can synthesise and make sense of it, that is
active and can do things. In contrast, A Realist Theory of Science argues that we
are active agen s engaged in various processes of transformation in a complex,
differentiated and changing world constituted by different levels, all of which
in principle can be scientifically understood, as can our own action. I wanted
to situate the possibility of freedom as a power of human beings capable of act-
ing out of their bio-psycho-social nature and from their complex constitution
and back on the materials out of which they are formed. 
This is consonant with recent work in anthropology, broadly conceived.
Thus Brenda Farnell24 argues that it is not sufficient merely to relocate the
body at the core of theories of social action, but that the body must be con-
ceived dynamically, as engaged in movement. Embodied human agency, con-
ceived as a generative causal power grounded in our corporeal materiality,
thus provides the conditions of possibility of our cultural being, while our cul-
tural life determines the form or mode of expression of our own materiality. In
short, persons are irreducibly bio-psycho-social beings, always manifesting
their intentionality in the physical world out of which they emerged.
Central to my approach in A Realist Theory of Science is a critique of our
received notions of a thing and events, and correspondingly critiques of our
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conceptions of identity and of universality and therefore unity. Both point 
the way forward to meta-Reality as a philosophy of a rich differentiated 
and developing identity that constellationally embraces non-identity and 
difference.
Another pointer in the direction of meta-Reality was the concept of depth-
stratification. Just as we have to think of beings at different levels, so we have
to think of our ordinary life as constituted by different levels of structure and
different levels of agency. Relatedly, the idea of a false understanding of sci-
ence coexisting with a good or sound practice of it leads on to the concept of
co-presence and the conceptualisation of the Tina formation in Dialectic and
of demi-reality in transcendental dialectical critical realism, and so to an
understanding of emancipation as the shedding of heteronomous orders of
determination to release the good or true enfolded within them. The concept
of the transcendentally real self is not yet there in transcendental realism, but
it was already very clear to me that you had to analyse the self in a different way.
This connects with the theme of non-duality in meta-Reality. This functions
as a kind of reductio of the crude subject–object model that sees subjects over
here and objects over there. The reformulation within transcendental realism
and subsequently within dialectical critical realism already makes it clear that
subjects arise from a world of objects that are causally acting and reacting back
on them. So the new model is differentiated, it is complex, it is dialectical and
it is stratified. But what happens in states of non-duality is that the focus on the
object as distinct from the subject, and vice versa, collapses. It does not mean
that the beings collapse but just that in that state there is no separation
between them. When you are reading the newspaper, actually reading it, in
that moment of reading it, it is not an object distinct from the reading, there is
just the reading; existential intransitivity is lost. But then you cannot do what
we call science. To do science means that you have to reconstitute a discursive
world; but non-duality is nevertheless a part of being, and without it you can-
not begin to do science. Science is a discursive superstructure on a non-dual
basis. The discursive superstructure is very important, and that is what A
Realist Theory of Science addressed. In meta-Reality one is talking about states
that transcend discursivity, and so this potentially completes the account of
science and scientific practice, indeed completes, as it underpins, the whole set
of issues that are built on or around the subject–object distinction. Indeed, this
may all be viewed as proleptically contained within the transitive/intransitive
distinction that is constructed in a clear but minimal way at the beginning of
critical realism. Together with notions of depth-stratification, emergence, the
irreducibility of novelty and unity-in-diversity,25 it gives you – A Realist Theory
of Science gives you – in rudimentary form many of the tools you need for criti-
cal depth-emancipatory discourse.
MH: I was going to ask if it ever seemed an attractive option for you to become a
professional philosopher of science, but from what you have just said about the
developmental logic of A Realist Theory of Science it would seem the answer is
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definitely no. This is a book that had to go on, and as we know it did. It was
already going on well before it was published.
RB: This is true, but at a more immediate and subjective level I was aware after A
Realist Theory of Science came out that I did not want to be like Popper or
Hume, who did their really original work at a young age and then basically
spent the rest of their lives reformulating it. I did not want to be like that. But
of course, as I have said, A Realist Theory of Science was only a third of a total
project to demolish the ideologies standing in the way of human freedom and
what I was later to call the eudaimonistic society. I would have felt divided if I
had ever accepted the option of being a narrowly professional philosopher of
science. I would have been an Unhappy Consciousness. So I did not do it.
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4 The critical realist embrace 
Critical naturalism (1975–1979)
MH: Tell us something about your personal life and career during the years covered
by this interview, the second half of the 1970s.
RB: I started off this period at Edinburgh. I’ve already recounted something of my
life there, how it was a liberation after the graduate world at Oxford but
became limiting after a time and how there was a move in the department for
me to succeed Walsh, but the way was blocked. My career was actually going
very well at this stage and I wasn’t particularly anxious to get a chair, or to set-
tle down in any way. I wanted rather to go on. I’d had an exceptionally good
reception in the University of Sussex when I went there in 1977 to give a
paper on the possibility of social scientific knowledge and the limits of natu-
ralism, which was published the following year in the Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour. The University of Sussex was a revolutionary campus.
Feyerabend had been there as a visiting Fellow; his tenure might have over-
lapped with my visit, but I didn’t meet him on that occasion. The reception
was so very good that I went back two or three times that year and eventually
they offered me a one-year fellowship, which I accepted, and I took sabbatical
leave from Edinburgh for that year. In 1979 I went down to Sussex, and I lived
most of that year in Brighton. Some time in 1980 I got a flat in Battersea in
London and, whenever I went to Brighton, I would drive there and back. 
MH: When you turned to the philosophy of science a key motivation was to dis-
cover what light an adequate philosophical account of the natural sciences
could shed on the search for truth and freedom in the social sphere – ‘the proj-
ect of human self-emancipation’1 that had been manifesting itself to you since
childhood; whether it would permit a resolution of the crisis in the human sci-
ences, their emancipation from the ideologies stymieing them for the work of
emancipation. I take it that The Possibility of Naturalism, with its central ques-
tion, ‘to what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature?’ was
thus, in terms of your drive to come into your dharma, a book that had to be
written. Indeed, as you mentioned last time, you were already planning it and
a sociology of knowledge or ideology-critique sequel on Philosophical Ideologies
when you were writing A Realist Theory of Science.
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RB: Yes, absolutely. 
MH: I take it that the fundamental message of the book is accordingly similar to
that of A Realist Theory of Science, with the emphasis now on the sociosphere:
social science as a way to freedom from ignorance as one of the conditions of
human free flourishing. Contra the gathering relativism of the age, scientific
knowledge of society is possible and social science, which unlike natural 
science is internal to its subject-matter, necessarily takes the form of 
explanatory critique and so directly impinges on the project of human eman-
cipation from reproduced structures of domination that constrain our essen-
tial freedom. 
RB: Yes, absolutely. 
MH: As I see it, the possibility of naturalism is derived from (1) transcendental
argument from human transformative praxis (intentional agency) and (2)
immanent critique of the antinomies of social theory: naturalism/anti-
naturalism; reification/voluntarism; holism/individualism; body/mind; causes/
reasons; facts/values. And it is lent support by consistency with transcenden-
tal realism, which critical naturalism constellationally embraces (hence its
long title: transcendental realist critical naturalism2). Am I right in thinking
that the main new move in all this was the widening of the minor premise to
embrace human practical activity as such, not just scientific practical activity?
As you explain in the 1989 Postscript, it is part of your strategy of immanent
critique, since intentional agency ‘is a good anti-naturalist premise’.3
RB: Yes, I agree with all of that. Your formulation is correct in terms of the discur-
sive strategy of the finished product. One could add that my initial approach
to the possibility of naturalism was via my first book. In A Realist Theory of
Science I had produced a radically new account of knowledge and science,
including its social preconditions. The question now was what could one do
with it, a question that must also be seen in the context of my pre-existing
triple project embracing the philosophy of social science and ideology-
critique of the philosophies that were so dominant. 
What could one do with a book like A Realist Theory of Science? The first and
most obvious thing is to look into its transapplication to different contexts, to
see whether and how far it is also applicable to, for example, the social sci-
ences, but perhaps also the biological sciences (as I was to do in Scientific
Realism and Human Emancipation) – or perhaps even to something more spe-
cific, such as cybernetics; or possibly to a domain of human practice, such as
for instance law or architecture. A second approach would have been to delve
further into the concrete, because undoubtedly my focus in A Realist Theory of
Science, as it was in the work I did subsequently, was theoretical as distinct
from applied science. Indeed, although I had gone into the stratification of
nature and emergence in some detail, I did not really do much more work on
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applied science or the concrete, at least until Dialectic, and then again it was
rather theoretical work on the concrete. So another form of application or
better, development, of transcendental realism, would have been to go into
the concrete, to look in depth at applied science. It is this kind of work I have
turned to over the last six or seven years, especially when I was working in
Scandinavia and the Nordic area. Then again one sub-division of that, inter-
secting with the first approach, would be to go into various regional sciences
in much greater detail, and to some extent I am also doing that now. Of course,
since A Realist Theory of Science, many other critical realists have been doing
that anyway, at least implicitly. People generally come to critical realism from
some specific context, a context in which theory may be stuck or there may be
problems in research or practice; and in using critical realism as a tool in that
context they are led to elaborate (or tacitly presuppose) a regional critical
realist theory of that context. This is something that is testified to by the many
divisional entries in your Dictionary of Critical Realism. 
While I did engage in transapplication enterprises and went deeper, at least
to some extent, into the concrete, the main emphasis of my subsequent work
has been on the theoretical deepening of transcendental realism. This took
the form mainly of a deepening of ontology rather than epistemology. I think
of this deepening as work that transcendental realism necessitated. Its devel-
opmental logic is registered in the MELDARA schema. The project of The
Possibility of Naturalism was the first stage in this; it took me onto the terrain of
2E, the terrain of negativity, contradiction, processuality and social relation-
ism and transformationalism. And of course I already knew that it would when
I started working on the book, that you could not just take critical realism as
developed from physics and chemistry and apply it mechanically to social sci-
ence, because that would be begging the question as to whether the subject-
matter of the social sciences is indeed comparable to that of the experimental
natural sciences (paradigmatically, classical physics and chemistry).
Undoubtedly you would find some kind of fit there, but so would a social con-
structionist or some other form of poststructuralist; Hempel and Popper and
the deductive-nomological philosophers had also thought they had found a
fit. So what was required was actually a transcendental realism for the social
sciences that was somewhat independent of existing critical realism, and
again what I did was try to pick on a premise that would be acceptable to peo-
ple almost everywhere. That was intentional agency. I have to say ‘almost
everywhere’ because there were positivists who denied it, and that is why I
needed the double approach of transcendental argument from intentional
agency and an immanent critique of the antinomies in which social theory
and science were stuck. 
This double strategy, on the basis of the transcendental realism already
posted as it were, is reflected in the double specificity of the results. Every 
science is going to be specific, on the one hand, to its subject-matter – you can-
not just have an epistemology or theory of method in isolation from a specific
subject-matter, some specific domain of the real; and, on the other, to where
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the science or scientist is in its research process, in its epistemological or tran-
sitive cycle of discovery and explanation. I think it is very important to
remember that work in the human and social sciences in particular is doubly
specific in this way. It is always going to be guided by the particular subject-
matter you are studying; if you are studying education, or health or military
history you are going to have to have slightly different ontologies and there-
fore slightly different methodologies. The methodologies are going to be a
vector partly of your specific ontology but then partly of something else that is
also very specific, which is where you are in your own concrete research
process. There is not a single simple methodology; the methodology that 
critical realism entails is always going to have this double specificity. 
This specificity can be seen in terms of a kind of double inclusiveness. First,
the critical realist orientation gives you a maximally inclusive ontology,
because for critical realism there is nothing that is not real. Now this does not
mean, if you believe in animism, that the world is populated by witches and
devils. However it does mean that it is populated inter alia by your belief in
witches and devils. Ontology then is maximally inclusive. Critical realism
does not say in advance that something is not real, or even that it might be real
but is not worth studying. That is up to the researcher to ascertain. So too, in
the second place, it is up to the specific researcher to determine exactly what
tools, what part of the total metatheoretical, categorial and conceptual toolkit
offered by critical naturalism needs to be deployed, and what exactly needs to
be tinkered with and developed according to the specificities of the research
of particular subject-matters. Moreover, the researcher’s interest will depend
on where the researcher is in the epistemological dialectic of the particular
science or concrete research enquiry, or even (embedded within these) the
researcher’s career. Thus, there is nothing that critical naturalism says in
advance against number-crunching. If you do not have any data then the first
thing is to get some data. Similarly there is nothing against theory-
constructi n. The house of an epistemology that is going to be adequate to
physics and chemistry, on the one hand, and the social sciences in general, on
the other, is going to have many different rooms. 
Now with this double (ontological and epistemological) inclusiveness in
mind, we can then look at what alternative or rival philosophies of social sci-
ence do, and we will see that normally they fasten onto only one particular bit
or phase of the research process and, in so far as they are doing ontology, the-
orise only the sort of thing they are expecting to find at that particular level.
So the Humeans – the empiricists – look for constant conjunctions. The neo-
Kantians are thinking about the importance of structure in mind and the
social community, so they are looking for that. The hermeneuticists come
along and say, well, the nature of social reality is very different from natural
reality and the structures that you neo-Kantians are thinking about are con-
stituted by language. Their basic argument is that that is how society is, so you
have empiricists and neo-Kantians focusing on the transitive dimension and
the hermeneuticists focusing on an intransitive dimension of the social as
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constituted by linguistic or conceptual matters. Then the social construction-
ists come along and couple a neo-Kantian epistemology with a hermeneutic
ontology and you have the doctrine that the only thing that can be known is
what we constitute in our linguistic experience. Then you realise that what all
these different philosophical vantage-points are talking about is correct in so
far as it goes, in so far as one focuses on one specific area of investigation or 
one moment of the total enquiry. However, what critical realism tries to do is
give a picture of the whole. This means that critical realists can embrace the
insights of other positions and need not fear anything from them. Critical real-
ists are welcome to join in, but so too are social constructionists, empiricists,
neo-Kantians and any other variety of philosopher, social theorist and
researcher. This could be called the critical realist embrace. 
MH: I like that!
RB: We do not demolish our opponents at this level, we embrace them. When you
are talking with them, you do not say, ‘What a terrible liberty, just focusing on
language and ignoring the other aspects of social life!’ or anything like that.
You share their enthusiasm for the particular linguistic feature they have fas-
tened on and invite them to be part of a critical realist research team and then
they will soon start saying, for example, ‘Oh critical realism – I can do critical
realism doing what I do as a social constructionist (or whatever), now let me
do it.’ And then, when their guard is down, a critical realist colleague might
say, ‘Why don’t you try economic structure as well as linguistic structure, and
look at these interesting statistics, or look at these interesting interviews I’ve
done.’ In this way I think critical realism can provide an ontological, episte-
mological, and methodological framework for everyone working on a research
project in the social sciences. All we ask of those people is that they don’t stop
other people doing what they want to do.
MH: All the tendencies within philosophy and social theory you have alluded to
are replicated within critical realism to some extent. Are you saying in effect
that it is entirely appropriate that people should work within them for, as we
know, pushed to their limit, their developmental logic will take them along
the authentic critical realist way, straight down the middle and over the top?
So all you need is to really want to know.
RB: Absolutely. Someone might ask, ‘If we can just do what we were doing anyway
what is the point of becoming a critical realist?’ To answer this we have to take
a slight detour – which is not really a detour – into the forms of critique of
alternative or rival philosophical accounts of the subject-matter of the social
and human sciences. One that I have always stressed is immanent critique,
and of course what might be nice for a researcher who is just seeing the light
about critical realism is to do an immanent critique of philosophical positions
at work in their subject area. There might be so many possible immanent 
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critiques that they could get a little lost, but there is a form of immanent cri-
tique that is very powerful, which I would recommend. It is what I have called
the Achilles’ Heel critique. In this form of critique you seize on the most
important premise for a particular position and show how that premise and all
the beautiful insights that are hoped to be sustained by it cannot in fact be sus-
tained on the basis of that specified ontology, epistemology and methodology.
It is a real blow to the empiricist, who believes that all knowledge about the
world comes via constant conjunctions of experience, to realise that this can-
not do justice to experimentally produced experience, which is the only sort
of experience that the natural scientist is normally interested in. Likewise, it
would be a blow to a Marxist, for example, if you could show on the basis of
their epistemology that they cannot sustain the concept of class conscious-
ness. It would be a blow to the hermeneuticists and social constructionists if
you could show that they cannot sustain the intelligibility of language on their
assumptions. So that is the Achilles’ Heel critique, and it is the most powerful
instrument for arriving at a more inclusive conceptual formation.
MH: The moral of all this is that if we are going to build the eudaimonistic society
we really have to use our heads.
RB: We have to use our heads anyway, because when you want to correct a belief
you have, or rid yourself of an illusion, or critique someone else’s false belief,
you are doing this. You are oriented against the false belief in favour of one
that you hope will succeed as the result of an intentional rational project. That
is the only way we can do it; we cannot suppose it is going to happen beneath
or behind the back of intentionality. Of course, we know that our intentional
projects won’t cover all the conditions that apply, but it is the hope of human
emancipation that we can do this thing, we can survive and flourish in a eudai-
monistic society as a result of our rational self-conscious endeavours. To those
who are very swayed by the pull of local sociologies oriented against reason I
would point out that the legitimate complaint that Third World people,
women and ethnic minorities might have is not against reason per se but
against one particular form of reason. Reason is for me dialectical and con-
crete, that is to say, it is always contextual and locally specific as well. That is
absolutely essential, and what they object to is a dominant ideology – instru-
mental rationality – which is an ideology we are against. 
MH: Margaret Archer’s ‘analytical dualism’, which endorses the transformational
model of social activity, holds structure and agency to be essentially related yet
ontologically and analytically distinct. This sounds like your concept of ‘dual-
ity’ rather than any kind of ‘dualism’.4 By unpacking its temporal dimension,
she has suggested significant refinements of the transformational model of
social activity. Am I right in thinking that your subsequent double ‘negative
generalisation’ of it in Dialectic, which preserves the activity-dependence of
structures even where the activity is that of the dead, takes her elaborations
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fully on board? So here we have a case where The Possibility of Naturalism defi-
nitely needed dialecticisation.
RB: Yes, in Dialectic, at the pages you have in mind, I refer to and praise Margaret
Archer’s elaborations.5 Having said that, the argument in Dialectic in relation
to negative generalisation was constructed before I had read Maggie’s work on
morphogenesis, and is already implicit in the elaboration of the TMSA as
four-planar social being in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation which,
although it was published in 1986, was written in 1983. But when I read her
work I saw that it did provide a very powerful argument against what she called
central conflation theory. I was very grateful to her for that. I had done the
work on the negative generalisation but I think she showed me in very stark
terms that there was no way that my position was the same as that of Tony
Giddens. I think the negative generalisation of the TMSA in Dialectic has to
be complemented with another form of generalisation, which I suppose is
there between the lines in Dialectic, but which only comes to the fore in the
philosophy of meta-Reality. This I would call the preservative generalisation,
because in any moment of transformative negation there is always going to be
something that is preserved; or to put it another way, in any praxis there will
be something transformed and something preserved. The whole emphasis of
The Possibility of Naturalism through to Plato Etc. was on the transformative
moment, or transformation and production – on human beings as producers of
change. It is what I as a critic of Kant actually focused on. However, ecologi-
cal and other considerations necessitate another orientation, which is caring,
sustaining, and nourishing, and a feminist could say that I have neglected that
side. But of course in a fully balanced account both should be there as two
aspects of the duality of praxis. We need to put sustenance on the same level
in our consciousness as transformation.
MH: Maggie has subsequently elaborated a thesis of ‘the primacy of practice’ in the
realisation of human agency. She argues that the properties and powers of
human beings are neither pre-given, nor socially bestowed, but realised
through (emergent from) our practical transactions and relations with our
natural, practical, and social environment. As such they have ‘relative auton-
omy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify both’.6 Do
you have any problems with this view?
RB: I have no problem with either the thesis of the primacy of practice or the over-
all contours of Maggie’s account. In fact I use a version of the thesis of the pri-
macy of the practical in the way I argue for the principle of axial rationality (in
my recent, not yet fully published, work). I argue that axial rationality stands
alongside universal solidarity as a principle or presupposition which can be
appealed to in the rational resolution of conflicts, especially those which seem
to involve scientific (disciplinary, professional) cultural or moral incommen-
surability. People everywhere learn how to cook, drive cars, handle guns and
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use computers – this is a learning, which depends on our capacity to identify
and correct mistakes. From this we can derive a basic universal principle of cri-
tique and self-critique, which, when coupled with the presupposition of uni-
versal solidarity, stating that we can in principle identify with any other
human being, a principle which can be motivated, and transcendentally
established, by the fact that we could have been them, gives us an organon or
procedure for carrying out the basic critical realist theorem of judgemental
rationality. However, this basis, deriving from the practical order, is learned,
and is always in a social context, historically relevant and shifting – it is both
transitive and always socially and culturally conditioned, contextualised and
mediated; it is not ‘foundationalist’. Furthermore, I would argue that, though
we are born with certain innate capacities and infinite possibilities into a
world of infinite possibilities, we always come into the world with a concretely
singularised endowment and into concretely singularised circumstances –
capacities and circumstances which at once constrain us and enable us to tran-
scend these constraints. Moreover, we are born as dependent needy beings,
dependent upon a context for our physical survival and the acquisition of the
practical skills which Maggie rightly stresses, a context which is always at once
social and cultural – which is the strength of the Vygotskian position which
she tends to underestimate – as well as natural. 
MH: Bob Jessop has recently argued that the transformational model of social
activity, as developed in The Possibility of Naturalism and defended and elabo-
rated by Maggie Archer, ‘adopts a flat temporal ontology, neglects space, and
treats the poles of structure and agency in terms of a relatively undifferentiated
concept of society and people rather than engaging with specific sites of struc-
tural constraints and different kinds of social forces’.7 Is it your view that this
identifies real deficiencies in the model, and to what extent has your later
work redressed them? 
RB: I think he is wrong to say that space and time are ignored or neglected. I was
very conscious of both from the word go in The Possibility of Naturalism, and I
talk about the space–time dependence of social structures. It is true that in the
simple model of the transformational model of social activity I do not specifi-
cally put space and time in anywhere, but of course transformation and repro-
duction have to be conceived as processes at a point or place in space and
across or over time. In Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation I develop
under the rubric of the social cube or, as I later called it, four-planar social
being,8 an elaborated ontology of the social world in which space and time are
explicitly incorporated, and this is further developed in Dialectic. So I do not
agree that they are neglected. Obviously they are very important in the phi-
losophy of social science. Second, what seems to be involved in his comments
is the idea that you should not talk about praxis or structure or agency or unac-
knowledged conditions or contradictions without talking about specific
instances of them. But I don’t think you can talk about specific contradictions,
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for example, unless you have a concept of a contradiction. Most people who
talk about contradictions have a wrong concept of contradiction. This is what
the work of underlabouring in The Possibility of Naturalism was all about, get-
ting the basic concepts, which would need to be refined subsequently, into
good shape. I did the subsequent refining, but then of course they have to be
concretely applied and that is what Bob Jessop and people like him are doing. 
MH: In elaborating a causal theory of mind in The Possibility of Naturalism you
allow for three possibilities, which you say we as yet have no means of decid-
ing between: (1) mind just is a complex set of powers historically emergent
from and present only in association with (certain complex forms of) matter;
(2) there is a material substance that is the bearer of these powers, a position
that reduces to a materialist stratified monism; and (3) there is an immaterial
substance that is their bearer, a position that reduces to dualistic interaction-
ism.9 How do you see these ‘equal possibilities’ today? Could not (1) be char-
acterised as a ‘stratified monism’ (a concept you used again in From East to
West10) as well as (2)?
In intentional causality, you say, ‘mind’ affects ‘matter’, that is, psychologi-
cal states affect neurophysiological states. This is a transcendentally necessary
condition of human praxis, but, because we do not know what the mediating
mechanism is, you introduce a concept of ‘transcategorial causality’.11 Some
find that this manner of speaking concedes too much to the mind/matter
dichotomy you wish to overcome and risks slipping back into idealism. Thus
Kathryn Dean in a recent draft paper comments: 
Bhaskar’s use of the phrase ‘radically new principles of organisation’ sug-
gests that his account of ‘mind’ remains materialist, so long as we have a
broad, multi-modal understanding of materiality which does not set it up
as the ‘other’ of ideality. Yet, throughout the chapter [Chapter 2],
Bhaskar’s dichotomising of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ implies that there is an
idealism at work here. Note, for example, the claim that ‘causality . . .
holds between beliefs and matter’ and the conception of agency as ‘mind’
putting ‘matter in motion’. Beliefs and mind are here, apparently, con-
ceptualised in non-material terms; as, somehow, the ‘other’ of matter
rather than as specific organisations of matter.12
So far as I can tell, in your later work you do not find it necessary to invoke
transcategorial causality. Are the kind of concerns Kathryn expresses the rea-
son why?
RB: The whole point of the synchronic emergent powers materialism model was to
show that reasons can be causally aefficacious in the world. So the emphasis
was very much on emergence, the emergence of the human and social sphere.
But it is important to avoid a misunderstanding here. It is sometimes main-
tained that I provide philosophical support for an autonomous psychology
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that has no need to resort to sociological explanations. This is not true. I have
no truck with the notion of an autonomous psychology in that sense. I do
speak of the ‘autonomy’ of psychology and the psychological in The Possibility
of Naturalism but only in the sense that, though constrained by the sociologi-
cal and the physiological, it is not reducible to them. It was very clear to me 
when writing that book that human beings are, as the World Health
Organisation has put it, a ‘biopsychosocial’ mix13 and I explicitly use ‘sociopsy-
chology’ and related concepts.14 In Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation
I distinguish between natural, mixed and social determinations and stress 
that human agency, ‘moored socially in a complex of social relations and 
physically at determinate locations in space and time’ is mixed.15 The whole
point was really that psychology is always going to be influenced by biology,
geography, history and sociology. Actually, what is called for in The 
Possibility of Naturalism are regional, geo-historically specific or sensitive 
psychologies. I would not deny that there might be universal principles oper-
ating in a transhistorical way at the psychological level. But in so far as one can
find psychological universals of that sort they are always going to be in a 
specific changing context. So you might as well build a context into them
from the start. 
In Plato Etc. I indicate that I do not talk about transcategorial causality any
more and do not need to, because the point of the argument for synchronic
emergent powers materialism was that reasons are aefficacious on the natural
world. That is normally what we call matter.16 Nonetheless, critical realists
who think of themselves as materialists sometimes regard me as falling short of
their position. I think the reason for this lies in the fact that materialism has
historically been a way of orienting oneself against religion and against expla-
nations of phenomena that cannot be justified in terms of reason, but have to
be accepted on faith. I am one hundred per cent a materialist in that sense, in
which materialism is basically acceptance of the scientific world-view, but I
would also rather not say that that is materialism; nor do I see it as necessarily
atheistic, though it will be critical of religion. We see exactly what a scientific
approach to explanation means when we look further into the kind of materi-
alism that people on the left are inclined to accept. There seem to be two prin-
cipal planks of this. First, they have to be against vulgar reductionist
materialism to defend the possibility of a social science at all. So they are
against reductionist materialism, as am I. Second, they have to be against indi-
vidualism and totally opposed to methodological individualism, as am I.
However, if you go into the sort of social materialism that I find sometimes
addressed to me these days and counterposed to what is imagined to be my
position, the claim is that my meta-Reality thesis of the primacy of self-
referentiality takes us back close to an individualist position. But this is not
true at all because I have always held that it is the task of the emancipatory
project to transform or eradicate the oppressive social structures we inherit
from the past. The primacy of self-referentiality only comes into it when you
ask how we are to do that. At the end of the day you can only do it through
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human action, and human action is precisely the place where the social sci-
ences touch base with materiality. That is the only place in the social sciences,
other than the artefacts produced by human action, where the social sphere
actually touches base with materiality. So social materialism is a peculiar ori-
entation to counterpose to my position. The project of an emancipatory social
science depends on, has as its premise, intentional human agency. This is the
presupposition, not only of Marx, but of the whole range of emancipatory
social science. And that presupposes the causal aefficacy of reasons in the
world. In the last instance this comes down to the causal aefficacy of a good
argument or a good reason on your belief and your own praxis in the world, and
thus on the world generally. 
MH: A good reason is not necessarily the ‘other’ of matter.
RB: That is true; one has here a situation in which, obviously, the opposition
between mind and body – the dualism of mind and body – has to be re-
thematised. The mind-body problem has to be critiqued as part of the emanci-
patory project of returning to a richer version of the ‘whole-body mindedness’17
all humans enjoyed prior to what I call with Max Weber and Karl Jaspers the
axial revolution in the first millennium BCE. Part of this critique will be to see
these reasons, which will always be in a social context, as aefficacious on the
world through intentional agency. The argument presupposes the irreducibil-
ity of reasons, intentional agency and the rest of the sociosphere to the mate-
rials in relation to and on which they are causally aefficacious. And if you take
emergence as roughly having a threefold meaning or justification, namely,
their unilateral existential dependency on lower-order structures and systems,
and the taxonomic and causal irreducibility of higher-order states to lower-
order states, you can say that the materialists who criticise my position are
wanting to emphasise the dependency whereas what I have tended to empha-
sise is the emergence. Whatever you want to call the emergent product, it is
clear that mind and thought in the last instance are the means in virtue of and
by which the material (physical) world is transformed. You cannot get away
from mind there. In order to have emancipatory science you need a causal
notion of mind. 
It is vital to defend the irreducibility of intentionality to physics and chem-
istry or biology if we are to have the possibility of rational argument and there-
fore of science. The sort of argument I produced in The Possibility of Naturalism is
the condition of any science, not just social science; but of course, most impor-
tantly from the point of view of the materialist project, it is a condition of the
possibility of any social science that we defend the emergent causality, and a
degree of autonomy, of the intentional realm. If the intentional realm was some
kind of automatic superstructure of the non-intentional realm, we could not
have a science at all, let alone a social science; there would not be any rational
point in having a science, and all the momentous and terrible things we have
done to nature and ourselves would be inexplicable and unattributable.
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Just invoking materialism without specifying exactly what the sense is does
not get you very far. It is often claimed that ideas and ideology have a material
existence ultimately rooted in physical matter. But what is physical matter? If
you go down one level of the stratification of nature you come to atoms that
are weird in terms of our normal conceptions of concrete materiality and in
fact turn out to be not a-tomic at all! If you go down another couple of levels
you are dealing with distributions in space and successions in time. You are
very far removed from ‘concrete materiality’. The world of quantum fields and
quarks is not the world of concrete objects and solid material things. What the
belief in brute physicality as exhaustive of the world depends on is in fact a
species of commodification; it is an ideological materialism that commodifies
and fetishises the properties of concrete material things. By downplaying or
denying the possibility of intentional agency, it is just as much oriented
against the possibility of social science as is supernaturalist idealism or the
resort to faith in totally transcendent, supernatural causes. In many cases I
would rather not use the terms ‘materialism’ and ‘idealism’: I would rather just
talk about ‘science’, ‘realism’ and ‘ontology’. 
I am a little wary of doing this, however, because, in so far as you have a dis-
pute between idealism and materialism, there are two levels at which you can
make out a case for orienting the balance in favour of materialism. The first is
that we are material things, and in science we confirm things, at the moment
anyway, through their impact on material things. The material world of solid
objects in which we live provides the framework in terms of which we adjudi-
cate all the other claims to reality. Second, we do have a successful theory of
how human beings emerged from less complex material things, the theory of
evolution. In both these senses, the sense in which we are unilaterally depend-
ent on the physical and biological world from which we emerged and the sense
in which we use it as our framework in the domain of public assessability of
scientific validity claims, materialism is valid. Both must be correct because
things must have been implicit in what they emerged from. I think there are
dangers in religious idealism. But there are also dangers in materialist secular-
ism. The philosophy of meta-Reality offers a way of transcending both.
The case for orienting the balance in favour of materialism takes us close to
the claims of historical materialism. It depends upon focusing on the implica-
tions of the relationship of dependency in the hierarchy or stratification of
levels of reality – from the physical (including cosmological), through the
chemical, biological, human (psychological), to the social, cultural, and so on.
This hierarchy is such that human cultural systems are (unilaterally) depend-
ent on human social systems, that is economic, political, family and commu-
nity, and military institutions and forms. Such human social systems are in
turn (unilaterally) dependent on human material systems, that is systems of
production, consumption, care and settlement, which are in turn (unilater-
ally) dependent on (human) life-support systems, such as for example, 
functioning ecosystems, species of living organisms in their environments 
and climatic systems. These are of course in turn dependent on more basic
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geological, chemical, and ultimately physical structures and powers. This
defines the sense in which certain material necessities have to be satisfied for
any form of social or cultural life. However, the manner in which such prereq-
uisites are satisfied is always socially and culturally dependent, and the way
they are efficacious, negotiated, mitigated or transcended is always depend-
ent, at least partially, upon a co-determining emergent higher-order level of
reality. The ‘material’ here is a constraint in a complex play of forces and 
structures, but a constraint that must always be satisfied in the social world,
and satisfied before anything else, and for anything else to be possible.
MH: What about the first part of the question, the possibilities concerning what
mind is that you originally postulated?
RB: Mind is just a complex set of powers historically emergent and present only as far
as we know in association with certain complex forms of matter. That is all we
can say. I am not so keen on the possibility that there is a material substance that
is the bearer of these powers, a position that reduces to a materialist stratified
monism, unless this emergent domain can be very clearly situated scientifically.
I was trying to bend the stick in favour of the view that the human and social
sphere has to be studied in terms of radically new principles of organisation,
deploying concepts, some of which were already familiar, such as the concept of
intentional agency, and others of which were not so familiar. Whether we are
familiar with the concepts or not, the study of this domain is going to have to be
the study of an emergent product and cannot be reduced by psychologism, biol-
ogism or anything else to something more simple. This is not to say that biology
is unimportant, but that we cannot reduce the social sciences to the play of the
gene pool. That is vital to the whole project of the possibility of naturalism. And
if you think about it, it is vital to all parties to disputes on these issues, including
the science of biology. For the science of biology advances as a result of a rea-
soning, intentional process in which we presuppose for the rationality of that
science that intentionality has causal aefficacy on the world, in particular on our
pre-existing beliefs. Even for this it has to be aefficacious in the production of
sounds and marks and all the material things that we want to do. 
MH: I want to come on to the whole issue of facts and values, explanatory critique
and ideology mainly in the next interview, because it receives much fuller
elaboration in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, though it is impor-
tant to register here that your basic thinking in this complex area was already
laid out in The Possibility of Naturalism. Bracketing that, then, what would you
say are the most original or radical theses of The Possibility of Naturalism?
RB: The resolution of the antinomies of structure and agency in the TMSA; indi-
vidualism and collectivism or holism in a relational conception of the subject-
matter of social science; and meaning and law in a qualified critical naturalist
conception that does justice to both, and also isolates the limits of both 
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naturalism and the linguistic paradigm, articulating a conception of social 
life as concept-dependent but not concept-exhausted. Then, relatedly, the
synchronic emergent powers materialism that I sketched, the defence of the
causality of reasons and the evaluative and value-entailing character of factual
discourse, and the orientation to theory–practice consistency and relevance,
a role that I summed up as philosophical underlabouring. Further, the explo-
ration of the possibility of social scientific (and psychological) knowledge,
which at the same time issues in a critique of alternative philosophies of social
science, especially positivism and hermeneutics. Finally, as A Realist Theory of
Science attempted to isolate the conditions of possibility of positivism, so The
Possibility of Naturalism attempts to isolate the conditions of possibility of
hermeneutics and the most characteristic hermeneutic circles. 
MH: There is an extraordinary passage at the end of The Possibility of Naturalism,
Chapter 3, in which you try to situate your achievement metatheoretically, 
to put your deduction of the possibility of naturalism, building on the tran-
scendental realist philosophy of science, in context of the major scientific
advances of modernity. You situate it within a four-fold decentring of
humankind initiated by Copernicus: 
• of the earth from the universe (Copernicus, astronomy);
• of earth-bound humanity from the universe (Darwin, biology);
• of human society from the human subject (Marx, sociology, geo-his-
tory), social practices from the intentional actions that reproduce them
(TMSA);
• of mind from consciousness (Freud, psychoanalysis, psychology); the
stratification of mind (psyche) and of purposes (project/a life): a person
as a decentred unity.
And you suggest that there are two further aspects of this decentring (from the
TMSA): establishment of a philosophical ontology or intransitive dimension;
and of a materialist (non-idealist) epistemology or transitive dimension,
entraining critiques of the leading philosophies of the social sciences.18
This underlines for me just how seriously you take the achievements of the
great modern scientists. Would it be true to say that your main role has been
to render explicit, via transcendental argument and critique, what was already
implicit in the scientific process? Is there any room for Einstein in the account
of decentring? In relation to your own contribution to it, specifically your
rejection of the Kantian view of the categories, does transcendental realism
leave open the possibility that there may be a priori forms of intuition and 
categories of understanding?
RB: The passage in The Possibility of Naturalism you refer to should be taken in 
conjunction with what I say in A Realist Theory of Science (see p. 198) about
the (tacitly gendered) modernist conception of man as one of three mutually
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reinforcing models underpinning the world-view I am critiquing there, the
others being the classical paradigm of action (or more generally the whole cor-
puscularian framework of which it was a part) and the celestial closure
Newtonian mechanics had effected. Now this world-view already involved a
profound break from the pre-modernist conception but it is itself in crucial
respects conceptually incoherent, as I show in A Realist Theory of Science (see
Chapter 2.3). The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed two fur-
ther conceptual revolutions in physics (revolutions which have been only
imperfectly reconciled). Einstein showed that we no longer live in a world of
absolute space and absolute time; quantum physics showed that the atomistic
conception of things must give way to something which is altogether more
peculiar, but is perhaps best thought of as a field with some irreducibly sto-
chastic properties, and that events must be thought in a non-punctiform way
as distributions (in space) and succession (in time). One implication of this is
that physics cannot be used to bolster atomistic individualism or a monistic
conception of space and time any more. However, it is also important to
remember the critical realist principle of methodological specificity, that one
always has to produce specific arguments for emergent domains as to what
their fundamental categories and methods are, so that we should never have
tried to transfer conceptual systems and techniques from physics to the social
field – and one should not do so now. As to the scope of the a priori, the exam-
ple of corpuscularianism shows that we can indeed (within limits) use rela-
tively a priori considerations to critique the conceptual framework of a
science, but I doubt very much whether there are absolutely a priori forms and
categorisations at a scientifically meaningful and significant level – the appro-
priate forms and categorisations come as part of an irreducibly empirical
process of discovery and conceptual transformation.
MH: Finally, tell us something about your manner of writing. I understand that,
starting with Dialectic, you have spoken all your books into a dictaphone from
notes. How did you produce your manuscripts before that? Did you type them
or write them by hand? Are the various manuscripts extant?
RB: Actually there was a procedure I developed when working on A Realist Theory
of Science and, indeed, the manuscripts that pre-dated it. This was to write
everything out by hand. I wrote very quickly. If there was a mistake on the
page, if the writing was not flowing, I would feel that there must be something
wrong with it. So there are indeed manuscripts, and they are mostly extant in
a warehouse in East Anglia, unlike many of my furnishings and clothes, which
were sent to the broker’s yard to be sold or auctioned. You can see very small,
but very neat handwriting. I would give the final version to a typist. At Oxford
I had a typist called Mrs. Browne. She typed several of my manuscripts. She
started typing for me in 1967 or 1968 (I think), but it gradually became more
and more difficult for her to read my handwriting, which was getting smaller,
so I began to use a dictaphone in about 1969. I always wrote everything out by
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hand and then spoke it into a dictaphone. I wrote these manuscripts at a rapid
rate, and some of them are quite long, one or two are the size of a big book.
Then I dictated the manuscript into a dictaphone. When I was in Edinburgh
I decided that I had to write things more legibly, so I wrote bigger, and The
Possibility of Naturalism was typed by someone else.
MH: I don’t fully understand the relationship between the dictaphone and the
writing.
RB: I spoke from handwritten manuscripts into a dictaphone, then the typist
played the dictaphone. These dictaphones came in two parts, a part you 
spoke into and a part you played like a tape recorder. So the typists would 
listen to that and they would have earphones and pedals for stopping and
starting the tape. It was a technology quite widely used in those days before
computers. 
MH: You were speaking from a complete manuscript?
RB: Yes. I didn’t just make it up as I went along.
MH: So there was no change in the way you did Dialectic? I’m being particular
about this because it is widely and in my view very unjustly believed that
Dialectic is badly written, and I’ve heard it said that the ‘fact’ that it was the
first book you spoke (from notes) rather than wrote might have contributed to
this. Did you write it first?
RB: I re-wrote it several times, re-doing earlier drafts. The only change that hap-
pened was in the editing of the typescript. I have written complete manuscripts
by hand for all my books with the partial exception of the meta-Reality vol-
umes. In the early days if there was a mistake I could easily mark it on the type-
script or I would sit next to the typist and tell her what corrections to enter. But
in the case of Dialectic, because of the many new and difficult concepts, there
were too many corrections to do things this way, so I carefully entered them all
by hand. The typist, I remember very well, was a woman called Sue Kelly who
was an amazing typist, almost as fast as Jenny Cobner (!!).19 Sue was a very bril-
liant woman. She had never been to university and her real love in life was
dogs. She had a house on the London side of Croydon, where she lived with her
husband or partner who was a minicab driver for Addison Lee. I was doing some
teaching in Brighton and Sue’s place was on the road between Battersea, where
I lived, and Brighton – I was driving most places in those days. Anyway, she
lived in a big house with about thirteen dogs of all varieties, and she used to
walk them. These were her own dogs, but in her spare time she used to work in
Battersea Dogs’ Home. She had lots of cats as well.
MH: What was brilliant about her? 
Ch 4.qxp  12/18/2009  1:59 PM  Page 89
90 The critical realist embrace, 1975–1979
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
RB: She had a brilliant mind. The tragedy was she was born into a working-class
background in which women just did not go to university. She was familiar
with most of my concepts.
MH: She understood your concepts?
RB: She didn’t try to understand them rigorously, but she understood their point
and how they functioned in a rough-and-ready way. 
MH: So she’s typing away, and all of a sudden she hears ‘ontological monovalence’! 
RB: And that’s new.
MH: What does she type?
RB: Well, she might look up ‘ontological’ and ‘monovalence’ in a dictionary, or
‘syntonic’ or whatever it was. As I concede and everyone says, it is a difficult
text. So when I was looking at the typed manuscript I started to edit it much
more and I did alter sentences.
MH: So the editing of Dialectic was if anything more thorough than was the case
with your previous books?
RB: Yes.
MH: Did Sue get most of these concepts right first time round?
RB: Yes, but that’s not why I said she was brilliant. I think anyone who is intelli-
gent, can type well and is practised at transcribing can pick up most of the con-
cepts aurally and put them in a written form. But she actually understood them
in a basic, spot-on sort of way.
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5 ‘Prolegomenon to a natural 
history of the human species’ 
Explanatory critique (1979–1986)
MH: The 1980s saw the crystallisation of the postmodern as a global discourse. In
your later written assessments of postmodernism, you praise it for its critique of
abstract universality and its emphasis on difference and diversity, its critique of
modernity and Eurocentrism, but strongly criticise it for its rejection of any
kind of universality and its consequent actualism and for its judgemental rela-
tivism. Fredric Jameson already in 1984 offered in effect a real definition: ‘the
cultural logic of late capitalism’.1 Your own work was very much devoted to
moving beyond that logic. While postmodernism’s political trajectory was
rightwards in the direction of anti-communism/anti-Marxism and an endism
that saw liberal democracy and capitalism as unsurpassable, that is, counter-
revolutionary,2 you continued to work metacritically within the conatus to
freedom linking Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Marx and remained committed to
a form of revolutionary socialism. Thus while postmodernism was rejecting the
European Enlightenment holus bolus, you (while by no means uncritical of it)
were elaborating versions of several of its ‘grand narratives’: those of emanci-
pation through the advance of knowledge and, in your work towards Dialectic,
of the tendential rational directionality of geo-history, issuing in the possibil-
ity of a new eudaimonian enlightenment. While postmodernism was prone to
view ethical categories as mystificatory traces of power relations, you were bent
on elaborating an ethics grounded in truth. You must have felt you were swim-
ming against the tide, if not kicking against the pricks?
RB: No, I didn’t really, funnily enough, because I had tremendous confidence in the
power of basic critical realism to critique the tendencies you refer to, and this
was something confirmed to me again and again in debates – of which my pub-
lished debates with Rom Harré and Ernesto Laclau are examples. Let me give
an example of this kind of context. Rom Harré organised a society called ‘The
Friends of Good Psychology’ to which he regularly invited social construction-
ists and postmodernists such as John Shotter (with whom I was very friendly)
and Ken Gergen, to come and talk. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour has
followed this example, giving equal place to social constructionism (of all vari-
eties), as it does to critical realism. Harré himself co-edited it with Paul Secord
until Charlie Smith took over in 1983. Harré’s views on philosophy and social
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science underwent several changes, so that in different books one can identify
radically different positions, but they were (at least in respect of social science)
basically idealist and mainly individualist, at least until his late Vygotskian
turn. I would go along to such events, sooner or later I would feel it necessary to
intervene, and there would tend to be no answer, or at least very little in the
way of a rational response, to the sort of thing I said (or so I felt). So critical real-
ism appeared to possess a kind of intellectual hegemony. I felt that the critique
of actualism and the isolation of the epistemic fallacy, together with the revin-
dication – indeed the establishment of a new science – of ontology were prob-
ably the most important things that enabled me to prevail. I could say, well,
what you are doing at the level of epistemology and of discourse co tains an
interesting enough suggestion about the social world, but there is also a part of
the social world that might be constituted by structures and so on, a part which
might cast light on your problem-area (or the tenability of your suggestion) –
let us investigate that too. A little later, by the time I had written Dialectic, I had
come to see that the critique of ontological monovalence was just as important
as the critique of the epistemic and linguistic fallacies. However, it was not so
useful from the point of view of critiquing poststructuralism and social con-
structionism, because many of their adherents accepted change and a non-
Platonic analysis of change, or at any rate accepted it as a phenomenon –
almost as much as their arch-concept of difference. 
However, although I was outwardly buoyant, underneath there was also a
slightly dejected feeling. Much of the time, at least while I was writing, or in a
seminar, I could be in a little capsule, or set of capsules, in which intellectual
arguments held sway. But it was also the case that it was the guys who lost the
argument who got the promotions and the material security that I lacked.
While I may have won intellectual victories, my antagonists were busy build-
ing nest-eggs for themselves. However I did have a firm conviction that there
was a certain rational directionality in history (which I went on to try to elab-
orate in Dialectic). Their victory at the level of material gains or even social
recognition would not count for so much in the long run, or so I thought. 
MH: Where were you physically at this stage?
RB: Physically I was mainly in London living in Battersea. I lived in three different
houses in Battersea. 
MH: Did you still have a job? 
RB: I retired from Edinburgh University in 1982. 
MH: In order to do what?
RB: I had been invited to apply for a chair in philosophy at Leeds, Peter Geach’s
chair. I went for the interview and there were six or seven other candidates; I
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thought I did quite well, but as the day wore on I had a feeling that I really 
didn’t much care for this, and I am sure that many of the people in the depart-
ment – although there were allies there – felt they didn’t much care for me
either. It was at the time of Thatcher’s first cuts, and I did not follow it up.
Later I was told that they were willing to make me an offer, but for some 
reason I did not receive it until after the position was otherwise filled. 
MH: So the broad picture is that you were freelancing, not holding down a full-
time academic job?
RB: I was effectively full-time freelancing, but I was also teaching in Oxford, for
which I was getting paid meagre rates. On the other hand I was also going to
prestigious conferences and colloquia in places like Hanover and Houston.
However, what I really wanted to do was to complete the tripartite project
that I had set myself in the late 1960s. By the time The Possibility of Naturalism
was published I was already working on Dialectic. In fact I had a contract from
Verso for a book on this topic, I think in 1978 or 1979, and I was also commis-
sioned to write an article for them. The book was going to be called Dialectics,
Materialism and Human Emancipation. The article, entitled ‘Dialectic, materi-
alism and science’, was to be on Della Volpe, Colletti and Timpanaro. This
took me back to do extensive work on the whole Marxian tradition, and of
course I wanted to write a book on Hegel. I knew I had to come to terms with
Hegel. You could say that, to anyone schooled in the analytical tradition, it
would have seemed a little odd perhaps to see copious references to dialectic
as the key concept that was going to resolve all the problems – the concept
about which Marx said he would love to write a couple of pages but never had
the time. I wanted to know, for instance, why Marx thought this was the secret
to the method of science, when existing critical realism and all the actual texts
and references in Marx suggested that both much science and much (perhaps
most) of Marx’s method could be very well understood in an analytical kind of
way, or at least in a way that did not necessitate extensive reference to dialec-
tics. What was I missing? It took me a long time. I did a series of articles on
Marx and Marxist philosophy, particularly entries for the Dictionary of Marxist
Thought. That was in 1983. 
I was deeply unsatisfied. Critical realism – transcendental realism and criti-
cal naturalism – seemed very neat, the infrastructure was complete, and the
pre-existing intellectually hegemonic philosophies had been devastatingly
critiqued. At first blush, everything appeared in order, but when one turned to
the field of dialectic and Marxist philosophy everything seemed untidy and
confused. Subconsciously, I suppose, I wanted to order that in the same kind
of way I felt I had ordered the philosophy of science and social science. I
wanted to have a framework that would be as simple, if you like, as elegant, as
comprehensive, as inclusive. Some of my dictionary entries approximated to
this; they seemed to be very inclusive, to be able to situate everyone. But a pro-
found feeling of dissatisfaction remained.
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MH: So you were unhappy personally. In your notes for this project, you refer to the
1980s as ‘dark days of the left, leading to the spiritual turn’. The grapevine has
it by contrast that you were an elegant man about town at the top of his form,
and certainly pieces such as the address you gave to the Second Socialist
Conference at Chesterfield in 1988 exude confidence, authority and hope,
aspiring to help ‘win the intellectual high-ground’ for a new socialist enlight-
enment.3
RB: Although I might have appeared very confident in my overt transactions with
the world, especially the intellectual ones, at a personal level I was not con-
tent. In fact I was working harder than ever before. I imagine I was a bit like
the eureka guy, unhappy until I had licked the problem. The problem I was
working on in the sphere of dialectical and Marxist philosophy was analogous
to the isolation of the epistemic fallacy and the critique of actualism in the
field of philosophy of science and social science. I was aware that it would be
the basis of all the categories and concepts we have for speaking in the nega-
tive, and that it had to be in reality as well. So although I was actually working
on absence and how to understand it from 1980 on, it was only around 1991–2
that I, as it were, saw the light. 
The problem I was working on was not simply that of explaining change,
because you could very easily explain change in terms of the transformation of
structures. So it is not true to say that, using the later terminology, 1M critical
realism does not have a concept of change; it does. But the basis of radically
irreducible change, the basis of novelty and emergence in nature and a fortiori
in the social world, had to be given by a deeper analysis. I was not in a clear
state about it. I was unhappy. There were many different clues, many different
loose ends. I was reading a great deal and writing a lot. 
Moreover, in order to know more about Freud I undertook three years of
psychoanalysis in this period, which made me more unhappy. For that I had
the slightly sick compensation that it made my psychoanalysts even more
unhappy than it made me. 
The real problem was that I could not obtain any kind of good intellectual
order in the whole field of dialectic. This manifested itself in me in a desire to
read and learn more about everything that could cast light on it. I felt I had the
practical experience to understand Marx in so far as I had mixed and talked
with revolutionaries, visited people in prison, talked about all the questions
that revolutionaries are supposed to talk about. But did I really know about the
unconscious? For that I had to be analysed. I started a regime of psychoanaly-
sis, basically because I wanted to understand it and one could not really talk
about psychoanalysis as a potential science of emancipation without actually
having experienced it. This is the unity of theory and practice. I had experi-
enced revolutionary struggle, and in that context I also wanted to experience
psychoanalysis. There ensued three years of psychoanalysis with various ana-
lysts. I think I should say that the psychoanalyst I knew best on a philosophi-
cal basis was a friend of mine, a young trainee who was becoming a
Ch 5.qxp  12/18/2009  1:58 PM  Page 94
‘Prolegomenon to a natural history of the human species’, 1979–1986 95
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
psychoanalyst in Edinburgh called David Will. He wrote a very good article on
the application of critical realism to psychoanalysis.4 He said to me, ‘Roy,
promise me never to be analysed. It will destroy your creativity. Freud was very 
precious of his creativity, but it was nearly destroyed by analysis.’ 
MH: When did he tell you that?
RB: About 1977. I was perhaps never very good at listening to advice. 
MH: Did he say why it is destructive?
RB: The reason I think he said that was not because of any great revelation you
would find out about yourself but because of the method practised in Freudian
theory. They tended to have very intensive analysis, and if you are sitting or
lying down talking about your parents or your sex life for four or more nights a
week for an hour or so, the whole round trip to the psychoanalyst is costing you
£40 or even more and taking three hours of your time per day; this process is
bound to absorb a lot of your creative energy. And of course I wanted to get to
the bottom of things in psychoanalysis as well, I wanted both to be able to use
it as a tool and to know more about myself, so I was diligent about it. All this
contributed to a sense of malaise, of not really wanting to take up any oppor-
tunities that might be there, such as the Leeds chair, until I had finished my
intellectual project. 
MH: What was the net result of the psychoanalysis?
RB: The end result in 1983 was to make me rather wary about psychoanalysis as a
therapeutic technique, a technique of intervention. Had I had a genuine prob-
lem rather than just intellectual curiosity I might have had a better experience
of it. My admiration for psychoanalysis as an explanatory theory increased if
anything during these years, but not as a technique of intervention. I started
off with two very bad analysts, one of whom used to sit over me and chain-
smoke. Both were obsessed by the phenomenology of my current sexual fan-
tasy life. Then I moved to a male psychoanalyst, who was also a doctor, a
consultant. I learnt later that I had played a cricket match with him when I
was very young; one of us had batted while the other bowled, and I don’t think
that conflict had been satisfactorily resolved. And then of course my work was
starting to be relatively well known in psychoanalytical journals, and I was
better known than he was, so I think there may have been some negative
transference there. At the end, I just thought that was enough of that. Other
people such as Andrew Collier,5 Terry Bloomfield and David Will had done
quite substantial articles on it from a critical realist sort of perspective. I don’t
know if this is well known or not in contemporary psychoanalysis, but it is a
funny thing, disciplines are a little like places: critical realism could be in 
fashion for a few years and then go out of fashion.6 Sussex was a tremendous
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stronghold of critical realism in the late 1970s and through most of the 1980s
but there is virtually no critical realism there now, or so I am told. Similarly
psychoanalysis and psychology were strongholds for a while in the same
period. And then of course Jacques Lacan became very fashionable with 
the avant garde, while the work of Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott 
and internal relations theory became entrenched within the Freudian 
mainstream. 
After psychoanalysis I went into a bit of humanistic psychology. It was a
relief. I had about ten sessions in all. One of these psychologists was very wor-
ried about my state of affairs so she sent me back to a psychiatrist, who put me
on anti-depressants, or rather tried to put me on them; I thought they were
absolutely terrible and soon stopped taking them. I had another encounter
with a psychiatrist in 1983. I was about to go to Majorca, but wasn’t feeling
well, so I went to my GP and got some antibiotics. I very inadvisably drank
alcohol when I was on these antibiotics. I passed out. I was at my place in
Battersea at the time, alone. When I came to I phoned a friend, who called the
ambulance, and I was taken to a hospital, but it was decided that it was too late
for me to be pumped out. The next morning I woke up in a ward. I wanted to
go home, but I had nothing on except a very flimsy dressing gown, so I could
not just leave. I had to get permission from the person in charge of the ward,
who told me I had to be seen by a psychiatrist. I had an appointment with a
publisher at three that afternoon, the day before I was due to go to Majorca. As
it got closer and closer to three I grew more and more concerned. But I was
finally seen by two psychiatrists, who asked me why I had tried to kill myself.
They had obviously put me down as a suicide case. I told them I had not tried
to kill myself, but was very anxious to get out of there. I finally managed to flee
from the hospital by about two fifty-five. 
MH: How did you get out?
RB: In my thin robe! Luckily there was a heat-wave in London. I got into a taxi,
drove to my house, ran in, changed clothes, and managed to keep my appoint-
ment. The hospital staff had thought it very odd that I arrived in this very
flimsy gown. I remember the psychiatrist describing it as a negligee. 
MH: You should have left it on for the publisher.
RB: At several stages in my life doctors have attempted to diagnose me as having
depression. The last time was in the early 1990s. I had a GP who insisted on
giving me Prozac. He told me he was going to bring me into the twentieth cen-
tury with this famous anti-depressant. I took it for a couple of days and found
my personality was undergoing transformation. So I refused to take it any
more. The doctor was absolutely furious. When I told him at my next appoint-
ment that I had only taken it for three or four days he stomped out of his sur-
gery, got into his Chelsea tractor and drove off, with all the other patients
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waiting! I could only think that subconsciously he wanted to control me (he
thought I was writing too much). He probably thought that medicine is one
field Roy Bhaskar does not know about, yet here he is deciding to be his own
doctor. We parted by mutual consent a little bit later. So enough of that
detour.
MH: You said in an earlier interview that you wrote Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation in 1983, yet as we know it was published in 1986. What accounts
for the gap?
RB: When I wrote it I thought it was going to be the first three or four chapters of
a larger work on Dialectics, Materialism and Human Emancipation (which was
eventually published as Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom). However, I was at
something of an impasse in my dialectical work, so in 1984–5 it occurred to me
that, since it was interesting and important in its own right, it should be pub-
lished sooner rather than later. It was not easy to find a publisher though.
Verso, with whom I had a contract for the book on dialectic, was very resist-
ant. I have already recounted how they sent around Peter Dews to tell me that
emergence was an unscientific concept. By this time Perry Anderson and his
circle had pretty much adopted the perspectives of analytical philosophy com-
bined with a biologically based materialism, exemplified for example in Gerry
Cohen’s work on Marx’s theory of history and Timpanaro’s on materialism,7
such that you did not really need dialectic or anything very complicated to
understand and change the world. But they eventually agreed to publish it,
rather reluctantly. 
MH: Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation is far and away your major pub-
lished work of these years. For me, it is in some respects to Dialectic what
Grundrisse is to Capital. I see it as a kind of prolegomenon to Dialectic, or 
better a prodrome in the literal sense, a running towards it, a working through
of some of the main issues in that direction, but also a consolidation, a 
marshalling of energies and resources that ‘concentrates its fire’ on analytical
rather than dialectical philosophy8 while you seek the key to transposing 
and elaborating your project in a dialectical register – a kind of analytical 
laboratory, then, in which you were consciously preparing for the leap 
into dialectic. Thus, in terms of Dialectic’s four-sided dialectic, Chapter 1
focuses on 1M (it justifies and develops transcendental realism); Chapter 2 
on 2E (it justifies and develops critical naturalism); Chapter 2.5–2.7 on 3L (it
justifies and develops explanatory critique on the terrain of philosophy); and
Ch 3 on 4D (it justifies and further develops explanatory critique on the ter-
rain of the sociology of knowledge, engaging in the transformative labour of
ideology-critique) – a presentational structure that Dialectic itself was to 
mirror. Extrapolating from this and what you have said in these interviews, is
it correct to say that the architectonic of your project went basically as in
Table 1?
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RB: I think you are absolutely right about the architectonic. However, one has to
remember that the reason why I divided Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation up into those chapters was more a legacy of my initial tripartite
project, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science and then an expla-
nation of them, a full critique. So the fit is a retrospective one. It is perfect and
I agree with it entirely, but it does not represent what I was feeling at the time.
MH: The Possibility of Naturalism initiates, it seems to me, an attempt to marry a
relational conception of society (later entity relationism as such and in gen-
eral) with depth-stratification as an alternative to the dialectical couple of
ontological dualism and ontological monism/holism, an attempt that you
carry forward in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation and through in
Dialectic. On this conception, the world is both asymmetrically stratified/
differentiated and dynamic/interconnected – both alterity and change are
irreducible and external relations are both real and constellationally con-
tained within the internal relationality of open (totalities nested within)
Totality; internal relationality does not entail explanatory equality among the
aspects related, that is, it is consistent with depth-explanation. In Scientific
Realism and Human Emancipation this approach to philosophical ontology
goes by the names of integrative pluralism (IP), also structured pluralism, and
developing (or dialectical) integrative pluralism (DIP). You did not deploy these
concepts much thereafter, however. Can you say why?
RB: There is absolutely nothing wrong with these concepts. The idea of develop-
ing integrative pluralism leads into the idea of structured and differentiated
totality. That is the sort of way I talk in Dialectic, and of course that in turn
leads into the kind of totality one has in meta-Reality where there are layers of
duality within the cosmic envelope or within non-duality and then layers of
demi-reality within duality. But they are all distinct concepts. I think the idea
of a structured and differentiated totality that is also developing is a perma-
nent legacy. This is very important as against the use of totality in Hegel and
in some strands of western Marxism. It is not a reductive or expressive totality,
and that is why the point about the different elements not being equally
important in an explanatory sense is so crucial. You could say that everything
that happens in our world bears the imprint of the fundamental relations of
the capitalist mode of production. That is true, but they do so in differential
ways. Many of the Marxist critiques of capitalism as a hegemonic totality have
viewed it expressively, as explaining what goes on in music or art as much as in
the sphere of production. I did not want to go along with that kind of reduc-
tionism or expressivism, because you could then apply it to Marx’s own work
and view all the distinctions that he made as equally important. That of course
is not true. Everything is structured, and structured differentially; Marx’s work
is structured, the social world is structured, everything that happens has its
own distinct structure, and what it is cannot be determined a priori on the
analysis of one structure, such as capitalism, it always has to be discovered a
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posteriori on the basis of investigations into the concrete reality you are 
dealing with. Perhaps there is one thing the idea of developing integrative 
pluralism has that the simple concept of a structured, differentiated and 
developing totality does not have, and that is the element of monism. For if it
is a developing integrative pluralism it is supposed to apply to everything, and
the everything is not theorised as such in Dialectic. This is taken up again in
meta-Reality in terms of the theme of the priority of unity over conflict and 
of identity over difference. I think integrative pluralism is an absolutely fine
concept.
MH: It is just that it was superseded by others that it developed into.
RB: Yes, that’s right. 
MH: In Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation you give I think the fullest treat-
ment and justification of your conception of philosophy anywhere, as both
relative to other social practices and so heteronomous and ‘soiled in life’,10
ultimately answerable to the findings of science, yet relatively autonomous in
that it proceeds a priori from premises furnished by historical practices (meta-
physics α) and conceptual forms associated with such practices (metaphysics
β). It is a rich discussion, generating an array of new concepts: metaphysics 
α and β, the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the transitive dimension, the
metacritical dimension and metacritique
1
and metacritique
2
, the method-
ological circle that ‘twin-screws’ philosophy and science, and axiological
standpoint among others. With respect to the last – extra-philosophical prac-
tical standpoints and interests that necessarily condition philosophy – you say
that philosophy alone can no more justify these ‘than boots can climb moun-
tains’, such that they present ‘an immanent barrier to immanent critique’ and
one’s only recourse in the final analysis is to ‘openly take one’s stand with sci-
ence’ – not as the only way of knowing but at any rate one with excellent his-
torical credentials.11 Do you have any further thoughts on this? 
RB: Yes. Since writing that, and notwithstanding the qualifications that I made
there, I have realised how important it is, if you say anything positive about
science or indicate that you are going to take your stand with science, to cou-
ple this with a critique of scientism – of pseudo-science, of instrumental, gov-
ernmental, military-industrial and techno- science. There are many practices
in our society that go by the name of science but are not science. I certainly do
not want to take my stand with them. Rather, I take my stand with the con-
cept of science, the concept that has been worked out by reflection on some of
the great moments in western scientific history, those associated with Galileo,
Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, Darwin, Einstein, and so on. That is very differ-
ent from taking one’s stand with practices that masquerade as science. I think
it is tremendously important to critique false science, and inadequate and
shoddy science. 
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MH: In Chapter 1.6 of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, in an exercise in
metaphysics α, you obtain an immanent refutation of the conceptual realism
of Kuhn and others whereby there is no theory-independent world, such that
when our theories change the world changes with them – a position you dub
‘subjective superidealism’ – by showing that the superidealists cannot sustain
the intelligibility of the conceptual transformations and the phenomenon of
incommensurability that they themselves draw attention to, whereas tran-
scendental realism can. Do you have anything to add to this critique, or do you
rest your case?
RB: I rest my case in respect of Kuhn and Feyerabend, or rather these tendencies
within their thought, but of course one has to add to the critique of superide-
alism in the philosophy of science all the theories of poststructuralism 
and postmodernism generally and in the philosophy of social science and
social theory the new social constructionists. I think one of the weaknesses 
of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation is that it does not do that. But 
I was actually doing it in practice in my verbal encounters. I did not really 
feel confident in writing about poststructuralism and postmodernism until 
I had dialectic under my belt, and I was aware that I had not adequately 
metatheorised some of the issues they were dealing with, such as power 
and the abuse of knowledge. That was to come when I had concepts 
such as that of master–slave-type relations; and when I had an adequate 
account of change and difference I could critique the partiality of their
accounts. 
MH: Am I right in thinking that the whole focus is really on developing your own
coherent system through immanent critique, and that you would look to
whatever was on offer – Hume, Marx, postmodernism, whatever – in order to
achieve this overriding aim?
RB: It wasn’t an overriding end in itself. My project was always rooted in some con-
ception of relevance for emancipatory practice. If one could have had just
that, then I would not have bothered with the intellectual superstructure. But
of course you cannot have it without, among other things, continually under-
labouring for it in the particular area I was working in professionally.
However, this philosophical critique was in order to satisfy this objective out-
side philosophy. It was an important part of my conception of philosophy from
the very beginning that philosophy exists only in relation to something out-
side it. You do not have philosophy without philosophers or readers, and they
exist as practical, biopsychosocial beings in a social world. The fundamental
end for me was always human emancipation, human self-emancipation and
self-realisation. I was only really interested in philosophies in so far as they
would help or impact upon that project. 
MH: Is the end of human emancipation outside philosophy?
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RB: It is outside philosophy in the sense that the end of human emancipation is to
have a society that is eudaimonistic, in which every individual concretely sin-
gularised person is in their dharma, is fulfilling their concretely singularised
nature. Philosophy is necessary for it in the same way as bread is necessary for
it, and music is necessary for it. 
MH: But is it really outside? Philosophy, as you say, is ‘soiled in life’. It is in a sense
refracting the geo-historical process within which the telos of emancipation is
inscribed.
RB: Yes. To look at this point in another way, all the categories of philosophy
apply to the whole of the world, to the whole of reality. 
MH: So it is part of totality. The problem might be mainly terminological. Your
formulation in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation speaks of philoso-
phy existing only in relation to something ‘other’ than rather than ‘outside’
itself.12
RB: Yes, it operates at the highest level of ontology, understanding and situating
the world at the highest possible level of abstraction. All the more concrete
ways of thinking about the world and the ways of acting in the world have that
philosophy in them. You cannot get rid of philosophy in that sense, that is
absolutely correct. Philosophy is only one practice among others, and you
have to have balance even, or perhaps especially, to be a philosopher.
MH: In the 1989 Postscript to The Possibility of Naturalism you wrote in response to
a critique by Ted Benton that ‘were I to rewrite The Possibility of Naturalism
today I would stress the way in which the social order is embedded and condi-
tioned by the natural order from which it is emergent and on which it in turn
acts back. An ecological orientation to social life is as important as is recogni-
tion of our biological being – both are insufficiently elaborated in the book.’13
In turning in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation to a consideration of
the analogies and disanalogies of geo-history and the sociosphere with biology
(Chapter 2.3, ‘Socio-Evolutionary Concepts, Functional Explanation and
Human History’) you were presumably seeking to make good this deficit? This
links up with a new, I think, insistence that science is not about manipulating
and controlling nature, of which it is a part, but about understanding it, and
with the new concept of the ecological asymmetry,14 whereby the world is not
made for us, but we for it. Arguably all this was already implicit in the anti-
anthropic stance you arrived at in your first book, which you now draw out.
And, conversely, implicit in it is the non-duality of meta-Reality, is it not?
RB: Yes, absolutely. I think that when I was writing The Possibility of Naturalism I
was very conscious of the contrast between the social sciences and physics and
chemistry. So the resolution of the problem of naturalism was in a way partial.
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It was the problem of whether the social and human sciences could ever be like
physics and chemistry. But you would also have to ask whether they could be
like biology, and you could also ask whether they could be like art or like 
philosophy itself. And there are very interesting analogies and disanalogies for
a range of practices. For instance, I think that transcendental and dialectical
arguments play a huge role in social science, so there is an analogy there. On
the issue of biology, obviously we are biological beings; as we’ve seen, you can
say we are biopsychosocial mixes. Understanding human beings in that way is
important, and that was relatively neglected in The Possibility of Naturalism. So
this orientation is an important corrective to that, just as the conception of
four-planar social being is to the transformational model of social activity. 
MH: Do you want to say something about the issue of manipulating and control-
ling nature as distinct from understanding it?
RB: The overall vision is that the social world, the world I was contrasting with the
world of physics and chemistry, is an emergent part of the natural world, par-
ticularly of its biological stratum. And that of course was there in my first two
books but not theorised. The ecological asymmetry you refer to is very impor-
tant, because we have to get used to being in the world in accordance with its
rhythms. People might say that the whole point about being a human being is
that you can rise above the world, why don’t we go settle on another planet or
another star? But while you are thinking about that, just imagine if something
drastic happened, as is happening now of course with our weather system.
Imagine if the sun stopped shining. Where would all these projects be? Or if
the earth stopped revolving around the sun in exactly the way that it does, or
the moon stopped revolving around the earth. We are utterly dependent on
nature. It is so important, and of course becomes crucial also at the level of
socio-political discourse generally, not just in terms of debates about ecology,
but in terms of debates about the nature of reality. The neo-Nietzscheans are
inclined to say that history is now whatever we make (of) it. However, they
have to accept that there is a reality out there, so that if, say, the neo-cons go
in and ‘democratise’ society in Iraq, making it safe for international corpora-
tions, there is of course something, a reality, that is being ‘made safe’ and that
will react back on any neo-Nietzschean project or fantasy. We have to learn
from this. 
MH: Can you elaborate on what you meant in the last sentence of the following, at
the outset of Chapter 2 on ‘Critical Naturalism and the Dialectic of Human
Emancipation’ in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation:
Emancipation depends upon explanation depends upon emergence.
Given the phenomena of emergence, an emancipatory politics (or more
generally transformative or therapeutic practice) depends upon a realist
science. But, if and only if emergence is real, the development of both 
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science and politics are up to us. This chapter is intended then as a 
kind of abbreviated prolegomenon to a natural history of the human
species.15
Were you consciously thinking of the prolegomenon as a philosophy of geo-
history that could furnish the general conceptual framework for a natural his-
tory? It is noteworthy, as you would expect in a work preparing for the leap into
dialectic, that the concept of (geo-)historicity as the self-reflexive conscious-
ness of the past that can enter into history ‘as a material force with an efficacy
of its own’16 comes much more to the fore in Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation than in your previous work, together with the related concepts
of the presence of the past, process (as ‘structure [or thing], considered under
the aspect of its story – of formation, reformation and transformation – in
time’17) and rhythm[ic],18 historical tendencies
2
, historical rationality (later
dialectical or absolute reason) and so on. On the other hand you argue that the
TMSA had already effected ‘the geo-historicisation of social theory’, which
you now underline.
RB: Let me just say that natural history as I understood it, or as I understand it now
anyway, includes the rational directionality that in Dialectic I was to call the
pulse of freedom, and I think this is very important for our present discussion.
This is what I meant by historical reason or rationality in Scientific Realism and
Human Emancipation; dialectical reason is aligned with what I call depth-
rationality.19 I should say that rational directionality is only one of the forces
generally at work in history; there are others connected with or seemingly
opposed to it. Reflexivity itself, for example, or solidarity, altruism, or empa-
thy; these are all basic tendencies implicated in the rational directionality of
history, as is morality, stemming from the altruistic and empathetic. The
development of technology is another major force. Then there are other
forces, rooted in the heteronomous features of social being, such as oppressive
social relations and human greed or selfishness, which are at any time opposed
to this telos; so that ‘rational directionality’ does not necessarily mean that it
will always win out in any particular set of circumstances or that it must win
out in the end. 
MH: I now want to come on to the whole issue of facts and values, explanatory cri-
tique and ideology. Although your basic thinking in this complex area was
already developed in The Possibility of Naturalism, it receives much fuller elab-
oration in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Your claim to have
refuted ‘Hume’s law’ by demonstrating that the human sciences are necessar-
ily explanatory critical, effecting transitions from facts to value and theory to
practice, is much disputed within critical realism, and in the scientific com-
munity generally it is still usually taken as axiomatic that science can have
nothing to say about what is morally right and morally wrong; so that, if you
are right, this must be seen as perhaps your most radical breakthrough. You
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have answered the objections a number of times in print,20 so I do not want to
go back over that ground here (unless you want to add anything). As you your-
self say in Reclaiming Reality, the significance of your demonstration lies less in
the formal refutation of Hume’s law (important though that is for the valori-
sation of critical explanatory social science) or in its delineation of ‘the 
structure of motivating argument for radical political commitment’, than in
its generalisability from the critique of cognitive ills to other seemingly neces-
sary ills conjugating around ‘the non-fulfillment of needs, wants, potentiali-
ties, interests and aspirations’,21 which together may constitute grounds for
emancipatory praxis. 
RB: One thing I would stress now is that you do not actually need the full theory 
of explanatory critique in order to refute Hume’s law, because to criticise 
a belief is implicitly to criticise any action that is informed by it, ceteris 
paribus; once you say no, you are there. That raises the meta-question of 
why this has not been seen and why the fact–value dichotomy is so widely
adhered to. 
MH: People say that there are concealed value premises.22
RB: But as I have argued right from the outset it is not necessary that any value
commitment other than commitment to truth enters in, and commitment to
truth is a condition of any discourse whatsoever, so it cannot be seized upon as
a concealed value premise – it is intrinsic to the concept of a fact. As you say,
however, the main point is actually to go on from explanatory critique and
from cognitive to non-cognitive ills, and these include the non-satisfaction
not only of basic physical needs but more generally of what one needs to fulfil
one’s dharma, one’s concretely singularised potentiality – lack of the tools of
one’s trade, or of free time, of recognition, respect, and so on, and most impor-
tantly of course they embrace oppression, including any violation of self-
determination. 
I think some people on the left tend to underestimate the importance of
political freedom and self-determination. The wars in Vietnam and now in
Iraq and Afghanistan were or are, for the people of those countries, not funda-
mentally or primarily about ideology but about self-determination, individual
and collective. That is, they are wars against oppression and this matters enor-
mously to people. A person cannot be said to be free, even if they are materi-
ally well looked after, unless at least some of their life is self-determining,
unless they can do something, unless they have projects within that life. So I
regard freedom, in the sense of the capacity to act and formulate projects of
your own, as just as important as the meeting of physical needs; it is a condi-
tion for doing anything else, because if you cannot do that then it does not
matter how well basic physical needs are being satisfied, you will not be fully
human. It is freedom in this sense that is the overriding concern 
of Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation and Dialectic. We need it to call 
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anything that we do our own, that is to attribute it to ourselves; and political
self-determination (or the absence of self-determination) still remains proba-
bly the single most important cause of war and social conflict generally. 
MH: The arguments and discussion in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation
in this area are again very rich, laying bare the logic of explanatory critiques in
an array of inference schemas, arriving at real definitions of freedom (which is
‘irrespective of the arrow’s flight, no regarder of the river’s flow’23) and eman-
cipation, and generating the fundamental concepts of the intrinsic and
extrinsic aspects; concrete axiological judgements; transformed, transforma-
tive praxis; depth-enquiry and depth-explanation (the possibility of which is
transcendentally ‘necessary for the unbounded projects and conduct of every-
day life’24), and so on, and very much anticipating the dialectics of discourse
and agency at the heart of Dialectic’s emancipatory axiology. What prevented
you at that stage from following through to a fuller elaboration of the dialec-
tics of freedom? What was missing?
RB: The simple answer to that is that I had not completed my work on dialectic.
This relates back to a question you asked earlier. These were dark days of the
left. The point is that the left in Britain did feel it had been hammered in the
early 1980s. It was in overwhelming control of the constituency Labour par-
ties and still very strong in the trade unions. I even joined the Labour Party
myself for a short period. I knew Tony Benn, and most of my friends were
Bennites. In London you had Ken Livingstone’s GLC (Greater London
Council), to which anyone on the left who had any pretensions of trying to
change society tended to gravitate; there were ex-revolutionary Marxists
working as advisors to the GLC in one capacity or another. What happened
under Thatcher from 1979 was of course that she systematically took on the
left in no uncertain terms. She took on the unions, smashed the miners who
were the most powerful union and then crushed local government, in London
actually abolishing the Greater London Council, so that London had no city-
wide local government for more than a decade. It was very depressing.
MH: It was the onset, we can see in retrospect, of an epoch of counter-revolution25
that is only just now showing signs of exhausting itself as it runs up against the
limits of the reality principle.
RB: Yes – well, it had begun before, when Denis Healey as Chancellor of the
Exchequer instituted savage cuts in 1976 at the request of the International
Monetary Fund, not to mention Wilson’s decision not to devalue in 1963,
which we discussed earlier. From the point of view of the phenomenology of
the left it was depressing to see Thatcher winning the war in the Falklands,
and instituting more oppressive measures in Ireland and generally. The sale of
council houses was a bribe to sections of the working class. Why did they not
see that the Labour left were the ones on their side? They did not see it, so
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these were indeed dark days. And, as we have seen, I myself was personally 
dissatisfied at this time because of unresolved intellectual problems. In general
I did not want to rest on my laurels, I wanted to get to the bottom of the west-
ern philosophical tradition. But more immediately I wanted to understand
what had gone wrong in the Soviet Union and what if anything had gone
wrong in the history of Marxism. More especially, I wanted to understand
Marx and in particular why he regarded dialectic as the key to everything.
Until I had really got that straight, I could not be very happy or content. That
is basically what was missing. Colin Robinson of Verso used to ring me up
every couple of months in the late 1980s and early 1990s and ask how I was
getting along with my book on dialectic, and I would say it was nearly there. It
might have been nearly there in terms of a draft – I was always nearly finishing
it – but I had not solved the problem. I did not want to publish it until I had
licked the problem. 
MH: You argue in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, as you had already
done in The Possibility of Naturalism, that in a non-neutral (unjust, asymmet-
rical) world, social science as explanatory critique is necessarily non-neutral,
siding with the oppressed against the oppressors, the oppressed having ‘an
interest in knowledge which their oppressors lack’ and seek to deny them.26 Of
all you have written on emancipation this is the one quote which people most
frequently ask me for chapter and verse. It seems to really resonate. What 
significance would you attach to that?
RB: It is tremendously important that the oppressed have an interest in knowledge
that the oppressors lack. We can look at why this is so by thinking about dif-
ferent types of knowledge. The oppressed have an interest in explanatory
knowledge of the structures that oppress them. But their oppressors do not
need to have that explanatory knowledge and it might be better for them if
they do not. The sort of knowledge they need to have is best not called knowl-
edge, but rather information or even data, and that is about how to manipu-
late events and circumstances and discourses. That kind of knowledge
nowadays might be called spin but is perhaps best thought of as information
(and dis-information). You can actually develop quite a nice little step dia-
gram or development from the most basic level. This is that of data, which
embraces everything you perceive and take in and can describe. The next step
or level is information, which is relevant data. This is the epistemic level that
is so beloved of people in information technology. OK, it is better than data;
the oppressed need information, true, and the oppressors also need and use
information, but information is not explanatory knowledge, it is not knowl-
edge of the structures and mechanisms, of the fundamental causes of why
things are as information tells us. For that you need, third, explanatory knowl-
edge, preferably explanatory scientific knowledge. And then, fourth, in order
to use explanatory and scientific knowledge you need wisdom, which is
explanatory knowledge incorporated, in the light of other values, into 
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practice. This is what the oppressed need. It involves many things besides
explanatory knowledge, including balance, judgement, discrimination, the
wisdom that comes from past practice and experience, and so on. It will be
seen that each step – from data to information, from information to explana-
tory knowledge, and from knowledge to wisdom – involves a huge leap. The
knowledge that the oppressed need is explanatory knowledge incorporated
into practice. Someone might ask whether, if they just had practical or tacit
knowledge, would not that be OK? It might be OK, but it would have to be
tacit knowledge of the conditions and causes of their oppression, so it would
still be practical knowledge of a structure even if it wasn’t discursive. 
MH: I think what people perhaps find most arresting about your formulation is the
notion that social science, if it does its job properly, is necessarily on the side of
the oppressed – not from some arbitrary political commitment but as science,
from commitment to truth.
RB: It is on their side, if (as you say) it is doing its job properly, in the sense that
what it produces is necessarily in their interests.
MH: Because ‘some anthropology is the condition of any moral discourse at all’,
you elaborate a theory of human nature in Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation, the elements of which correspond to those of the concrete uni-
versal and four-planar social being (which you refer to as the ‘social cube’ in
this book) and on the basis of which you assert the ‘existence of rights (and
goods) for all human beings’ in virtue of their possession of a core universal
nature, manifested in certain species-wide powers and needs ‘even though
these rights (and goods) can only come to be formulated as demands, recog-
nised as legitimate and exercised as rights under very definite historical con-
ditions’.27 Alasdair MacIntyre has famously maintained that belief in the
existence of such rights is like belief in witches or unicorns.28 How would you
respond to that kind of objection?
RB: In its universal aspect, human nature is an ensemble of potentials and needs
(constituted as ensembles of powers and liabilities, tendencies and disposi-
tions) that, while they can only be realised or satisfied in historically specific
conditions by concretely singularised people, are not reducible to the condi-
tions of their realisation or satisfaction. Thus all people have the potential to
speak languages or to live to the age of a hundred, just as they have needs that
must be met in order for them to survive or in order for them to formulate proj-
ects. These are all objective facts about human beings, whether you consider
all human beings transhistorically as a species, specific classes or groups of
human beings, or particular individuals. There is nothing at all subjective
about this. The reason why it seems to be subjective is because in the course of
time we come to learn more and more about what human potentiality is.
Nowadays we tend to take it for granted that disabled people, like everyone
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else, have a right to be mobile or to have a university education. These are
things that only came to be recognised historically. However, the needs and
potentials of disabled people, like those of everyone else, have been there all
along throughout the course of history. The particular reasons why accept-
ance or recognition of these rights has come about in recent times do not affect
this. I really cannot understand why this confusion is made, and why Alasdair
MacIntyre can say such things about the existence of such rights. Is he really
wanting to say that the existence of these needs and potentialities is like belief
in witches or unicorns? But of course I don’t think he would want to say that;
it is rather the discourse of rights he is against, as part of an argument against
modernity, a discourse in which these needs and potentialities are discussed
solely at the level of what society should allow or admit to be owing to partic-
ular classes of people and to all people. The fundamental point is that it is
wrong to confuse the existence (or not) of such rights, grounded in the needs
and potentialities of human beings, their intransitive reality, with the histor-
ical relativity of our discourse about such rights, or of our recognition of such
rights (our acceptance of them, or not, as rights), or of their satisfaction or
realisation (or the degrees and modes of the realisation) in particular geo-
historically determinate societies – it is wrong to confound the former with
any of the latter.
MH: You want to say that rights exist at the level of the real, not just needs and
potentials; rights are grounded in the real?
RB: Yes, a right is the other side of the coin to a potential or need, the realisation
or meeting of which is not auto-subversive. Given that freedom is intrinsic to
what it is to be a human being, all humans have the right to have it. It might
not be realised, but it is real. The genetic structure of a human being is not
something I could have accessed before the development of modern biology,
but people had it in the seventeenth century or whenever, and a right is
exactly like that. It is a bit of intransitive reality that we only start to look at
and talk about under certain historical conditions, but it is there all along.
One thing that people have said to me is that this idea of human nature and
human potentiality is pretty much an open-ended thing, because what are
human potentialities? Well, they are open. We do not know what all the
potentialities of human beings are, but we do know that there are many poten-
tialities that have been actualised by some human beings and not by others.
You can think of it like this. A human being, a group of human beings, or all
human beings have potentialities. The first step is to discover or recognise
these as capacities, things that in principle they can do. Then the next step is
to transform these capacities into capabilities. Thus everyone has the capacity
to learn Japanese, but to make that a capability many others things are
required: teachers of Japanese, free time and so on, and of course you must
have your material needs sufficiently satisfied to do all that. So to transform a
capacity into a capability or a concretely singularised ability to speak Japanese
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is a huge step that depends on social action. The third step, conceptually, is of
course the actualisation of the capability in speaking Japanese. So we have
capacity → capability → actualisation. The first and second steps, the discov-
ery and recognition of capacities, and their transformation into capabilities as
concretely singularised abilities are, generically and specifically, urgent and
momentous components of the agenda for the left. 
Of course one cannot assume that these powers or potentialities are all
good. Just as in a descriptive and explanatory context you have the contrast
between a power and a liability, similarly in the ethical sphere you have a 
contrast between potentialities that are affirming and sustainable and those
that are not, which contain internal contradictions. Thus heavy drug-taking
or carrying out pre-emptive wars are patently not self-sustainable practices.
You can of course carry out a pre-emptive war or take masses of dope but 
you cannot then also fulfil the other parts of your human potential or realise
your concretely singularised nature, your dharma. So you evaluate these in
relation to other human powers and needs. Such powers or potentialities 
are auto-subversive, they deconstruct themselves, not just in theory, but in
practicality.
MH: In Reclaiming Reality you argue that any distinction between ‘basic’ human
physical needs and ‘higher-order psychological (mental) or spiritual needs’ is
‘crude’ because it ignores that the latter needs are ‘intrinsic to the way so-
called basic needs are met’,29 and you said just a while ago that you regard free-
dom in the sense of the ability to formulate your own projects as just as
important as physical needs. Alison Assiter and Jeff Noonan have a recent
paper in Journal of Critical Realism in which they uphold the primacy of basic
physical needs on the grounds that they are ‘constraints of precondition’ that
‘must be satisfied before any other higher-level project can be pursued at all’.30
Thus the need for autonomy, to take your example, only becomes possible on
the basis of a certain level of satisfaction of basic physical needs. In effect, they
argue that basic physical needs are ontologically prior to higher-order needs,
in the same way that you argue that love is prior to war. What are your
thoughts on this? 
RB: I think that their contribution is very welcome because certainly the satisfac-
tion of the needs they specify for food, drinkable water, shelter and a few other
things – what they call relative health – is a precondition for any action or
project at all. But this is not the only kind of precondition. Freedom in the
sense of self-determination is I think just as basic as those physical needs. It
corresponds to a different part of our constitution as human beings, not the
biological part but the psychosocial part, and we cannot be said to be free
unless we are capable of formulating our own projects individually and collec-
tively. So freedom from oppression is a necessary condition also. What one
needs is of course a whole set of social conditions – other states of one’s psy-
chology can be included within them – that are necessary in order to fulfil the
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action, in order to have it as a reasonable or meaningful action. Thus a mean-
ingful act presupposes a certain level of recognition, respect, dignity or
esteem. It presupposes, moreover, that the particular way in which you want
to act is a matter of your well-being or vital interest, say to listen to and play
music; this presupposes that you have the right instruments, that there is a
society that facilitates people becoming musicians, and so on. 
So I am suggesting that there are other universal constraints of precondi-
tion, foremost among which are those that are necessary for any action that is
one’s own, any intentional project. But then when you singularise the univer-
sal, build in a whole lot of other projects and put it all in the context of a geo-
historical rhythmic, it must be the case that even the specific way in which
basic needs are satisfied becomes very important. For example, if you are a veg-
etarian living in a society that facilitates this and you are suddenly placed in a
situation where it is mandatory to eat meat, although your material conditions
of survival are guaranteed, this is not enough, you cannot formulate your own
project in the way you want to formulate it. This leads us into the whole realm
of the relations between the components of concrete being – universality, par-
ticular mediations, geo-historical rhythmics and concrete singularity. The
way we satisfy our hunger, as Marx stressed, is not any sort of way: there are
people who would probably die before they ate a raw animal. The feeling of
revulsion that most people would have in doing that is sufficiently great for us
to include cooked food of an OK or kosher kind, that is, a kind that the agent
feels happy with as part of their conditions for acting and formulating projects.
The way we satisfy our basic physical needs is dependent on the way psycho-
logical and social needs have developed. There is always an element of singu-
larity and relativity in an assessment of what is crudely physical. The crudely
physical is then no longer just physical. Arguably the most horrible thing that
has happened to prisoners in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere is sexual taunting and
abuse, because it offends their self-identity at a very fundamental level, par-
ticularly in the case of Muslims. The American and British guards soon dis-
covered that this is worse for them than any material deprivation. None of this
is to say that there are not about two billion people in the world who do not
really have enough to survive physically. That is absolutely shocking.
MH: If they had enough to survive physically, but not freedom, that would also be
shocking.
RB: It would also be shocking, so I completely disagree with their example of 
slaves: that slaves who are well treated have their humanity in a way that peo-
ple who are starving do not.31 But I think this is just the kind of argument that
we need to have because it both presupposes the objectivity of needs and
potentials and can be developed into an exercise in creative concrete utopian
thinking. 
By the way, I was using the concept concrete utopianism about this time. I
looked in your Dictionary and you imply that I introduced it in Dialectic.32 I’m
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not sure if there were any references to it in Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation; it doesn’t have an index, perhaps it doesn’t come in.
MH: No, I don’t think it does. You use it for the first time in Reclaiming Reality I
think.
RB: But I was using it in discussion in the 1980s before I started using it in print.
When I was leading a workshop, say, at the Chesterfield conferences – 
MH: What were they?
RB: The Chesterfield conferences were held annually in Tony Benn’s con-
stituency from 1987 to 1989. They consisted of gatherings of socialists from all
over Britain, mainly inside but also outside the Labour Party. They were
organised into and around ‘policy workshops’. I was the convenor of the phi-
losophy workshop. This was always one of the more popular workshops, with
over 100 participants out of a total of up to 1,000 or more conference-goers.
There were some critical realists who participated in the overtly political
Chesterfield conferences (such as Doreen Massey) but eschewed the more
academic Realism and the Human Sciences conferences which were held from
1983 to 1994, before the establishment of the Centre for Critical Realism
(CCR), and then the International Association for Critical Realism (IACR)
took over their function.
MH: I’ll come back to these more academic conferences next time. I think your
first reference to concrete utopianism in print is actually in a version of an
address you gave to the second Chesterfield conference in 1988.33
RB: Right, that figures. At these conferences we would in part be looking at philo-
sophical problems and ideologies through a political and ethical prism. But
the point was also to try to see how a Labour government could do things dif-
ferently. So we would ask the people in the workshop to assume that they had
won a majority at an election: so what were they going to do now? And that is
the most important question you have to ask because, if you don’t ask that
question and start preparing for it now, you will be absolutely bankrupt when
you get into power – which is more or less what happened to Harold Wilson in
1963, and it would seem is happening to Gordon Brown today. It reminds me
of the story of the Brazilian president, Jânio Quadros, who at the end of 1960,
just after John F. Kennedy in the United States, won a landslide popular elec-
tion and then resigned after a few months and went off on a voyage with his
advisors to decide what he would do when he was swept back into power by
popular acclaim. He never came back. The generals took over. Our aim was to
get aspiring left politicians to switch a little bit of their energy away from
thinking about how to get into power and put a little bit more into the project
of thinking about what they would do when they got into power. It also
seemed to me at the time that they would not actually get into power (or at
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least power as distinct from office) unless they had a plausible concrete
utopian vision with which they could inspire the electorate – assuming that
they wanted to get into power via parliamentary democracy. 
MH: Did you borrow the concept concrete utopia from Ernst Bloch?
RB: It might be a concept that I initially picked up from somewhere else, but I gave
it my own meaning. Indeed, I was implicitly using it when I was teaching eco-
nomics in Oxford in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I had to make sense of
what economic theory, more especially neo-classical economic theory, was. I
was seeing it as a praxiology, as a way of showing how you could achieve an end
with a certain finite set of resources or constraints. What you had to do was for-
mulate your objective function and then economic theory could show you
how to optimise or maximise it. These were sound, albeit limited, techniques.
However, in economics the ends would typically never be formulated explic-
itly, dispassionately and neutrally; rather, they were always implicitly to be
understood as maximising profit or income or personal pleasure. They were
not goals such as maximising the benefit to your customers in a nationalised
industry, or fulfilling the wishes of the electorate as revealed at the last elec-
tion. What one could do in critical economics was counterpose to the implicit
maximisation of some egocentric or partial particular interest the explicit sat-
isfaction of some general social benefit. Thus economics tutorials could
become or contain exercises in concrete utopianism in their own way.
Concrete utopianism was thus in a way with me from a very early stage.
Indeed, I have always tried to think in a concrete utopian way in my own 
personal life, not always successfully. 
MH: What do you say to critical realists such as Andrew Collier who reject your
utopianism on the grounds that the causal connection adduced in western lib-
eral political theory by thinkers such as Popper, Friedrich von Hayek, and
Isaiah Berlin between utopianism, on the one hand, and totalitarianism and
the slaughter of millions, on the other, is real, albeit not the main factor in
such developments.34
RB: If I may say so, Andrew doesn’t pay sufficient attention to the adjective ‘con-
crete’. There is no way the revolution is going to happen independently of
human agency and ideas, and those actions and ideas are not going to be pro-
duced solely as a result of endogenous systemic causes. Emancipation, properly
so called, is always self-conscious self-emancipation. Even if the system
unlocks the doors of the cell, the prisoner still has to walk out of the door,
engage in an emancipatory praxis to be free. And such an emancipatory praxis
needs the concrete utopian moment, specifying how the world would, or
could, be a better place if and when the constraint or absence that binds the
agent is itself absented (or constrained). Concrete utopianism is of course 
only one of the requirements for emancipatory axiology. What is also needed
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is explanatory critique and a theory of transition, and all three components 
are what I came to call in Dialectic ‘the explanatory critical complex’ develop-
ing alongside and in unity with a totalising depth praxis oriented to 
emancipation.
MH: I want to ask you now about the critique of irrealism you begin to develop in
Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Your ‘First Steps Towards the
Metacritique of Irrealism’ (Chapter 1.7), together with Chapter 2.6 ‘Reason
and the Dialectic of Human Emancipation’ and Chapter 3, ‘The Positivist
Illusion: Sketch of a Philosophical Ideology at Work’ constitute I think the
most adequate philosophical account we have of ideology as false conscious-
ness. This is an area in which you step forward in your most full-bloodedly clas-
sical Marxist mode, essaying a proto-explanatory critique of positivism that
arrives at its real definition as ‘one might say, the house-philosophy of the
bourgeoisie’ that naturalises and normalises the capitalist social order and
‘reflects in an endless hall of mirrors the self image of Bourgeois Man’.35 Not
only is the analysis again extraordinarily rich, spawning concepts such as irre-
alism, anthroporealism and anthroporealist exchanges, [Tina] compromise
formation,36 the constant conjunction form and the fact form, the
Platonic–Aristotelian fault-line, the positivistic illusion (the illusion that
there is no illusion) and the speculative illusion, the presence of the past, and
subject–object identity theory; but it is exceedingly complex, to the point
where, as nowhere else in your oeuvre, you occasionally lose me because antic-
ipated rewards do not match the labour required to follow the intricacies.
What drove you to such effort?
RB: What drove me really was the desire, perhaps the need, to explore the full pos-
sibilities of an explanatory critique of philosophy structurally. I wanted to see
exactly what one could do at a theoretical level in relation to a philosophical
ideology. I was also interested at the time in conjunctural analysis of particu-
lar episodes in the history of philosophy or the formation of particular figures.
My essays on Paul Feyerabend, Gaston Bachelard and Richard Rorty fall into
this category.37 I suppose the fundamental thing was my desire, having done a
comprehensive critique of epistemology, at least as applied to the philosophy
of science and of social science, to see exactly what the maximum possibilities
were in terms of explaining why this had happened structurally. Linguists such
as Chomsky, on the one hand, and anthropologists such as Lévi-Strauss, on
the other, had shown that human behaviour could be understood as revealing
very complex and recondite structures which could however be described very
precisely in a logical or mathematical way. I suppose I was imagining that my
work might be a prototype for such a structural study of philosophical ideolo-
gies. I actually wrote a few more; but I didn’t publish them, mainly because the
effort did not seem to be worthwhile – and of course I had this problem of
dialectic. It seemed to me that, really, what people were interested in were
narratives telling a story about how positivism came to be, or how Popper or
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Feyerabend or Rorty came to think the things that they did, accounts that
were interesting at a human level. Most of the historians I knew, including the
Marxist historians, had this view as well. Certainly I felt I was not able to get
through to people in this way. I remember that, when I first gave a paper in 
this area in 1976 at the London School of Economics, the chair asked for 
questions, and there were none. I was mortified. Then someone did ask a ques-
tion. But I realised that this work of mine had a sort of ‘what-can-you-say-to-
that?’ effect, which is not what I wanted. I wanted to get people thinking, to
start doing their own work differently if they were philosophers or social sci-
entists, and of course acting differently as social agents. But my work on the
structural analysis of philosophical ideologies was not having that effect. So I
put it aside.
MH: Well, I for one am glad you did this work, not only because it is arguably the
best account we have of ideology as false consciousness on the terrain of phi-
losophy and the sociology of knowledge, but because it provides the ground-
work for further important theoretical developments. Your analysis in
Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation ends with the following words: 
Those who would rationally change the world need to re-open the case at
all levels, in every science, in each practice, lest they be caught in a trap
spun by a spider who knows the web of its problem-field well, knows that
another name by which system P[ositivism] goes is that of vulgar (that is,
unthinking) materialism.38
Am I right in thinking that the ‘web’ you mention here is the prototype of the web
of maya in the theory of the demi-real that you later articulated? The analysis in
Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation explicitly develops a concept of a com-
promise formation, which becomes necessary to save a theory when it contravenes
an axiological necessity, such that you have ‘truth in practice combined or held in
tension with . . . falsity in theory’, as you later summarised;39 and in 1989, in
Reclaiming Reality, you mention Tina (‘there is no alternative’) for the first time,40
later bringing the two concepts together, in Dialectic, in the concept Tina compro-
mise formation. As we know, the demi-real, at the level both of philosophy and of
society, can be regarded as a compounding of Tina compromise upon Tina com-
promise, such that demi-reality is in effect Tina-reality. Also, am I right in think-
ing that your message about the dangers of getting caught in the web was directed
specifically at Marxist unthinking materialism?
RB: Yes, both points are right. ‘Unthinking materialism’ had become fashionable.
I was appalled by the way in which, say, New left Review had taken up relatively
uncritically, first Galvano Della Volpe and Colletti, and then Timpanaro.
Timpanaro was a very basic, almost reductionist materialist. Then of course
New left Review started paying homage to the empiricists and analytical
philosopher figures. You are absolutely right that the web of illusion is maya, a
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concept that goes hand in hand with the concept of avidya, which is igno-
rance. You must remember that this work was published when I was writing
manuscripts about dialectic, including the metacritique of irrealism and the
western philosophical system, so it is not surprising that some of what
appeared in later works should be present in the earlier one.
MH: You don’t actually use the concept of the demi-real yet, but it is just about
there when you describe the positivistic illusion as ‘half-real’.41
RB: You can see the concept in motion. Your analogy with the Grundrisse is very
flattering, but also apt in this respect. 
MH: You deploy the concept of absence frequently in your work from A Realist
Theory of Science on, and necessarily so in that, inter alia, you are engaging in
immanent critique. But in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, I think
for the first time, you explicitly refer to absence as ‘causally efficacious’42 and
dramatically illustrate the point by leaving a large blank space under the sec-
tion heading ‘Ideology in the Metacritical Dimension: Presence of an
Absence’.43 Does this signify a change in your thinking at this stage about the
concept of absence and at any rate an intuition that it was the category that
could unify critical realist dialectic? This was in 1983, when you wrote the
book.
RB: Absolutely right. There was of course an absence in Scientific Realism and
Human Emancipation itself, which was the lack of a metatheory of absence.
There was a metatheory of presence there, but there was not another world
worked out, a metatheory of what was not there, and that was to come in
Dialectic. In a way I was saying look, I cannot say any more at present. I can just
show you – show you where I would like to go.
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6 The axiology of freedom
Dialectical critical realism
(1986–1994)
MH: We will come on to the entrenchment and institutionalisation of critical
realism in the 1990s and the wider context and applications of the dialectical
turn (for example, what went wrong in the Soviet Union) in the next two
interviews. Today the focus is on the theoretical content of the dialectical
turn, including its generation and reception. You have indicated that ‘it all
came together’ in 1991–2. Can you tell us how, specifically?
RB: To answer this I need to go back to around 1978–9. It then seemed to me obvi-
ous that, in relation to critical realism’s underlabouring for the social sciences,
the most fundamental body of work was that of Marx and Marxism, from the
point of view of the science of history at any rate. Patently Marx had not called
himself a critical realist or even a realist; rather, I had to come to terms with
his own self-understanding of what he was doing in his method, which
involved understanding dialectic. So that was my motivation for going into
dialectic. Quite early on, within a year or so, it became clear to me that
absence was going to be crucial. But how do you actually talk about absence,
how do you say or speak the not, which had been declared an impossibility by
Parmenides and the whole tradition of the metaphysics of presence? That was
a very difficult problem. In the meantime I wrote dictionary entries in the gen-
eral area, giving accounts of Marx’s method showing how he approximated to
critical realism, and I think that kind of reconstruction of Marx’s method,
namely as a critical realist, was probably the best that there was to date. But
these pieces still did not really satisfactorily come to terms with the impor-
tance for Marx of dialectic. I obviously needed to go into Hegel and Marx’s
relation to Hegel, so I did a great deal of work on this, but still the fundamen-
tal conceptual problem of saying the not remained unsolved.
Now I am saying this in hindsight. Obviously I did not go around for thir-
teen years thinking that I had to crack the problem of saying the not. It was
rather that there were some things that did not fit. However, in so far as there
is a key, it is more or less what I say in Chapter 2.1 of Dialectic, the section that
I was now able to write on absence in 1991–2. It started with breaking the link
between reference and existence. That was the really crucial thing. On page
40 I say that ‘my first objective is to argue, against Plato and Frege, that 
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reference does not presuppose existence’. I think it is useful to look at the log-
ical infrastructure of that, because the distinctions that I refer to there, fol-
lowing R. M. Hare, between the phrastic, the neustic and the tropic, enabled
me to see that actually you have the not or the negation at all three levels, and
that we need to be able to understand in particular that the negation of a
proposition at the level of its phrastic or ontic content is not the same as nega-
tion at the level of the neustic, which is saying no. I also say elsewhere in the
book that I had previously been focusing on absence as essential to change and
depth, which of course it is, but had been overlooking that there are also sim-
pler forms of absence, such as a void in space–time.1 At any rate, you have a
clear distinction, which I was analysing in terms of absence, between the not
at the level of the phrastic (non-being) and at the level of the neustic (nega-
tion or denial); so you could deny a positive or negative ontic content, you
could deny a presence or an absence. And then of course something else that
had been confused in the literature was the nature of fictional discourse, at the
level of what Hare called the tropic. The non-existence of Hamlet is not the
same as the non-existence of caloric or phlogiston. This gives you three dis-
tinct levels of negation. The non-existence of Hamlet involves negation at
the level of the tropic, the non-existence of caloric involves negation at the
level of the neustic in the transitive dimension, and non-existence or absence
simpliciter involves negation at the level of the phrastic in the intransitive
dimension. 
The clear demarcation of these three levels was the key to unlocking the
problem of the not. In particular, it revealed absence ontologically, absence at
the level of the phrastic or ontic, what I call the de-ontic. This then enabled
me to simplify Hegel’s dialectic, and I think at the end of Chapter 1 there is
quite a nice account of the simple logistics of the Hegelian dialectic which
proceeds by the rectification of incompleteness – and incompleteness is of
course an absence. I think I could put this all much more simply now, but that
was the essence of my treatment of what Marx called the rational kernel of
Hegelian dialectic. Then of course the mystical shell followed very straight-
forwardly from that, because it was the oblivion or forgetting or undoing of
absence in Hegel, the forgetting that it was actually a negativity. It was always
sequestered at a very early stage in his systematic dialectics. In the Science of
Logic becoming is sublated for Hegel in determinate being. Moreover, once I
had the logical apparatus of the three levels I could of course focus on deter-
minate absence. The realm of negation was not limited to things that existed
at a more abstract level than determinate being. It included determinate
absences, determinate non-beings as well as beings, and of course in real life
almost all of the uses of dialectic are specific, they are about determinate
absences. So the mystical shell then became ontological monovalence, the
assumption of a purely positive account of being. So now I was making sense
of Marx’s intuition that Hegel was both really important, because he gave an
account of the fundamental way in which knowledge, in particular scientific
knowledge, progresses; and at the same time (in the last instance) an apologist
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for the status quo, because of his reinstatement of the positive, his ontological
monovalence. Then I began to see philosophy as such as a response to threat-
ening change, a way of unconsciously and aporetically normalising the exist-
ing order of things. So I now had many of the fundamental elements of the
logical infrastructure of the book. It all stemmed from seeing that you can have
absence as well as presence in being, and that you can talk about this: you can
assert absence just as you can also deny presence (or for that matter affirm or
posit a fiction). You can, after all, say the not.
MH: How does that connect up with your earlier work? After all, absence is funda-
mental to A Realist Theory of Science.
RB: Of course, if you think about it, absence and change are the essence of my
account of the transitive dimension, because you only talk about something
like epistemological relativity in the context of change, that is what makes
knowledge relative. But this does not mean that I had an adequate account of
absence or change, in fact I did not go into it. 
MH: And then of course, in the intransitive dimension, the domain of the real and
the possible might be absent from the level of the actual, but this was not con-
ceptualised in terms of absence.
RB: It should have been. Once you have ontology separated from epistemology, it
is easy to see that the notion that the whole domain of ontology is filled with
positive existences without any non-existences or absences, which are neces-
sary for change, is an absurd superstition. You could present critical realism
through to the dialectical stage much more simply than I have done. It all fol-
lows from the distinction between knowledge and its objects, the situation of
the domain of ontology. Just as A Realist Theory of Science is structured around
the theme of ontology and the distinctiveness of epistemology from ontology,
so Dialectic is structured around the theme of absence. I say that alethia is
equally important, so that is another theme, but absence and alethia stand to
dialectical critical realism somewhat like the transitive/intransitive and
real/actual distinctions stand to first-level or basic critical realism, and they
are all pretty simple, if fundamental, concepts.
MH: You set yourself three closely related aims in Dialectic: the dialectical enrich-
ment and deepening of critical realism; the development of the dialectics of
freedom – of a general theory of dialectic capable of furnishing a metatheory
for the social sciences on the basis of which they can play a significant eman-
cipatory role; and the outline of the elements of a totalising critique of west-
ern philosophy. That is an extraordinarily ambitious agenda that must have
required a stupendous and sustained concentration of powers to address. I
have heard tell that you were totally exhausted when you finished. On the
other hand, the work is positively exuberant conceptually, and you have sung
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high praises in a number of places to the angel of creative work. How would
you describe your experience of writing this book? 
RB: Well, it does cover a long period of time, from 1979 through to 1993. 
If I restrict myself to the period between 1991 and 1993, I think I felt isolated
– certainly intellectually – in my creative work. Undoubtedly there was more
than an iota of what can only be described as alienation there. 
MH: Isolated in a way you had not felt before?
RB: Yes, intellectually isolated. It is difficult to say to what extent this is endemic
to any creative work while you are doing it, because obviously it is very impor-
tant, particularly when it is a completely new idea, not to release it prema-
turely while it is still in a vulnerable form. 
MH: You were re-working pre-existing materials of your own, various manuscripts?
RB: Yes, working through the same sort of content. At the same time, there was a
kind of separation phenomenologically, and even alienation, from the com-
munity in general. But there was also a feeling that, even if I was alienated in
the immediate context in which I was writing the book, I was nevertheless in
touch and in resonance with what was happening in the wider society, includ-
ing intellectual society. I kept in touch through activities such as the Realism
and the Human Sciences conferences2 and weekly trips to Oxford to do teach-
ing. I often stayed there a couple of days attending conferences and also carry-
ing on writing (I’m actually talking about the whole period now). But whereas
in A Realist Theory of Science I was among other things bringing together the
best insights of the anti-deductive and anti-monistic traditions and there were
many philosophers of science who were already moving towards my position,
in the case of Dialectic I felt I was more or less out on my own. There was a dis-
cussion in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason that was useful as far as it went,
and then there were helpful clues in Marx, but you could not get very far with
Engels’s dialectics of nature. I had more or less to do it for myself. Of course, I
was helped by the fact that it was a development of basic critical realism and
this was being gradually taken up around the world. At this time critical real-
ists were still finding it difficult to get their work published. So the work of
keeping in touch with critical realists personally and attending conferences
and seminars was even more important for me than perhaps it is today (though
of course it is always important) and through that work I kept in touch with
what was happening in the wider academy and the wider world. I continued to
be politically active as well. But it was all definitely secondary to my intellec-
tual work. I was probably very far from the picture one might have of the
organic intellectual rooted in concrete struggles. The hero or heroine of the
book I was writing is someone who lives the unity of theory and practice. Well,
of course, I tried to live it, but in a very removed way. I think most of this was
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inevitable really, given the lack of immediate antecedents or precursors of
what I was trying to say.
MH: Your intuitions were borne out by events. When the book came out, it was
basically regarded by many in the critical realist world as impossibly and
unnecessarily difficult, so that must have reinforced your sense of isolation.
That is the way with very original works, initially. Anyhow, it did not exhaust
you?
RB: I think I was exhausted when I finished it. But I immediately decided to write
a simplified form of it, which was Plato Etc. I wrote that in 1993–4 and then in
the second half of 1994 I had one cold after another. I was trying to write some-
thing on the philosophy of money and also to complete Philosophical Ideologies,
but I just could not do it because I was always getting ill. Then I went to Cyprus
for a holiday. I will tell you about that next time, because I had an experience
there that leads on to the spiritual turn. 
MH: Your father died during this period. How were you affected by that?
RB: Of course, I was upset by his death in 1991, I think it was probably about
February. But I did not have the same sort of malaise I had after my mother’s
death. 
MH: I understand he didn’t leave you a penny.
RB: My father made it very clear to both me and my brother from very early on that
there was no way he was going to leave any money to us. 
MH: That’s a very unusual thing to do.
RB: I know, and when my mother died, I think he had managed to ensure that her
assets or share of their joint assets went to him. So nothing actually came from
either of my parents.
MH: While he was alive you were receiving assistance from him?
RB: No. There was no assistance from him other than help with the Mini and then
the sports car when I was at Oxford and a deposit for my first flat in Edinburgh.
MH: You had a house in Islington when I first met you. How did you manage to buy
that without a full income?
RB: I will tell you. In 1978 I bought a flat in Edinburgh for a few thousand pounds,
my father assisting with the deposit. At the same time Hilary’s father had
given us, as a wedding present, a house in Herefordshire which cost about
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£1,000. On those two bases in 1979 I bought a flat with a slight mortgage in
Mayford Road in Battersea. Then I moved from one place to the next. The
Mayford Road flat was about £10,000. It was sold a couple of years later for
£25,000 and then, with the help of a mortgage, a house in Battersea was pur-
chased for £40,000. Then by the same sort of step up this house, in Balfern
Street, was exchanged for another in Battersea, in Altenburg Gardens. Then
the house in Islington cost much less than the Altenburg Gardens house was
sold for; this was in 1995. I was a beneficiary of the property boom. Hilary’s
father left myself and Hilary a small legacy, most of which was pretty soon con-
sumed. As you know, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation was dedicated
to Andrew Wainwright, and that was actually partly a way of saying thank you
to that family. Andrew Wainwright was the third of the children of Hilary’s
father. He had committed suicide at about the age of nineteen or twenty by
setting fire to himself. He was a very lovely person who was unable to live up
to his understanding of his parents’ conception of himself – I am not attribut-
ing blame. According to his understanding, his parents wanted him to become
something like a chartered accountant or lawyer, but he did not shine at aca-
demic studies. Rather he was excellent, kind and caring with people; he prob-
ably would have liked to be in some kind of voluntary service for the rest of his
life, as a kind of generalised carer and poet. He was very interesting to talk
with. But as soon as he committed suicide his parents took the line that he was
schizophrenic; it was something caused by chemical reactions in his brain.
They denied a Langian explanation of it, which I would have been inclined to
give. Of course, this dispute goes on today wi hin psychiatry. 
MH: Before we leave the business of writing Dialectic too far behind, can you say
something about the diagrams. They are quite extraordinary, some of them
distil an argument ranging across 2,000 years onto a single page.
RB: When I was working on my DPhil thesis and gearing up to writing A Realist
Theory of Science I had the feeling that, really, the truth oughtn’t to be that
complicated, you ought to be able to say it on, if not the back of an envelope,
then at least on a single page. This caused me to write smaller and smaller, and
I had the feeling that if there was anything wrong, if there was a mistake, or
even some crossing out on the page, then this was or at least might be a sign of
some imperfection in the argument. I soon realised that this was obsessive. But
I still had the basic idea that you ought to be able to summarise or diagramma-
tise a complex argument in a simple way. So I decided to represent many of the
arguments and discursive structures in diagrams.
MH: Did they come before or after their written form, or simultaneously?
RB: Many came after. It was a way of summarising and perhaps internally checking
whether what I had written made sense. It was not of course peculiar to
Dialectic, only more prevalent – there are many representations of complex
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arguments diagrammatically in the earlier books, especially in A Realist Theory
of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. The diagrams are
also a way of overcoming the linearity of the text. Dialectic in particular is
obviously not simply linear, you are dealing with totality and there are a whole
number of possibilities and directions that a dialectic movement might go in,
and sometimes one wants them all together. You yourself make a similar use of
tables in Dictionary of Critical Realism. Even a table helps to surmount the lin-
earity of the text. It does not say first go from here to there, it presents a spread.
MH: So it was mainly in the writing that you mapped new conceptual space. The
diagrams for the most part just registered and perhaps clarified what you had
done, like my tables (which in their basic form accordingly preceded my own
writing). Coming now to the text of Dialectic, its presentational dialectics cor-
respond loosely to the stadia of the causal-axiological chain (MELD). Chapter
1 deals with critical realism, Hegelian dialectic, and the problems of philoso-
phy – the material that is to be worked on/with and developed or transformed
(1M non-identity); Chapter 2 expounds dialectic as the logic of absence (2E
negativity); Chapter 3 presents the system of dialectical critical realism and
the totalising dialectic of freedom (3L totality, the domain of ethics); and
Chapter 4 engages in the transformative labour of the metacritique of western
philosophical irrealism (4D). Rather than attempt to work through the myr-
iad complex issues they raise, I think it best to concentrate on those that have
proved particularly difficult or controversial. First, since I have just mentioned
it, even after they are well into the book for the first or even second time, many
people have difficulty grasping what MELD is, and why it is necessary to think
in terms of 1M, 2E, 3L and 4D – it seems so complex. How would you begin to
explain this to relative novices?
RB: The simplest way to answer this is to think of basic critical realism as opening
up the whole domain of ontology and dialectic as deepening that ontology by
supplying concepts and exploring domains that were only presupposed at the
first level. One way to see this deepening of ontology is in terms of what I have
called the 1M to 7Z/A schema. You move through, first, the domain of 1M
non-identity, which is also a domain of structure. Why is the starting point
characterised as non-identity? Because all the basic distinctions within tran-
scendental realism turn on non-identity relations. The object is not the same
as the knowledge of the object, this is the transitive/intransitive distinction;
then you have the distinction between the domains of the real, actual and
empirical. All these involve non-identity relations, and that supplies the log-
ical infrastructure of basic critical realism. It is true that emergence also plays
an important part in it, but it is not yet theorised very fully, just as the spatio-
temporality of social structures is part of the architectonic of critical natural-
ism, but is not yet explicitly theorised. So you can think of the movement of
dialectic as opening up, finding it necessary to unravel, deeper levels of ontol-
ogy. 2E is the realm that is opened up by absence, but it includes the whole
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world of process, negation, and transformation. So while at 1M you think
being as non-identity and structure, at 2E you think it as process. Then at a
third, deeper level, 3L, you think being as a whole, so critiquing ontological
extensionalism by seeing internal relations between the different parts of
being, not just external connections. And then at a fourth level, 4D, which is
obviously already present in an under-elaborated way in critical naturalism
and indeed in transcendental realism, you think being as incorporating trans-
formative praxis, agentive agency or intentional causality that effects material
changes in the world. Then at the time of the spiritual turn I saw that it was
necessary to have three further levels: at 5A you think being as spiritual or as
incorporating self-reflexive human praxis; at 6R you think it as (re-)
enchanted or as meaningful and valuable in itself; and then at 7A/Z you think
being as non-duality, more generally as one. The first four steps (MELD if you
abstract from the numerals) are the crucial ones for understanding what I later
called the world of duality, including specifically the world of demi-
reality. They are perfectly adequate for understanding that world, but not nec-
essarily for bringing about the changes we want, which require the further
deepening of ontology in the last three steps. 
MH: We will come on to them in subsequent interviews. People also experience
serious difficulties with the key unifying concept of absence. They say that an
absence, qua pure negativity, cannot by definition possess any causal powers3
and they are uncomfortable with the notion of the ontological priority of
absence. Even those who cannot gainsay your arguments for ontological pri-
ority within at any rate the world as we know it, that is, one containing both
absence and presence, seem much happier with the notion that absence and
presence are somehow on a par.4
RB: There are two basic arguments or considerations that suggest that absence is
logically prior to presence. The first is that you can coherently imagine or con-
ceive of a world without presence, but not of a world without absence: there is
no internal contradiction in the idea of a complete void, of there not having
been anything. That is the way in which I argue, using a number of subsidiary
arguments: it is impossible to conceive of a world without gaps, spaces, and
boundaries, or at least some of those things, or without changes, including in
particular the human changes that we bring about in our agentive agency.
That is the first argument, there could not be a world without absence. The
second argument is that if one wants to think about the beginning or the end
of such a world, if you want to ask causal questions about the coming into or
going out of being of such a world, then this must be from and to a void. The
beginning must be from a void and the end must be to nothing. The beginning
would have to be some sort of radical autogenesis, the coming into being of the
universe has to be out of nothing. I think that is logically absolutely correct. If
you go into stories of creation, they have great difficulty in explaining what
happened before God created the universe. The most consistent ones try to
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picture some way in which the universe comes into being when the creator
creates it. Often this involves obscure sexual imagery, a god or a goddess fer-
tilising themselves. But does the god or goddess have a beginning in time, or
does it create time? There is a footnote in Dialectic about contemporary cos-
mological theory,5 and I think, whichever of those routes you take, they are
going to involve the idea of a world in which there was no positive being and
no positive presence, in which there was just absence. 
MH: That footnote itself seems to reject the notion that something can come out
of nothing. 
RB: Yes, I think that is right. I think this sort of thing has to be decided in the con-
text of scientific theory. 
MH: It does not seem scientifically possible.
RB: No it does not. 
MH: Some recent speculative cosmological theory does purport to show, although
perhaps not very convincingly, that the universe or multiverse could have
originated from absolutely nothing in accordance with the laws of physics.6
The other thing people say is that in working out what must logically be the
case – that is, that you could not have a purely positive world but you could
have just nothing – you are logicising being.7
RB: I don’t know about that. We are talking about something, so we are in the
realm of discourse. Just think about a world without absences. It is literally
inconceivable. How could you identify anything except by reference to what
it is not; by reference, if you like, physically, socially or conceptually, to its
space? So I cannot see that it makes any sense to talk about logicising being.
This is a discourse about being.
MH: If the argument for the priority of absence logicises being, then all transcen-
dental argumentation logicises being, because it works out what logically must
be the case relatively or absolutely independently of human being.
RB: And of course you are not supposing this is why it is the case, you are not say-
ing the reason why it is the case is because of a logical proposition, it is just a
question of whether it can be the case or not. How could you begin to explain
an absolute beginning except in terms of something that conceptually
involved the coming into being of something out of nothing? 
MH: Your current position on this then, is it correct to say, is that although it seems
to go against a great deal of science, it must be the case that there was a radical
autogenesis out of nothing?
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RB: Outside our universe I think there were other universes, but outside any possi-
ble universe it would have to be so. I do not actually think there was ever a
time in which there was absolutely nothing, but that is to take objection to the
whole hypothesis of the Big Bang. I think there might be modes of absence
that we do not fully comprehend and degrees of absence that we cannot think
about conceptually, and the beginnings of the multiverse might be a case, if
you like, of something less absent coming out of something more absent or a
deeper level of absence. I would like to have the time to go into that in rela-
tion to current scientific thinking and disputes. 
MH: That would be fascinating; there have been some very interesting and perti-
nent recent developments in cosmology. I now want to ask about the dialec-
tics of nature. You arrive at a real definition of dialectic as ‘the axiology of
freedom – or as absenting absences, or, applied recursively, as absenting con-
straints on absenting absences’,8 thereby retotalising the diffraction of dialectic
under the sign of absence. Where does this leave the dialectics of nature?
RB: There are a number of things I want to say about this. First, I think the
Engelsian formula for the dialectics of nature in terms of the transformation of
quality into quantity, the unity of opposites, and the negation of the negation
is very limited. That is the first thing. I do try to situate it in Dialectic, and I am
not saying it is not important. The second thing is that the dialectics of nature
and the whole discussion about them should presuppose a resolution of the
problem of naturalism of the kind I achieved in The Possibility of Naturalism,
but then deepen it so as to incorporate a conception of four-planar social
being, as in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. And from within this
standpoint, then, one has to say two things. First, dialectics or dialectical
movements cannot exhaust the study of change. There are non-dialectical
movements and changes in the social and natural world, of which the most
important is probably the entropic transformation of a structure into its ele-
ments. This is not the resolution of a problem-field but its proliferation –
which in a way is a moment within dialectics. Moreover, one cannot assume
that there is always going to be a negentropic outcome to changes such as that.
Entropy stands alongside dialectic as the two great possibilities. But there are
other, subsidiary possibilities, and in Dialectic I canvass some of them in rela-
tion to Hegel.9 So dialectics does not incorporate the whole of the study of
change. Second, the extent to which dialectics applies in the natural world
always depends on specific dialectical laws, so there is no one answer to it.
Contradictions, it seems patently obvious, exist in nature, and the emergence
of human beings out of nature or of primate animals in biological evolution is
something that involves dialectic. Indeed, if you look at the sweep of biologi-
cal history, you could also recast the theory of evolution in a dialectical way –
by arguing that a species that survived, as distinct from one that did not, did so
by managing in its history – in its evolution – to liberate itself from some con-
straints. It was absenting an absence, getting rid of a constraint. This is not to
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presuppose any purpose or teleology, and that was Darwin’s point, but 
nevertheless it still involves movement towards greater order and complexity,
and in a way towards greater self-determination or possibilities of self-
determination and, we could say (at least in the domain of human life), greater
volition. Here you are going pretty far into the dialectical thicket, though of
course it does not make any sense to talk about assertorically imperatival sen-
sitised solidarity or the fiduciary nature of the expressively veracious remark
when you are referring to animal existence.
MH: Can we apply that to inorganic nature, as a real developmental tendency?
RB: This is very interesting because inorganic nature had to evolve and the dream
of the alchemists, in a peculiar way, must have been realised at one point in
the natural history of the cosmos – gold, or at least its possibility, must have
been formed from more basic elements or their atomic and subatomic con-
stituents. Of course, quasi-alchemical processes would not have resulted just
in gold, and they would have issued from hydrogen and helium or some mix of
basic elements, but you would have had to have the transformation of one ele-
ment or its components into another. And you could recast this in dialectical
terms.
MH: Not in terms of the extended definition I have just cited – ‘the absenting of
constraints on absenting absences’, or the axiology of freedom. You can
extend this to the biosphere, as you have just pointed out, but for inorganic
nature you need the abbreviated version, just ‘absenting absences’.
RB: That is the most basic one, because absenting absences in the human sphere
means eliminating, transcending or transforming constraints – absenting the
ill or the constraint that plagues you. It is just much richer, much more imme-
diate, in the social world, whereas what you would be doing in the natural
world, given that inorganic nature has not by and large been understood
dialectically by scientists, is imposing as it were a schema on it. How impor-
tant it is to think human action in terms of dialectical categories! Human
intentional action is always dialectical, it is always eliminating a want or try-
ing to relieve a need; whenever you are producing a material change in your
environment because you want to get rid of – eliminate, absent – something in
that environment that is constraining you or that constrains you in some way.
The dialectical transposition of human actions is of course a prolegomenon to
the dialectical transposition of human and social problems. That is the way
you have to situate them to make sense of them philosophically, at least from
the point of view of praxis. 
MH: When you talk of emergence in nature you speak of ‘a quantum leap . . . of
(one feels like saying) the materialised imagination — or even, with Hegel,
reason . . . This is matter as creative, as autopoietic.’10 So there is a sense 
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in which you seem to be connecting the dialectics of nature up with the 
dialectics of human geo-history, by indicating that the latter is implicit as 
possibility in the former.
RB: This is right. Perhaps we will talk about this when we come on to meta-
Reality. There is a way of looking at the natural world as already implicitly
containing our consciousness of it; and of seeing all the possibilities of devel-
opment and self-awareness that can at the moment, as far as we know, only be
instantiated in the human world, as already enfolded in the organic, and
beneath and before that the inorganic, world – because the organic world
came from somewhere. 
MH: To have a dialectic that embraces the whole of being presupposes system-
building; as Hegel put it, since what is concretely true is so only as totality, the
thought that seeks to grasp it must take the shape of a system.11 But system-
building in philosophy is still much out of fashion, and among critical realists
Andrew Collier,12 for one, has expressed doubts as to whether it is desirable or
even possible on the grounds that our knowledge of being is necessarily frag-
mented or partial. 
RB: Yes, our knowledge is necessarily partial, but you are going to organise your
understanding of being anyway, willy nilly: if you do not accept the dialectical
critical realist way of organising being, then you are going to be accepting a
poststructuralist or empiricist or some other vision, some framework or
schematism is unavoidable. What is the typical empiricist response to being? It
is that the world is partial and fragmented, atomistic. This objection is mani-
festing the assumption that everything is at bottom fragmented. This is also one
of the refrains of poststructuralism with its critique of grand narratives. The cri-
tique of grand narratives is of course itself a grand narrative, the grand narrative
that you cannot tell a story, any story, that would gainsay the grand narrative or
myth that there is no story. Similarly, any story here, in response to this kind of
objection, that attempts to see being as a whole – attempts a systematic analy-
sis of our most basic concepts for ontology – is only implicitly defending what is
already there, because there is no way of thinking about absence and change,
for example, without invoking a category of causality of some sort or another.
MH: My next question concerns the ethical inflection of absence. As I point out in
Dictionary of Critical Realism, the ancient Greek word on which deontology,
the study of moral duty, is formed – dein (vb) or deon (n.) – has two basic mean-
ings which coincide with the two you derive for absence, which allow you to
unify ethics with the theory of being-becoming, that is, constraint and
absence simpliciter, or more fully (1) a bind, fastening, or fetter and (2) want,
lack, or need.13 Were you aware of this at the time of writing?
RB: Thank you for telling me that. I think it is very indicative. 
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MH: Perhaps you were drawing out what was already implicit in the etymology. 
RB: Or perhaps I made a certain move using the language at my disposal. And the
roots of that language derive from a time in which the distinction I am trying
to draw now was also drawn. 
MH: Where did the Greeks who made the distinction get the insight? Perhaps the
real connection here is praxis, which supplies your main premises and a form
of which the ancient Greeks were of course engaging in.
RB: I would have to look into that. You talk in your excellent dictionary entry
about the etymology of alethia, the original concept meaning the undoing of
oblivion, and it does fit very well with what I say about alethic truth.14
MH: Let us move on to alethia, then, and the theory of the truth tetrapolity. You
say that next to sustaining an adequate account of negativity, the second great
discovery you would like to claim in Dialectic is that of ‘a genuinely ontologi-
cal notion of truth: alethia – the truth of things, as distinct from proposi-
tions’.15 Alethia is but one, albeit the most important, moment in the theory
of the truth tetrapolity, which some view as ‘simply a list’ or ‘aggregation’16 of
different meanings of the concept of truth. I would like you first of all to com-
ment on that.
RB: I do not think the four components of the truth tetrapolity are just a list,
because they are related in terms of a dialectical deepening of truth. This has
four stages, each presupposing the next. First there is truth as normative-
fiduciary, or the trust-me-you-can-act-on-it sense of truth. That is a very early
and primitive stage in the dialectic. Although you need not use them in a uni-
linear way, in science that might be the stage of subjective conviction – but it
is more than just ‘I believe this, you should believe it too’. Second, there is truth
as adequating or warrantedly assertible. Here the claim is that this proposition
is adequate for the description of reality for this moment in our epistemic
enquiries, and this of course brings out much of what the correspondence 
theory of truth intends. Third, there is truth in an expressive-referential sense,
in which you say this is how the world is. At this level, truth is a duality that
both expresses and refers to the world; it is not the dualism you get in corre-
spondence theories whereby the world is out there and our language in here, it
is just simply the way you express in discourse the nature of being. You have
now found a way of expressing what being is that is the best possible way you
could have and is a deepening and refinement of the adequating concept.
However in the dialectic of science you eventually get to the point where you
have the real reason for something. The truth of the proposition that this is
water is that it is constituted by molecules of H
2
0. When you get to this level,
especially if you can in turn give an account of the constitution of hydrogen
and oxygen, there is no disputing about the proposition, because you have the
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real reason why water must be the way it is. I do not think this tetrapolity is
simply a list, because what we see here is how the components are related in a
progression, a notional temporal process, and how they are also systematically
related in various ways. 
MH: They map on to 1M–4D. 
RB: Absolutely. The second thing I want to say is that most of the objections to
alethic truth, or misunderstandings of it, fail to take into account that in the
domain of alethia we are talking about the truth of things, not propositions.
Now I want to distinguish here three levels: the level of ontology as such; the
level of truth or epistemologically mediated ontology; and at the level of the
ontic, the objects of specific epistemic enquiries. First and most basically, there
is the level of ontology as such, the whole domain of ontology, of being and
reality. Then there is the level of truth that in its ontological aspect is ontology
given the possibility of language, of human practice; so it is epistemologically
mediated or tied to the possibility of human practice. That is the domain of
alethic truth. At a third level you have the domain of the ontic, and this is
where you are talking about a further division within ontology that consists in
the intransitive objects of specific epistemic enquiries. Most of the critics of
alethia fail to see that you cannot collapse it to the purely epistemic level or
even further; it is not just an ontic, it is a deeper level of ontology. It presupposes
ontological stratification, that is absolutely true, but you have to be careful
here: if there were a world without human beings, you would still have onto-
logical stratification even though you did not have truths; if you could take us
humans away, you would have deep strata but you would not have alethic truth,
because you only have the concept in relation to what we mentioned earlier,
the undoing of oblivion – it does not make sense to speak of nature being obliv-
ious of itself: nature does not disguise itself from itself. So this is ontological
stratification from the point of view of the possibility of human practice. And
that is a deeper level – the level of objective truth – than the level of episte-
mology, that is, the level at which we have a transitive/intransitive differenti-
ation and at which we have specific enquiries with specific intransitive objects,
and at which you begin to see the sense of the other aspects of truth. In consid-
ering ontol gical and alethic truth we make the mistake of tying ontology, not
to the possibility of human practice, but to specific cognitive enquiries.
MH: The concepts of ontological and alethic truth would seem to have affinities
with Hegel’s concept of the Idea as ‘the adequate Notion, that which is objec-
tively true, or the true as such’, a concept in which ‘being has attained the sig-
nificance of truth’ and which expresses the real reason for everything actual.17
To what extent are you indebted to Hegel here?
RB: In Hegel there is a positive and a negative. The real reason is, on the one hand,
thrown up by the process of reality itself, that is to say it is immanent in 
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reality; this is the positive point. But, on the other hand, it is ultimately and
only a (process of) thought; this is the negative point, betraying Hegel’s con-
tinuing commitment to the principle of identity or realised idealism, and thus
to the epistemic fallacy.
MH: Is alethia in any way, other than etymologically, related to Heidegger’s con-
cept of ale
¬
theia?
RB: In Heidegger the alethic truth, what is undone in the ‘undoing of oblivion’, is
always ultimately a truth about ourselves, whereas for me alethic truth has no
such anthropocentric connotations. What we are oblivious to include truths
about the objective, existentially intransitive world in which we live and of
which we are a small and temporally ephemeral part. Human being, Dasein, is
inscribed within a greater being, to which we also pertain – and just because of
this, knowledge of the alethic truth of things, including ourselves, can help us
become free, indeed is a necessary condition for our liberation. Of course, it is
true that, at the level of meta-Reality, we have a philosophy of identity or
unity again, but it is a differentiated and developing identity, in which there
are still and always an other, an outside, that which is existentially intransi-
tive, to our embodied personalities, though our ground-states and the cosmic
envelope may be one.
MH: You have already partly answered this next question. Probably the majority of
critical realists accept that truth is in the final analysis ontological and alethic,
such that the world imposes its truth on us rather than the other way around.
Quite a few do not, however, holding that truth is an exclusively epistemo-
logical notion and that one gains nothing by extending it to ontology. If x is
the generative mechanism of y, one gains nothing by adding that x is the truth
of y. But one stands to lose something: fallibilism and anti-absolutism;18 a few
seem to think alethia leads straight to God, so some Marxists simply ignore
it.19
RB: To think about x being the truth of y is to think about it being a real reason or
dialectical ground for y, and that is also to be able to show why y occurs. It is
very important to see that this does not gainsay fallibilism or anti-absolutism,
because of course one’s account of the real grounds or reasons for something is
fallible, but the grounds themselves are not, so you have to understand the real
grounds as being ontological. Fallibilism does not apply to ontology, it refers
to something within the epistemological or transitive dimension.
MH: That is why some want to keep truth as an exclusively epistemological 
concept.
RB: There is something infallible. What is infallible is the real grounds for some-
thing, the real reason why it happens, and that ontological notion is very
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important: it is one of the meanings of truth – that is my claim – one of the
components of a full analysis of truth to the effect that our accounts of it are
fallible. Ontological ‘infallibilism’ is necessary for epistemic fallibilism. If you
were to have alethia in isolation from the dialectic of truth, or from the
broader dialectic of scientific discovery I sketch in A Realist Theory of Science
as later elaborated in the epistemological dialectic, you might well ask what it
really adds. But once you have a sense of the movement of human knowledge,
that what you are really trying to do in science or any process of learning or 
discovery is to move from one level of structure to a deeper level of structure,
it can be seen that alethia brings out what you are actually trying to do. For
when you have reached the alethic level, when you have attained alethic
knowledge or knowledge of the alethic truth of something – and it is always
relative – you then move on to the alethia of that alethic knowledge. An
account of critical realism that leaves this out might not be disastrous for your
practice, but it would be impoverished. It is not so difficult to understand.
Particularly when you go into the ethical realm and then some of the devel-
opments of the alethic strand within Dialectic, the basic notion of alethia can
be seen to be actually very like the notion of absence. It depends on simple dis-
tinctions, really, between the level of human-independent ontology, the level
of an ontology that relates to or is tied conceptually to human practice, and
the level of ontology in which you are talking about the specific content of
particular enquiries. Like the distinction between the phrastic, the neustic
and the tropic, it is not so difficult to understand.
MH: Some have difficulty with the notion that alethia is developing and dynamic
– emergent, ‘the stratified form’ of referential detachment;20 and conversely
with the concept of emergent falsity and related concepts: the alethic truth of
falsity, which might itself be false.21 I say relatedly because falsity as well as
truth is here being taken as ontological, though I do not think you had yet
begun to speak of (real) false being(s) as such, as you do later.22
RB: If you think of alethia as being the real reason or dialectical grounds for 
something then these grounds are in time-space, particularly, but not only, 
in the social world. Because alethic truth is the real reason for things insofar 
as humans have encountered it in their practice, it can be transformed in 
its intransitive aspect and our knowledge of it is also undergoing a process of
transformation. So the structural grounds, the dialectical grounds, the real
reasons for things are developing and dynamic. We tend to view causes in a
very static way, but a cause, as a generative mechanism of a structure, is 
the mode of operation of that structure. If you turn to the social realm, you can
say that the dialectical ground for the collapse of Northern Rock is a 
certain property of capitalism at a certain stage in its development. That is the
alethia of the collapse of Northern Rock. But for a Marxist capitalism 
itself is false and potentially historically transient. You could argue that the
real reason why women in the nineteenth century had such little influence in
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the body politic was in part because they were denied the vote and so 
excluded from political participation. That would be a dialectic ground that
was false in itself but was also transformed in history. When using the 
new notion of alethia in the sociosphere one still has to retain the basic con-
ceptual machinery of critical realism, but in the context of an understanding
that one is talking about a real ground or a real reason for something that is in
history and is itself subject to critique and transformation, to geo-historical
change.
MH: Can you explain the relation between alethic truth, the reality principle, and
axiological necessity? We have begun to see them at work in the previous
interview in the constitution of Tina compromise formations. Am I right in
thinking that, though there might be subtle differences, ultimately they are
the same thing? 
RB: You are basically right, they are essentially the same thing. However they can
also be seen as different perspectives on the same thing. If we refer back to
what I was saying about the different declensions of ontology, then within the
level of ontology related to human practice, that is, the level at which you talk
about alethic truth, the most objective of these three concepts is the concept
of alethic truth, and the most subjective is the concept of axiological neces-
sity. You can talk about the alethic truth of something that happens at a cer-
tain level without thinking of human practice in a concrete way, whereas
when you talk about axiological necessity it is always from the point of view of
some specific practice: you are looking at the way in which alethic truth, the
truth of things, imposes itself on your praxis. And then in between the two you
have something like the reality principle, which I think I do not use very much
and which refers to practices in general in the sense in which Freud wants to
talk about this. 
MH: You use alethia much more frequently, but the reality principle does make its
presence felt in the text, as indeed it should. I now want to come on to ethics
via discussion of the relation of dialectical critical realism to Marxism. I think
it is true to say that Marxists, like most critical realists as such (although this
seems to be changing), have a higher opinion of basic than of dialectical crit-
ical realism, valuing in particular the emergentist stratified and differentiated
ontology that the former articulates and viewing the latter as unnecessary or
at any rate unnecessarily complicated on the grounds that first-wave critical
realism is already dialectical.23 On the face of it, there is something of a para-
dox here, since it is dialectic that Marx held to be ‘a scandal and abomination
to the bourgeoisie’, as you remind us in the quote from Marx you give pride of
place alongside ones from Plato and Hegel at the beginning of Dialectic.
Marxists by and large seem to like your materialist diffraction of dialectic, ini-
tiated by Marx, and also explanatory critiques, and leading on from that 
some value the dialectics of freedom highly, but a number of other things or
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perceptions seem to have them really worried, especially it would seem
Marxists who see materialism as going together with atheism. First, they are
concerned that your dialectic intends to englobe and supersede Marxism, that
is, transcend or (essentially preservatively) sublate it, to which they respond
by attempting to show that Marxian dialectic can sublate dialectical critical
realism, in that it can in particular better handle the dialectics of nature and
provides a conceptual toolkit that more adequately guards against slippage
into irrealist ‘idealism and/or godism’.24
RB: It is not intended to supersede Marxism; rather, it operates at a different 
level. What I am trying to do in relation to Marxism is to bring out the 
most fundamental categories it needs in order to understand a subject-matter
that is intrinsically dialectical, and so it is at a more basic or abstract level 
than Marxian dialectic. Were I writing a book on the unfinished business of
Marxism at a substantive level then obviously it would have to be much 
more concrete and specific. The examples I give in Dialectic are exactly that,
exemplifications. In relation to my alleged intention to englobe, I think
englobing is the wrong metaphor for what a philosophical discourse is trying
to do. If you think of being as a sort of dynamic pyramid, at the top you 
have being as such; then the categories of basic or first-level critical realism,
such as structure, and so on; and then what dialectical critical realism 
does is go from there to a set of categories necessary to think process and
change as such; and then come the categories that are necessary to think
specifically historical changes, for instance, using a substantive theory of his-
tory such as historical materialism. Dialectical critical realism provides the
most abstract concepts for understanding being and therefore the most
abstract concepts for a critique of developments within Marxism. It provides a
critique of anti-Marxism, and I think on the whole my intention, certainly at
the time of writing Dialectic, was to support the science of history Marx had
opened up.
MH: Yes, that is underlabouring. But you can see how the idea arises because you
do say such things as dialectical critical realism claims to sublate previous
dialectics.
RB: That’s right, it means dialectics at that level. It claims to sublate, for example,
Marx’s comments on dialectic by bringing out their rational essence, and 
getting rid of what is not essential. It claims to be able to show why Marx 
found it so difficult to say what was so good about Hegel by critiquing the sin
of ontological monovalence as a founding error of the whole history of irreal-
ism and by situating Marx’s own work at a level that is more specific, showing
how it was that he was unable to do justice philosophically even to the levels
that are addressed by basic critical realism. That is why, if you are a Marxist,
you need basic critical realism and also, I am suggesting, dialectical critical
realism.
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MH: Another concern of some Marxists is that dialectical critical realist ethics are
idealist in the sense of articulating mere ideals, not real tendencies, that is,
they are unanchored in the concrete tendencies of actual geo-history,25 and
that this paves the way to the alleged outright idealism and spiritualism of the
books of the spiritual turn. Your powers are evidently in sad decline in
Dialectic,26 you begin to ‘go off the rails’27 and you are yourself guilty of ‘the
speculative illusion’.28 As you know, Alex Callinicos attributes this at least in
part to your deployment of transcendental arguments, albeit from historically
relative premises. The best way to stay on the tracks of Marxist materialism
and atheism is to read one’s metaphysics off from science, as Marx and 
Engels of The German Ideology were prone to do, and venture a few cautious
conjectures.29
RB: I think it is really important to see rational directionality as one of many real
tendencies that operate in a particular situation, but as a very important one
that takes us from any action or even any remark all the way through to some-
thing like Marx’s vision of the ideal society, which I call eudaimonia, a society
in which the free development of each is a condition of the free development
of all. Rational directionality is, if you like, the logical underpinning of a real
tendency operating in history that is the throwing off of constraints or action
oriented towards throwing them off. It is currently very fashionable to say that
this does not happen. But how, in that case, do you begin to make sense of at
least part of what is happening in Afghanistan or Iraq except in terms of self-
determination and the struggle to throw off constraints imposed by the impo-
sition of alien rule? As I argued in relation to needs, it is difficult not to see
self-determination or the desire for self-determination as absolutely basic in
human life. 
MH: Relatedly people claim that your dialectics of freedom are contextualised
socio-substantively by a concept of generalised master–slave-type (or power
2
)
relations that is too abstract and generalised to be of much use in ‘unravelling
the complex relational determinations of the various axes of social power’30
and that downplays the central explanatory importance of class. Thus you
wrongly criticise Marx for being ‘fixated on the wage-labour/capital relation at
the expense of the totality of master–slave relations’31 – which is taken to
imply that you yourself do not think that class is ‘arguably the explanatorily
most important . . . of master–slave-type relations’.32 Moreover, focusing on
the master–slave trope, it is claimed, obscures the fact that under capitalism
power
2
is an epiphenomenon of a form of power
1
– control over resources – and
thus leaves power
2 
without an explanation and plays an ideological, reproduc-
tive role.33
RB: The first point that I would want to make is that power
2 
refers to at least two
planes of what I call four-planar social being: not only the plane of social inter-
actions, but the plane of social structures sui generis, so that I use the concept
Ch 6.qxp  12/18/2009  1:55 PM  Page 135
136 The axiology of freedom: dialectical critical realism 1986–1994
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
of power
2
to refer to the structures of exploitation, domination and oppres-
sion, including of course the structures intrinsic to capitalism. I just do not
think you can get away with translating everything back to power
1
. Structural
domination and oppression is an indisputable fact, it needs to be registered as
such. Otherwise I can agree with Andrew Collier that the imposition of dif-
ferential control over certain kinds of resources, for example the means of
labour, is indeed a fundamental act. 
MH: That would seem to make control over resources a form of power
2
. 
RB: Power
1
and power
2
are mutually interdependent. Whenever you have an
instance of power
2
either at the structural or at a more personalised level 
it is also an instance of power
1
: power
1
includes, but does not entail, power
2
.
Typically in the kind of domain we are talking about many instances of 
power
1
will also be instances of power
2
. But the reason why it is important 
to have the notion of power
1
distinct from power
2
is because, of course, not 
all power is bad, that is not all instances of it. Transformative capacity is an
essential part of freedom. So it is absolutely vital to have a conception of 
transformative capacity and thus of power
1
. This relates to the concept of
power as causal powers. On the other hand, the concept of power as domina-
tion, power
2
, is just too prevalent to forget about, and it applies at both these
levels. I find it somewhat difficult to understand what that debate is about
really. 
MH: What do you make of the issue of ‘fixation’?34
RB: It is evident to me that in addition to class oppression and our understanding
of it there are other modes of oppression. These have to be theorised in their
own right even if at the end of the day you can come to some sort of synchronic
explanatory reduction of them in terms of class oppression – and I say ‘even if’
because I do not think that is possible. Either way, they still have to be theo-
rised in their own right and are still going to form an important constituent of
any conjuncture in which you act. I am saying that Marxists have to accept the
plurality of the forms of oppression.
MH: Is this compatible with the notion of a hierarchy of causes?
RB: Class oppression colours all the others, and is the most important, or at any
rate a very important, causal factor in explaining them. 
MH: Finally, and relatedly, some Marxists claim that your dialectic is headed
towards voluntarism and the downplaying of structural constraints, and
ignores that people are not essentially free (or god-like) but rather essentially
both free and unfree; hence your eudaimonia is idealistic and utopian or 
perfectionist in a pejorative sense and plainly unachievable.35
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RB: People are both free and unfree, as the objection says, but it overlooks that
these things are not on the same logical level. People are actually slaves but
really free. What people want to do is to deconstrain themselves, to remove
constraints in their environment or in themselves on the achievement of
what they want, and so to become free in actuality, or more free than they
were. So understood dynamically the two things are not on the same logical
level. Understood statically one would not know what a society was like in
which there was no freedom or nobody was in any respect free; it would be a
society in which there was no intentional action. But the converse is possible
to imagine: a society that is eudaimonistic, in which the constraints have been
removed, or rather the constraints at the level of the demi-real have been
removed, because there will always be challenges (and so duality) in the
world. So freedom is analytical or essential to human action and to human
being in a way that unfreedom is not.
MH: In his forthcoming book on your dialectic, Alan Norrie has characterised its
ethics as ‘constellational’ and ‘cumulative’, by which I take him to mean
roughly that, while ethics on your account is embedded within the geo-
historical process and subject to extrinsic structuring, it is also, in virtue of
what you have called ‘the deep content of the judgement form and the latent
immanent teleology of praxis’,36 intrinsically critical of actually existing
morality, such that moral alethia, like alethic truth as such, is dynamic and
developing?37 Can you comment on this? The key notion underpinning cumu-
lation is of course something we have already touched on, that of the tenden-
tial rational directionality of geo-history towards the moral object/ive of the
species, that is, the pulse of freedom, which is dialectic itself. Marxist critical
realists such as Sean Creaven welcome this thesis as rehabilitating in philoso-
phy and social theory a concept of progressive if uneven and contingent social
development that they see at the heart of Marx’s social theory,38 but some
other commentators close to critical realism, for example Radha D’Souza,
view any such notion as irredeemably contaminated with residues of
Eurocentrism, colonialism and imperialism.39 What is the way forward here?
RB: We are in the sphere of practical reasoning, and what we have to understand
when we are talking about ethics is that it is always action-guiding, on the one
hand, but on he other it always exists in relation to some actually existing
morality and some concrete situation or set of circumstances. In this sense it is
always within history and always potentially involves explanatory critiques of
actual existing morality. So you could say that it is always critical. As action-
guiding, I argue that the moral alethia of the species is universal concretely
singularised human flourishing in nature, but also that the ethical thing to do
will always be something that is specific to our different concretely singu-
larised natures, rhythmics and circumstances, and actionable in that context.
That does not mean that one cannot have a general theory of it. What I
attempt to do is to bring out a theoretical infrastructure at the centre of which
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is what I call the ethical tetrapolity, in which one moves from the solidarity
implicit in what I call the expressively veracious remark to the content of
explanatory critical theories – what we need to do, what needs to happen in
the world to resolve the ill that is afflicting us – through the totalising depth-
praxis necessary to remove the constraints, to the pulse that is movement in
the direction of universal human emancipation or eudaimonia. That brings
out the directionality of ethics, but any particular judgement or any particular
moral stance is always going to be very specific. 
MH: What do you say about the perceived Eurocentrism of rational directionality,
its possible affinity with ‘the idea of progress’ and theories of modernisation
and social evolution that provide a rationale for imperialism? 
RB: Let us look at the higher levels of freedom I distinguish: emancipation from spe-
cific ills through to autonomy or self-determination, through to well-being,
through to flourishing, through to universal flourishing or eudaimonia. They all
encompass colonial rebellion, the suffragettes’ revolt, the revolt of the
oppressed, the revolt of the periphery, and so on. It is very Eurocentric of people
to say that this is western – to imagine that, say, Islamic people today are not
concerned about liberty. I find that an extraordinary idea, indeed a quasi-
Eurocentric conceit. They are concerned about liberty under the declension of
self-determination, of freedom from arbitrary arrest, or freedom to practice their
religion in the way they want to, and so on. This is what we are all striving for.
The struggle for freedom comes from people wherever they are, there is nothing
Eurocentric about it. What Radha says is mediated by a certain kind of post-
modernist and poststructuralist perception of narratives and grand narratives. It
is correct to say that what I am essaying is a grand narrative, it is not correct to
say that this work is in any way Eurocentric. The fundamental basis of this could
have been developed in critical engagement with Chinese or Indian or
Indigenous philosophy, and I would very much like to complete it in that way.
The philosophical tradition that denies the pulse of freedom and is being artic-
ulated here is irrealism. It is basically oppressive illusion, and perhaps delusion. 
MH: Let us turn to your critique of irrealism or non-transcendental realism, then,
your totalising metacritique of western philosophy. It is geared around the
‘unholy trinity’ of ontological monovalence, the epistemic fallacy and ‘primal
squeeze’ on empirically controlled theory and natural necessity. Since primal
squeeze is generated by the epistemic fallacy, mediated by actualism, the trin-
ity reduces to a pair, and the question arises as to which is the more primordial
and fundamental error. When you explicitly weigh them in the balance, you
award primacy to ontological monovalence, but some of your formulations
seem to suggest otherwise. Thus western philosophy is historically determined
by rationalist criteriology generated by ontological monovalence↔monism/
reductionism but structurally dominated by empiricist ontology generated by
the epistemic fallacy↔fundamentalism, and this structural domination
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comes into its own in the modernist epoch via the mediation of ‘the great sub-
jectiviser’,40 Descartes, ensuring the triumph of empiricism; and as we know
some postmodernist philosophy runs a critique of the philosophy of presence.
So the balance seems to be tipped towards the epistemic fallacy in the philo-
sophical discourse of modernity.
RB: I think if you go back to ancient Greek times there is something that needs to
be said in favour of the epistemic fallacy already being there. The Greeks
implicitly assume a kind of exact correspondence or homology between the
world and what they say, between logos, our speech, and the world – that the
world is what is sayable. That of course takes them very close to the epistemic
fallacy. On the other hand, against that, they did explicitly thematise ontol-
ogy and properties of being, they were aware of other cultures that had differ-
ent views and were upfront about it, so they were not so far away from the
fundamental themes of basic or first-level critical realism. However the thing
that they really wanted to do was to give a rational account of the world and
their place in it that did away with the spectre of instability and change – that
would normalise Athens at a certain time in its history or, going back before
that, Pythagorean or other early Greek conceptions of what the world ought
to be like. The whole motivation here was the ruling out of absence and
change, it was about ontological monovalence. If you read Plato this is clear:
change is just a form of difference, and difference is a useful and acceptable
category for thinking the world. This history is continuous, going right
through to the rise of modernity. It is then overlaid by, first, the dispute
between rationalists and empiricists and then by the trap of Humean empiri-
cism or its Kantian version in which the epistemic fallacy and the impossibil-
ity of talking about the world becomes, as I characterise it, structurally
dominant. Now you could not talk about change for the added reason that you
cannot talk about the world, so forget about change: if you cannot talk about
it, it does not happen. Some critical realists, maybe Alan Norrie, seem to
think that some of the poststructuralists can have a coherent concept of
change, but I do not really see it. Postmodernism in general is an important
corrective to modernism, but to thematise difference alongside dialectical
universality is better. We have to get rid of any abstract universality and then
thematise difference in a way that allows us to see that it actually presupposes
all the levels of the concrete universal. Similarly, we have to analyse change
and difference to make it clear that they are fundamentally different things.
MH: Underlying the fear of change must have been not just a desire to preserve the
status quo, but ultimately fear of death. You say in Dialectic that you can dialec-
tically detach the fear of death and discard it as obsolete way of thinking.41
Why could they not have learnt to do that?
RB: Once you accept emergence and disemergence, in other words birth and
death, coming into being and passing out of being at any level of being, then
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you have change as fundamental. To get rid of death in some way might appeal
to some philosophers as members of a relatively privileged elite. But the fun-
damental thing that philosophers have been doing for rulers is provide an
account of the world that would show how the order that the (and their) rulers
wanted to establish was going to be eternal, could not and would not be
changed. You can see this in our own times. The neo-conservative idea of an
American century is only a step away from the idea of the thousand-year
Reich: what exists now is going to be always. Once you situate death as funda-
mentally disturbing, then you are half way to all the other changes, the trans-
formations that might occur in your world. Children do not behave the way
you behave, and that is unsettling. Then what do you have? What the philoso-
phers thought they had was the notion of consciousness as universal and infi-
nite. Of course the content of their thought, what it is talking about, does have
a universal aspect, but their understanding at any moment of time is itself
going to be transient. You have to understand thought in both its aspects, as
potentially making a claim about all magnetic bodies (or whatever) and as
itself transient – as transient as the bodies it is talking about. There is no way
of getting rid of change, and no way of getting rid of the fear of change except
by embracing change.
MH: Any major philosophical treatise on dialectic has to settle accounts critically
with Hegel and Marx, which Dialectic essays. I heard you say soon after From
East to West came out that you had been too hard on Hegel. Why so? Would
you say the same of Marx?
RB: I probably was a little too hard on Hegel in the sense that what he had done
was something pretty enormous, that is, bring out the generative role of
absence, such that the basic form of a dialectical learning process is very
roughly (and suitably reconstructed) as he said it is. But of course where he
erred was in proceeding to eliminate the absence – the absence he had discov-
ered – by various intellectual sleights of hand. I was very concerned that it
should not be eliminated, so I concentrated on the negative side of Hegel,
especially because I then wanted to go on more positively as it were to evalu-
ate Marx as founding a science of history. If this project was to be sustained I
had to be very hard on the Hegelian and other residues in Marx; in order to
sustain Marx’s intuitions and innovations, I had to be critical of much of the
content of what Marx said. My main concern was not so much to be
hermeneutically accurate to Marx as to clear the ground for the unfinished
business of Marxism: historical materialism and the critique of political econ-
omy. I proceeded from the point of view that Marx had started something, but
that Marxists have not well understood what he started; Marx had set an
agenda, raising many important questions and it is the job of Marxists, as suc-
cessors of Marx, to work on and develop this agenda. The reason why I 
was hard on Hegel is thus probably because I wanted to be hard on Marx, and
the reason I wanted to be hard on Marx was to clear the ground for an 
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understanding of contemporary developments and the lack of them. This is
very important, and what I would like to do in one of the succeeding sessions,
as I have not written about it anywhere in much detail so far, is to talk about
the fate of actually existing socialism: what happened and what went wrong
there. 
MH: I will make a point of asking you. In Dialectic and Plato Etc. you claim to have
solved most of the textbook problems of western philosophy. In Dictionary of
Critical Realism I wrote:
This has been taken for hubris, but clearly, if the problems have been gen-
erated within and in virtue of an irrealist problematic, and in particular, in
virtue of the absence of (adequate) concepts of ontology and alethic truth
at 1M, of absence at 2E, of totality at 3L and of agentive agency at 4D (such
that the problems of philosophy are unified by the absence of the concept
of absence . . .), remedy of these lacks should make their resolution, in 
theory, possible. The real problem with Bhaskar’s claim is perhaps that in
professional philosophy, as Popper has noted, ‘nothing seems less wanted
than a simple solution to an age-old philosophical problem’, and the basis
for this very probably lies in what the paradox-ridden condition of philos-
ophy reflects in the sociosphere . . . . The problematicity of philosophy is
almost an article of faith, and, since philosophical problems are ‘superve-
nient on life’, provides an important diagnostic clue to social problems.42
Would you want to qualify or add anything to that sort of defence against the
charge of hubris?
RB: Intellectually, either the existing textbook problems of philosophy have been
solved or they have not. What someone who claims that this is hubris has to
do is to show how my solutions fail. Of course, it is quite possible that some of
these problems will not have been resolved, but someone has to show that,
and so far no-one has. That is the intellectual answer. What you then have to
do is ask why people think that the problems of philosophy have not been
resolved, but that just takes us into the realm of the diagnostic: what does its
problematicity tell us about (1) philosophy and (2) the social context in
which philosophy subsists or flourishes? If philosophy is understood only as a
discipline that is entirely aporetic – that exists only in these problem-fields –
then of course philosophers will go out of business once their problems have
been resolved. However, I think there is another future for philosophers: con-
ceptually articulating proposals for better futures. Let them be underlabourers
for and in relation to concrete utopian enterprises, the other and better worlds
that our world implicitly contains.43 As for what the problematicity tells us
about the social order, this is where the platinum plate of Hegelian dialectic is
so important. What it basically tells us is that, if you take a specific ideology
like that of poststructuralism, its position that there are no grounds, no deep
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structures, is a kind of oblivion – alethic untruth – of the fundamental facts of
our societal existence, which remain under the dominance of the deep struc-
tures of capitalism. Poststructuralism is there as an accompanying ideology:
capitalism does not exist, nor does the pulse of freedom. What exists is the sur-
face, what you have really got, and since that is all that exists, it will always be
there in one form or another. This is rather like assuming that you yourself as
an embodied being are going to be immortal. That is the kind of thing the
problems of philosophy point to. They all have their roots in the characteris-
tic errors of irrealism – the epistemic fallacy, ontological monovalence, onto-
logical extensionalism and the denegation of intentional causality – errors
that are underpinned ultimately by fear of change manifesting itself in the
normally unconscious desire to maintain or affirm the status quo.
MH: Which brings us nicely to my next question: philosophy, you say, must in the
long run be consistent with the findings of science.44 How does Dialectic stand
in relation to the findings of modern science? Would you want to rewrite any-
thing today?
RB: I think it stands up pretty well really. Today I would want to say more about
technology, particularly information technology. I would also want to do a cri-
tique of grand theories of everything, which are very fashionable in physics
and popular cosmology, and of biological reductionism, which is pervasive.
Although I lay the conceptual groundwork for it, I do not explicitly critique
the new fundamentalism associated with bourgeois triumphalism, which is a
market fundamentalism predicated on the success of the revolution of 1989.
Obviously I did not foresee the extent to which religious fundamentalism
would arise, but I think it too fits very nicely into the schema, as the dialecti-
cal counterpart of market fundamentalism. Also I would probably want to 
thematise in a more systematic and perhaps dramatic way the ecological crisis,
but I do think most of my work reads pretty well in that respect, because I have
been aware of it from the 1970s. 
MH: Far more so than your earlier work, Dialectic has largely been ignored by main-
stream philosophers. What do you see as the main reasons for this and do you
expect it to continue? Under what conditions would Dialectic come into its own?
RB: This is an interesting question. I can begin to answer it by reference to the
three aims I set myself in Dialectic. These were, as you’ve mentioned, the
dialectical enrichment of critical realism; the development of a general theory
of dialectic, including Hegelian dialectic as the special case; and the elements
of a totalising critique of western philosophy. 
In reference to the first aim, I think you can practise critical realism up to a
point without reference to the categories of dialectic, but then you will be
sticking mainly to the first level of ontology, overlooking the potential bene-
fits of the deepening of this ontology in the ways I have indicated. As critical
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realist research into concrete and applied topics develops, researchers will feel
the necessity to deepen their understanding of the structures that they are
analysing or situating and of the actions that they are exploring in their
research process, and they will begin to make conscious use of dialectical
notions. Of course, they do this spontaneously anyhow, they think contradic-
tion and negativity. Many people have pointed out to me that it is not as if I
discovered contradiction, which of course is true. But there is a problem about
using the concept of contradiction. If it comes at too crucial a point in your
analysis and promises to give rise to a radical social theory, you are going to
have philosophers stomping on you, telling you that you cannot think the
negative or contradiction. The one thing that drove Rom Harré apoplectic
about my work was the fact that I defended absence and negation; he said Kant
had shown that to be impossible. Once you are confronted by such a philoso-
pher you have to defend yourself, and that is where Dialectic can play an essen-
tial role by providing a philosophical rationale for thinking the not. But of
course then it is not just a question of using a category, you want to know all
its implications and ramifications, you want to come to self-consciousness in
your research about that category, and that might allow you to explore the way
in which your first-level constructions can be thought in a supplementary or
second-level way such that you can see intentional action in terms of the rem-
edying of lacks or absences. You get a new spin on the same subject-matter
that increases the number of ontological options you have available as tools to
think that subject-matter. So I think this process is inevitable but slow.
Turning to the second motivation of Dialectic, the general theory of dialec-
tic, I think people will slowly start to use Hegel and Marx more readily when
they realise that dialectical categories can be defended or given an adequate
rationale philosophically. In relation to my third motivation, the totalising
critique of western philosophy, getting into this probably does require special
conditions. There is evidence that, as moments of far-reaching change or rev-
olutionary rupture approach, people become intensely and more openly
engaged in reflection on the most basic things, all the things that are normally
taken for granted. Thus Lenin wrote The State and Revolution in 1916–17 and
he did all his dialectical philosophy then. The interest in Marxism and also
critical realism soared in South Africa during the struggle that ended
Apartheid. Another example is provided by an episode at the time of the pub-
lication of my critique of Rorty, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom.45 This
occurred soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall – it was still being dismantled –
and the book’s launch was one of two meetings in the Institute of
Contemporary Arts held next to each other and simultaneously. One was a
debate about my book between myself and Jonathan Rée, since Rorty had
declined to come; and next door there was a discussion of the fall of the Berlin
Wall, which I would have been interested to go to myself. The room I was in
was packed out, there were a couple of hundred people there, and in the room
next door there were only a handful. It was a revolutionary moment in history,
but what people wanted to talk about was Rorty and how to understand 
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reality. If you have a view of categorial error in reality as very deep and perva-
sive, then you can see that what we have to do is transform the categories of
social life. There was a rationale to what might appear as topical madness in
the imbalance between the meetings that day.
MH: One last question. In the Introduction to Dialectic and the 1998 Preface to
The Possibility of Naturalism you announced five forthcoming books: Plato Etc.;
Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx; Dialectical Social Theory; Totality and Transcendence
and The Philosophy of Money.46 You brought only one of these (Plato Etc.) to
publication, though the Totality and Transcendence manuscript presumably
went into the making of the books of the spiritual turn. I take it that the oth-
ers were, so to speak, victims of the drive to the spiritual turn. You said last
time that you gave up writing Philosophical Ideologies, which was near comple-
tion, to pursue the new line of thought, and clearly after the publication of
From East to West you would have focused on elaborating the philosophy of
meta-Reality. Do you now intend to complete and publish any of the other
books you announced?
RB: I do not think I will write a book on Kant, Hegel and Marx, although I would
love to engage in a more detailed hermeneutics of those thinkers. I would also
love to do more work on the philosophy of money. The project of Totality and
Transcendence was taken up into the meta-Reality books. I now think
Dialectical Social Theory would have to be done at a level of concreteness I was
not envisaging at the time. It would have to be on a specific area, for example,
peace, and I have elements of a draft text that concerns itself with problems of
incommensurability, not only in peace negotiations about human conflicts,
but between cultures and civilisations. So that is one way of concretising
dialectical social theory. Another is through thematising the character of
applied critical realism, which I have been working on for the last several years.
And then finally there is a question of whether you can make the categories
much more specific and concrete than they are in, say, Dialectic. The category
of education in that work, for example, is a very broad one encompassing the
learning process not just in schools and universities but in life as a whole. But
you can also develop it further at the level of the philosophy and sociology of
education, which is something I am doing now at the Institute of Education.
MH: It is interesting you say you would like to do a more detailed hermeneutic of
Kant, Hegel and Marx. You have done only one book like that, the one on
Rorty, and certainly critical realists often say they wish you would engage
other philosophers in more detail. I have always taken it that you operate at a
much more abstract level, going for the really pivotal aporiai and lacunae in a
thinker’s thought, and so are not particularly interested in the detail as such.
But you are saying this is not the case, you are interested in the detail – 
RB: It is just that I have not had the time. 
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7 The spiritual turn
Transcendental dialectical
critical realism (1994–2000)
MH: Before we come on to the spiritual turn, I want to ask you about critical real-
ism as a movement in the period leading up to it. The 1990s saw the entrench-
ment of critical realism in a wide array of areas of study within the academy
around the globe, the inauguration of a major critical realism book series with
Routledge and the emergence of critical realist organisational forms, in the
establishment of which you played a leading role: the Centre for Critical
Realism (CCR) in 1996, and the International Association for Critical
Realism (IACR) in 1997, together with the IACR newsletter Alethia (1998),
which grew into the peer-reviewed Journal of Critical Realism early in the new
century. A series of Realism and the Human Sciences conferences in the 1980s
and 1990s was followed by the first of the ongoing IACR international con-
ferences in 1997. Some commentators seem to think that there is something
inappropriately evangelical or distasteful about a philosophy and social theory
assuming organisational forms. How would you respond to that?
RB: I think the idea that it cannot or does not need to organise is very naive. There
is no way of propagating a standpoint in the present world other than by doing
things like writing books and getting these books distributed. Of course, if the
academy had been spontaneously receptive to critical realism we could just
have used the organisational forms of the academy, but it was not. In the late
1970s, more so in the early 1980s, I was very concerned that people who were
taking up critical realism or themes from my work were finding it very difficult
to get their work published. At times I felt as if critical realism was in real dan-
ger of being suffocated in the academy. I think that is true of all revolutionary
new ideas; obviously they meet with resistance. This of course eased once crit-
ical realists started getting chairs in the academy; however there was still the
danger that the radical thrust in critical realism would be submerged. Early in
the 1980s we set up conferences on Realism and the Human Sciences where we
could gather for three or four days, and these were like an oasis for the early
critical realists. They were characterised by friendliness – a good, higher level
of friendliness – commitment to truth and working through the arguments.
They were very rewarding experiences for everyone. They were self-organised
and there is no way that any philosophy, whether it is critical realism or a part
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of the established order, can reproduce itself except in a socially organised
form. The same motivation lay behind the establishment of the Centre for
Critical Realism and the other semi-independent institutions. So I think this
is a socially naive objection. 
MH: In our last interview you referred to an experience you had in Cyprus in 1994
that marked the inception of the spiritual turn. Can you begin our discussion
of the spiritual turn by telling us something about it?
RB: What happened is that I went to Cyprus on Boxing Day for a holiday. Dialectic
and Plato Etc. had come out, but I had not been able to complete the follow-
up, Philosophical Ideologies – which was annoying. I was feeling physically run
down. When I arrived in Cyprus I thought this is really great, I can swim and
be with nature, and enjoy myself. The second day in Cyprus I caught another
cold, a bad cold, and I went to see a local doctor, or rather I think my hotel
called the local doctor because I had a temperature. He gave me antibiotics yet
again, and said no swimming. So I thought just my luck, and was feeling really
fed up. No swimming, no drinking because of the antibiotics – what could I do?
I was staying in the Hotel Annabelle in Paphos, and they were advertising aro-
matherapy. So I thought why not, let’s try alternative medicine. The person
who was doing the aromatherapy said what you really need is Reiki. So she
gave me Reiki, and it opened up a new world of experience to me. Reiki is a
form of hands-on healing that originated in Japan in the early twentieth cen-
tury. In the 1990s it was quite common to find Reiki practitioners in, for exam-
ple, hairdressers; it was something you could get on the High Street. So I had
Reiki, and this was a revelation to me. It occurred to me that everything I had
been doing referred to the world of external objects and material things,
whereas Reiki (at least in the hands of the practitioner, an English woman liv-
ing in Cyprus) put me in touch again with a deep inner world: what was hap-
pening, as it were in myself, behind – or rather in the deep uncharted interior
of – the world of physical bodies and material objects. And then the next thing
I discovered was that the Reiki practitioner’s husband was a teacher of tran-
scendental meditation. So I did a course in that too. This reawakened me to
things that I had been vaguely familiar with in my youth, and again I found
this a very moving experience. I decided to undertake a systematic investiga-
tion into the forms, practical and theoretical, of what could be called eastern
mysticism. Reiki did not last. Meditation is something profound. I am sure
that personal contact is very important in forms of healing, so there is a
rational kernel to hands-on healing of the Reiki. For whatever reason, I soon
found my energy levels returning. I interpreted this as my higher self telling me
that there was no point in writing another book on the themes or topics I had
explored up to now, that I had to do something else. So I gave up writing
Philosophical Ideologies to try to explore this alternative world that I had for-
gotten about or repressed. The whole area of eastern culture and mysticism
was a huge absence in my experience of life, and so in a practical way I wanted
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to discover what it was all about; and that was the beginning of my spiritual
turn.
MH: What you’ve said implies that this experience was – to use the terms of your
later writings – an experience of transcendence, of non-duality, of union or
identity, and to a considerable extent a case of East meeting West, or the
‘undoing of oblivion’ in relation to the Indian side of your self. To what extent
did the earlier theorisation of an adequate account of negativity – and specif-
ically, of the moment of absolute transcendence or creativity ex nihilo in the
process of scientific discovery,1 and of ultimata for science – feed into this
experience, and had East already made an input into that? Your first major
work of the spiritual turn, From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul (2000), seems
to give grounds for inferring that the experience was a religious one (that is, of
God or the ultimate or absolute),2 whereas previously your position from your
late teens on had been agnostic or atheist. 
RB: I think the first thing to do is to situate this particular moment in terms of the
method and the process of development of critical realism. Throughout I had
adopted an approach of immanent critique. This consisted in going into a 
subject-matter and exploring the internal contradictions and aporiai that
might lead to a metacritique, in the first instance to the identification of an
absence that was causing all those problems. You can see this, to put it in terms
of MELD, in the revindication of ontology at 1M, the thematisation of nega-
tivity and absence at 2E, the situation of internal relations at 3L and the
demonstration of the causality of transformative praxis at 4D. All these things
were in a sense taboo in the dominant traditions at the time, ontology was
taboo, negativity was taboo, the internality of relations between at least exter-
nally related things was taboo, as was intentional causality and a host of other
notions necessary for the intelligibility of transformative praxis. What I tried
to do, and critical realism tries to do, is to bring these hitherto tabooed topics
that were causing the intellectual problems in an area reflexively into self-
consciousness, that is, into the discursive domain, so that we could then say
the previously unsayable, think the previously unthinkable, and hence restore
coherence to the hitherto aporetic subject-matter. 
One thing that had been troubling me for some time, but especially from the
early 1990s, was the fact that there were colleagues and friends of mine, some
of whom were committed to critical realism, who were deeply religious but
were, so to speak, in the closet. They would not, and felt they could not, talk
about their religiosity. And of course this perception was further deepened
when I went again to India to speak as a philosopher around the turn of the
millennium, because the academics I encountered there were in their private
lives deeply religious but in their public intellectual lives professed a kind of
atheism. There was thus a profound contradiction within their beliefs, more
generally a contradiction in their theory and practice. One of the things that
I wanted to do in the spiritual turn was to make the unsayable sayable, and in
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initiating discourse about spirituality as taboo, in starting to talk about it, I
took it that we would be enhancing the overall rationality of critical realism.
I’ll say something about the discussions I had with these religious fellow criti-
cal realists later, but one thing I think is very important to register here is the
fact that for me religion was not the same thing as spirituality. Indeed, even at
the time of the spiritual turn I did not hold any deep or specific religious con-
victions. Conversely, there was an element or moment of spirituality that I
had always recognised even in my most militant and atheist days. I still
retained the memory of the experience of moments of transcendence in my
youth and I had a kind of naive feeling that at some point it might connect up
with my intellectual project. 
MH: Does that still apply today – not having deep religious as dist nct from spiri-
tual convictions?
RB: I do not have any specific religious convictions. Or rather, I would say that I
subscribe to something like Shankara’s higher truth. All religions are paths to
the absolute, but none are strictly necessary; nor is it necessary to have a reli-
gion as such, if one has, for instance, the secular spirituality situated by the
philosophy of meta-Reality. From this metacritical perspective, of course,
many secularists and atheists implicitly have a religion, or absolute, or sense of
ultimate concerns, that imparts coherence, identity and form to their under-
standings and practice. 
MH: How did the spiritual turn tie in initially with your project to rethink (the
deficiencies of) the theory and practice of the left and of ‘actually existing
socialism’?
RB: One of my motivations – the most important motivation – for the spiritual
turn was actually to strengthen the cultural resources of the left. I think that
what I wanted to do, at the formal level, was to critique the one-dimensional
practices of actually existing socialism, by which I mean the practice not 
only of Soviet communism but also of the social democrats in the West, and
one-dimensional in the sense of four-planar social being. The project of 
constructing socialism had been seen essentially as a project of transformation
on only one of the planes of social being, that is, the plane of social structure.
In the case of our material transactions with nature, we had ecological degra-
dations presided over by actually existing socialism in one form or another 
as great as anything by unfettered capitalism. The quality of inter-personal
interactions under Stalinism was perhaps not as bad as under fascism, but it
was at least comparable, so that books could be written assimilating fascism
and the practices of communism to the same paradigm. And, of course, under-
standing of and work on the stratification of the embodied personality were
virtually non-existent in the practice of socialism. This was despite Marx’s
injunction in the third thesis on Feuerbach that the educators – those who
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would usher in a new society – must themselves be educated, that is, must 
educate themselves. 
That was one aspect of the formal change I wanted to bring about. Another
– and this ties in more directly and immediately with the spiritual turn –
involved the idea that our conceptual resources were too weak. This was a
problem particularly about the West, because western civilisation and science
had been oriented to the understanding and mastery of the world external to
us. Within the East, in practices that you find in South and Southeast 
Asia, especially in the Indian subcontinent but also in Taoism and to some
extent Confucianism in China, Japan, and Korea, in the whole region east of
– wherever the East starts – 
MH: East of Istanbul?
RB: The Middle East is really part of the West in many respects. But anyway, in
India, China and the civilisations that grew up from them, there was some
understanding of the inner world. The experience I had in Cyprus, or the sort
of experiences that began in Cyprus, led me to refocus on this. I had the sense
of a kind of revelation when I realised that, just as the internal structure of an
atom is spacious and comparable in size, in terms of relative distances, to the
internal structure of the universe, so what we ourselves have inside in the
inner world (which is of course a metaphor but still one with a great deal of lit-
eral bite) is an extraordinary realm waiting to be plumbed as the physical
world had been plumbed by western civilisation. I felt very strongly that the
only way one could come into a really authentic understanding of a domain of
phenomena was not just by studying and understanding it abstractly but by
going into it and experiencing it. This was one aspect of the unity of theory
and practice, and of course I had already started to do this in the 1980s when I
spent three or four years in not very successful psychoanalysis. So when I
arrived back in England from Cyprus I gradually, but in a methodical way,
attempted to get as much experience as I could of what struck me as poten-
tially deep aspects of the cultural traditions of the East. So I attended classes
on meditation, but also on tai chi, Reiki, feng shui and the like, and this was
an important part of the overall experience. In order to do those courses and
have these experiences, I adopted a standpoint of innocence. This is rather
like the standpoint of immanent critique. When you go into a subject-matter,
the point is not to apply some external findings that have been produced else-
where, but to generate a critique as a result of an immanent resolution of the
aporiai and contradictions within the subject-matter. So that meant that I
went into these experiences with a certain degree of innocence. This can be
understood in a double sense: first, I did not have preconceptions and, second,
I was just going into them and in the moment of the experience suspending 
my critical faculties. It struck me that this inner world I had discovered did
contain a spiritual element, but that the religious element in it was a contin-
gent one, not a necessary part of it, so that it was possible to have a secular 
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spirituality – an intuition that I saw the necessity to develop in the philosophy
of meta-Reality. I also felt that it would be wrong to identify the inner and the
spiritual, because the inner also contains an emotional life which is something
other than the spiritual. However, the spiritual was certainly not just to be
identified with the religious, let alone with any one form of religiosity.
MH: You mentioned discussions you had with deeply religious critical realist 
colleagues. At what stage did you have these discussions, with whom, and can
you give us something of their flavour and importance for your intellectual 
trajectory at this time?
RB: They were with Maggie Archer, Andrew Collier and Doug Porpora. I think
they started in 1998, by which time I had thoroughly immersed myself in read-
ing and experiencing as much as I could of this terrain. Maggie and Doug are
Catholics and Andrew had a Church of England background. I had one-on-
one discussions with each of them, and we also discussed as a group in meet-
ings over long weekends at my house in Suffolk (where I was living at the
time). We talked about a whole range of things, but mainly about how critical
realism might make talk about God and religion and more generally spiritual-
ity intellectually respectable, how it might bring them into the discursive
domain. We decided to write a book together, and this eventually led to the
publication of Transcendence: Critical Realism and God a few years later.3
However, for a number of reasons I decided in the end not to lend my name to
it. Perhaps I did not at the time fully share my friends’ commitment to making
religion as such, as distinct from spirituality, respectable. However, for me the
exact point of tension, or the most important one, can be brought out in rela-
tion to the ‘Twelve Propositions on Transcendence, Critical Realism and
God’ that I formulated as a summary of our discussions in 1999. These were
discussed at a weekend in Suffolk and then debated with a number of other
critical realists at a seminar in London which included Maggie and Andrew;4
and I included a further developed version of them in From East to West, in the
section ‘Twelve Steps to Heaven’.5
The most important of these propositions was the first one. This applied the
critical realist ‘holy trinity’ of the compatibility of ontological realism, episte-
mological relativism and judgemental rationality to the topic of God.
Basically the vision was that God or the absolute (in my later terminology the
cosmic envelope) could be an object, ontologically, which could be said to
exist or not exist and could be understood in different ways. I was saying that
the different religions understand this object in different ways and also that
this understanding can be seen as a form of manifestation of the object or, to
put it in an ontologically stronger way, that the object itself is manifesting
itself differently to different people. If the absolute is manifesting to people in
different religious traditions in different ways, that gives you an immediate
tolerance for other religions. The stumbling block is of course that most 
people who profess a particular religion feel that they have the unique, the
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only way to God: this is the only way that God can be described, and if your
description is different you are not actually describing God. So in a way it was
probably the alleged uniqueness of Christianity that was the stumbling block
for me – a position that we can call uniquism. We did not actually discuss that
– my position was more or less assumed in practice – but when it came to the
writing of the book I felt that a Christian slant or interpretation was being put
on things, whereas it was my aspiration to be neutral.
I firmly believed that the distinction Shankara introduced between the
higher truth and the ordinary truth, which I sketched in our first interview, is
very relevant here. The higher truth, known to the esoteric, sees all religions
as so many different paths to the absolute; the ordinary truth, which is what
the masses believe, proclaims a monopoly of truth. The higher truth is actually
present as a lived reality in most of the major religious traditions and practices:
in Judaism you have Kaballah; in Christianity you had the mystics and latterly
you have the varieties of liberation and some liberal, postmodern and
(recently) critical realist theology, and so on; in Islam you have Sufism, which
tries to incorporate the best insights from, for example, Hinduism, Buddhism
and Christianity; and in India you have the paths sketched out by the
Vedantic mystics, and by Buddha and Krishna, all of which were differenti-
ated from popular religion. So Shankara’s distinction is there in actuality, but
of course it has to be acknowledged that we can no longer afford to accept that
it is permanent. The time for the higher truth to become the ordinary truth
has arrived; and so we have to understand that, although on the ‘holy trinity’
of critical realism I must give rational grounds for the beliefs I have, and I
might be able to say that my path is the best path for me, it does not necessar-
ily follow that it is the best path for you, or him, or her. For other people have
their own rhythmics, and might have very good reasons for preferring another
path to the absolute. These considerations ground religious diversity in a way
that contradicts the formal teachings of most religions and yet is implicitly
practised by their higher saints and teachers.
MH: This was a bone of contention between you and the other discussants?
RB: They did not accept my interpretation, and do not now. It was brought home
to me recently that for some critical realist Christians uniquism is the limit to
the acceptance of meta-Reality; and of course uniquism is what lies behind
‘the clash of civilisations’ in its religious form. To the Christian right in
America there is no way Islam can be seen as an alternative path to God, and
similarly for the Sunni or Shia masses and their imams, there is no other way.
MH: How important for you positively, in terms of moving forward and developing
your own position, were the discussions with Andrew, Doug and Maggie?
RB: To discuss these topics with people who were close colleagues and friends 
was very important and meant that I was not completely isolated intellectually.
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The limits to this were inscribed in differential interpretations of what follows
from the application of the ‘holy trinity’ of critical realism in the first of the
‘Twelve Propositions’ (which were going to be the first chapter of our book).
Really, it is very difficult and perhaps impossible to have a uniquist interpreta-
tion of these and it is also impossible to justify the interpretation they subse-
quently put forward. Three main things should follow from a critical realist
approach to God. First, the compatibility of alternative descriptions with judg-
mental rationality. Second, the co-implication of immanence and transcen-
dence, of the divine already within us and the divine outside us that transcends
all human beings. On critical realist premises, if God is real, God must be both
ingredient in people and unsaturated by them, providing only their highest-
order conditions of possibility. Third, a solution to the notional problem of evil.
Although God might be ingredient in and everywhere sustaining the world, it
cannot be the case that God exhausts it, because of course you have emergence.
God or the absolute is responsible for higher selves or souls or ground-states, but
not for the actions of heteronomous human beings. If you put this in the con-
text of four-planar social being, as we did in our discussions, you can isolate
some interesting analogues of evil on all the four planes. So in the case of the
social structural plane you have the phenomenon of ‘structural sin’.
MH: Did Maggie contribute that concept?6
RB: Yes, but these ideas were also part of the theoretical infrastructure of 
transcendental dialectical critical realism. 
MH: It comes out of the Catholic tradition.7
RB: Yes, in particular the work and concerns of the liberation theologians. You
could thus formulate a programme for emancipatory action that was very
strong, meshing in with the eschatological project in a religious sense of
becoming an ever better vehicle for God’s purpose: a programme of universal
self-realisation, whereby you progressively eliminated the heteronomies both
in yourself and your praxis and in society. 
Of course the next step – and an equally important reason why I did not lend
my name to Transcendence – was that it became obvious to me that spiritual-
ity, which had been clearly situated in From East to West as a presupposition
both of religious and of emancipatory projects, was also a presupposition of
everyday life. This was tremendously important, because it means that there is
no necessary connection between spirituality and religiosity, that the ways in
which religion is practised are not just distorted manifestations of spirituality,
and that you can have a completely secular spirituality – which is what is
attempted in the philosophy of meta-Reality. 
MH: Can you summarise why you did not go ahead with co-authoring
Transcendence?
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RB: There were two reasons. First, the position of the other authors was too
uniquist in relation to Christianity. Second, it was too religious and not suffi-
ciently secular, and this is something the extended periods I spent in India in
1999–2002 helped me to understand. More about that next time.
MH: Can we pursue a little more what you were saying about the implications of
the spiritual turn for rethinking the left, and vice versa? Your interest in where
the left had gone wrong did not of course come out of the blue, and the dialec-
tics of Dialectic had already entrained an analysis in terms of substitutionism,
elitism and commandism, cognitive triumphalism, and so on. How did the
two sources of critique in the dialectical and spiritual turns link up? 
RB: If you go back to actually existing socialism in the form of Soviet communism,
it is obvious that there was no attempt to transfer power to the immediate pro-
ducers, the agents involved in the labour process. Instead, power was trans-
ferred from one set of commanders, roughly the capitalist class and their
agents, to another, the commanders of the party state. This was if you like the
first failing, that actually existing socialism did not even try to do the socialist
thing. Then, as I have already pointed out, there was no attempt to act on any
plane of social being other than at the level of social structure, except in the
early days of the revolution when, in the intense energy of what Lenin had
called ‘the carnival of the oppressed’, new initiatives and ways of doing things
did flourish and there was an extraordinary dynamism. I am not trying to put
the Soviet Union down, because its very existence enabled gains to be made
elsewhere. In the South, it was there as an alternative source of inspiration
and support for people who were looking for a different road from the capital-
ist one. In the West, we had Keynesianism and the welfare state, the improved
position of women, and greater degrees of racial equality all as a result, at least
in part, of its direct or indirect presence; the danger is that with it gone we will
see further reversals on these fronts. But internally its project was only to
transform social structure, and hence things on the other planes of social being
were left as they were. While the other planes are also massively important,
most fundamentally from the point of view of this argument (we are talking
about the spiritual turn), there was no orientation towards the self-
transformation or self-realisation of the nature of human beings, and this is
very odd in view of the fact that Marx had formulated a vision of society in
which the free development of each would be the condition of the free devel-
opment of all. When I was reflecting on this aphorism during the experien-
tially investigative moment of the spiritual turn, it occurred to me that this
involves an absence of ego because, if your development is as important to me
as my own, this means that I cannot have an ego that privileges myself over
you. And not only you, but that person there doing the hoovering8 – her
development is as important as mine – and I cannot place myself above her in
any way: everyone’s flourishing and development is equally important. But
this is very similar to the injunctions of, say, Mahayana Buddhism, with its
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battle against the ego or the privileging of one’s own standpoint. So the affin-
ity between Marx’s Marxism and Mahayana and other forms of Buddhism was
very clear. This is how I began to understand spirituality as a presupposition of
emancipatory projects as such. When I studied it further and began to see it as
a presupposition of everyday life, this was in no sense to weaken that thesis,
but to reveal spirituality as a tremendous taken-for-granted and unthematised
resource underlying everything we do. 
MH: I now come to the specific contents of your first book of the spiritual turn.
Contrary to what is probably the majority opinion within critical realism
today, I think From East to West is in some ways a really importa t work,
though I have reservations about a few things. It was initially greeted with
considerable hostility and consternation, including (as you know) by myself,
though I changed my assessment after a while.9 I think the main problem 
was that many people saw you as operating within a tradition of ontological,
epistemological and practical materialism from a position within the
European Enlightenment and received a rude shock when you espoused views
that seemed at odds with that tradition as they understood it: the ideas of 
an immortal soul and God, the primacy of spirituality understood as self-
reflexivity and self-change, an allegedly inflated view of the role of ideas in
history, and so on, not to mention flirtation with what some have called ‘New
Age spiritualism’.10 Let me list the areas in which I think this new philosophy
(dubbed ‘transcendental dialectical critical realism’ because it further tran-
scendentalises [dialectical] critical realism) makes a valuable contribution 
(all of which involve cla ification and development, sometimes radical, of
pre-existing positions), some of which I will then come on to seriatim: dispo-
sitional and categorial realism (1M); life as a dialectical learning process, the
dialectics of co-presence, the deployment of dialectic to provide diagnostic
clues to social and human problems and ills, the concepts of transcendence
and creativity (2E); the account of the self and self-realisation, the theory of
ideology/alienation and the demi-real (3L); thematisation of spontaneous
right-action as a basic human capacity (4D); the thesis of the primacy of self-
or subject-referentiality or self-reflexivity in social change (what you were
later to designate 5A or fifth aspect: the spirituality presupposed by emancipa-
tory projects); and the way in which From East to West brings to a culmination
the drive in your philosophy to help effect nothing less than a paradigm shift
from the outlook of the bourgeois enlightenment to an outlook fitting for a
post-slave order, a eudaimonian enlightenment. I think it is a grave mistake,
in short, to dismiss the book just because one does not like its discourse about
God and so on. And whatever one might think of its ‘novella’ section, which
recounts the odyssey of the Bhaskarian soul on its way to enlightenment 
over fifteen lives, there are some real gems to be discovered for those who 
persist; for example, the paean to the teacher–student relationship as a model
for the kind of relationships that must supersede the master–slave order – a
relation between equals in which all learn and which ‘does not abolish but
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universalises essentially unilateral progressive development’.11 It is notewor-
thy too, in relation to the more personal thematics of the present book, that
the soul in a number of lives is a busy ‘Bumblebee’, and that, taken as a whole,
the lives are clearly an important record of your own authentic spiritual 
experience over the years.
That is my general position on the book. Here is my first question. From East
to West attempts to synthesise the dualism of East and West, whereas the phi-
losophy of meta-Reality seeks to transcend it. Synthesis – which leaves the
original dichotomy intact – is not really in character with your philosophy,
with its drive to transcendence in ever more complete conceptual totalities.
Why was it a synthesis that you attempted in From East to West and not a 
transcendence?
RB: If you look at any process of resolution of an aporia or rectification of an
absence, what normally happens as you try to work your way to a new tran-
scending concept such as gravity or relative space–time is that you borrow a
concept from a pre-existing field and then attempt to mesh or mix it in with
the aporetic or otherwise inadequate conceptual field. Thus the first moment
is where you try to synthesise, to hold the two together; it is the moment of
model-building if you like. You can, of course, do it theoretically just by imag-
ing that the world is as postulated in some other domain, and you have the
model there as abstracted, but when you come to the point, when you actually
want to revolutionise your field, you have to put it into the field in some way.
And this is the moment of the coexistence of positive contraries, when both
cannot be true, and when you realise that you must now move on to their 
transcendence.
MH: So there are two phases, presumably corresponding to the σ (sigma) and τ
(tau) transforms in your epistemological dialectic?12
RB: Yes. The moment of transcendence is when the positive contraries are held as
a memory, as negative sub-contraries, and you redescribe the terrain. But I
think the first moment is always synthesis if it actually involves the presence
of another field and cannot be done solely by internal resolution (which in
general it cannot). 
MH: This means that transcendental dialectical critical realism is going to be tran-
sitional and not one of the main moments in the development of the system,
on a par with basic critical realism, dialectical critical realism and meta-
Reality – as Seo MinGyu has recently argued.13
RB: That is absolutely right. Transcendental dialectical critical realism is, if you
like, a half-way house at which there is a conception of the absolute and a con-
ception of the interconnectivity involved, but it is not yet adequately theo-
rised because it is not comprehensive. It seems to exclude those who define
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themselves as agnostic or atheist, and there is no reason to do that. Most
importantly, it leaves out everyday life. This means that, when I am talking
about the absolute as immanent in human beings, many people probably have
the feeling: ‘The absolute present in me? Me?!’ Indeed, in From East to West I
treat the whole subject-matter in rather reverential terms, as if you might per-
haps have a moment of transcendence in your life if you are lucky; whereas I
would now say that you cannot live without it and that its occurrence is com-
monplace and routine. I suppose if I had done something analogous to From
East to West in the case of Dialectic I would have published the results of my
investigations in that area in about 1991. But I did not. In the case of the spir-
itual turn, there was such a taboo, so many blind spots in the discursive
domain, that I felt the need to give the topic an airing at an earlier stage. Also
I was in a process of personal experience and deepening, and I could not be 
certain where it would all end. 
MH: But if your main concern was with spirituality, why did you first need to talk
about religion and God? I should perhaps say for our readers that From East to
West thematises God as the ultimate categorial structure and ingredient pure
dispositionality of the cosmos. Whatever the merits of your case for the reality
of God – and as an agnostic about God I have no objection personally to 
people referring to the dispositional and categorial ultimata of the cosmos, if
there be such, as God – putting forward the case seems problematic in terms of
your attempt to address the question of what is wrong on the left, because the
new philosophy (transcendental dialectical critical realism), as you say, could
not aspire to command the assent of atheists and agnostics, who were given to
understand that their unbelief alienated part of their being. This is a point the
philosophy of meta-Reality, with its appeal, via the concepts of the cosmic
envelope and the ground-state, to ‘those of all faiths and no faith’, seems to
concede, although it does still acknowledge ‘god’ and the divine. 
RB: This relates to the general point about synthesis and transcendence. More
specifically, there is a blind spot about spirituality, especially in the West, and
an even bigger blind spot about the possibility of a secular spirituality, so the
only way you could start talking about spirituality, at least it seemed to me at
the time, was to talk about religion. At some time in the future it might be pos-
sible to talk about spirituality without talking about religion, but it wasn’t
then. I would say similarly that I could not have arrived at transcendental real-
ism except via an immanent critique of transcendental idealism. Religion
hegemonises the concept of spirituality, so in order to see the possibility of a
non-religious secular spirituality you have to go via it.
MH: We must have an open mind about religious spirituality.
RB: Of course we must be tolerant of it. The cosmologists of such secularism have
in turn to account for the totality of human experience, and no doubt they will. 
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MH: In your previous work you had elaborated both dispositional realism and cat-
egorial realism without naming them as such; I personally have no quarrel
with them – I accept them as fundamental – only with some of the uses to
which you now put them. The issue I want to take up in regard to dispositional
realism concerns the soul, construed as a disposition or set of dispositions at
the level of the real, and reincarnation. The nub of your argument for reincar-
nation seems to be that on ubiquity determinism it is impossible to explain dif-
ferences in intellectual attainment (emergent intentional states) except on
the assumption that they stem (at least in part) from past lives – there are
insufficient causes and consequences in a person’s lifetime to explain such dif-
ferences. So we can account for Einstein’s genius and its impact, for example,
only by presupposing that he had a soul that both pre-existed and post-existed
his embodied personality, a soul that developed over a whole series of lives,
including lives after Einstein’s death. But surely there are strong rival explana-
tory hypotheses here (a fortuitous coming together of conditions to nurture a
genius, the resonance of ideas with the material conditions that made their
emergence possible), such that the deduction fails, or at any rate the matter
must remain an open question. I would want to argue that the dialectics of
learning processes do not necessarily presuppose any continuant other than
that of social relations and forms as established by the transformational model
of social activity. Does not your position actually land you, despite your overt
anti-dualism, in some kind of spirit/mat er dualism here (what Andrew
Collier has referred to as a Gnostic tendency in your work),14 and indeed, since
the soul constellationally contains the mind, mind-body dualism? In a subse-
quent book you suggest that if ‘the physical basis of our embodied being’ were
destroyed there is no reason to suppose that beings with minds and feelings
‘could not survive without that basis’.15 But this is just what the mainstream
critical realist reading of synchronic emergent powers materialism (SEPM)
denies; it is of course a possibility SEPM allows for, but only on pain of SEPM
reducing to ‘a species of dualistic interactionism’.16 What do you say to those
critical realists who, like Garry Potter, hold that espousal of reincarnation
damages or discredits critical realism?17
RB: This has a number of aspects. First, we are all familiar from contemporary
physics with the idea of action at a spatio-temporal distance. There need
therefore be no continuant between lives. L2 can resume the challenges of L1,
even if they are spatio-temporally discrete, and indeed, distant. Something
like this is close to a standard Buddhist view of reincarnation. Moreover, it is
implicit in the Christian idea of the resurrection of the body.
Second, the idea of the post-existence, as distinct from pre-existence, of
feelings and thoughts, does not seem to me to be too difficult. It is clearly
established (as a possibility) by SEPM, once the emergence of feelings and
thoughts is conceded. One could imagine the post-existence of these phe-
nomena, until perhaps they gradually fade away (without the urgency imposed
by the physical). This gives us the post-existence of feelings and thoughts, on
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the one hand, and the pre-existence of non-embodied possibilities, on the
other.
Third, what are these possibilities possibilities of? They may be conceived as
the possibilities of individual, concretely singularised psychic beings or as the
possibilities of larger or smaller entities. The idea of the pre-existence of non-
embodied possibilities as possibilities (powers and liabilities) of the species –
that is, of humanity as such – allows us to understand the Mahayana Buddhist
idea of dharmakaya as involving the taking up and discharge of the karma 
of others, in the first place by the enlightened or self-realised one, the
Bodhisattva, the one who has no karma of his/her own.
Fourth, what of the idea of the coming together of a fortuitous combination
of circumstances as a sufficient explanation of agency? What this leaves out is
precisely the subjective side of our agency, and in particular the contribution
of the ground-state. The response to a situation can be more or less evolved,
and more or less inspired, more or less released from the rebound of karma, the
residues and recoils of the heteronomously informed intentional causality of
the past; and the evolution of a psychic being, of a reincarnated one, may con-
sist in the process of the shedding of such heteronomies, and with it, progres-
sive liberation from the inherited causality of the past.
Together, considerations such as these allow us to sketch out some of the
components of a theory that would situate the possibility of reincarnation.
There is need for their further development, elaboration and integration,
which perhaps I will be able to undertake one day.
MH: I now want to ask you about categorial realism. From East to West develops
and sharpens up the view, based on your earlier work, that the categories are
real: both the social and the natural world are precategorised in the intransi-
tive dimension independently of any account of their categorisation in the
transitive dimension. If valid, categories are constitutive of reality; if invalid,
they miscategorise it and are in part constitutive of (social) reality, though
dependent on valid categories. This position is absolutely fundamental to your
critique of irrealism and your theory of the demi-real, hence to the dialectics
of self-realisation, but some critical realists have problems with it on the
grounds that categories are, they hold, essentially ideational or semiotic,
hence pertain exclusively to the epistemic order, except where, as in the case
of the social world, they are partly constitutive of being. This of course relates
to our earlier discussion of alethic truth. What is the way forward here?
RB: I want to make two points in response to this, first about categories in general,
then about alethic truth. If you have a conception of there being just one
world, then the categories refer to the most abstract generic features of this
world, for example, causality. From a generically realist standpoint, you either
have to say that causal laws are real, but there is no such thing as causality,
which does not make sense; or else you have to say that both the category of
causality and the category of a causal law apply to reality. You then have to say
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that the categories are constitutive of reality in exactly the same way as the ref-
erent of any other description, however abstract or concrete, is part of the
world. It is just that the categories are very abstract, that is, their referent is
constituted by vast swathes of being. So you are not required to defend 
categorial relativism. 
We can deepen this argument by referring to ontological and alethic truth
which, as we have seen, is reality tied to the possibility of human language and
practices. Once you can defend an ontological deployment of truth you can
understand that it applies even when you are operating at the expressive-
referential level of truth. At the expressive-referential level, where you just
have the world expressed in language, you can then make sense of the way in
which the truths of the world impose themselves on the projects of human
beings, rather than that human beings impose their truths on the world. The
neo-Nietzschean project of the neo-conservatives around George Bush to
produce an American century comes with claims that reality and facts are old-
fashioned and have been superseded, and furthermore, if you are strong
enough, if you are a Nietzschean superpower, you can invent any world you
want; so we have the idea that the American dream can be imposed on the rest
of the world. This presupposes the abolition of intransitivity. But of course it
does not abolish intransitivity in practice, and we can see that the truths
impose themselves – the truth in Iraq, the truth of Afghanistan, is imposing
itself, and so is the truth of global warming. This is a dramatic way of talking
about reality: from the point of view of our practices. It reinforces the case for
categorial realism, but without being essential to it. This is important when we
come on to the theory of the demi-real, because I want to say that categorial
error is there in our practices. The wage-form, for example, as Marx demon-
strated, embodies a huge category mistake, and that has disastrous effects, as
do illusions generally.
MH: Why do you think this is so strongly resisted by some critical realists? 
RB: All you need to get there is the idea that you cannot be a consistent critical
realist without being a categorial realist and it is absurd to regard causal laws as
real without regarding causality as real. The reason why critical realists
naively slip into the contrary way of thinking is because the western philo-
sophical tradition – well, especially from Kant, and including Popper in recent
times – has always regarded the categories as ways of classifying the world,
rather than being in the world itself. The same chain of argument would say
that Ohm’s law, for example, is a way of talking about the world and not in the
world itself. Some would say global warming is just a way of talking about the
world, so we do not have to worry or do anything about it; this is the line put
out about global warming.
MH: I asked you last time why you were saying round about the time of the publi-
cation of From East to West that you had been too hard on Hegel in Dialectic.
Ch 7.qxp  12/18/2009  1:20 PM  Page 159
160 The spiritual turn, 1994–2000
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
A re-reading of From East to West reminds me that you draw heavily on Hegel
in a range of positive ways in this work. It is Hegel’s demonstration of the diag-
nostic value of philosophy in relation to social problems (what you call 
his ‘platinum plate’) that gives you a clue to the fundamental malaise of 
master–slave-type social orders: the irrealist categorial structure of philosophy
(involving alienation from reality in thought) accurately reflects an irrealist
(false or inadequate) categorial structure of society (involving alienation from
reality in our social practices and in our selves, both inner and outer). It is
Hegel’s ‘golden nugget’ – the dialectics of co-presence – that then assists you
in thinking the reality of a true categorial structure underlying/underpinning
and occluded by the (emergent) irrealist ones, such that (necessary)
autonomous orders of determination are co-present with and sustain (unnec-
essary) heteronomous ones that occlude them – which leads straight on to the
theory of the demi-real and to a re-casting of the dialectic of freedom as a
dialectic of shedding or disemergence. And it is Hegelian dialectic as a learn-
ing process (the ‘rational kernel’) involving the absenting of absences (incom-
pletenesses) that informs the dialectic of desire for freedom (which now
transmutes into a dialectic of freedom from desire as constituted in the demi-
real), as well as the more contentious but phenomenologically interesting
account of the odyssey of a soul in the novella section. Even Hegel’s ‘mystical
shell’ – his ultimate ontological monovalence – plays a crucial role, nega-
tively, as the absence of the concept of absence that underpins irrealist cate-
gorial structures. And the overall structure of your dialectic as geo-historical
process is now clearly similar to Hegel’s (though of course it is not original to
him but has roots deep in the Judaeo-Christian tradition): from an original
undifferentiated unity to diremption followed by a return to a fuller, more
richly differentiated unity, in which diremption based on ignorance and error
is necessary for eventual enlightenment. You even speak of the drive to ‘com-
plete’ totalities,18 whereas previously you would perhaps have spoken of ‘more
complete’, such that one wonders whether you yourself are not closing geo-
history down in some sense in eudaimonia. What are your thoughts on all this
today? Does the notion, cardinal to your critique of modernity, that desire as
we experience it in the demi-real is itself a fundamental constraint on human
happiness in that it is a bad infinite, rooted in alienation, come from Hegel or
is it of more eastern provenance, or both?
RB: I think Hegel was very important – we stand on his shoulders – but as I indi-
cated last time I don’t really agree that I was too hard on him. What is impor-
tant to register is that the critique of Hegel – the critique of ontological
monovalence – stands in full in the spiritual turn. When you say that my posi-
tion ends up looking somewhat like Hegel’s because of a similar model of geo-
historical directionality, you have to bear in mind that some such model is
going to be there if you talk about alienation, because there is something
essential to yourself that is not now part of yourself. One of Hegel’s errors 
was to assume that he restored the self, the path of the self, in his dialectical
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idealism; but he did not, he transfigured reality without resolving the contra-
dictions within it. The position of From East to West, by contrast, is that the
overcoming of alienation is to be achieved by the praxis of universal self-
realisation, understood to embrace all four planes of social being. In relation
to desire, what it is important to see – and perhaps this book is not all that clear
on it – is that desire, like challenge or contradiction, is something that is fun-
damental to the world of duality as part of the structure of intentional action,
and what the vision here is trying to do is get rid of the dominance of desire and
greed in our life, the dominance of motifs from the world of duality in a dual-
istic form. So I am not saying that desire has to be abolished, but that it has to
be constellationally contained within emergent practices informed by and
oriented to unconditional love and universal self-realisation.
MH: I think one of the profoundest contributions of From East to West – but of
course it presupposes much else – is the theory of the demi-real as an emergent
level of reality comprising a web (maya) of ignorance (avidya), informed by
categorial error and illusion, underpinned by insecurity rooted in desire/fear or
attachment, and deriving ultimately from alienation from our true selves; a
level of reality that is ‘(1) irrealist in character (i.e. not realist); (2) demi-real in
truth-value (i.e. false), but (3) real in causal aefficacy (and hence being),
although dependently so’19 and that includes social practices such as the wage-
form and the illusion that we have egos; a level of reality that we accordingly
have to shed in order to be free or self-realised. Although it builds on the 
theory of the Tina syndrome, such that (as we have noted before) demi-
reality is Tina-reality generalised, many critical realists do not much like the
theory: they are uncomfortable with the alleged implication that we only
inhabit some sort of half-world, and they are also concerned that you might be
explaining the heteronomous structures that constrain us by philosophical
mistakes in the manner of historical idealism. Am I right in sourcing your use
of ‘demi’ here to the connotation it has in Hegel of ‘irrational existent’ as well
as to the more conventional meaning of ‘halved or curtailed’?20 And are you
being historically idealist here?
RB: We do live in a half-world. It is a world in which we have potentials that we
cannot fulfil. I plead guilty to that. We are living very fractured forms of a life
that we could live, and the world could, even now, be a world of plenty –
poverty could be abolished – but we live in the midst of poverty.
MH: There is a sense in which we do not just live in a half-world. You are not say-
ing we are completely cut off from the rest of reality.
RB: The demi-real world has as its condition of possibility relative reality and then
a stratum of absolute reality; that is what we are enjoined to become aware of
in the philosophy of meta-Reality. But in the world of the demi-real it is as if
we are seeing everything in a terrible smog, and the metaphor of a half-world,
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or for us a half-existence, accurately describes the situation. Once the smog
lifts – once we get rid of demi-reality – we will be able to see that the world is
actually far richer than we ever thought.
MH: What about ‘irrational existent’? Does it connect up with Hegel?
RB: In a way it does, and in a way it does not. I cannot really remember why I
thought of using the notion of ‘demi-’, I think I probably toyed with ‘semi-’. 
MH: You do comment on Hegel’s thematisation of ‘demi-’, including thinking of
women as ‘demi-’21; and leading on from that you dub the Hegelian present,
which is irrational because it is constellationally closed, the ‘demi-present’,
and deploy the concept of the ‘demi-actual’ to refer to that part of actuality
Hegel’s system cannot rationally explain.22
RB: Yes, that is right. This is the aporia of Krug’s pen. Krug said to Hegel, in effect,
‘You can explain the rational state, but can you explain my pen? If you cannot
explain my pen you are not so clever.’ So Hegel said that what he was trying to
do was to explain (to put it in my terms) the contours of actuality; and that the
way these contours pan themselves out, how they are inhabited, is not a ques-
tion for philosophy but for the empirical sciences. But I think that Hegel’s use
of ‘demi-’ is different from my use of ‘demi-’, which is more germane to talk
about a half-world. I am not saying that when we have a eudaimonistic society
we will be able to explain the position of pens or anything like that.
MH: Yet from a eudaimonian perspective, demi-reality as a whole is an irrational
existent.
RB: It is an irrational existent, but the bar is not set by some particular philosoph-
ical account; the bar is set by the nature of human being, its potentiality as we
know it.
MH: Along with creativity (transcendence) (2E), From East to West identifies free-
dom (1M), love (3L) and spontaneous right-action (4D) as basic human capac-
ities pertaining to our essential selves. It is the 4D concept that From East to
West introduces for the first time, although the related concept of unconditional
love is also new. As I think of it, spontaneous right-action is that sort of action
in which careful or mindful action consistent with our essential selves (to take
a very simple example, learning to ride a bicycle) passes over into carefree or
spontaneous action (just riding). How does the normative aspect enter in?
RB: Spontaneous right-action has to be seen in the context of a dialectic of learn-
ing. In our life we learn or acquire properties that we then manifest in a spon-
taneous way. When you learn French, for example, at first you have to think
about it a lot. As you become better at it you stop using rote sentences and
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learn to play with French for yourself, but it is still something you have to
think about. Then there comes a moment, typically when you are in France,
or talking with French-speaking people, when you can just do it sponta-
neously without having to think about it; it is now in-built into your essential
being. And that is how we learn to do anything. An important theme I take
up, particularly in the meta-Reality books, is the idea that mind, or rather
thought, gets in the way of right-action and that in general if you are placed in
a situation in which you have to do something courageous or noble, if you
think about whether to do it, rather than just doing it, you will often end up
giving yourself reasons for not doing it, rationalising inaction.
MH: This relates to your critique of the discursive intellect, which we will come on
to next time.
RB: Another theme is that basically we know what to do and what is right. Of
course, we could if necessary stop and think about it and argue the pros and
cons, but when we pass that stage we just do it. The capacity for spontaneous
right-action has become coiled into our being at the level of the transcenden-
tally real self or ground-state; we have actually built specific capacities into our
ground-states. That is why we just do it, and why you get people who are
heroes who say: ‘There is nothing special about what I did, I just did it – any-
one would do it.’ It is true that anyone could do it, but many people do not.
And that is either because the process of making the right-action a part of our
being such that it just flows has not been accomplished or because, although
we have it, we have allowed something to interfere with it. This is all part of
an attempt to begin to see the role of the transcendental qualities of human
beings, and to bring into full view the huge domain in which we do not do
things instrumentally or contractually – the domain of caring and uncondi-
tional love, reciprocity and solidarity, and creativity, in which we actually
embody some of the teachings of Christ and other great religious teachers, but
which is occluded and thwarted by the smog of the demi-real. 
MH: How does this relate to the problem of radical evil? It is possible to ‘just be’ a
fascist, spontaneously roaming around the streets and kicking people – 
RB: It is impossible. That is to say, I do not think it is possible to be living and to be
completely detached from your alethic self. This would be, for example, to be
without the capacity to be creative, or to be trustworthy. How could you, for
instance, use or understand language, without trusting that others would con-
tinue to use words in ways that you could rely on – or at least retaining the
hope or belief that this would or could once again be so? And you would be
relying on the spontaneous right-action of others.
MH: As I see it, the thesis of the primacy of self- or subject-referentiality, of self-
change, is grounded ultimately in the axiological commitment implicit in
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human praxis to universal autonomy or free flourishing already argued for in
Dialectic, which of course you now explicitly link to the transcendentally real
self. It states that only we can act on the world, no-one can do it for us (and we
must act – the axiological imperative – such that ‘the action I perform is mine,
not yours’), and all social change is also self-change. We have been over this
ground in an interview a few years ago.23 Can you say again why this concep-
tion is not individualist and voluntarist?
RB: The most important thing to realise is that there is no way of acting on the
world immediately except through your own action. There is no way of doing
something without you doing something. The re-orientation of spirituality
and our received notion of it that From East to West and the meta-Reality
books are trying to effect is one in which we are continually engaged in the
world. But as spiritual beings we do not act as isolated individuals, we act 
to abolish inequities, master–slave relations and so on, to abolish injustice 
and oppression wherever we see it, so that we are continually extending the
scope of the expression of the ground-state quality of unconditional love, 
for example. We engage with others in concrete utopian exercises, in think-
ing creatively about how we can use resources such that they are more fulfill-
ing to us. The stress on self-referentiality makes a virtue of the necessary and,
one is tempted to add, the obvious – but unfortunately it is not so obvious.
Once you realise that you have to do something to do anything at all then you
might pay some attention to the you, the agent, because you will better do
things in the world the clearer you are, and clarity presupposes that you are not
split. If you have a project in life that is inconsistent with your ground-state,
you are going to be split because you cannot get rid of your dharma which, if
you like, is trying to tell you what you should do in your life. If you are not in
your dharma you will be split, and in the case of the great majority of people
the world itself splits them because it removes them from the possibility of
their dharma. 
Of course, this only becomes a real contradiction or a problem if in some
sense you have a choice as to what to do. It is within a framework of choice
that western philosophy and morality always situates the problem. If you have
a choice, the answer is that you must choose your self-realisation or a project
that entails it. If you do not have a choice, you are just going to be staying
alive, and one of the things about physical corporeality that is important to
note is that we cannot get away from the idea of staying alive; this is something
that just in virtue of being a human being we want to do, to preserve ourselves.
I do not think we can get rid of that, but in any case it is tautologically obvious
that if you have to struggle to stay alive physically then that is going to be the
supreme objective in your life. And my claim is that we can all have survival
easily, even today if there were more social justice, and then the predicament
of only the few in the West would be generalised and there would be a notional
choice for everyone as to what to do in their life. And where you have that
choice then you should always orient it to make yourself a better agent. If you
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think of self-realisation as making yourself a better agent for performing acts
in the social world, then it does not have the individualistic and narcissistic
connotations that are sometimes read into it.
MH: In forming the view that it is individualist and voluntarist, people I think
overlook that transcendental dialectical critical realism, like meta-Reality,
presupposes the whole of the rest of the system and the emphasis you place
there on collective transformative praxis and struggle. It is just that you are
focusing on this area that has been neglected.
RB: Absolutely. It had been taken for granted, presumed. But of course, what we
saw in the case of actually existing socialism is that we cannot presume it, we
have to engage in conscious practices of self-change. 
MH: One notes in From East to West an increased urgency in your warnings of the
possibility of ecological catastrophe, which you had begun issuing far ahead of
most other commentators. A leading environmentalist has recently power-
fully articulated the view that, if we are to avert catastrophe, we must abandon
‘growth fetishism’ and consumerism but that this would involve a well-nigh
impossible ‘psychological transition’. Profligate consumption defines who we
are, it is profoundly embedded in ‘manufactured selves that we fear relin-
quishing . . . more than we fear the consequences of climate change’.24 Is this a
line of thought that underlies, at least in part, the emphasis on the primacy of
self-referentiality? Does it mean that we all have to get into, inter alia, turning
off our electrical appliances, taking fewer plane trips, and so on, in order to
save the planet?
RB: Yes. But that alone will not save the planet, we have to act on the other planes.
In particular, it requires a profound change in social structure as well, such that
we have a simpler form of society in one respect yet also a richer, deeper and
more complex one in other respects. But we can go into that when we discuss
meta-Reality.
MH: Yes, I want to ask you next time about the relation of meta-Reality to 
deep ecology. An Indian friend of mine recounts having had a copy of 
From East to West lying about in her home in Mumbai and one of her 
Indian guests came across it and asked, ‘Why are you reading this Brahminical
nonsense?’ She explained that the red rose is a Brahmin symbol. Is there 
any connection with the rose on the cover of From East to West and
Brahminism?
RB: No. I did not know that. No such connection was intended; and I was not
aware of any such symbolism – certainly, if it exists, it is not very well known.
However, the thrust of the observation is anti-Brahminism, because the 
big conflict in Indian religion and philosophy was between the Brahmins, 
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who were the priests and the highest caste, and by and large upholders of the
status quo and, if you like, the sadhus, the seekers or sages and travelling teach-
ers, who emphasised self-realisation for everyone through their own practices.
Although I have a Brahmin background on my father’s side, I have always
been on the side of the sadhus or seekers.
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8 The philosophy of 
unity-in-difference
Meta-Reality (2000–2002)
MH: You started calling yourself Ram Roy Bhaskar again at about the time the
meta-Reality books came out. This suggests that you were feeling a new level
of being at home with the Indian side of yourself. We talked about this last
time in the context of the experience of 1994, but can you bring us up to date
in the context of meta-Reality? The discourse of the philosophy of meta-
Reality is of course congruent in important respects with eastern philosophy,
and you seem to have been immediately at home in it. Re-visiting it, it struck
me as an extraordinary efflatus on a par with the creative multiplication of
concepts in Dialectic (and at least as difficult to get on top of!). Yet it is almost
as though you had always been in that element.
RB: I think there are three aspects to this question. The first concerns the whole
issue of secularism. In 1999 I went to India for the first time in a long while,
and as a philosopher – the trip had been set up for me as a philosopher. During
the period I wrote From East to West and the meta-Reality books I made five or
six trips to India. I was there lecturing and doing workshops in all the major
cities and regions for about a third of the time, perhaps even more. So I was
spending time in India again, and it was brought home very clearly to me that
there was a problem in talking about God. I probably would have experienced
this anyway in the West, but the problem was not so much hostility to, as a
lack of any level of intellectual seriousness about, talking about God. It was
clear that my audience had very different conceptions of God, and most of
these were exclusive. They wanted to know, for example, was my God the
same as their God, in which case was he Allah, or was he Brahman or some
other Indian god? And so on. Most people in my audiences interpreted God in
an exclusive way, in the sense that my God cannot possibly be the same as your
God. So in order to talk about the absolute I had to move to a more mutual or
secular way of talking about it. Of course, this was something I was very happy
to do because, although the focus in From East to West had been very much on
God or the absolute as a presupposition of all religious practices (including, I
might add, Indigenous religious practices, although I did not explicitly discuss
them), it was also clear to me at the time of writing that what I was talking
about was in fact a presupposition of all emancipatory practices. I remember,
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when I drew up a prospectus for some lectures I was invited to give at
Rabindranath Tagore university in Kolkata on comparative religion and spir-
ituality, called the Radhakrishnan lectures in honour of the erstwhile
President of India, I was very explicit that all forms of materialism and atheism
are on a par with religion in so far as they posit, explicitly or implicitly, some
sort of absolute. By the time From East to West was published I was very inter-
ested to see how the conceptions of transcendental dialectical critical realism,
which were to become sharpened into those of meta-Reality, functioned not
just as presuppositions of emancipatory projects but of ordinary life. As I indi-
cated last time, this was for me a stunning revelation. At the same time I
wanted to preserve the critical realist orientation to science, and it seemed to
me that to cast everything in a secular way would make it easier to look at the
implications of science, including fundamental physics, for spirituality. There
was no intention of course to collapse philosophy at this level to science, but
by not talking about God one preserved that opening. God became the cosmic
envelope and, as the god within, the ground-state. What I wanted to do was to
make spirituality compatible with secularism. 
MH: You do still talk about god with a small ‘g’. It will perhaps be perceived as not
such a big change really.
RB: While I was in India – the question is about the Indian side of my identity –
there were very bad riots of a sort that had not been seen since 1947. Muslims
in Gujrat, in Gandhi’s home state, were killed, and there was a widespread
sense of a tinderbox waiting to explode. The whole question of secularisation
was very prominent, and it was brought home to me that secularity is an
important principle to uphold. So that was one kind of effect that the Indian
trips had on me. 
In the second place, it struck me that Hinduism, Buddhism and other reli-
gions within the Indian context had a long and distinguished pedigree that
was certainly as good as the pedigree of western Christianity. The six schools
of Indian philosophy – an extraordinarily complex structure – stretch back
several thousand years to the time of the classical Greeks. Arguably the kind
of developments in Indian philosophy at that time were superior to those of
the Greeks. There were also remarkable parallels, and I do not think you can
say that Indian philosophy owed much to the Greeks, although you cannot
rule out the possibility of various borrowings, and direct or indirect influences.
But here I was on a terrain where Indian philosophy was at least as good as
Anglo-Saxon or European philosophy, and that of course made it easier for me
to acknowledge openly as it were the Indian side of my identity. In fact, I
became a kind of ambassador for Indian philosophy. I found myself in a diffi-
cult situation with Indian intellectuals on those lecture trips because most
really did not want to talk about Indian philosophy in any way and indeed
some of them were very ignorant of it; and I thought it part of my duty to call
their attention to the great heritage they were in denial of. 
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In the third place, the Indian trips started me thinking and writing system-
atically about the philosophical discourse of modernity. A number of people
had asked me to talk on modernity and modernisation; and globalisation,
which was seen as inevitable to India’s modernisation, was a hot intellectual
topic. Although I confined my written reflections at the time to western
modernity, I also started to think about situating and critiquing the philo-
sophical discourse of European modernity, including critical realism, within
the context of other possible modernities. This involves going back roughly to
1000 BCE and what Max Weber and others have called the axial age and the
axial revolution. Somewhere between 1000 and 500 BCE a multi-faceted rev-
olution seems to have occurred in various different parts of the world simulta-
neously. First, there was sufficient surplus there to allow a class of intellectuals
enough leisure-time for philosophical reflection. A certain amount of leisure-
time is clearly necessary for a tradition of intellectual reflection to be set in
train. Of course, it was unequal, as it is in our society. If the necessary work
were more equitably distributed we would now be in an era of universal or gen-
eralised leisure-time, such that everyone could be an intellectual and indeed
an organic intellectual. But at least there was a stratum of intellectuals.
Second, there was a switch in the relation between the towns and the coun-
tryside, with the countryside basically feeding the towns. Relatedly, you had
the development of the early empires and standing armies, and of money in
the form of coin to pay for these. Hand in hand with this went a growing cos-
mopolitanism that fed into intellectual discussion, when the following kind of
question started to be asked: given the past practices in our community, and
given the practices of other peoples and cities we know about, what should 
we do, and how are we to justify it? So we have the beginnings of a sustained
reflexivity associated in Greece with Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and the like;
in China with Lao-Tse and Confucius; in India with Buddha; and so on. 
What I would like to do is to situate western modernity within a longer 
and wider geo-history, a longer and wider profile or rhythmic of axiality. This
leaves of course the question of all those peoples and societies – commonly
known today as Indigenous peoples or First Nations – that did not experience
an axial revolution or its effects, and did not develop a written culture or a
characteristic philosophical mode of enquiry. We need to do much more
research on that. We have the modern societies, the axial societies and 
then the Indigenous societies. I think in many ways the Indigenous societies
were just as sophisticated, but they had a different form of sophistication if 
you like.
MH: So India acts as a stimulus to your bringing systematically together all the
strands of the critique of the philosophical discourse of modernity you had
been developing from the outset of your career. But it also brings you to see
things you had not seen before. You now see the need to put it in a much big-
ger picture.
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RB: It would be nice to do that. To bring this home, there are passages in Dialectic
where I talk about the co-presence of different times and levels of develop-
ment. You cannot go to any Indian city without immediately noticing this.
Modern cars are co-present with buffaloes, elephants, and cows strolling
across the road, and twenty-first century joggers à la Jane Fonda weave in and
out of processions enacting ancient rituals. This was a stimulus to reflection on
modernity, and modernity is up front in the meta-Reality books.
MH: I understand there was an unfortunate sequel to the experience of 1994, in
that you fell in with people whose company turned out to have problematic
consequences for you in some respects. Can you tell us something about this?
I take it that you trusted certain people only to discover that your trust was rad-
ically misplaced?
RB: I have already indicated how, during the experientially investigative phase of
the spiritual turn from 1994 to 2000, I adopted a certain standpoint of inno-
cence, and I have related this to the practice of immanent critique. With the
benefit of hindsight I can see that, in entering into circles where the kind of
topics I was interested in were accepted as a matter of course, I practised a
degree of suspension of my critical faculties that I subsequently came to regret.
Some suspension is absolutely indispensable for such a project, but my sus-
pension was definitely too all encompassing. This led me to depart from a prin-
ciple of balance and discrimination that I believe should guide us. It was very
much part of an attempt to embrace something fully. 
Now in revindicating ontology in A Realist Theory of Science I had wanted
to keep my distance from the past history of ontology, the baggage of ontology,
and so invented the neologisms transitive dimension and intransitive dimen-
sion. Similarly, what meta-Reality did was belatedly provide the neologistic
structure in terms of which I could talk about issues that had been talked about
in terms of God, the soul, spirit and so on. Before that, in trying to normalise
or regularise discourse about God, I was at the sort of epistemic half-way house
we talked about in Chapter 7, corresponding to the σ (sigma), as distinct from
the τ (tau), transform in the epistemological dialectic from dialectical critical
realism to the philosophy of meta-Reality, en route to my final or settled posi-
tion, which is very much as meta-Reality sketches it out. In From East to West
I talked enthusiastically about God, and all the experiences that I had and that
I have had throughout my life are there as authentic experiences. I made no
attempt to deny them or other people’s religious experiences, rather I
embraced them and said in effect: ‘Here is a framework where we can put expe-
riences from different religious paradigms together.’ If you go into a new
domain a certain degree of trust is absolutely necessary. But as you say some
trust was misplaced. I would recommend to anyone going into a new area that
they think of the area as a room: take your critical faculties into the room, and
whilst you are listening to everyone switch them off, but have them there with
you – don’t leave them outside the door.
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MH: In practical terms it had severe effects on your trajectory in the sense that,
since it left you impoverished financially, you had to return to the concrete 
via employment opportunities that presented themselves in Scandinavia. So
paradoxically it ended up inhibiting the elaboration of meta-Reality in the
sense that you could not devote much energy to it, and a number of books you
announced never saw the light of day.1
RB: Absolutely. But it could also be said that the turn to the concrete was anyway
necessary. 
MH: Yes, we’ll talk about that turn next time. 
RB: I would of course still love to do those books, but probably in another 
form.
MH: We have discussed the genealogy of the idea of meta-Reality to a considerable
extent in previous interviews: how it was anticipated by various themes from
A Realist Theory of Science on – the thematisation of depth-stratification, of
both a relative and an absolute moment of transcendence in science as indis-
pensable to discovery, of the co-presence of the false with good scientific prac-
tice and of false with true categorisations of reality, of ultimata for science, and
so on; the role of the experience of 1994; and the arguments concerning the
spiritual presuppositions of emancipatory projects entraining transcendental
dialectical critical realism. Pursuing this line further, can you elaborate a little
how the philosophy of meta-Reality differs from transcendental dialectical
critical realism and why it was developmentally necessary? In our last inter-
view you indicated agreement with Seo MinGyu that transcendental dialecti-
cal critical realism is a mediating stage between dialectical critical realism and
the philosophy of meta-Reality in the development of your thought rather
than an independent stage in its own right,2 and you’ve just referred to it as an
epistemic half-way house. On this interpretation, and if the theory of explana-
tory critique is seen as transitional to dialectic,3 the development of your sys-
tem falls into three main stages: (basic or first-level or -wave) critical realism
(transcendental realism, critical naturalism, explanatory critique); dialectical
critical realism (including transcendental dialectical critical realism); and the
philosophy of meta-Reality. Were you aware at the time of elaborating the
new philosophy that the turn to spirituality and non-duality was part of a
wider movement on roughly similar lines on an international scale and ori-
ented, like yours, to ‘articulating ways of transforming our transformative
praxis in the world’4 – it was ‘in the air’ such that today notions such as ‘spiri-
tual internationalism’, ‘progressive-rational spirituality for global society’ and
‘reconnecting transcendence with a militant materialism’ are starting to
become buzz words?5 Would you agree that the movement from non-identity
to identity was necessary for the ‘completion’ of your system, and in particular
for carrying through its anti-anthropic intent?6
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RB: I think the fundamental difference between transcendental dialectical critical
realism and meta-Reality is the one I have already indicated: in meta-Reality
spirituality was now seen as something that is a presupposition not just of reli-
gious or more generally emancipatory practices, but of everyday life. Thus I
now saw the kind of reciprocity you have in, say, the golden rule as a presup-
position of all commercial transactions and indeed everything we do. I saw the
solidarity involved in ordinary care as having a direct analogue in the solidar-
ity expressed immediately in ordinary understanding, which is an empathic
putting yourself in the place of the other; we all do this easily and automati-
cally. The transcendental identity and identification that is so difficult in
meditation and prayer is very easy and routine when we are reading a newspa-
per or watching television: if we are not in transcendental identification with
what we are reading or watching, we have to go back a step or two. I saw that
the kind of unconditional love and solidarity involved in parenting a child is
present in every workplace in which we spontaneously attend to the ills of our
colleagues and spontaneously work together. All of this suggested a level of
praxis that is hidden, a hidden substratum to social life. There is an esoteric
sociology in everyday life, the sort of things we do routinely and uncondition-
ally but which do not count. 
MH: Not hidden so much as just not noticed.
RB: Unrecognised. The extraordinary thing about this is that in this realm we are
very creative, spontaneously and unconditionally loving, with many of the
attributes of a good society, the sort of society in which the free development
of each is the condition of the free development of all. Certainly there is not
an ego. There is no sense in these spontaneous roles and acts of privileging
your own health or wealth or well-being at the expense of the person you are
solidarising with. This is a wonderful realm of possibility which philosophy
and the social sciences have not taken account of. This sphere has qualities
that are in many cases directly opposite to what it underpins. Acts of exploita-
tion and greed are actually underpinned by and presuppose unselfish and
spontaneous trust and altruism. The horror of war presupposes all the peaceful
acts necessary to keep it going. What it seemed to me we needed to do was to
recognise and empower this unrecognised world, in some cases hidden, in
some cases just unrecognised; and liberate it by getting rid of the oppressive
superstructures. 
So what we have here is a very general pattern or logic of emancipatory dis-
course pertaining to all emancipatory projects which can, for instance, be
exactly exemplified in the structure of Marx’s critique of capitalism and more
generally in his dialectic of the productive powers of the species and social
relations of production. There is an essential level, then another level emer-
gent on it, which is useful for the development and flourishing of the basic or
essential level up to a point, after which the secondary or superstructural level
acts so as to constrain the development of the primary level, or at least its 
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negative outweighs its positive effect. The point then becomes to disengage or
dis-emerge the emergent level; to shed it, releasing the powers and the poten-
tiality of the hidden or unrecognised, but essential, realm. One consequence
of this of course is that at the essential level, the level of creative praxis, eudai-
monistic society is already here as a capacity which is exercised and partially
actualised. We do not actually have to transform human nature radically. All
we have to do is recognise the eudaimonian person inside us, the elements of
non-egoistic action that are always there, and necessarily there, in every
human being, and shed the rest on all four planes of social being. This means
that utopia, concretely understood, is not so far off, in fact it is here; the actual
finished state is relatively far off because it involves the shedding of all those
heteronomous orders of determination. 
MH: Which of course entails an enormous amount of hard work and struggle.
RB: Yes, but at least the programme starts here. So what I was doing in meta-
Reality was uncovering the most basic ground for the emancipatory projects I
had been talking about since my earliest writings. 
MH: Andrew Collier has criticised this theory of shedding as ‘the nutcracker
model of human liberation’, involving the view that ‘there is a good and free
being fully formed inside each evil and enslaved one, just waiting to get out’.7
Do you want to comment on that?
RB: Shedding is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for emancipation. A
transformative moment is involved along with the shedding. This specifies
the transformation of capacities into capabilities, or of abstract powers into
concrete ones. Of course, for their effective exercise and realisation there must
also be the satisfaction of a whole host of social, and arguably natural, condi-
tions. Their satisfaction too requires in general a labour of transformation.
However, it is important to hold on to the point that what is released after the
shedding are the powers of human beings, possibilities of the ground-state
which, as such, were possessed all along. These powers, as capacities, are grad-
ually and arduously unfolded, as capabilities, into the actuality of the embod-
ied personality. 
MH: Did you feel that what you were doing was part of an incipient wider move-
ment?
RB: The honest answer is not really. Of course, I knew that Derrida had in his last
years started talking about God, but I could not see anything very interesting
there – he started talking about Marx at the same time – and I knew that
Habermas had as well, and so on, but I wasn’t really aware that I was part of a
wider movement. I was of course aware that there were people such as Rabbi
Lerner, and it was obvious to me that there would be connections between a
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radical left politics and some form of spirituality but I did not feel part of a
wider movement. 
The final question here is about the movement from non-identity to iden-
tity being necessary for the completion of my system. I agree with that. Unless
I had achieved identity the result would have been aporetic. But it is very
important to remember, first, that the identity is nothing like the identity of
subject–object identity theory or identity-thinking. Rather, it is the sort of
identity that is involved in transcendental identification in consciousness,
which actually preserves the non-identity of the elements that are in tran-
scendental unity or identification. Second, that the identities we are talking
about here are not atomistic or punctual, they are rich, differentiated and
developing. Think about standing or sitting in front of a beautiful picture in
an art gallery and being lost in appreciation of it. The deeper your apprecia-
tion, the more you will notice all the specificities. You do not just sit there in
a passive, inert way. Your involvement is active, your consciousness is a rich,
developing and differentiating one. Or take a Shakespearean play. Every time
you read it or go to see it you might find that your understanding of it develops. 
I should also say something about my alleged anti-anthropic intent.
Although anti-anthropism is a theme in all my work, it was not part of my
intent: it was a result or a consequence of what I did. When I was writing A
Realist Theory of Science I did not think, ‘I must think of a way to dethrone
human beings’, and similarly when I arrived at the formulations of meta-
Reality I did not think, ‘This will put man in his place.’
MH: So it just names a result of your enquiries and we can see only in retrospect
that it issues in a really consistent and unifying theme in your system overall?
RB: Yes. And it is certainly a good hermeneutic exercise to trace it.
MH: On a more specific genealogical point, Philip Tew claims to have originated
the concept of ‘meta-realism’ in discussion with you and others at the first
IACR conference at Essex in 1997.8 Is that how you see it – that is, Tew came
up with the idea and you ran with it – or were you already thinking along those
lines?
RB: I hope this involves no disrespect, but I am afraid that I don’t have any recol-
lection of that conversation or of the persons involved. It is interesting, but I
do not think that can possibly have been the case; it cannot even have been
that I unconsciously did it, because I hit upon the idea of meta-Reality very
late, towards the end of 2001 or even early 2002. Otherwise it would have
found its way into From East to West. When I coined it I wanted a way of
describing the new development other than as a form of critical realism; my
concern, at any rate initially, was to avoid embarrassing and causing conster-
nation among other critical realists. I thought, well, let’s call the whole pre-
existing system critical realism and see that as a jumping off point for what I
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am saying now. I actually see it as continuous with what I have said in the past,
but I cannot assume that other people will, and that is why I wanted a differ-
ent name for it. 
MH: So the actual concept arrives late, but presumably you had been thinking
along these lines earlier, at least in general terms. The basic idea is implicit in,
for example, David Bohm’s distinction between the implicate or enfolded and
the explicated or unfolded order,9 and of course the perception of an underly-
ing non-dual order, though not expressed in exactly those terms, is common
in literature and art, not to say in philosophy outside of the tradition of irreal-
ism, and in religion.
RB: I would definitely say Bohm was an influence, in the sense that I read him.
And an ally. I would put the actual coining of the concept of meta-Reality on
a par with the coining of the concept of transcendental realism. I arrived at the
distinctions between the transitive and the intransitive dimensions and the
domains of the real, the actual and the empirical long before the concept of
transcendental realism, even though I had been consciously using transcen-
dental arguments and reading everything I could lay my hands on by and
about Kant. The concept of transcendental ealism does not actually come
into what I wrote before A Realist Theory of Science. Then it occurred to me
that I needed a name for it. 
MH: Why did you give the ‘Reality’ in ‘meta-Reality’ a capital R?
RB: It is partly stylistic. I prefer ‘meta-Reality’, but I am tolerant about ‘meta-
reality’ and, in some cases (e.g. titles), Meta-Reality. When it is not a title, I
think that meta-Reality signifies that we are talking about a level, aspect or
component of reality, that is, it is qualifying the kind of reality that is being
referred to or discussed, so that the ‘Reality’ in ‘meta-Reality’ functions as, in
effect, a proper noun.
MH: Minimally stated, the philosophy of meta-Reality holds that the dualistic
world we inhabit, as best described by (dialectical) critical realism, is ulti-
mately sustained and powered by non-duality as the ground or ground-state of
being, as the mode of constitution (reproduction/transformation) of everyday
life via transcendence, and as the fine structure or deep interior of beings.
These modes of non-duality correspond to 1M–3L in the MELD schema, and
by extension (from 2E) 4D – so non-duality underpins the whole of being as
understood by critical realism (relative reality or the world of becoming), and
the whole point of the new philosophy is ‘to re-ground the relative in the
absolute, . . . re-connect and re-unite our embodied personalities with our
ground-states from which, so to speak, they have cut loose’.10 We arrive at the
eudaimonistic society by shedding heteronomous orders of determination 
and becoming who we already essentially are. How are these propositions
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established? You address the issue of justification globally at a number of
places, and it is of course vital to be clear about what the main lines are. As I
see it the argumentation, like that for the priority of absence in Dialectic, is
multi-pronged and complex, certainly nothing like the ‘short, quick’ tran-
scendental arguments Alex Callinicos claims you are prone to make do with
already in Dialectic.11 You yourself summarise them in terms either of how they
relate to the two stadia of meta-Reality, enchantment (6R) and non-duality
(7A/Z)12 or of the main themes of meta-Reality as a whole.13 To take the lat-
ter approach, you suggest that the argumentation comprises (1) objective and
(2) subjective considerations and (3) the unity of these in an argument that
meta-Reality is a necessary condition for any being at all. (1) shows, by imma-
nent critique and extension (by transcendental argument) of critical realism,
that the world of non-identity or duality and dualism studied by critical real-
ism is unilaterally dependent on (has as its condition of possibility) a world of
identity or non-duality and that critical realism’s own emancipatory project,
along with all other such projects, secular and spiritual, presupposes such a
world together with the possibility of shedding the dualistic master–slave
social order that is dependent on it. (2) By subjective, I take it you mean (tran-
scendental) arguments taking as their premise aspects of human intentional-
ity, in particular successful action and fulfilled intentionality. (3) needs no
further comment here, other than to mention the fundamental point estab-
lishing the ontological, epistemological and logical priority of non-duality
over duality: interrelation or interconnection ‘always presupposes some prior
or encompassing identity or identification, otherwise there would be no
grounds for declaring the non-identical elements distinct’; dualistic under-
standings of being always involve mis-identification and truth is most basi-
cally the revelation of identity.14 The fundamental procedure overall is the
transcendental analysis familiar from your earlier work, including metacri-
tique of the philosophical discourse of modernity, supplemented by phenom-
enological analysis, reductios and so on. And the arguments map on to each
other or are cumulative, such that, for example, the cycle of the human cre-
ative process thematised under (2) mirrors that of the cycle of the cosmic cre-
ative process articulated under (3). 
RB: What you say about the objective considerations is fine, I agree with that. But
the subjective considerations don’t really involve transcendental arguments;
rather, they suggest a very practical route to meta-Reality. I think the best way
of articulating the objective considerations is in terms of the three main ways
in which non-duality underpins the dual world we inhabit, which I summarise
in the Preface to From Science to Emancipation: as mode of its constitution; as
its basis or ground; and as its fine structure or deep interior. Mode of constitu-
tion refers to the sense in which the non-dual is a necessary condition for the
reproduction and transformation of any social form, for all social action and
life. Without transcendental agency you do not have agency at all. The argu-
ment is along the lines that, unless you could act in a non-dual way, unless
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transcendental agency is real, you could not perform any act at all: if you
always thought about how to do what you were going to do, you would never
get round to doing it. The transcendental self is established in the same sort of
way. It doesn’t matter how fractured or split you are, you still have a sense of
yourself being fractured or split, so you still have a sense of yourself as a tran-
scendentally real being. Similarly with transcendental identification in con-
sciousness: we could not have a conversation with our worst enemy unless we
could understand what they are saying; it would not be a conversation. The
second objective consideration is that meta-Reality underpins duality as its
ground or basis. You could not do anything at all without possessing the prim-
itive qualities of the ground-state.
MH: Am I right in assuming that, while it is your term of art, the concept of the
ground-state derives from quantum field theory, where I understand it refers to
the quantum state with the lowest possible energy (the vacuum state)?
RB: The ground-state is the state that is present in all other states, the state that all
other states presuppose. It is something like an absolute zero of consciousness,
or as you say, the vacuum state of quantum field theory. As present in the con-
crete actions of the embodied personality, the more heteronomous that per-
sonality is, the more noise or interference its causality will suffer and,
consequently, the more mediated its aefficacy will be. However, its aefficacy
and our energy will be at a maximum, not a minimum, when there is no such
interference. Basic will, creativity and unconditional love and the capacity for
spontaneous right-action, these all provide an essential basis for the world of
relative and demi-reality. A meta-Real dimension is thus the essential but
unrecognised or hidden substratum of all other aspects of social life, as peace is
essential for war. Then the third objective consideration is that everything
has a deep interior. This does not really involve transcendental argument and
immanent critique, but rather phenomenological experience. The argument
is basically that if you go into anything sufficiently deeply you will find quali-
ties that can only be described in terms of the void or the Buddha-nature, a
level of pure bliss or some other property such as that. If I am trying to under-
stand someone else, on the one hand I have to go into their deep interior at the
level of the ground-state, and on the other my reception will be best when I am
in my own ground-state; so you have a ground-state in unity with another
ground-state. This could be a paradigm or model of what you want to achieve
in a peace negotiation, because everyone wants to negotiate with their enemy
when their enemy is at their most just and merciful. This would be the stan-
dard or norm, but of course it is also the standard or norm for all the other kinds
of human action, including our own parenting of ourselves. And it provides a
paradigm of a good social structure: one that does not embody structural sin,
that does not prevent us from being consistent with our ground-state or medi-
ate or obscure it. It is just like the basic concept of reality – you cannot get
away from it; or like the concept of a causal law as a structure or operation of a
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mechanism that is pulling you to the ground. There is no way you can get
around, or get out of, or bypass the level of meta-Reality. 
The subjective considerations are practical arguments. The basis of these is
that unless someone is at one with their ground-state their intentionality is
going to be split, because their intentionality is always going to be at least
partly directed by or coming from the ground-state. They are going to be
unhappy in some way. 
MH: But the argument presupposes the reality of the ground-state.
RB: That’s right, it’s a practical argument. It is not a transcendental argument, it is
an ad hominem argument that says, ‘Look, just try it in practice, and see for
yourself. You will be split.’ This has a resonance with the sort of thing Buddha
was saying: if you are a human being at least set yourself an objective you can
achieve, and what you can achieve is realisation or enlightenment, as he put
it. If you do not achieve that, you cannot satisfactorily achieve all these other
things you want to achieve; in popular parlance that would be because there is
a bit of you that is unhappy with them in so far as they conflict with your
ground-state, because you won’t be satisfying the urgings of your ground-state.
If you are not at all in touch with your higher self – whether or not you believe
you have a higher self is not really relevant – this argument will not impress
you, but your higher self will still have some, however remote, aefficacy on the
totality of what you do. So this subjective argument is practical, it concerns
what you might do in practice; it ties in with what I have said about being
being as not just a question of thinking, you actually have to do. 
Then the third line of argument is the unity of the objective and subjective
considerations, in which you might come to see the sort of cosmological,
including social, considerations born from the objective arguments as in reso-
nance with the structure of your own action and the necessary structure in
your action. 
MH: In his critical assessment of meta-Reality, Jamie Morgan15 focuses on the
objective considerations, and within that the experience of transcendental
identification in consciousness, agency and teamwork, which he regards as
‘the basis from which the system is constructed’ (somewhat confusingly dub-
bing it ‘the Archimedean point’).16 He argues that the inference to non-
duality is only one of a number of plausible interpretations, and in particular
that it might equally be the case that (1), as neuroscience suggests, ‘material
changes to the structure of the brain . . . emerge synchronically with the ability
described’,17 conferring powers of simulation and imagination: for example,
the emergent power of propriaception could explain our sense that we are 
part of our own frame of perceptual reference,18 which you use as part of your
overall argument for meta-Reality; and (2) the special sense of connectivity
experienced in prayer, meditation, and so on could be a mistake or mis-
identification (a possibility you yourself take on board19). Assuming that one
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accepts this, how would it affect the overall case for meta-Reality? Do you
agree that there needs to be serious engagement with neuroscience on the
issue?
RB: ‘Material changes to the structure of the brain . . . emerge synchronically with
the ability described’: that is right, the material structure of the brain confers
a power; whether we exercise it or not is up to us. I would not deny that for
everything we can do in the world as we know it there is a material basis. And
of course we need science that takes into account all these other phenomena.
In terms of engaging with neuroscience: yes, there would be something wrong
if neuroscience came out with a finding that disproves or discredits this.
MH: If neuroscience were to find that there is no conceivable way that transcen-
dental identification occurs – 
RB: The question is does it occur or not? If it occurs without a conceivable basis, I
am afraid empirically I would have to take its occurrence as real, and I hope
that neuroscience would take on board that the phenomena we are talking
about are real. Whether the philosophical apparatus I construct for it is a good
way of situating it or not, there is a real level of phenomena that I am talking
about and we can talk about, under the rubric of transcendental agency or not.
If neuroscience comes along and says it does not believe in these phenomena
then it is not really being scientific. But supposing that what neuroscience
shows is that these phenomena are not what they appear to be, then that is
perfectly possible: it is perfectly possible that this could be a level of illusion.
However, what you would have to do to justify that position would be to show
how in that case agency is possible, or understanding, or team-work or all the
practical instances of it that Freud and especially Jung, pointed to – in, for
instance, what Jung called synchronicity – all of which are very common and
widespread in ordinary life. Neuroscience would have to situate the possibility
of agency without an element of non-duality; it would have to explain how
despite the absence of that element action was still possible. It is perfectly con-
ceivable that it should do so, but that is what it would have to do, and it is very
difficult to imagine it actually doing it. It is not very plausible as an exhaustive
approach to this domain of phenomena because, when the neuroscientist had
actually achieved some sort of explanatory reduction of the field and been
awarded a Nobel prize, the whole domain of intentionalistic phenomena that
has its own level of reality, its own emergent powers, would still be there as the
level at which we operate, at which our social life and our language operates.
Unless the reduction were to miraculously transform human beings such that
they no longer took pleasure in a challenge successfully met or a struggle won,
it would be a very hollow victory: it would not be a victory, it would not have
done justice to the phenomena. 
Having said that, everything that meta-Reality says should ultimately be
compatible with the findings of neuroscience and any other kind of science,
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and of course neuroscience is very important here in investigating phenomena
such as telepathy. Meta-Reality also is supposed to underlabour for the sci-
ences. It does this in the first instance for what I call the esoteric sociology of
everyday life. But there are other elements to it: for example, the understand-
ing of the deep stratification of our embodied personalities. That is a huge
research project. How memory and how the past is locked in. How we think of
other people. Is it like a series of concentric circles, with ourselves in the cen-
tre and our nearest and dearest ones very close to us and then the species as a
whole in a much remoter position and other species further out still, and so on?
Or is it perhaps the case that you cannot generalise because we are all concrete
singularities: to some people their cat or dog is the most important thing in
their lives, because it does not answer back.
MH: You say in the Preface to Meta-Reality: 
Perhaps it is best not to call the philosophy of meta-Reality a realism, as
realism connotes the idea of a split or opposition between a world and its
description, that is, insofar as the very concept of realism is itself dualis-
tic. So I prefer to think of it as describing being but oriented to being
which does not think being, and which in fact engages as much a polemic
against thought, and the ego, and the products of thought and the ego, as
it does against subject–object duality as such. So it is not really even a sys-
tem of thought, but an intervention in the discursive process which is
designed to enable agents to reflexively situate their own non-dual being
in the context of their growth and development in the dual realm and
their struggles in the dualistic realm which dominates and screens or
occludes not only the relative world of duality but the absolute non-dual
world on which it entirely reposes. So this could be said to be a philoso-
phy of truth, rather than reality (insofar as reality is affected and so to
speak contaminated by duality and thus – in our present epoch – dual-
ism). Hence the ‘meta’: it is the ground and truth of reality.20
Is the formulation, ‘a philosophy of truth rather than reality’, one you want to
stick with? How would you say the shift of focus registered in this passage 
from ‘thinking being’ to, as you put it a few pages earlier, ‘being being, . . . or
rather a becoming of our being, the becoming or realisation of ourselves, self-
realisation’21 relates to and/or improves on the thematisation of absolute rea-
son in Dialectic – the unity or coherence of theory and practice in practice
entrained by the dialectics of freedom – as the overcoming of alienation?
RB: In the meta-Real moment our physical being and other aspects of the physical
world and all the dimensions of the world of duality are preserved. In a way you
could say that they are suspended in the moment of direct identification in
consciousness. But they are still there. Understanding that what meta-Reality
describes is the most basic and essential level of human beings and, so I argue,
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all being, you can set yourself the task of always being in a state where you can
be in your ground-state, which means eliminating from yourself the het-
eronomous levels and orders of determination that are a part of what you are
in your relative embodied personality. When you reach that point we could
say that you are self-realised, but you can also think of self-realisation as
progress or movement towards that state. Now when you are self-realised
there will still be lots of things outside you, you will still be outside them, you
will not know everything, and you will not be able to see everything, so there
will still be many challenges for your own personal growth. Even more impor-
tantly, to be such a person means that you will be very creative and you will be
imbued with compassion and love for the rest of creation, and particularly that
part of creation that is close to you, your society, so you will be an agent in the
social world, seeking to transform it. You will be a non-dual being in a sea of
duality with the goal of absolute or dialectical reason, which is the unity or
coherence of theory and practice in practice, so that you are not split. You will
have made yourself maximally apt to be an agent of dialectical or absolute rea-
son. You will be the best possible agent for eliminating heteronomies in the
social world, in other people, in our social relations and our transactions with
nature.
MH: Overcoming alienation.
RB: Yes, but there will still be a huge task there. So this is the answer to the ques-
tion, how do the two stand to each other. In realising yourself, you will be
being or rather becoming the being that is yourself. You will have minimised
the theory–practice contradictions and alienations in your own practice and
life and will be the most effective agent of dialectical or absolute reason.
MH: How does that improve on the account in Dialectic?
RB: It shows how to get to the level of being such an agent, and also that as an
agent of absolute reason you are not working alone, you are working with
everything else on the cosmic envelope. In particular, there is an unrecog-
nised substratum of social life that is a manifestation of the fact that every per-
son has an element or a level in which they are intrinsically divine.
MH: Something like that is already presupposed in Dialectic: that people as such are
free, for example.
RB: That is right, but it is implicitly there. In meta-Reality it is overtly stated and
explicit. That is what the philosophy of meta-Reality does: it makes what was
implicit explicit and elaborates it. There is no theorisation in Dialectic of the
non-dual and no explicit theorisation of the transcendentally real self. 
The idea that truth is more basic than reality stems from the fact that the
simple subject–object distinction or the basic premise of realism that there is
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something existing independently of one’s consciousness actually breaks
down. At the level of non-duality there is not another, there is not something
that is existentially intransitive, you are at one with whatever it is that you are
identifying with. So you do not have realism; realism does not apply at that
level, but truth does. But I would not normally put it like this, that truth is more
basic, because of course if you abstract from the moment of non-duality there is
a real distinction. Suppose I am in a non-dual relation with this water; if I
abstract from that there is a distinction, the water is there and I am here. Reality
is not dissolved within our non-dual consciousness, but there are aspects of
reality that cannot adequately be thought in a realistic way. That is really what
I am saying. When I was coming to understand the importance of non-duality
I felt it a nice irony that there is a level of social being at which the whole 
premise of my previous work, existential realism, breaks down. Had I obses-
sively wanted to stick to my original intuitions I would never have seen it. 
MH: Your case for the always already enchanted nature of the world (6R) as I
understand it rests importantly on this breakdown of subject–object duality in
transcendental identification, the paradigm case of which is direct mind-to-
mind, or more generally consciousness-to-consciousness, action, which you
suggest is ‘a natural corollary of the thesis already established by critical real-
ism of mind as a synchronic emergent power of matter’.22 Your paradigm of
communication is twofold; on the one hand it is direct and unmediated by
physical causes and on the other indirect and mediated. As I understand it,
you do not deny that, outside of telepathy and related phenomena (if there be
such), there is a sense in which communication is usually mediated by physi-
cal causes, at least in the zone of relative reality. But you argue that direct com-
munication still occurs in the moment of understanding and that it is primary,
and the physical medium is secondary.23 Thus far I think I am in agreement,
and it seems entirely compatible with synchronic emergent powers material-
ism: if mind can directly affect material things it seems entirely reasonable to
hold that it can directly affect other minds.24 It is the particular significance
you attach to this that I have difficulties with. It seems to be pointing in the
direction of the universal detachability of consciousness (viewed as ‘primary,
or as primary as matter’ and implicit in everything) from the physical, or as you
put it the ‘motility and universality’ of consciousness, that is, its ability to
move spontaneously and independently anywhere.25 To this I would say in
general that the irreducibility of thought and feeling to their physical expres-
sion or to bodies is one thing, their independence from them quite another.
Moreover, you seem to be positing the possibility of direct consciousness-to-
consciousness communication and (cumulative, recursively embeddable)
dialectically universalised responsiveness or reciprocity throughout the cos-
mos,26 and that at first sight is a fantastic idea, albeit perhaps a logical one on
the basis of the general case for connectivity, which includes of course action-
at-a-distance theorised by modern physics. It seems to depend ultimately on a
notion of consciousness as primary and matter as secondary, such that what
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beings ‘most essentially’27 are is implicit (transcendental or supramental) con-
sciousness. Or are you redefining the physical to include what we conven-
tionally take to be non-physical existence and causality, such that everything
hinges here ultimately on the solution you offer to the age-old problem of
metaphysical idealism versus materialism?
RB: You say that irreducibility is not the same as independence, and that could be
a useful starting point. Transcendental identification in consciousness is irre-
ducible but it normally depends on cues, physical cues of the sort that can be
theorised by physics, though not as cues; in other words it operates with cues,
and when I understand you, the cue is the sound and then the occasion is
direct transcendental identification in consciousness.
MH: Why do you say ‘cue’ rather than ‘medium’?
RB: Airwaves carry the sounds and in this sense are a medium, but when you tell
me something I am not aware of any medium, I just hear it. What happens is
there is a sound, and I immediately hear it, and that is what I am calling a cue.
The basic argument is that my understanding you is irreducible to the exis-
tence of the cue. That in itself does not prove that it could occur independ-
ently of any cue. But at least it establishes the possibility of that. Of course, it
also could be wrong: it could be that we never understand anything without a
cue of that kind. So that position is perfectly consistent with synchronic emer-
gent powers materialism. Then what one would have to do is formulate some
empirically testable hypotheses with a bearing on whether it is possible or not.
But there are phenomena that speak against its not being possible, just at its
own level. For example, if you hear a couple of people having a blazing argu-
ment and you go into the room that they were in, many people find it easy to
feel the argument.
MH: After they have gone?
RB: Yes. When you go back home after you have had a bad day at work, you still
feel the workplace, you carry it with you.
MH: You need to take a shower or something?
RB: Yes, you carry it in the aura of your physical being, your physical presence, and
it is noticeable. There are far stronger arguments for what you call detachabil-
ity, but detachability is not the right word, because it is there almost always
with you and your understanding of what someone else says remains with you
after they have said it, such that you can refer back to it. All this requires com-
plex analysis and I have only indicated my minimal position. That is really all
I am trying to say. It is up to our arguments and empirically based science
whether direct-mind-to-mind contact without cues is possible. 
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Here we come back to the kind of considerations we touched on last time when
I suggested that the fact that you cannot reduce feelings and minds to physical cor-
poreality makes it possible that they have a post-existence of some sort; and also
that we might have the potentiality to connect up with a previous life, where the
pre-existence is still arguably physical and the psychic being is purely potential – it
would not be an actual conveyer between the past and the present. Another possi-
bility is that the feelings and mind you actually have in your life will not exist after
your death but will in some way connect up with a future existence that might or
might not be physical. These are purely notional possibilities. You might ask why
should I even contemplate these possibilities in this context? It is because your
ground-state has a peculiar status as part of the cosmic envelope: it is both outside
space–time and inside space–time. 
MH: You talk of it as eternal.
RB: And so that is one consideration: there is a kind of a bivalence of the cosmic
envelope. And I actually think this is a feature of it, that it is both. And the
way we might understand this is by analogy with a surface: you cannot see the
side that is outside space–time. So that is one consideration, the bivalence 
of the ground-state. Another consideration is the interconnectedness of the
cosmos. You say that you find it difficult to get your head around this?
MH: Well, the notion that we can have immediate effects throughout the cosmos
that, moreover, are recursively embeddable.
RB: What I would say is, OK, it might only have an infinitesimally small effect, an
effect that cannot be measured with our existing instruments, but to say it has
a small effect does not mean it has no effect. So I am not arguing about the
magnitude of the effects. Actually the magnitude of human effects, the mag-
nitude of our intentional actions on the physical world have been enormous,
but it is still circumscribed – 
MH: We live on this tiny speck of a planet, almost a null-point in the great scheme
of things.
RB: If we blow our planet up it will have a discernible effect on neighbouring plan-
ets and possibly the solar system. It is the kind of thing we are quite capable of
doing.
MH: As I read you, you are saying that what we do, our state of consciousness, can
affect the deep evolutionary processes of the cosmos, that is, the whole process
of universal self-realisation and god-realisation.28 This is where I have problems.
RB: And my response to that is to say, all right, I admit for the most part it 
would be a very small effect. But consider the sort of effects our conscious
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intentionality is having on the world. These might be restricted to the solar
system or something like that, but they are still very big effects in my book. All
I am saying is it can potentially have an effect throughout the multiverse. It
might be that there are far off states of the universe and configurations of par-
ticles or subparticles in fundamental physics that we can never know about,
but I think there are good strong transcendental arguments for the unity of the
cosmos and, given that, it is at least potentially the case that we can have an
effect anywhere in the cosmos. This could be like a butterfly effect. But of
course the beings of the cosmos are very differentiated. The argument is then
that, while it might only be remotely possible that we can have an effect else-
where in the cosmos at a physical level, it is much more likely that we will have
an effect on other beings like us. Again, what are the mechanisms of this?
Well, this is a very interesting field. Many studies of animal behaviour seem to
suggest that there is something akin to ‘species learning’ in which, once some
members of a species learn a new form of behaviour, other (even distant)
members of that species manifest, or more readily learn or acquire, that new
form of behaviour. There is the well-known case of the blackbirds in England,
a few of which discovered that they could get at the content of milk bottles by
pecking a hole in the aluminium top, and then, quite quickly, blackbirds
everywhere in far distant regions got the hang of this. I do not know what the
mechanisms are, but there will be mechanisms and we have to discover them.
These are the possibilities opened up. I am quite happy at the end of the day if
we have a good explanation of all these phenomena that does not invoke any
new media or vehicles; but I think this is very unlikely, because in physics and
in science generally we are continually discovering new strata or aspects of
reality and new kinds of mechanism and I think it quite possible that new lev-
els of being will be discovered when our science is open-minded enough to
consider all this. 
MH: How does your solution to the problem of metaphysical idealism versus 
materialism bear on all this? The most succinct statement of your solution is
perhaps: 
consciousness is enfolded in all being . . . but matter is not enfolded in all
consciousness. This means that there is an inverse chain or synchronic
order of ontological priority in the increasing determinacy with which
consciousness enfolds itself in matter; and makes matter a synchronically
emergent or derivative power of consciousness, while at the same time
allowing that consciousness can be diachronically emergent from matter.29
I find this a difficult concept.
RB: What I am thinking of is something like this. All matter has consciousness
enfolded within it as a more or less remote possibility, in two senses. It has the
possibility, first, of evolving into a conscious state, and second of being known
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through consciousness – through transcendental identification in conscious-
ness. So in those senses all matter has consciousness enfolded within it. But
the converse does not apply. Think of, say, the consciousness of Beethoven
when composing a symphony. This consciousness does not have matter
enfolded in it in the way that matter has consciousness within it. You might
say that music presupposes material instruments and so on. That is fine, but it
only takes you so far, because you can hum the music, you can remember it and
Beethoven did not even hear it late in his life – he ceased to hear it. Or think
of e = mc2. You can have consciousness of that which does not have matter
enfolded within it in any way. We can make sense of this in the following kind
of way. We have a view of matter evolving through time–space into a point
where it becomes conscious and we have paradigms of consciousness without
matter enfolded within it. But having evolved from matter, consciousness
does not need to go back to matter. It is not the case that all consciousness has
matter enfolded within it: some consciousness might have, but much of what
we call high consciousness does not. It might be asked why we have this asym-
metry. You can make sense of this by thinking of an evolution where matter
becomes more and more self-aware and when it gets to a certain point of self-
awareness you do not actually need to go back to the level of brute, inanimate
matter. Of course, there would always be the possibility of a degradation of
evolution back to that level; if you got rid of consciousness on earth there
would still be matter. 
MH: With implicit consciousness enfolded within it. 
RB: We would have to see. But it is arguable that, at a certain threshold of evolu-
tion, you have consciousness without matter: consciousness that is no longer
tied to matter. 
MH: Why don’t we have a dualism here then, if mind can become independent of
matter?
RB: To have a monism does not mean that the monism is undifferentiated. What
you would have is different modes of consciousness or different modes of what
you might want to call being or, as you suggested in conversation earlier, dif-
ferent modes of energy – and I am perfectly happy to say that. I am perfectly
happy to think of the most fundamental element in the universe as conscious-
ness with bits of root matter enfolded within it – if you want to call that energy,
or matter-consciousness, that’s fine.
MH: Don’t you say that ultimately reality is consciousness, at least in so far as, con-
sidered synchronically, matter is the product of a logically prior but notional
moment of involution of consciousness?30
RB: I am trying not to say that. Let us just call it the cosmic envelope.
Consciousness and self-awareness can be thought of as powers or potentialities
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of beings on that envelope, of some beings anyway, looked at in a very broad
historical perspective. You can make sense of evolution then. As I say some-
where, initially the universe emerged out of nothing. Something came out of
nothing, then as evolution proceeds we unfold more and more possibilities
until, at the end of the day, we get everything in everything. 
MH: You seem to go along with traditional cosmologies in seeing the emergence of
the cosmos as an act of consciousness, of a creator or god who ‘self-creates him-
self out of the void’.31 Your notional ‘involution of consciousness’ corresponds
to the descent of consciousness in traditional cosmologies.
RB: We do not really have anything different in Big Bang theory, which posits an
explosion out of nothing and eventually an implosion into nothing. 
MH: The theory of generalised co-presence, whereby the alethic truth of every-
thing is enfolded as potential within everything else, arguably entrains a solu-
tion to the problem of knowledge that critical realism perhaps had not quite
resolved: how is it possible to bridge the gap between the transitive and intran-
sitive dimension, to fallibly discover the truth of things? We can come to
know truths of the world (including moral truths) ultimately because the
world was formed by the same powers that constituted and are enfolded within
us, such that in making new discoveries (or actually learning anything) we
‘recall’ what is already within us as implicit potential, thereby achieving a
point of identity or union with what we have discovered. Alethia is thus 
literally ‘the undoing of oblivion’ in an important sense, that of Platonic
anamnesis: ‘truth . . . is most basically the revelation of identity (in the iden-
tity consciousness of another being)’.32 And education is ‘the bringing out of
what is already in’.33 Learning and discovery always involves a moment of the
suspension of thought (unthought) – of supramental consciousness at the
level of ground-states – in which the implicit emerges or is explicated. What
are your thoughts on this today? Do we have an element of Platonic idealist
realism here as well as anamnesis?
RB: No, I do not think so. This is realism about universals and realism about sin-
gulars and realism about all the other things, but it is not a specifically Platonic
one. Otherwise I agree with what you have said, although I do not entirely
agree with the idea that we need the meta-Real solution to the problem of
knowledge, as you put it, because I think that the solution given in transcen-
dental realism is quite adequate. For there is no way we can overcome the fact
– this is the language I used at the time – that we are not immediately at the
level of the world we study in experimental, or more generally in critical, sci-
ence. All we can do is to attempt to fashion language in such a way that it
expresses as adequately as possible what is independent of us. That is obviously
a dualistic formulation, but I think it is quite adequate for empirical 
science. Even looked at from the point of view of meta-Reality, the transitive
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dimension of knowledge has its own modalities and its own rhythm which is
independent of intransitive reality, even including the intransitive reality of
non-duality and the ground-state. Dualistically reflected knowledge will
always be with us. When I was going into meta-Reality, I saw it not so much in
terms of the problem of knowledge but as allowing us to make sense of a level
of experience and understanding in which we become increasingly skilled and
accomplished agents, such that the realm of what we can spontaneously know
and spontaneously do increases. Meta-Reality points to moments – and this
ties in with the philosophy of truth – in which a dualistic subject–object way
of looking at the world needs to be complemented. So if there was a problem
of knowledge that was not really solved in A Realist Theory of Science it is the
problem, if it is a problem, at that level, of how you get to a new concept given
that you cannot do it by induction or deduction. This is what meta-Reality
answers. What it does in relation to subject–object dualism is to point to a
level in our experience in which we transcend that dualism easily on the basis
of our cognitive accomplishments. So we seem to be in agreement.
MH: Yes, that is what I had in mind. It theorises the subjective condition for learn-
ing in a way that your earlier work did not, a condition that I believe we have
seen at work in practice in the ability of Sue Kelly to understand your concepts
in a basic sort of way.34 I move on now to your critique of the discursive intel-
lect. Meta-Reality, and especially its thematisation of transcendence as con-
stitutive of creativity or transcendental emergence, entrains a ‘radical
transcendentalisation of the dialectial critique of analytical reasoning’, which
you refer to as the critique of the discursive intellect as distinct from the intu-
itive intellect, ‘where “intellect” is just the faculty of discrimination and
choice’.35 The discursive intellect, which includes dialectical as well as ana-
lytical thought, is sentential, instrumental, calculative, sequential, and ana-
logical; the intuitive intellect is iconic, unconditional, spontaneous,
simultaneous and holistic, and is at least equally important. All creative dis-
covery depends on a synthesis of the discursive and intuitive, ‘left’ and ‘right’
brain, a synthesis that is underpinned by supramental consciousness at the
level of the ground-state and that depends on five ‘others’ to thought – con-
sciousness (awareness), intuition or unthought (direct inference – ‘I get it’),
direct perception, being (of which thought is only a small part), and emptiness
or suchness or just being/doing – and your true scientist (or any creative
human being) is a ‘practical mystic’ engaged in acts at or close to the ground-
state and simultaneously committed, on scientific grounds, to this-worldly
transformative practice to effect (universal) self-realisation or enlighten-
ment. If we just rely on the discursive intellect we mis-identify our self as our
ego, ‘the wonders of consciousness [as] the reifications of language’,36 creativ-
ity as the powers of mind and the ideologies of mind, the immediacy of the
now as the clock time created by our minds, and so on. I find this all very con-
vincing, but include it for possible comment because it leads into the next
question.
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RB: I agree with all that I think.
MH: You say that time is ‘a creation of the mind’,37 specifically the modern mind.
You do not of course mean that we create time–space and evolutionary
process, but clock time and time angst – these (while the former is conven-
ient) mis-categorise the true nature of tense and process, which they conse-
quently occlude. It is only if we ‘draw back the curtains of the mind’, that is,
shed clock time and time angst and the illusion that they are natural, that it
becomes possible to live fully ‘in the now’ rather than in the ‘demi-present’ of
demi-reality.38 In this context you suggest that a sense of past, present and
future is an emergent product of modernity – it did not exist before – whereas
in Dialectic you argued for the reality and irreducibility of tense. Are you now
saying that you got it wrong in Dialectic or that what was new in modernity was
awareness (in the transitive dimension) of tense (in the intransitive dimen-
sion) that had been real all along? If as I take it the latter, how does this square
with your statement that it is in our essential nature ‘to overcome the illusion of
past and future’?39 This only makes sense, as you say, from the perspective of
eternity – only if our essence is ‘an eternal being outside space and time’, that
is, what you call our (concretely singularised) ground-state or spirit (jivatman)
as distinct from our soul or psychic being that is formed by the ground-state in
its evolution within relative reality (geo-history).40 If our eternal self changes,
past and future would presumably everywhere be real. Are some ultimata
unchanging? Or does everything change, as you sometimes seem to imply; for
example, ‘there is no reason why the absolute cannot encompass an ever deep-
ening process of expansion’.41 Is the cosmic envelope – absolute reality –
inside or outside space–time, or both (immanent/transcendent) and how?
(You have touched on this already – you say both – but I include it here for 
possible further comment.) 
RB: I think you are absolutely right in saying that what was new in modernity was
awareness of tense that had been real all along. Also new was the illusion of
clock time, and illusions are real and causally aefficacious. Critical realism and
meta-Reality, with its conception of the multi-tiered stratification of reality,
has an enormous advantage over alternative metaphysical approaches here in
that it can situate illusion – the smog of the demi-real – as a real causally aeffi-
cacious emergent stratum within reality. So clock time is a real emergent illu-
sion within relative reality, and that is one thing. On the other hand, tense
and process are real and non-illusory features of relative reality, but when
looked at from the perspective of absolute reality, of eternity, they too are illu-
sory. This relates to the issue of whether the cosmic envelope – absolute real-
ity – is inside or outside space and time, or both; and as you know I want to say
it is both. This is difficult to make entirely consistent with common sense
except by analogy, so I compare it to a surface of which we can only see one
side. When we look at the side we can see it is within space and time. But
looked at from another point of view – what we would see if we saw the other
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side – it is outside. You quote me as saying there is no reason why the absolute
cannot encompass an ever deepening process of expansion. This is how it is,
and I think that transfinite mathematics shows the possibility of greater and
lesser infinities; mathematics has gotten round to thinking of infinity as a con-
cept within which you can have various gradations – you can certainly have
deepening. What we have to be able to do is both to think (and act) within
time and a tensed world and to unthink. Much of the philosophy of meta-
Reality is designed to be a propaedeutic to a practical exposition of how we
might better live in a eudaimonistic, simple society. In such a society we would
be able to remove ourselves from time angst and just enjoy the bliss of some-
thing; it might be some music, or it might be anything – that, as the Zens
claim, we can go into anything and enjoy it. We have to involute our life
importantly in this way.
MH: Your notion of generalised synchronous reciprocity and co-presence, which
includes a notion of the intentionality of ground-states, that is, their 
conatus to the telos of self-realisation, combined with the view that beings
with minds and feeling can survive forever even if their physical basis is
destroyed, leads you to espouse a view that might be called ‘spiritual
inevitabilism’. By this I mean the view that sooner or later universal self-
realisation will inevitably occur, even if planet Earth is destroyed.42 (I note
that this is not ‘triumphalism’, which refers to the exorbitation of specifically
human powers, in particular cognitive ones. Spiritual inevitabilism presup-
poses the rejection of cognitive triumphalism.) I take it you are not being
determinist in an actualistic sense here – the inexorability is in the tendency
which, since it is robust, must win out over the very long term; there is war
between peace and war, love and hate (between non-duality and the struc-
tures of dualism or demi-reality) for relative reality that is not really a war
because in the long run peace must triumph through the peaceful dissolution
of war, which unilaterally depends on it. That seems all very logical, and it
makes the whole show all the more sublime; and I can accept, as you memo-
rably say, that ‘it is not that there are the starry heavens above and the moral
law within, as Kant would have it; rather, the true basis of your virtuous exis-
tence is the fact that the starry heavens are within you, and you are within
them’.43 But how crucial to it all are the notions of reverberating reciprocity
and enduring psychic beings with minds and feelings that pre- and post-exist
embodied personalities? If crucial, most secular critical realists will part com-
pany with you here, and to that extent you would not have ‘a spirituality
within the bounds of secularism, consistent with all faiths and no faith’, a tran-
scendence of the dualism of the sacred and profane.44 Paradoxically, the price
of this guarantee/inexorability seems to be the postponement of the full reali-
sation of eudaimonia, which is but the end of pre-history and the beginning of
history proper on Earth, to a remote epoch: ‘When the whole of creation is
self-realised, when it reflects back its own divinity, then and only then will
there be peace’.45
Ch 8.qxp  12/18/2009  1:19 PM  Page 190
The philosophy of unity-in-difference, 2000–2002 191
No
t fo
r D
istr
ibu
tio
n
RB: I do not think they really are crucial. If I could just break down the question
into two parts. Is universal self-realisation inevitable? And does this mean
that we have to postpone the idea of eudaimonia until the moment when lit-
erally we have universal self-realisation? First, it is very important to stress that
it is not inevitable for us as corporeal beings on our planet. Even – indeed,
especially – from the point of view of being in our ground-state, what we first
have to do is to try to ensure the survival of our planet. We cannot have any
other practical perspective, we are ineluctably tied to the physical. Alongside
the tendency of the non-dual to win out over the demi-real is the tendency of
the particular form that the demi-real takes to destroy its physical basis. The
second is at present occurring at a much faster rate than the first, which is not
to say that things could not be reversed, but that is the way it is. If you are in
your ground-state the best way of speeding up the counteracting tendency will
also necessarily involve trying to halt the negative tendency to the destruc-
tion of physical life, because this physical life is tied to things of intrinsic value
and has its own ground-states. We cannot want to destroy the basis of physical
life. On the contrary, it has to be strengthened, and meta-Reality conceives
itself as an agent in this task. The inevitability at issue is the inevitability only
of a tendency.
MH: But regardless of what happens to us as corporeal beings, as a species, the
process of cosmic unfolding will go on.
RB: Yes, that is right. But it would be scant compensation to us as embodied 
beings. Does this involve postponing eudaimonia until universal self-
realisation is achieved? No. We need eudaimonia now; we need to get rid of
the demi-real to have a better existence in the world of duality. It is a neces-
sary step on the long path to universal self-realisation. When I say that only
when everything is self-realised will there be peace, I do not mean that 
there cannot be eudaimonia short of that, because when we have a eudai-
monistic society it will still be within the world of duality; there will still be
challenges and conflicting points of view and orientations, but they will be
resolvable, and the more people are at their ground-state the easier it will be
to resolve them. When there is universal self-realisation, on the other hand,
we would be in a form of existence which you could say is post-mental, in
which thought itself had been transcended and all the challenges of thinking
being had given way to being being itself at a self-realised level. No one can say
that evolution would come to a stop. We might discover whole new challeng-
ing domains. But perhaps the very concepts of challenge and resolution would
no longer have applicability. Universal self-realisation is the limit situation
and eudaimonia is a practical concept designed to apply in the world as we
know it.
MH: Alex Callinicos’s recent The Resources of Critique has as its central theme the
issue of how transcendence, defined as our ability ‘to go beyond the limit set
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by existing practices and beliefs and produce something new’, is possible
today. His answer, at this moment of transition ‘in which one political subject
has died and a new one has yet to emerge’, is to hold on to the standpoint 
formulated by Marx in 1843 and developed by Lukàcs: that of the proletariat
as the universal class.46 You see transcendence rather as a universal human
capacity to go beyond existing states of consciousness that informs our every
act and is grounded ultimately in the deep creativity of the cosmos. Are these
two positions reconcilable?
RB: I would say that they are reconcilable only on three conditions. First, if you
have a non-actualist definition of class, that is, if you do not identify class posi-
tions immediately with particular human beings. Second, if you allow for the
totality of master–slave-type relations, and accept that you have to work on all
the other master–slave-type relations and inequities at the level of social
structure besides class. Third, and most importantly, if you also understand the
project as one involving work on all four levels of four-planar social being.
That is to depart from the letter of Lukàcs’s formulation, I think, but not 
from its spirit, which is something dialectical critical realism and meta-Reality
take up. 
MH: You end Reflections on meta-Reality with a quote from Jelaluddin Rumi: 
Every forest branch moves differently 
in the breeze, but as they sway 
they connect at the roots 
Taken as a metaphor for the cosmos this, along with much else in the philos-
ophy of meta-Reality, is very much in keeping with deep ecology. Most of 
the main meta-Reality concepts are at least implicitly present in deep 
ecology, including anti-anthropism and a concept of the intrinsic value of
being, and an emphasis on self-realisation as a cumulative process, a 
conception that like yours is significantly indebted to East. Thus Arne Næss
holds, like you, that the higher the self-realisation attained by anyone, 
the broader and deeper the identification with others and the more its further
increase depends upon the self-realisation of others; and that the complete
self-realisation of anyone depends on that of all. The related Gaia Hypothesis
holds that the earth is alive – a living system – and that we are a part of it.
Would you say meta-Reality is a vitalistic philosophy, not in the sense that the
life force (consciousness, intentionality, energy) it postulates as animating
and cohering the cosmos is necessarily different from the energy modern
physics theorises but in the sense that it just is the ultimate form of that 
energy, reducible neither to ‘matter’ nor ‘spirit’ as understood in western 
philosophy but analogous to the ch’i or qi (vital force) postulated by
Confucianism, which you invoke a number of times?47 I take it that you see
yourself here, as always, not as going against the best modern science but on
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the contrary as taking its implications seriously, especially quantum physics
and the life sciences? 
RB: I would not exactly call it a vitalistic philosophy, but I think it does have
analogies with Taoism and Confucianism. I think that MinGyu48 gives a very
Taoist interpretation of Confucianism by the way. I do not know whether Tu
Wei-Ming, the scholar he refers to, would be regarded as an orthodox
Confucian or not, but it is obviously a very Taoist interpretation and it has
much in common with many Buddhist conceptions as well. I think meta-
Reality goes a little bit deeper than the philosophy of ch’i, but certainly there
are very interesting analogies and overlaps. Perhaps what Taoism lacks is a
really clear conception of stratification. As for the relation between meta-
Reality and deep ecology, this is something I am currently working on;49 but 
as a general orientation I would say that deep ecology is strong in the domains
of 3L, 5A and 6R, less so in those of 1M, 2E and 4D, of stratification and a 
geo-historical negating praxis.
MH: Your message in the meta-Reality books is in the end a very ‘simple’ one, 
both at the personal and social level and at the level of practical reason. 
‘The fool’, you remind us, ‘is the Shakespea ean wise guy, and the idiot is 
the enlightened one.’50 Master–slave-type societies are ‘ontologically 
extravagant’, particularly capitalism; ‘we should be striving toward a society
that is both ontologically simple and ontologically honest’.51 ‘We do not 
have to construct an alternative order, the system which is despoiling us
entirely depends on what we already have. All we have to do is recognise that
we already have and are this order.’ To realise eudaimonia we ‘just’ have to be
who we really are, and that’s it – the dominating and occluding order ‘will col-
lapse without resistance’. And ‘then the rest is up to the workings of a universe
and cosmic envelope connecting all our ground-states which no-one can
attempt to second guess’.52 It is indeed a simple, if profound, message; some
will say too simple. But one thing that strikes me is that, as is your wont, it is
ahead of its time – you push to their utmost logical conclusion wider intellec-
tual currents that are eschewing commandist notions of seizing and using state
power to construct a new order in favour of relying on the organised creativity
of the oppressed, which you construe as the whole of humanity.53
RB: I think we do have to simplify our life radically. What we have now, capital-
ism and everything associated with it, is the spectre of a bad infinite, a bad infi-
nite that will come to an end. Logically, its end is of course when there is
nothing left to commodify, but unfortunately long before that happens our
planet will have come to an end, because it cannot take much – if any – more,
and human beings will have ceased to exist.
MH: But it could not commodify everything – in terms of meta-Reality, everything
pertaining to the ground-state.54
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RB: That is right, and that is a very important point. It cannot commodify, or ever
touch, the meta-Real world that it presupposes; that world is a real limit to
alienation. It could of course reduce its scope and recognition, but meta-
Reality would still be necessary to it. If you imagine some horrendous dictator
giving an order to destroy everything, that order would still have to be carried
out and that would depend on a vein of trust. 
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9 Where do we go from here?
Applied critical realism and 
beyond (2002–)
MH: Before broaching the issue of where we go from here, I would like to ask about
your personal trajectory since the publication of Meta-Reality in 2002, culmi-
nating in your recent appointment as World Scholar at the Institute of
Education, London. In your notes for this book, you described these years as a
period of ‘return to the concrete and consolidation’. I am aware that, besides
the visits to India you mentioned last time, you also made a number of trips to
Europe, North America and Australia to promote critical realism and meta-
Reality. You also established a Foundation for Meta-Reality. Can you tell us a
little about these activities and their rationale? 
RB: First I should say a little bit about what I have been doing intellectually over
the intervening years. All the recent activity I am going to describe has been
done under the sign of economic necessity. Had I been able to carry on my pre-
existing practice, at least initially I would probably have continued to work
systematically on the three projected meta-Reality volumes that we men-
tioned last time, but this was not possible. Much of my actual time after 2002
was spent in Scandinavia, where interest in basic or first-level critical realism
is very strong. And of course, in so far as I was in the market selling my labour-
power and I wanted to do something that was connected with critical realism
and meta-Reality, the most feasible option for me was to talk and write about
first-wave critical realism. When I arrived in Sweden people such as Göran
Therborn told me that to all intents and purposes critical realism was hege-
monic there. I am not so sure about that, but it is at least widely known. 
I can best indicate the rationale of the work I have been doing by locating it
within a topology of ways of developing the argument of A Realist Theory of
Science that were in principle open to me. One way, obviously, was the way I
followed in the 1970s, which was to consider the transapplicability of the
argument, or rather its results, to the domain of the social sciences, which I did
in The Possibility of Naturalism. Another way was to go into the matter of the
experimental physical sciences in much greater detail. That path has not actu-
ally been taken up very much by any critical realist to my knowledge. As the
main thrust of A Realist Theory of Science is to understand science as concerned
with the movement from events to explanatory structures, another path in
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principle open to me was to look in much more detail at the first term in this
kind of dialectic, that is the nature of events as complex, as constituted in
open systems. This is basically the province of applied or concrete critical real-
ism. There are of course critical realist studies of particular concrete phenom-
ena and subjects in open systems, but we do not have anything like a logic of
the concrete as such.
The path I actually followed after The Possibility of Naturalism in the 1980s
and 1990s was two-fold. First, the deepening of the ontology from the first
level of critical realism to the other six levels of the ontological–axiological
chain (MELDARA). That was undoubtedly the main thrust. Second, there
was a subsidiary thrust into the conditions of the possibility of false or ideolog-
ical forms, and this was the metacritical development. 
After 2002 I turned to the logic of the concrete. This took me into the
whole field of applied critical realism because I was now working with scien-
tists, social scientists, philosophers and professionals of various kinds (such as
social workers or teachers) who were concerned with concrete research proj-
ects and practices and wanted to apply critical realism. There is a book project
I have in hand, which is not very far written, called Applied Critical Realism; it
would be a research manual. The beginnings of something like a logic of the
concrete is contained in my forthcoming book with Berth Danermark on
interdisciplinarity and health.1 So that is one thing I have been doing. 
A second area moved very much into view in the period after 9/11. This was
the problem of cultural and moral incommensurability. I think to some extent
we can think of what I called the fifth phase of the development of modernity,
western bourgeois triumphalism, inaugurated in 1989 with the collapse of the
Soviet Bloc, as falling into two sub-phases: an intense phase of globalisation
under the dominance of market fundamentalism, followed by a second phase
around about the time of 9/11 characterised by the clash and proliferation of
fundamentalisms: the clash of market fundamentalism in alliance with
Christian and perhaps also Jewish fundamentalism, on the one hand, with
Islamic fundamentalism on the other, coupled with, and overlaid by, the
breaking out of myriad local and petty fundamentalisms, chauvinisms and
absolutisms. This is the period of the Bush–Blair ‘war on terror’. Recently
(August 2008) there are signs that we might be about to enter a new 
sub-phase, marked by a partial return to a multi-polar world (in which the
emerging BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, China] countries provide a partial
counter-weight to US hegemony), increasing crises of international law 
and co-operation and the accentuated urgency of economic and ecological
challenges. However the main features of the second sub-phase persist. 
(September 20092). The financial crisis of September 2008 onwards and
the current economic recession has been created most fundamentally by a
triple disembedding: of money from the real economy; of the real economy
from society; and of society from its spiritual infrastructure (or meta-Real
basis). This has occurred in the context of the manifestation of symptoms of
growing alienation and stress at all four planes of social being; and a growing
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increase in inequality in many of the advanced western countries, in which
income no longer bears any relation to merit, effort or need, a fact widely
apprehended and inducing a normative crisis, a crisis of legitimacy in the eco-
nomic order and the social relations it presupposes, a crisis of social justice.
The crises at the level of social structure and our transactions with nature have
been coupled in the UK with a breakdown in trust in the governing classes
(the parliamentary expenses scandal). In the USA, in the week of the
Pittsburgh G-20 meeting, Obama is besieged by raucous critics from the right
and the traditional working-class left, who have lost faith in the project of
globalisation at the very time when U.S. governmental action is most needed
to take the measures which are required now – at the Copenhagen climate
change conference in December 2009 (towards which some of us critical 
realists are making our own intervention3) – if ecological catastrophe is to 
be avoided.
What is required in the short and transitional run includes (1) re-regulation
of finance and the economy; (2) the reconstitution of a public sphere nurtur-
ing an extended and deepened democracy in which the quality of information
and the depth of discussion becomes as important as, and a condition for, vot-
ing; (3) the defence and rebuilding of a public sector and a welfare state with
a renovated public sphere in which informed and reasoned decisions can once
more take place over collective, including economic, decisions (i.e. over
social welfare and objective functions); and (4) a state which is unafraid to
intervene in the market to implement social choices and at the same time
opens itself up to the participation of an informed public. In the not-so-long
run, we require the silent revolution of the meta-Real against the demi-real.
In all this, ideas, and a fortiori intellectuals (the more organic the better),
have a great potential role to play in concrete utopian projects at all levels –
about alternative productions, distributions, rates of growth and life-styles or
ways of living. A multi-polar world externally and internally (i.e. within a
nation state) gives us greater scope than we have had for some time and new
opportunity to begin to implement our concrete utopian visions, at least in
some measure, wherever we are.
In this context, the thesis of cultural incommensurability, that civilisations
cannot talk to each other, re-visits the thesis of paradigm incommensurability
floated by Kuhn and Feyerabend in the 1960s on a moral plane. If you assume
that force is ultimately the only way to resolve these issues, as is still widely
assumed on all sides, including most recently by David Miliband,4 then you
will not really have the possibility of any non-violent response. I did a great
deal of work on the problem of moral incommensurability, the results of which
will be published in a book provisionally called Understanding, Peace and
Security. This took me back into consideration of issues of non-violence and I
would very much like to give a fuller account – I have given talks on it – of
Gandhi’s satyagraha, his theory of non-violence, which is also a theory of
social change. It is not a theory of compliance or acquiescence to oppression,
but a theory about how to deal with it. And of course he was the figurehead in
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an arguably very successful campaign to get the British out of India. I would
like very much at some point to do a hermeneutic study of Gandhi. It might be
very interesting to put this alongside other figures outside of traditional west-
ern philosophy in a book of hermeneutic studies of thinkers such as Kant and
Marx. That is a project that is still to come. 
In Understanding, Peace and Security I formulate two axioms – of universal
solidarity and what I call axial rationality – which I think are very strong.
They provide the metatheoretical underpinnings to attempts to transcend
incommensurability in practice. But of course this leads immediately into the
philosophy of meta-Reality, so a third thing I have been doing in recent years
is attempting to refocus the themes, or some of the themes and theses, of meta-
Reality; and I would like to put this work together into a short book. First, and
in particular, I have resumed my interest in the problem of modernity. I have
extended the concept back in time, such that I now view western modernity
as a particular capitalist and European form of development of civilisational
structures that are far older. That takes one back to the axial revolutions of the
first millennium BCE that we talked about last time, then sideways to
Indigenous societies, because they have been carrying on more or less success-
fully sustaining themselves the whole time. I am also looking at the particular
forms that modernity took, especially as they have been theorised around
motifs such as Eurocentricity, and at alternative modernities, or more gener-
ally alternative routes from the level of axiality that would be a necessary con-
dition of human being in the future. Second, at a personal level there is an
interest in the great classical religions, and I already have a project that will be
a follow-up on From East to West called Beyond East to West. This will be a sec-
ular restatement of spirituality – of the argument that spirituality is a presup-
position of emancipatory projects in general, that it is not the same as and does
not depend upon religiosity, although for those who want religion that is
always an option. Third, I have refocused meta-Reality on the esoteric sociol-
ogy of everyday life: the way in which reciprocity, solidarity, tolerance, for-
giveness, mutual understanding and even features such as reflexivity are
actually there as part of the humus and matrix of social life, a hidden or at least
unrecognised substratum that is a tremendous resource for the struggle against
oppression. Once we begin to see this unnoticed substratum everywhere, it
can be tied in with the reconciliatory aims of the Understanding, Peace and
Security project by looking at the way in which something like the golden rule
is accepted as important in every society, because it is a necessary condition for
social bonding, and we are a social species. Actually, the golden rule needs to
be amended to take into account the great gain of modernity, recognition of
individuality, because we are not all the same, we are concretely singular indi-
viduals, so you need to do unto the other, not so much as you would, but as
they would be done by, that is, according to their specificities and differences.
But it is a very good start.
A fourth development, following on from this, is a renewed and deepened
interest in education associated with my taking up a position in October 2007
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as World Scholar at the Institute of Education in the University of London.
The project of education has to be understood in principle as a life-long one
concerned with enhancing, critiquing, refining and transforming the compo-
nential springs or bases of human action. There is nothing that happens at any
of the planes of our social being that is not mediated through intentional
action. The components of action are set out diagramatically in Figure 2.29 in
Dialectic.5 They include beliefs, feelings, values and norms, wants, and needs
and capabilities for expression and for performative efficiency, supplemented
by skills and facilities (access to resources), and it is the task of education to
enhance them. Education is thus not only life-long but also as wide and broad
as the intentional activities one engages in, and it can be as deep, furthermore,
as the levels of rationality I sketched out in Scientific Realism and Human
Emancipation.6 Moreover, it needs to be deep if we are going to consciously,
rationally change society. Following on from this, finally, there is of course my
renewed interest in the problems of actually existing socialism. These are the
areas in which I have been working. 
MH: Do you want to comment on the setting up of the Foundation for 
Meta-Reality?
RB: The motivation behind it was basically the same as in the case of the other
critical realist organisations and institutions, which I have already com-
mented on. But there were two additional motives. First, I felt that meta-
Reality was in danger of getting lost or emasculated in the official structures of
critical realism itself, because as you know there was a great deal of hostility to
it. I also felt, in the second place, that academics were not likely to be the main
supporters and beneficiaries of this philosophy, and I wanted the Foundation
to provide a basis for talking to non-academics about it. Of course, in exactly
the same way there is a need to involve non-academics in the activities and
organisations of first-level critical realism and dialectical critical realism, as
they experience it as helping and empowering their practice.
MH: Last time I asked you whether meta-Reality was necessary for carrying
through the anti-anthropic intent of your system. Part of your answer was 
that there was in fact no intent; anti-anthropism was rather a consequence of
your search for truth, and in particular I take it of your determination to 
question the ‘very widespread assumption of western thought . . . that basically
we do not really have any grounds for anything in life. Any grounds for belief.’7
If by some kind of clairvoyance you could have known at the outset, that is, in
the late 1960s or early 1970s, where your quest would take you, what if 
anything would have surprised you? During your journey, did you ever feel 
that you might have to give up on some of the earlier stuff; that you had
reached a point at which you might have to leave some or much of what you
had achieved behind? Were there – are there – moments of crisis and radical
doubt?
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RB: I think in a peculiar way I would have been surprised to know that I was going
to be a philosopher for the rest of my life. I did not foresee that. I would also
have been surprised to learn that I would be as constrained by economic neces-
sity to the extent that I have been. This has to do with the social conditions of
the time: there was a feeling that such things would take care of themselves,
everyone would be looked after. I and many of my friends had a feeling, an
optimism and a naive confidence, that given that we did have talent there
would not really be a problem about reproducing our material being; in other
words, we would not have a problem getting reasonable jobs. And of course
when someone is young, as Buddha pointed out, they also do not feel that 
they are going to be subjected to physical ill-health. Because of my struggle
against parental restrictions in childhood and adolescence, I was aware of 
the level of risk involved in trying to realise your dharma in some sense, but in
the late 1960s and early 1970s any problem of economic survival seemed
inconceivable.
MH: In retrospect one can see that you did not play the game to maximise your
career prospects. But had you played it, you probably would not have been able
to write books such as Dialectic.
RB: It would have taken me a great deal longer. In some ways, the struggle to come
into my dharma in my early years is mirrored in the struggle I have had for the
last five or six years to be able to be in my dharma doing what I want to do. Of
course, what I have been doing makes perfect sense in retrospect, there is a
rationale, but it is not what I would have chosen. This is a continuing struggle.
MH: Is that the sum total of surprises – that you are a philosopher and afflicted by
economic necessity?
RB: A third surprise is the problem I have recently had with my feet, occasioned by
a neuropathy of unknown origin and manifest in a syndrome known as
Charcot’s disease, which has recently resulted in the amputation of my right
foot and in my being constrained by physical necessity of a sort we do not
imagine to be possible when we are young. There may of course be more sur-
prises to come. But of course, at quite an early age I had a critique of histori-
cism that meant that I knew I could not predict what I was going to be or do,
so I do not think it would have totally surprised me that there were going to be
so many dialectical twists and turns in both my life and the development of the
system.
MH: Including spirituality?
RB: I might not have been able to see it at some stages, and I might have disliked it
at others, but I do not think it would have been a total surprise. I certainly
never gave up my awareness of the transcendent and my enjoyment of what I
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would now call non-dual experiences in life. I do not think I would have been
surprised by it.
MH: What about the last part of the question: were there any moments of crisis and
radical doubt in your intellectual development? 
RB: Certainly from time to time I had a crisis turning on whether my environment
would support and sustain me, because obviously whether you can survive and
flourish depends not only on you yourself and whatever innate self-confidence
you might have but on your environment. In Hegelian terms, I experienced
moments of concern that I might suffer the fate of the Beautiful Soul in the
sense that my ideas were too removed from conventional academic under-
standing. Of course, the method of immanent critique is supposed to take
account of that, but what it does not in itself specify is how hard or soft you
should be, and I have from time to time gone to one extreme or the other: I
have tended to be either too challenging to the environment, perhaps From
East to West was a case of this; or not challenging enough, which is probably
my natural disposition. I am very conscious of there being a delicate line. The
method of immanent critique is a matter not only of balance in relation to the
totality of one’s life but also of discrimination and judgement about what 
people can take. A Realist Theory of Science did prove to be palatable in main-
stream analytical philosophy in the sense that people read it and liked it. But
then many just left it, not doing anything more with it. Nowadays, in turning
my attention to the realm of education studies, I have tended mainly to listen
to what people say – this is the first stage of immanent critique. But I am aware
that at some point people need to be challenged, to have me say look, that is
not right, your view of education as a process whereby knowledge is transmit-
ted by a teacher leaves out all the questions raised by meta-Reality about what
is already enfolded within, the process of its unfolding, the dialectic of learn-
ing, and so on. The danger is that people will like the ideas but not do anything
much with them. The whole process is a delicate one. It is a sensitive
hermeneutic process involving people, getting their attention, talking to
them, being open to learning from them – and of course you always need to do
that for an immanent critique – but also getting them to see the transforma-
tive possibilities inherent in what you are saying so that they can see how they
need what you are proposing for their praxis. This presupposes that they have
a domain of freedom; I suppose all academics do to a certain extent, but if they
are very busy on research projects or subject to a strict timetable they might
well feel they do not have the time or freedom to attend to the opportunities
that the critique is offering them. For these kinds of reasons I am currently
involved in a project to set up a Centre for Critical Realism and Education
Studies so that a culture can be grown, a culture of critical realists involved in
education. 
So that is one enduring area of concern. There have been of course many
more transient ones. Thus I was concerned whether I would ever get my
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DPhil, whether I would ever lick the problem of dialectic, whether the meta-
Reality books would ever be acceptable to my existing constituency. I think
these are mundane crises that befall any intellectual or any writer. 
MH: The method of immanent critique does of course have its advantages. If you
can locate and remedy absences in the best that is going, you can be sure that
you have done as well as can be, that you occupy the intellectual high-ground.
I was going to ask you if, after the better part of a lifetime deploying it, you
think it has any downside, but you have just answered that really, at least in
part. How would you respond to the suggestion one sometimes hears that, in
the dialectical and more particularly the spiritual turn, you have moved from
a philosophical practice of underlabouring for science via immanent and 
transcendental critique to one in which philosophy is master-science?
RB: Immanent critique, as you know, is just the first stage of critique; it always has
to be followed up by omissive critique and then explanatory critique. There is
always a danger that you will forget this and become so involved in the imma-
nent practice itself that you drown in it. So that is a further possible downside.
That is the problem with what the Trotskyists used to call ‘deep entryism’: that
you go in, join the Labour Party, prove your trustworthiness, become an MP
and eventually a very conservative Prime Minister – and your socialism sinks
without trace. It can be averted if you keep in mind that the follow-up to
immanent is omissive and then explanatory critique – that there will be some-
thing wrong with the practice, something that can be explained in terms of its
social context. I was never in danger of forgetting that in most of my work,
except momentarily when reading Hegel and, as I have recounted, to some
extent during the investigative phase of the spiritual turn. This is of course the
result of a very soft approach in which the immanence outweighs the critical
element, but then the converse is also a danger: being impatient, not going
into the practice fully and coming out with too hard and premature judge-
ments. This is the sort of shrill, ungrounded criticism that normally passes for
critique. Ideally critique involves a perfect intellectual balance, and I think in
one or two places in my books I have achieved that. 
As for the objection that my later work is in the tradition of philosophy as
master-science rather than as underlabourer for the sciences, what this betrays
is a lack of appreciation of how much can in fact be said by relatively a priori
arguments. They are of course only relatively a priori because you are taking
on board some data in your premises, but there are two essential things you
have to remember here. The first is that transcendental and dialectical argu-
ments are continuous with explanatory-retroductive arguments, and the sec-
ond is categorial realism. The form of the transcendental argument is exactly
the same as a substantive explanatory-retroductive argument in science – and
it has exactly the same status. What distinguishes the philosophical deploy-
ment of this argument-form is the fact that you are talking about the most
abstract features of the domain of reality, whereas when you are advancing
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explanatory-retroductive substantive arguments in science you are talking
about more concrete features. In philosophy we talk about substance, whereas
a chemist would talk about iron or copper, which are substances and which
instantiate what the philosophy, if true, is saying about substance. The other
thing the objection overlooks is categorial realism. This is indispensable for
critical realism because otherwise you have a two-world, split ontology.
Critical realism avoids such a split by upholding a stratified and differentiated
monism that applies to the form of arguments as well, and of course the whole
project is to underlabour for emancipatory practices among which I include
science. I have always been concerned to elaborate a general conceptual
schema for the sciences.
MH: Yes, I think people who make the objection misconstrue underlabouring neg-
atively as doing a bit of conceptual tidying up or removing debris for the sci-
ences when in fact you have always been concerned with the more positive
side of this, that is, with delineating the general contours of the world at an
abstract level. 
RB: What A Realist Theory of Science says is shocking: that we have got science
wrong in our philosophy – what science discloses is something fantastic, a very
rich and deep world, and the nature of the disclosing, science itself, is an excit-
ing and arduous process of transformation and revolution that has been over-
looked in philosophy.
MH: Last time we agreed that the developmental logic of your thought has under-
gone three main phases: critical realism, dialectical critical realism, and the
philosophy of meta-Reality. Would you want to say that any of these were
more crucial or fundamental than the others? If we descend to the next level
of specificity and take your books, Ted Benton, for example, thinks A Realist
Theory of Science is your most important book,8 whereas I would be inclined to
say that Dialectic is, while recognising that it was possible only on the basis of
your previous work and is itself unfinished business. What do you think? With
the benefit of hindsight, what would you say were your most crucial and far-
reaching insights and breakthroughs? I have been struck during these inter-
views by the way in which you keep coming back to depth-stratification as a
fundamental lack in other positions, so perhaps you feel that that is the most
far-reaching? On the other hand, from an emancipatory point of view the 
theory of explanatory critique could be seen to be your most radical break-
through since it is pretty axiomatic in the scientific community that values are
science-free.
RB: The three great errors of western philosophy are the epistemic fallacy, onto-
logical monovalence, and what I call primal squeeze on the Platonic–
Aristotelian fault-line. The answer to primal squeeze is of course the alethic
depth-stratification of the world, which includes beliefs. So it is a very 
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important theme and can be very useful in pointing up a fundamentally cor-
rect intuition premised on lack of stratification. Thus for example when
Shankara talked about what I call demi-reality as an illusion, he did not clar-
ify that illusion is real, as real as steel; it is not just the absolute that is real. You
need the stratification of reality to situate this by transposing the realm of illu-
sion into the realm of demi-reality and seeing that as embedded within the
realm of duality, itself reposing on the realm of non-duality. But important as
it is, I would not say basic, first-level or -wave critical realism is more funda-
mental than the dialectical or spiritual moments or waves. I think what you
have in terms of the main phases of my thought is an asymmetry between pre-
suppositions and implications. You could argue that meta-Reality is the most
fundamental because it actually presupposes the other two, but it would be
equally logical to say that the transcendental realism of A Realist Theory of
Science is the most fundamental because it is a necessary condition for the oth-
ers. So there is a kind of asymmetry of presuppositions and implications. You
cannot really say that any one is more important than the other.
I would say the same of the major themes and theses of each of the main
phases. They are all fundamental. Here is a bare list. In that part of basic criti-
cal realism which is transcendental realism: the revindication of ontology
together with the method of transcendental arguments; the stratification you
have within it; and then the fact that you have emergence. In critical natural-
ism: the situation of intentional causality and therefore synchronic emergent
powers materialism as the mechanism by which mind acts on the world; the
transformational model of social activity; and the critique of Hume’s law.
These are fundamental to the project of social science and rational self-
emancipation. In dialectical critical realism, in relation to the first aim I set
myself, the dialectical deepening of critical realism: the extraction of the
rational kernel of Hegelian dialectic as the general form or logic of progressive
change; the isolation of the mystical shell, which is ontological monovalence or
the elimination of absence – which is fundamental to the logic of freedom,
because to understand praxis properly you have to see how all praxis is an
absenting of an absence; what I called the golden nugget or the co-presence of
absence and presence; and the platinum plate or the way in which philosophical
mistakes can point to the social absurdities and errors that underlie them. Then,
in relation to the second aim, the dialectics of freedom: the deepening of the
logic of emancipation to include the dialectic of desire to freedom and eudai-
monia. And then, third, the totalising critique of western philosophy. I have
perhaps not stressed enough that this metacritique isolates the general form of
irrealism, and that it points the way directly to the philosophy of identity in
meta-Reality. In meta-Reality, splits and alienations are resolved and embed-
ded within a rich, differentiated, and developing monistic structure. Then you
have the moments of this new philosophy of identity – the ground-state, the
cosmic envelope and the themes of non-duality, co-presence and so on. 
So that is really what I want to say. All these theses and themes are funda-
mentally important. You cannot say that one is more important than another.
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From one point of view the move to establish or vindicate ontology is the most
important, from another the view of ground-states lying on the cosmic envelope
and the dynamics I have recently been working on of how you get reconciliation
between human beings through ground-state to ground-state interaction is 
the most important, because this is the way we must move forward.
MH: You say that the metacritique of irrealism in the second wave points the way
directly to the concept of the ground-state and the philosophy of meta-
Reality. Would you say the same of your thematisation of absence and the
logic of freedom? What is the connection there?
RB: Yes. Human freedom is, and depends upon, the absenting of absences 
(constraints) and it is attained when we are flourishing in a eudaimonistic
society. For this, we must be at one with our ground-state; without that, there
is a constraint upon our well-being and flourishing imposed from withi .
MH: I turn now to the question of where we go from here. The question of the
political implications of critical realism, if any, recently surfaced – as it does
from time to time – on the Critical Realism List, and was discussed at some
length. Some feel that critical realism is above politics, or at any rate indiffer-
ent in its implications as between left and right; others feel that critical real-
ism has no political implications but that dialectical critical realism does;
others that it is a philosophy of the left. How would you summarise this mat-
ter? Would you describe yourself as a philosopher of the left?
RB: This is a very interesting question. What I would like to say is that in one sense
I agree with the claim that critical realism is above politics, and in another
sense I clearly am a philosopher of the left. The sense in which critical realism
is above politics is a synchronic one. It is above politics in that ex ante, before
it does its work, it does not take sides but typically seeks to show how appar-
ently contradictory philosophical positions leave out a crucial feature of the
domain – and this actually holds true of many human conflicts – and then of
course ex post, after the philosophical work of critical realism, you have a
more inclusive totality. And so critical realism attempts to usher in a more
inclusive conceptual totality that can inform transformative praxis and make
it more rational, ceteris paribus, in open systems. In transcending oppositions
in this way it does of course have practical implications. This is the way it seeks
to be a practically aefficacious philosophy. Diachronically, however, one has to
say that, adopting the standpoint I have sketched, which is roughly that of
dialectical critical realism, developmentally and genealogically critical real-
ism is a philosophy of the left in so far as it favours more inclusive totalities and
what it is doing is isolating absences that include social inequities and imbal-
ances that exist in social life, and it is this that powers the system. 
Of course, what I have said so far does not really get us very far if you have
two bodies of armed human beings confronting each other, for example.
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However, meta-Reality suggests a technique for resolving oppositions. 
To take the case of armed conflict, what the critical realist peace worker 
would basically try to do is to get the warring parties to sit down with each
other in their ground-states and talk to each other; and on the basis of that
hermeneutic they would, at least in the ideal case, come to see that they had a
common interest in tackling relevant common problems and constraints – it
might be a common bully or a structure of master–slave relations or a natural
constraint. The value of the hermeneutic encounter and the exchange of posi-
tions is that, when you are talking with someone in this way, you cannot in
general any longer be afraid of them, and if you are to go on in transcendental
identification with them, empathetically talking to them, you cannot at the
same time beat them up (you would be beating up what is now experienced as
part of yourself). Just being in a situation in which you have to talk to someone
means that you have to empathise with them a little, and so you begin to see
their point of view. Of course, it is easier to get the two parties to move to com-
mon ground that allows them to see how a practical reconciliation could be
achieved if you are armed with an explanatory critical theory. This will give
them a clear conception of the ground of their opposition and their mutual
interest in removing it. Very often it will also involve a crucial moment of
concrete utopianism in which the parties, having perhaps concluded that
there is no way they can do anything about the ground now, imagine a possi-
ble future. They will then need a third thing, which is a theory of transition –
how you actually get to it. All of this might allow some good strategic action
oriented to the removal of the ground and the construction of the concretely
utopianly imagined and envisioned realm. Now you cannot actually get this
hermeneutic off the ground unless you get them both in or moving towards
their ground-states. They are then in a state of maximal negentropy, maxi-
mally alert and maximally flexible – and many peace negotiations go astray
because the parties are just re-stating well-rehearsed positions. An instance of
something like this in practice was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
established by Nelson Mandela in South Africa after the ending of Apartheid
(the full experience of which has to be looked into). 
MH: Arguably what it fundamentally achieved was a reconciliation to the existing
class structure, the alethic untruth of which is currently becoming apparent.
RB: Yes, rather than the isolation under explanatory critical theory of the ground
that had to be removed. But you see, at the end of the day capitalism is not kept
in business by anything other than people, including the soldiers, and when
they walk away, then it will go, just as actually existing socialism in the Soviet
Union went. Change is ineluctable.
MH: Even considered diachronically, then, although it comes out of the tradition
of the left, there is a sense in which critical realism wants to go beyond left and
right. That is the overall trajectory: transcending the big oppositions.
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RB: When it stops moving towards that goal, the left becomes ostracised and part
of the problem. 
MH: The philosophy of meta-Reality gives an unequivocal metatheoretical
answer to the question of what is to be done: ‘What we have to do is, as Krishna
did in the Bhagavad Gita, resolve the problem of action by an expanded con-
ception of the self. The Leninist question “what is to be done?” has to be
resolved by asking the transcendental question “who am I?” or “what is the
self?”’9 What follows more concretely from this in terms of what is to be done,
in particular in relation to the Leninist answer?
RB: From the point of view of meta-Reality one wants a practice oriented to 
universal self-realisation at all levels of four-planar social being, including 
levels that do not explicitly thematise themselves as political. The practice 
of actually existing socialism, as we have discussed, was fixated on one 
level, namely the level of social structure and even so did not really attempt 
to carry out the socialist vision of that level, which was to transfer power to 
the immediate producers in the labour process. That was never done; instead,
one master–slave economy and society was replaced with another. The
Leninist project has to be radicalised to include all levels of social being. 
At the plane of the embodied personality, this immediately sets you on a 
path to self-realisation in which you are engaged in practice at all the other
planes of social being. And necessarily so because, as you become less egoisti-
cal and less full of heteronomous emotions and prejudices, you come to 
see that your own freedom depends on the freedom of everyone else and your
practice comes to be oriented to the abolition of master–slave relations 
everywhere, including master–slave relations you have internalised and 
master–slave relations you have imposed on nature. So what is to be done
involves breaking with the one-dimensionality of traditional projects for
socialism. 
The only way I can conceive the good society for humans being achieved is
through the freeing up of our agency by the abolition of heteronomous ele-
ments that impede it wherever it is. If you can transform relations at the work-
place, that is what you must do. If you cannot do this, then you must improve
relations in your family, and of course you might have to take tactical deci-
sions. Gandhi, for example, was notoriously bad with his family and many of
his friends. This was a necessity, he felt, for the sake of the role he could play
in the struggle for Indian freedom. Very few people today would accept that
kind of justification, and that is probably a good thing, because we want to aim
as high as we can. Moreover, this vision does not deny that there might be dif-
ficult decisions that you have to take in the realm of necessity. So while polit-
ical change requires a concerted orientation to, and attack on, all planes of
social being, the dominant moment is going to be that of our transformed
transformative praxis, and that amounts to engaged self-realisation oriented
to the project of universal self-realisation. 
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MH: In From Science to Emancipation you explicitly link the question of what 
is to be done, and the necessary change in our conception of our selves, to 
‘the politics of disenchantment’, the politics of Nietzsche and Weber 
and the politics of social democracy . . . which has so profoundly influ-
enced the politics of the left. We need to produce a different conception
of ourselves in the world. The revolution will be nothing less than this:
the transformation of our understanding of ourselves and of the whole
world in which we live, our situation in the cosmos.10
It could be, then, that one of the ways forward at the level of philosophy is a
closer engagement with Nietzsche. Of course, at one level, in terms of politi-
cal implications, as in other ways, there could not be a greater contrast. In a
definitive recent study, the Italian Hegelian scholar, Dominico Losurdo,11 has
shown pretty convincingly that, contrary to the fashionable view that he was
above politics, Nietzsche was through and through a philosopher of the right,
the great modern antagonist of Rousseau, Marx and generalised human eman-
cipation. Thus Nietzsche’s consistent basic concern was to nip the modern
revolutionary tradition in the bud, whereas yours has been to rejuvenate and
enrich it. Nietzsche’s perspective is that of the unmediated domination of a
revitalised master-class, yours is the transcendence of master–slavery in all its
forms. Where Nietzsche thematises will to power and egoism unbridled by
altruism, you thematise moral alethia and the pulse of freedom. Yet arguably,
precisely because Nietzsche is such a great champion of the master-classes, he
has much to teach us from an emancipatory point of view: the impossibility of
founding a eudaimonian politics on resentment, for example, and the need to
move beyond slavery and any kind of overmanliness as such, as well as diag-
nostic clues to the real basis of the current round of the ‘imperialism of human
rights’, which he exposes as a sham.
RB: It is important to have an understanding and a good critique of Nietzsche and
Nietzscheanism. The first thing I would like to say is that what has been called
the hermeneutics of suspicion is extremely valuable and is an important part
of critical realist emancipatory axiology, because what it draws attention to
are precisely the heteronomous elements in human life: the power and aeffi-
cacy of what has not been resolved. This links in to my second point, which is
a critical one: that Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism is a philosophy based on the
repression, denial and forgetting of what has not been included in the totality;
it is a philosophy of split in which some values and some human beings are
privileged over other human beings, issuing in a politics of split. The whole
thrust of Nietzscheanism is to forget what you must forget, which of course in
our world is that the masters exist in virtue of the slaves and their activity.
Freud has shown that the strategy of forgetting is untenable. The conscious
exists in virtue of the unconscious, you cannot just forget about the uncon-
scious. What you have to do is redress the imbalance, the asymmetry, between
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the top component and the bottom component. If you forget about it, you are
excluding it from the totality of your concerns and will pay the price of this
omission. The strategy of forgetting is however typically the standpoint or
position of oppressing masters; it is what the neo-conservatives around Bush
did: they forgot about the culture and traditions of Iraq, and the vibrant Iraqi
human beings – all became just part of the project.
MH: The neo-conservatives are incarnations of the Nietzschean philosophy.
RB: Absolutely. So the Achilles’ heel of Nietzscheanism is that it draws attention
to heteronomy, and then the impossible answer is forget about it – do not
bother about it, rise above it. Of course, this is the very dualistic standpoint of
radical split and master–slave society. So what we have to do is situate both the
Nietzschean problem and the Nietzschean answer within the structures of
dialectical critical realism and meta-Reality, within a moving conceptual for-
mation that will incorporate the repressed and resolve this aporia. What
Nietzscheanism overlooks or neglects is not only that what has been forgotten,
denied or repressed is (1) actually part of a totality with, and (2) bound even-
tually to be causally aefficacious on, the unforgotten, affirmed part, but also –
and this is my third point – the dialectics of co-presence, namely, that (3) what
is excluded is just the unrecognised or undeveloped part of yourself. Such
exclusion is the basis of all oppositions according to the philosophy of meta-
Reality. The person you are fighting with is just bringing out or developing
aspects of yourself that you have not acknowledged. That is at the deepest level.
Of course, at more superficial levels you can apply other modes of criticism and
understanding, but at the end of the day that is what the repressed is. The
repressed is what you yourself have not developed. And when you have devel-
oped it – this is the thrust of Freud – there is then no need to repress it at all
because it will now be part of your moral economy in sublated or sublimated
form. It is of course very difficult actually to achieve a society that incorporates
all the oppressed such that there are no longer any master–slave-type distinc-
tions and oppressions, but that is the only position that is tenable. Sooner or
later this process of sublating and radically incorporating will yield joy, you will
experience those bits of yourself that you have left out as enjoyable and reward-
ing and wonder why you did not think about and acknowledge this before. 
MH: So in fundamental ways your philosophy could be viewed as a response to
Nietzsche: if you think in terms of thesis, antithesis, synthesis you have some-
thing like Hegel/Marx, Nietzsche, Bhaskar. But I take it you did not con-
sciously intend this; you do not engage with Nietzsche in detail, it is mostly
implicit.
RB: I am not sure whether I will have time to get round to it but of course it might
be that this way of looking at my work is the best way, in which case I will have
to make time. There is no doubt that Nietzsche together with Heidegger, who
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combines Nietzsche and hermeneutics, are the most influential philosophers
in the vogue part of the academy at any rate, because they are the thinkers the
poststructuralists are mainly indebted to. 
MH: I think it was Gary MacLennan who first described the critical realist project
as a ‘long march’ through the academy, and it strikes me as in some ways pretty
apt. It is not just a matter of ‘winning the intellectual high ground’ for eudai-
monia, as you have put it,12 but of getting the dialectics of emancipation going
in the sense of a proliferating array of progressive research programmes organ-
ically articulated with wider social movements. The weakness of this strategy
seems to me the structural positioning of your typical academic as prone to
insecurity and careerism. Standing in the way is thus one of the main sources
of error in western philosophy on your own account, fear of change. What is to
be done?
RB: I think you are absolutely right about the insecurity and careerism of the typi-
cal academic. This is a long-standing structural feature of intellectuals.
Throughout the written history of civilisations, at any rate, they have been a
dependent stratum, and today the academy is very implicated in the structures
of government, globalisation, market fundamentalism and so on. They are
thus even more vulnerable than they have been historically. The only way you
can overcome this is to cultivate a sense of solidarity within the academy. The
critical realist workshop in Cambridge, the new Institute of Advanced Studies
in Lancaster, and the critical realist book series with Routledge indicate some
ways forward. Then you have the autonomous institutions of critical realism:
the Centre for Critical Realism (CCR), the developing International Centre
for Critical Realism and Education/Education Studies (CCRES), the
International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) together with its jour-
nal (Journal of Critical Realism), and within IACR you have regional bodies
such as the Australasian Association for Critical Realism and the Nordic
Network of Critical Realism, and also developing national bodies such as the
Danish Network of Critical Realism and new thematically oriented groupings
such as the Critical Realism in Action Group in the UK.
MH: There might well soon be a Latin American Association arising out of the
2009 IACR conference in Rio.
RB: There are signs that things are happening in North America too, partly as a
result of the Philadelphia conference in 2007, and something like this has
been on the cards in India for some time too. A European-wide network could
also be in the offing. Also encouraging are recent developments in Italy,
France and Germany, which for a long time were difficult constituencies for
critical realism to gain a foothold in because they have their own, very strong
national traditions. In Italy there is a great deal of critical realist activity,
including translations of books such as The Possibility of Naturalism and an
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Italian critical realist reader. There is also a project for a French reader and in
Berlin this academic year there has been a weekly seminar in critical realism.
We already have relatively better reception in Iberia and in Greece, together
with the growth of critical realism within the Nordic areas. That leaves 
eastern Europe, but there are things happening there too. I was recently asked
to go and do interviews in Moscow, and Jamie Morgan stepped into my shoes
when I could not find the time. There is also quite a strong critical realist 
presence in Turkey.
MH: Japan is perhaps another. There are institutions subscribing to the journal.
RB: That’s right, and there are Japanese translations now of A Realist Theory of
Science and The Possibility of Naturalism. There is also a Korean translation of
one of my books. The philosophy of meta-Reality, as the work of Seo MinGyu
suggests, holds out the prospect of a reappraisal of Taoism and Confucianism
that might attract interest in China. And then of course there is considerable
interest in South Asia, especially India, and southern Africa. So this is the way
forward in the academy.
MH: What about outside the academy – where do we go there? 
RB: There is no general answer, but if you take specific cases then you can see a way
forward. You have to look at this problem in a concretely singular way. In some
countries there are strong traditions of self-education and self-improvement
that can be tapped into, for example in America and then of course India.
Again, many research projects have a proleptically organic form that necessi-
tates involvement with people outside the academy. You cannot really do a
project on health workers or social workers without talking to them and that
gives rise to the possibility of setting up discussion groups and workshops. In
Sweden, as a consequence, there are I think very few social workers who do
not know something about critical realism. I have been to Umeå a couple of
times, where there is an excellent critical realist presence in the academy, but
many of these are not conventional academics – they include for instance
organic intellectuals with strong roots in the social work community. I call
such persons ‘organic critical realists’. Sweden is of course a special case, but
one will have particularities in each context. In the case of Australia, for
example, there is much critical realist work being done in education studies
that often involves organic links to communities. One of the first areas in
which critical realism caught on was in management and organisational stud-
ies and management science, so there is interest in critical realism even in the
business community. If you think of business as an enemy, that is fine, but do
remember there are critical realists in the business schools. It is obviously a
long struggle to make critical realism part of the common sense of the age, but
it is important to remember, as we have discussed, that critical realism is
already implicit in everyday life, and this is a tremendous resource.
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MH: Considered as an intellectual tradition, critical realism is by any standard
pretty impressive, as you have indicated. In little more than thirty years it has
become a genuinely international movement, underlabouring for a rich array
of research programmes across the social sciences and increasingly in the
humanities, with growing interest in some of the non-human sciences. Yet
this is not without seeming paradox. In particular, one notes that its impact in
philosophy has been much less marked than in social theory and the social sci-
ences, though this is changing, and that, in the main intellectual vehicles of
left and left-liberal opinion, such as (in the UK) Radical Philosophy, New left
Review, or London Review of Books, philosophers such as Alain Badiou, Giles
Deleuze and Slavoj Z
S
iz
S
ek, who cannot match you in terms of impact across the
academy as distinct from some sections within it, are far more in vogue than
yourself.13 What is your take on this apparent paradox?
RB: I am quite happy for you to give your reasons for it and ask me to comment on
them.
MH: I would adduce three main reasons. (1) Because of its emphasis in an age of
judgemental relativism and actualism on scientific knowledge as necessary for
emancipation, first-level critical realism (hence, for some, your whole proj-
ect) is wrongly regarded as scientistic or even positivist in some quarters. (2)
Most left philosophy ultimately operates in a fundamental sense within the
tradition of western philosophy and within the paradigm of the bourgeois
enlightenment. Your totalising metacritique of both, issuing ultimately in the
spiritual turn, is experienced as threatening in an academy not much given to
dialectic and where the default position is atheism. (3) Relatedly, your 
philosophy is, perhaps uniquely, uncompromisingly revolutionary and anti-
capitalist. Quite a few critical realists, let alone mainstream scholars, reject
explanatory critique (the move from facts to values), not to mention the eman-
cipatory axiology of the dialectical turn and ‘the universal silent revolution’14
of the spiritual one. It strikes me that, to be more in vogue while capitalism
(notwithstanding that it is now in deep crisis) still seems to most the only game
in town, you would need to be operating on the terrain of modernism and post-
modernism, that is, fundamentally within the problematic of the philosophical
discourse of modernity rather than diagnosing its problematicity as crucially
linked to our power
2
-stricken condition and transcending it from within in an
attempt to move to a new paradigm of enlightenment. In sum: science, dialec-
tic and spirituality, and revolutionism, both philosophical and practical.
If I had to choose between the three, I would pick the first. Notwithstanding
the important qualifications about fallibilism and epistemic relativity, you
have been above all on about alethic truth and its indispensability for human
emancipation. That is what the left and left-liberal avant garde, in an age of
spin and institutionalised lying for which they help to provide a rationale,
finds so unpalatable. Thus whereas Z
S
iz
S
ek, for example, emphatically endorses
Hegel’s subjective anthropic and actualist view that there is nothing behind
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the ‘curtain’ of appearances that veils reality other than what the subject who
goes behind it to look puts there herself, such that there are no ‘objective
social fact[s]’,15 you demonstrate that this view entails the anomaly of a second
self-consciousness appearing ‘out of the blue’ in the dialectic of master and
slave, which only the alethic truth of our common humanity as a natural kind
and of the priority of dialectics of solidarity, trust and love over those of recog-
nition can resolve.16 Eric Hazan, commenting on the scene in France today,
has put the general point well:
It makes little sense to demand transparency: the appointment of commit-
tees of inquiry, mediators, observers, high authorities of all kinds; what we
need to demand is the truth. But that would run against one of the basic
postulates of the postmodern thinking that guides the champions of ‘prag-
matism’ and inspires their speeches, in which the word ‘concretely’
appears in every other sentence. According to this postulate, truth is a 
relative notion, a matter of interpretations between which it is impossible
to decide, each of them casting a distorted reflection on the others.17
‘What we need to demand is the truth.’ That, for me, is your fundamental 
message, and what I most deeply appreciate in your work. It is one that is out
of kilter with its age, for central to all the main tendencies of the philosophy
of late modernity is the displacement of the metaphysics of truth by the ques-
tion of language and meaning.18
RB: I think I agree with the three main reasons you give. What is really important
to remember about the stress on science is that I do not see science as being
opposed to humanity; there is not a contrast between science and the realm of
humanity, culture, and history, nor in particular is there another contrast
between science and emancipation. Science properly understood, which is
the crucial thing, is an agent of emancipation, and what I think we have to
stress here is that for critical realism science is always specific to its subject-
matter. Positivism’s standard received view of science is doubly wrong in the
field of the human world, because it is not an account of what natural science
does, let alone of what social science or any other form of science does.
Undoubtedly the fact that critical realism starts from science lends itself to the
charge of scientism, so let me just reiterate why I started there. I started from
science because it was the most prestigious intellectual practice and I was con-
cerned about problems of poverty and so on in the Third World. It was obvi-
ous to me that we needed to understand, first, what the problem was, then to
correct it. So it was a pragmatic interest in science that initially led me to for-
mulate the critical realist project. It is true that science has yielded some
extraordinarily impressive cognitive structures, and that Marx, Freud and
other agents of liberation could see themselves as scientists. That is all on the
positive side. What we have to understand is that, if you have a subject-
matter that you want to study scientifically, you are in principle free to argue
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the case for any method, providing it is grounded in some way in the nature of 
your subject-matter. There are certain moves that one might see as essential to
science given such a wide brief. One is the attempt to move from the already
known, given, superficial or obvious to its explanation; another is that what
you discover must be of potential utility for the project of human emancipa-
tion. Those are virtually the only constraints. So I really cannot understand
objections to critical realism on the grounds that it is scientistic, and of course
critical realism is very critical of the abusive practices of science. 
MH: These objections come from people who reject or are hostile to science – in
theory, although not often in practice.
RB: There are of course, as I have mentioned, those who think that critical realism
is not scientific enough, for example in its theory of emergence. But that 
theory is posited precisely on a critique of reductionist science.
The second thing you mention is dialectic and spirituality. Now a big opposi-
tion is normally posited here between the emphasis on self and emphasis on soci-
ety, but again I think what I have done in the theory of universal self-realisation
is break this opposition down. The way to be a good social agent is to be in touch
with and informed by your ground-state; you cannot then be oblivious to struc-
tural sin and ecological degradation, you must be an active agent involved in
remedying them. Revolutionism, specifically anti-capitalism, has been opposed
by many to spirituality. But you cannot ground capitalism in any religion that I
know of. It systematically promotes gross sins, whether personal sins such as
greed and avarice, or social sins such as the exploitation of your fellow human
beings and insensitivity to their suffering. There is nothing in common between
capitalism and spirituality. Just as we have a social spirituality, so we have more
specifically an anti-capitalist one; an anticapitalist spirituality that does not
neglect the self: in other words the onus is on you to make yourself a better per-
son and a better agent of social change. This entails working on yourself, which
means getting rid of your jealousies and prejudices. And actually I would add
being in favour of emancipation to your trio of science, dialectic and spirituality,
and revolutionism. There is a bit of us that does not like emancipation, that
wants to remain stuck in master–slavery, and so is very concerned to flatten 
the emancipatory impulse. This is definitely one of the malign effects of
Nietzscheanism. That is, if you talk about emancipation rather than supremacy
then you are on the side of the slaves, in a context in which human beings have
internalised master–slave relations. So in looking at your philosophy they will
identify with the master in the dialectic of master and slave, and not like its out-
come; they will take the side of the master without realising that the element of
authentic mastery in their own personal lives is minimal.
MH: Nietzsche was right, they are pathetic.
RB: That is the value of understanding Nietzsche, although not of adopting a
Nietzschean approach to life. So this is what I call a flattening. And that goes
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on in the academy as well, because any philosophy that is really going to make
a difference is avoided like death. So I would say the fourth thing is the eman-
cipatory impulse; that is the reason why critical realism is not in vogue –
although it is attracting a lot of attention from those who really want to know. 
MH: Emancipation entails revolution. 
RB: Of course it does. I would add that, in so far as there is a touchstone, that must
be truth. Truth is not something we make, it is something we discover and so
the alethic conception of truth is very important, and arguably perhaps – I am
agreeing with you – the single most important moment. 
MH: It’s implicit in the others – presupposed.
RB: It is. Unless you are committed to the truth you will be undermined: reality
will get back at you. You might not live to see it as an embodied physical being,
but you will not be well judged by posterity.
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Endnotes
1 Childhood and adolescence
1 Bhaskar 2000: 4 et passim.
2 Gujranwala has since developed into a city of more than a million inhabitants, the fifth
largest in Pakistan.
3 Wikipedia, ‘Theosophy’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theosophy. See also especially
Blavatsky 1995. 
4 In orthodox Hinduism there were so many incarnations of Vishnu, who can be loosely
related to God the Son in the Christian trinity. [RB].
5 ‘Heathen’ or ‘pagan’ was a commonly used descriptor throughout the British Empire
(and also in Western Europe and North America) for any person not of European
descent who practised a non-Christian religion. Something of the opprobrium it con-
veyed, together with its far-flung pervasiveness, was brought home to me [MH] during a
recent visit to the town cemetery in Gympie, Queensland, Australia, where my parents
are buried: the cemetery is segregated not only on both class (‘private’ and ‘public’) and
Euro-denominational (Church of England, Methodist, Roman Catholic, etc.) lines but
also has a special (‘public’) ‘Pagan’ section containing the remains of Aboriginal
Australians, South Sea Islanders, Chinese, South Asians and so on.
6 ‘It is alarming and nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now
posing as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half naked up the steps of the
vice-regal palace, while he is still organising and conducting a campaign of civil disobe-
dience, to parlay on equal terms with the representative of the Emperor-King’ (Winston
Churchill c mmenting in the House of Commons on Gandhi’s meeting with the
Viceroy of India in 1931, quoted in Ashe 1968: 37). 
2 Oxford days
1 Bhaskar 2002c: 299. 
2 Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 11.
3 Harré 1970. 
4 Cf. Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 164, n. 39. Contrary to a common view that Harré was, with
Bhaskar, co-founder of critical realism, it thus seems probable that, to the extent that he
was, for a time, a transcendental realist, Harré was far more influenced by Bhaskar than
vice versa. He had been reading Bhaskar’s manuscripts since the second half of 1970. A
Realist Theory of Science was completed in its present form as a thesis in the first term of
1974 and published as a book in December 1974. The book in which Harré’s (transient)
realism is perhaps most full-blooded (Rom Harré and E. H. Madden (1975) Causal
Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity) appeared in the following year.
5 For an account of one aspect of this, see Pratten 2009, esp. 200–5. 
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6 The development of the philosophical system of critical realism and meta-Reality falls
into three main stages: critical realism (transcendental realism and critical naturalism),
dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of meta-Reality. ‘First-level’ or ‘basic’ (or
‘first-wave’ or ‘original’) critical realism refers to the first of these stages, not just to 1M
in the MELDARA schema. [RB]. 
7 Cf. note 4, above.
8 Since published as Harré 2009.
9 Bhaskar 2002c: 200. 
10 ‘Great spirits have always found violent opposition from mediocrities. The latter cannot
understand it when a man does not thoughtlessly submit to hereditary prejudices but
honestly and courageously uses his intelligence’ (The New York Times, March 19, 1940).
Rejection of a highly creative academic thesis is thus by no means a fate unique to
Bhaskar (although rejection of two such theses which both became famous books in
their own right doubtless belongs in The Guinness Book of Records). When in 1925
Walter Benjamin’s The Origins of German Tragic Drama was rejected by the University
of Frankfurt as a Habilitationschrift, his professors adopted the strategy of the examiners
of Bhaskar’s first thesis (ignore it and hope it will go away), declaring that they were
unable to find anything in the thesis relating to the topic (the philosophy of art). See
Brodersen 1996: 146–50.
11 In so far as the anti-cringer shares this inability, anti-cringer and cringer are, in
Bhaskar’s later terminology, tacitly complicit dialectical antagonists whose opposition
is ultimately phoney. Cringing/anti-cringing has its counterpart within the critical real-
ist movement in the inability of some to acknowledge the philosophical stature of
Bhaskar in a mature way, issuing in a tendency to puff their own work at the expense of
his; or to recognise that metatheory necessarily and appropriately proceeds at a high
level of abstraction, issuing in the inverse elitism of those who hold that it should be
written in ‘plain English’.
3 Beyond empiricism and transcendental idealism
1 Hilary Wainwright (1949–) is the founding editor of Red Pepper. She read PPE at 
St Anne’s College, Oxford, graduating in 1970. She gained a BPhil in Sociology 
from St Antony’s College, Oxford in 1973 (http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Hilary_
Wainwright).
2 Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 47.
3 Bunge 1977 and 1979. 
4 Callinicos 2006: 159.
5 E.g. Bhaskar 2002a: 14. 
6 Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 37.
7 Ibid.: 250.
8 Ibid.: 195; cf. 180–1.
9 Porpora 2007: 425.
10 Groff 2004: ch. 5.
11 Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 21.
12 Bhaskar 2002d: 67–93, 83–4.
13 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 335 and Bhaskar 2000: 24 n. 4.
14 See Tyfield 2007a, and also ‘The debate about transcendental arguments in critical 
realism’, presentation to the seminar launch of Dictionary of Critical Realism, Institute of
Education, London, 17 March 2007. See also Agar 2006 and David Tyfield’s 2008
review of this book. 
15 Westphal 2004. See the 2005 review essay of Westphal’s book by Jamie Morgan. 
16 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 224f.
17 Paul Eluard, cited in White [1966] 1969: epigraph.
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18 It is important not to confuse ‘categorical’ here with ‘categorial’, as in ‘categorial real-
ism’. Categorial realism refers to the existence of the categories (causality, law, etc.)
independently of the categorising mind or community. Categorical as opposed to 
dispositional properties are those which constitute or inhere in a thing itself rather than
its behaviour. [RB]
19 Groff 2009: 269–70.
20 Bhaskar [1975] 2008: 259.
21 Ibid.: 260.
22 Ibid.: 196.
23 Ibid.: 262.
24 Farnell forthcoming 2010.
25 Proleptically, this points the way to the concrete universal and stands to the emergence
of 3L as emergence itself stands to that of 2E. [RB] 
4 The critical realist embrace
1 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 48. 
2 Ibid.: 137.
3 Ibid.: 173.
4 See Hartwig, ‘Duality and dualism’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 149–50.
5 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 154–60.
6 Archer 2000: 87.
7 Jessop 2005: 47.
8 In Dialectic and subsequently, Bhaskar usually employs ‘social cube’ to refer to a sub-cube
of four-planar social being comprising power
2
, discursive/communicative and 
normative/moral relations, intersecting in ideology. See Hartwig, ‘Human nature’ and
‘Social cube’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 243–4 and 420–1.
9 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 97–8.
10 Bhaskar, 2000: 86.
11 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 90, 101f.
12 Dean 2007. We are grateful to Kathryn Dean for permission to cite this paper. The
quotes are from Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 103, 105.
13 World Health Organisation 1980. 
14 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 100; see also 29, 35, 81, 112.
15 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 129.
16 Bhaskar 1994: 103.
17 Dean 2007: 15f.
18 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 113–14.
19 Jenny Cobner typed the current manuscript from a recording. The exclamation marks
are hers.
5 ‘Prolegomenon to a natural history of the human species’
1 Jameson 1984. 
2 For a trenchant (immanent and explanatory) critique of the ‘postmarxist’ strand of post-
modernism/poststructuralism in the last two decades of the twentieth century from a
perspective that has strong affinities with critical realism, that of structural Marxism, see
Boucher 2008.
3 Bhaskar 1989: 1.
4 Will 1980 and 1986. 
5 Collier 1977.
6 For evidence that it is currently coming back into fashion, together with an indication
of the striking fit between Freudian thought and critical realism, see Kran forthcoming
2010.
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7 Cohen 1978 and Timpanaro 1976.
8 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: ‘Preface’.
9 An earlier, incomplete, version of this Table appears in Hartwig, ‘Introduction’ to
Bhaskar [1986] 2009: xiii.
10 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 16.
11 Ibid.: 18–19.
12 Ibid.: 12.
13 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 173.
14 See also Hartwig, ‘Ecological asymmetry’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 152.
15 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 104.
16 Ibid.: 149.
17 Ibid.: 215.
18 The concept ‘rhythm’ (in Dialectic, ‘rhythmic’) is deployed in the sense of ‘a space-time
flow’ (see ibid.: 213, 220).
19 Ibid.: 181.
20 E.g. Bhaskar, ‘General introduction’, in Archer, Collier, Lawson and Norrie (eds) 1998:
xvii–xix; Bhaskar and Collier, ‘Introduction: explanatory critiques’, in ibid.: 385–94.
21 Bhaskar 1989: 187.
22 E.g. Hammersley 2002.
23 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 142.
24 Ibid.: 201.
25 For an excellent recent account, see Glyn 2006. 
26 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 182. See also Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 60 n. 84, 177 and Bhaskar
1989: 6.
27 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 207, 209, original emphasis. 
28 Bill Bowring, ‘Legal studies’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 278.
29 Bhaskar 1989: 7.
30 Assiter and Noonan 2007: 179.
31 Ibid.: 189.
32 Hartwig, ‘Concrete utopianism’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 74–5.
33 Bhaskar 1989: 6.
34 Collier 2008: 279.
35 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 307–8.
36 The idea of a Tina formation is already present in all but name in Bhaskar [1979] 1998:
19–20, 122.
37 See Bhaskar 1989: chs 3, 8.
38 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 308.
39 Bhaskar 2002b: 84–5.
40 Bhaskar 1989: 10.
41 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 250.
42 Ibid.: 25, 291.
43 Ibid.: 292.
6 The axiology of freedom
1 See Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 7n.
2 ‘When I started out people who had been influenced by my work found themselves fre-
quently marginalised in academic life. They had extreme difficulty in getting critical
realist papers published, and I found myself acting as a sort of one person support mech-
anism for people influenced by my work. It was helped a little by the publication of books
by Ted Benton, Russell Keat, John Urry and others – and it began to develop an aca-
demic reputation. Nevertheless, there was still a feeling of isolation and fragmentation.
Then four of us got together – myself, Ted Benton, Andrew Collier and William
Outhwaite – in the early 1980s, and we would begin by discussing important theses 
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in philosophy and end up by discussing what was wrong with the state of politics or 
whatever. Out of that was born the Realism and the Human Sciences conferences 
movement. From 1983, we had annual conferences, characterised by friendliness and
intellectual stimulation, solidarity and great enjoyment. Not really marked by
careerism, position taking, fractious argument, but a real sense of comradeship and an
idea of the exploration of truth’ (Roy Bhaskar, interviewed by Christopher Norris, The
Philosopher’s Magazine 8 [1999]; reproduced at http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalreal-
ism/ archive/ rbhaskar_rbi.html). The Realism and the Human Sciences conferences con-
tinued until 1994. They were the precursors of the International Association for Critical
Realism conferences, sponsored initially by the Centre for Critical Realism, that have
been held annually since 1997.
3 E.g. Creaven 2007: 37.
4 E.g. Joseph 2002: 13.
5 See Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 47n.
6 See e.g. Davies [2006] 2007: 91–3.
7 E.g. Creaven 2007: 63.
8 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 377.
9 See ibid.: 344.
10 Ibid.: 49.
11 Arthur 2002: 63 (paraphrasing Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, §63).
12 Collier 2002: 88–114, 162. See also Collier 2008.
13 Hartwig, ‘Ont/de-ont’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 333. As Tobin Nellhaus has pointed out
on the Critical Realism List, the entry is mistaken in postulating an etymological con-
nection between the Bhaskarian concept ‘de-ont’ (a negative being) and ‘deon’ (one of
the two Greek roots for ‘deontology’). The ‘de-’ in ‘de-ont’ is the Latin preposition in its
meaning of ‘away from’, not the Greek conjunctive particle ‘de’.
14 Hartwig, ‘Alethia’, in ibid.: 24.
15 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 200.
16 Ruth Groff, ‘Truth’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 487, and Groff 2004: 85.
17 Hegel [1969] 1997: 755–7, original emphasis.
18 Groff 2004: 82–3.
19 Callinicos 2006 devotes a number of pages (173–9) to the critical realist conception of
truth without mentioning alethic truth. 
20 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 371.
21 Ibid.: 362. See also Bhaskar 1994: 133, 220, 243.
22 See especially Bhaskar 2000: 37, 56.
23 E.g. Collier 2008. 
24 Creaven 2007: 69. 
25 Jamie Morgan 2007: 117–25, 121 (‘Change is not motivated because actual explanatory
mechanisms are not set out which promulgate emancipation’); Alan Norrie 2005: 107.
Norrie has since abandoned this view.
26 Callinicos 2006: 158.
27 Callinicos, in Bhaskar and Callinicos 2003: 95.
28 Heikki Patomäki 2001: 158. 
29 Callinicos 2006: 159 (‘It would seem better to strip away the transcendental superstruc-
ture that obscures what is interesting and original in Bhaskar’s work and offer it simply
as a philosophical presentation of the world as revealed to us by the sciences.’) 
30 Creaven 2007: 50.
31 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 333.
32 Bhaskar 1994: 209.
33 Collier 2007: 110–16. 
34 Collier 2007: ‘Power
1.5
’, 114; Morgan 2007: 121; Creaven 2007: 51–2, 59.
35 E.g. Creaven 2007: 53–5.
36 Bhaskar 1994: 154.
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37 Norrie forthcoming 2009. We are grateful to Alan Norrie for letting us see a draft of this
work.
38 Creaven 2007: 5, 37, 325f.
39 Radha D’Souza, ‘Colonialism, neo-colonialism, post-colonialism’, in Hartwig (ed.)
2007: 69–70.
40 Bhaskar 1994: 236.
41 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 104.
42 Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Problem’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 381–4, 381. The quote from Popper
is taken from Morgan 2004: 334. The second quote is from Bhaskar 1994: 9.
43 Bhaskar argues that the problems of philosophy have their source ultimately in the gen-
erative separation (alienation) that inaugurates and underpins master–slave society and
their ‘real resolution’ only in its transcendence via transformative praxis. It follows that,
if philosophers really want to resolve ‘their problems’, they should devote their energies
to the eudaimonian project. See the discussion in Bhaskar 1994, ‘Appendix: explaining
philosophies’, especially §3, ‘On the problems of philosophy and their real resolution’,
which invokes Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.
44 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 13.
45 Bhaskar 1991. 
46 The preface to Plato Etc. adds a further projected volume to this list: Critical History of
Western Philosophy. Dialectic, Plato Etc., Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Dialectical Social
Theory were conceived of as a quartet devoted to carrying through ‘an anti-Parmenidean
revolution, reversing 2500 years of philosophical thought’ (Bhaskar 1994: xi).
Philosophical Ideologies developed the metacritique
2
of irrealism sketched in the
Appendix to Plato Etc. And it was intended that Critical History of Western Philosophy
should flesh out the critical history outlined in the last two chapters of the same book.
7 The spiritual turn
1 Cf. Bhaskar 2002c: xi: ‘In genealogical terms, elaboration of this moment of non-dual-
ity occurred to me by reflection [on] the way in which there was a non-algorithmic
moment in any scientific revolution, discovery or even ordinary learning, that is a
moment of pure creativity which could not be derived from induction or deduction or
any mechanical formula.’
2 See especially p. 76, where ‘the driving impulse of the book’ is said to be ‘love for, and
desire to be one with, the divine’. 
3 Archer, Collier and Porpora 2004.
4 The propositions and debate are recorded in Bhaskar 2002c: 145–64. 
5 Bhaskar 2000: 40–50.
6 Bhaskar first deployed the concept of ‘structural sin’ in From East to West (2000): 37.
7 Pope John Paul II, Solicitudo Rei Socialis [On Social Concern], 1987.
8 The interviews were conducted in a hotel dining area.
9 Something of my initial hostility is recorded in Hartwig 2001: 139–65, which, however,
may also be viewed as transitional towards my current, far more positive assessment.
10 Callinicos 2006: 158.
11 Bhaskar 2000: 103, n. 10.
12 See Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Epistemological dialectic’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 176.
13 Seo 2008: 5–28. In From Science to Emancipation (p. ix), Bhaskar brackets transcenden-
tal dialectical critical realism with critical realism in a context that sharply 
differentiates critical realism ‘in all its forms’ from the philosophy of meta-Reality.
14 Collier 2001: 22. Collier does however argue that reincarnation (like resurrection) is
compatible with critical realism.
15 Bhaskar 2002a: 364.
16 Bhaskar [1979] 1998: 98.
17 Potter 2006: 93.
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18 Bhaskar 2000: 134.
19 Ibid.: 6, n. 5.
20 Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Demi-reality’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 113.
21 Bhaskar 1994: 123n.
22 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 64, 73n, 115, 194, 198, 274, 310.
23 Bhaskar 2002d: 68.
24 Hamilton 2007: 92.
8 The philosophy of unity-in-difference
1 The Philosophy of Meta-Reality, Volume 2, Between East and West: Comparative Religion
and Spirituality in an Age of Global Crisis; The Philosophy of Meta-Reality, Volume 3, 
Re-enchanting Reality: A Critique of Modernity and Modernisation; The Philosophy of 
Meta-Reality, Volume 4, Work In: A Manual; Fathoming the Depths of Reality: Savita Singh
in Conversation with Roy Bhaskar.
2 Seo MinGyu 2008. 
3 See Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Introduction’ to Bhaskar [1986] 2009.
4 Bhaskar 2002a: 152–3.
5 E.g. the deep ecology movement, the proliferating organisations for which the journals
Kosmos (http://www.kosmosjournal.org/) and Integral Review (http://integral-review.
org/) provide a focus and the work of Michael Lerner and associates in America, leading
to the formation of the Network of Spiritual Progressives in 2005 (www.spiritualpro-
gressives.org/). Terry Eagleton’s The Meaning of Life (2007) is a sign of the times, and the
‘new atheism’ is in important ways an alarmed response to a resurgent spirituality, albeit
focused largely on the fundamentalist right. For accounts of its resurgence, see
Benedikter 2006; Berger (ed.) 1999; Job forthcoming 2009; and Heelas and Woodhead
2005. For the renewal of interest in the transcendent with the waning of modernity, see
McGrath 2008: ch. 2. For the recent ‘(re)turn to religion’ in philosophy, see e.g. Bradley
2004; Roberts 2008; Davis, Milbank and Z
S
iz
S
ek (eds) 2005; and Z
S
iz
S
ek and Milbank 2009.
Eagleton 2009, esp. ch. 4, offers a broad contextualisation of resurgent spirituality that
chimes in important ways with a critical realist approach.
6 Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Preface’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: xvi; Seo MinGyu 2008. 
7 Collier, ‘Emancipation, social and spiritual’, in Archer, Collier and Porpora 2004: 173. 
8 Philip Tew, ‘Literary theory’, in Hartwig (ed.) 2007: 281. 
9 Bohm 1980. Like Bhaskar, Bohm holds that consciousness is enfolded in all matter in
varying degrees of unfoldment. His concept of ‘sustained incoherence’ arguably antici-
pates the theory of the Tina form and demi-real.
10 Bhaskar 2002a: 127.
11 Callinicos 1994. The burden of Callinicos’s view on this issue is repeated by Creaven
2007: 42–3.
12 Bhaskar 2002c: xiv; 2002a: xi f., 315f. 
13 Bhaskar 2002b: 267ff.
14 Bhaskar 2002a: xiv, xvf.
15 Morgan 2003: 115–46.
16 Ibid.: 117, 135. Morgan correctly sees that Bhaskar’s ‘characteristic mode of
philosophising’ is one of immanent critique that departs from premises ‘shared by dis-
puting positions in some discourse’, but overlooks that Archimedes sought a non-
immanent vantage point from which to move the world with his fantastic lever.
17 Ibid.: 140.
18 ‘Imagining ourselves in the environment and simulating identification with aspects of it
helps us to negotiate it but does not necessarily indicate that the totality itself has any
particular characteristic that facilitates or is necessary to that process’ (ibid.: 142).
19 Bhaskar, 2002b: 239 and 2002a: xlviii.
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20 Bhaskar 2002a: xxiii–xxiv. Cf. p. 51: ‘truth … is a more basic concept than reality’.
21 Ibid.: xx.
22 Ibid.: 318.
23 Bhaskar 2002b: 245.
24 Bhaskar 2002a: xl.
25 Ibid.: xxvii, 153, 156.
26 E.g. ibid.: xlix, 114–15; Bhaskar 2002b: 249, 273–4.
27 Bhaskar 2002a: 87, emphasis added.
28 See especially ibid.: 144, 324–5.
29 Ibid.: 70.
30 See e.g. ibid.: 21, 70.
31 Ibid.: 110.
32 Ibid.: xv n.
33 Ibid.: 117.
34 See ch. 4, 89–90, above. Cf. Bhaskar 2002d: 79–80; and the view of Marcel Proust
(whose work aimed to provide readers with ‘the means of reading within themselves’)
that the family servant Françoise ‘had an intuitive understanding of my task’, ‘in a way
that all unpretentious people who live alongside us do’ (Proust [1927] 2003: 343). In
thematising the subjective conditions for learning, meta-Reality arguably achieves at
the level of philosophy what Proust achieves at the level of art, while moving beyond the
Proustian irrealism that asserts that ‘it is only coarse and inaccurate perception which
places everything in the object, when everything is in the mind’ (ibid.: 221), but simul-
taneously champions the reality of domains – of the meta-Real (‘the essence of things’),
of the transcendentally real self, of the past-in-the present, in short of truth as such –
that are irreducible to the human mind.
35 Bhaskar 2002a: 122, 135.
36 Ibid.: xvii.
37 Ibid.: 101.
38 Ibid.: xvi, 104.
39 Ibid.: 104, emphasis added.
40 Bhaskar 2002b: 217.
41 Ibid.: 227.
42 Bhaskar 2000: 45; 2002a: liii, 184, 332, 361–2; 2002c: 277.
43 Bhaskar 2002a: 351.
44 Bhaskar 2002b: 93; cf. 273–4.
45 Ibid.: 262.
46 Callinicos 2006: 1, 248f., 257.
47 Bhaskar 2002a: 19n, 90, 187.
48 Seo 2008. 
49 See Bhaskar, Frank, Høyer and Næss (eds) forthcoming 2009.
50 Bhaskar 2002a: xlvi.
51 Bhaskar 2002c: 193.
52 Bhaskar 2002a: li–lii.
53 See e.g. Holloway 2002. 
54 Cf. Suzuki 2005.
9 Where do we go from here?
1 Bhaskar and Danermark forthcoming 2009.
2 The comments in this and the next two paragraphs were made in September 2009.
3 Bhaskar, Frank, Høyer, Næss and Parker forthcoming 2009.
4 Foreign Secretary, UK, 2007–.
5 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 166.
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6 Bhaskar [1986] 2009: 180f.
7 Bhaskar 2002c: 13.
8 Ted Benton, ‘Foreword’, in Frauley and Pearce (eds) 2007: x. 
9 Bhaskar 2002c: 43.
10 Ibid.: 201.
11 Losurdo 2002. See the review essay by Jan Rehmann (2007).
12 Bhaskar 1989: 1.
13 Thus even Christopher Norris, who is philosophically close to critical realism, can write
a whole, in many ways superb, book about Badiou without mentioning Bhaskar or criti-
cal realism (which disappears into a melting pot called ‘realism’), albeit otherwise rang-
ing across the panoply of contemporary philosophical tendencies. See Norris 2009.
Both the affinities and disaffinities between the two systems of thought, which (claim
to) revindicate ontology in different ways, could prove illuminating. These include 
matters as fundamental as the identification of fundamental ontology with the findings
of mathematics (Badiou) and its derivation by the method of transcendental critique
(Bhaskar); an ontology of infinite multiplicity (Badiou) and a richly differentiated
depth-ontology of causal powers (Bhaskar); the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘event’
(Badiou) and the ‘intransitive’ and ‘transitive dimensions’ (Bhaskar); the ‘void’
(Badiou) and ‘absence’ (Bhaskar); ontological and alethic truth (Bhaskar’s names for
possibly similar notions in Badiou); truth-procedure (Badiou) and epistemological
dialectic (Bhaskar); and ‘indiscernment’ (Badiou) and ‘unthought’ (Bhaskar).
Although Norris evidently thinks otherwise, Bhaskar’s Dialectic is a book of at least com-
parable scope and ambition to Badiou’s magnum opus (Being and Event [1988] 2006).
Moreover, Bhaskar, but not to date Badiou, thereafter breaks through to another ‘break-
through’ – the philosophy of meta-Reality. (Badiou’s Being and Event and its sequel,
Logiques des mondes [2006] have been hailed, first by their author and most recently by
Z
S
iz
S
ek, as making an ‘ontological breakthrough’ [Z
S
iz
S
ek and Milbank 2009: 90f.].)
14 Bhaskar 2002a: xlix–l, 72.
15 Z
S
iz
S
ek 2007. John Milbank, the ‘radical orthodox’ theologian and sparring partner of
Z
S
iz
S
ek in The Monstrosity of Christ, agrees, and to that extent reveals himself to be, not so
much a thoroughgoing opponent of Z
S
iz
S
ek’s militant atheism, as a complicit dialectical
antagonist. He has recently revealingly summarised his disagreement with critical real-
ism as follows. ‘The mistakes of Bhaskar and his followers are: (1) To imagine that there
are identifiable “laws” more ultimate than the contingency of flux and event. (2) To fail
to see that these “laws” are no more than the projections of human instrumental reason
and its encountered limits on to an imagined “reality”. (3) To fail to see also that the
social is in no sense a “reality” over against us, since it is us, and therefore entirely co-
terminous with our endlessly revisable interpretations: the social world both is an act of
interpretation, and also endlessly subject to reinterpretations which really alter how it
“is” or how it occurs in time. Thus “Realism” spatialises the real, in such a way that the
reality of occurrence (time, history) is obliterated. (4) Still to lust after a false marriage
of socialism and scientific objectifying reason.’ Milbank 2009: 228 n. 3, original empha-
sis. Socialism’s true marriage, for Milbank, is with Toryism (see his ‘Red Toryism is the
best hope of a new progressive politics’, letter to The Guardian, 22 May 2008). 
16 Bhaskar [1993] 2008: 327.
17 Hazan 2007: 83. 
18 Badiou [1997] 2006. Unlike Bhaskar’s, however, Badiou’s metaphysics is a (self-
avowed) first philosophy that in effect substitutes a mathematical version of the epis-
temic fallacy for the linguistic fallacy. See especially Badiou, ‘Ontology is mathematics’,
2004: 1–93.
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